


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No. I.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

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No. I.

JOHN FISKE ON THE IDEA OF GOD.

Professor Fiske, of Harvard University, in discussing the idea of God as affected by modern knowledge and especially by the doctrine of Evolution,¹ makes the rather astonishing statement that St. Augustine was an anthropomorphist.² The authority of Prof. Fiske in matters historical and philosophical carries with it no inconsiderable weight in the minds of scholars, and inclines not a few to a ready acceptance of his views. Not without interest, therefore, is his present contention that the intellect of Augustine was darkened by an idea of the God-head wholly at variance with the best thinking and utterly untenable in the light and drift of modern science. The figure of the great Bishop of Hippo stands out pre-eminent in the centuries as that of a man who rose on stepping stones of his dead selves to higher things; one who, once the heights were scaled, could look with wonderment at the gradual fusion of many narrower points of view, afforded him while climbing, into the splendid vision of an orderly whole which fell upon his gaze as a mighty unity always does, corrective, impartial and inspiring. His works together with his confessions tell the story of his gradual unfettering from the thrall of environment. His retractations are nothing else than the obituary notice of his cast-off former self. Has Prof. Fiske portrayed Augustine at his prime? Is the Augustine who thought and wrote in Africa the self-same one whom Prof. Fiske has reconstructed in his pages? We propose to let Augustine's works speak out objectively for themselves and tell the story of the master-mind which penned them.

¹The Idea of God, as affected by Modern Knowledge. By John Fiske. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1895. ²Pp. 94, 95.

I.—PROF. FISKE'S POSITION.

Prof. Fiske is a theist who, to use his own words, recognizes an omnipresent energy, which is none other than the living God.¹ He is careful, in his preface² to the work in question, to eliminate all possible misunderstanding of his view by the explicit statement that he does not propose to divest the theistic idea of every shred of anthropomorphism.³ On the contrary, he quite agrees that this would be an utterly illegitimate proceeding for any thinker actually defining his position as theistic.⁴ Neither does he stand sponsor for the contention that personality and infinity are entirely unthinkable in combination. There is, according to him, scarcely less anthropomorphism lurking in the phrase "infinite power" than in the phrase "infinite person."⁵ He is even prepared to admit that God is spirit if the reader will but bear in mind the symbolic character of the words.⁶ Nay more, he expressly states his desire to exclude the idea of God as Force, since this latter concept calls up invariably a sort of blind necessity involved in all Pantheistic notions.⁷ What he singles out explicitly for rejection is the idea of God outlined by Augustine under the overpowering influence of Gnostic thought; an idea so unbefitting the Deity as to be in very truth a barbaric conception, suited alike to the lower grade of culture in Western Europe and to the Latin political genius which was bent upon the construction of an imperial church.⁸

"In his doctrine of original sin," continues Prof. Fiske, "Augustine represents humanity as cut off from all relationship with God, who is depicted as a crudely anthropomorphic Being, far removed from the universe and accessible only through the mediating offices of an organized church."⁹ "The God of Augustine is a Being actuated by human passions and purposes, localizable in space and utterly remote from that inert machine, the universe in which we live and on which He acts intermittently through the suspension of what are called natural laws."¹⁰ This Augustinian conception, he avers, has permeated the whole fibre of Christianity and is responsible for the cries raised nowadays by orthodoxy against every new discovery of science. To Prof. Fiske's mind all conception of a Personal God is anthropomorphic, and the idea of personality as attributed to God by most modern theologians a relict of Plato and Augustine which must be carefully toned down to be at all admissible.¹¹

In order to bring out his meaning to the full, Prof. Fiske contrasts sharply on historical lines, "cosmic" and "anthropo-

¹Preface, p. XII. ²P. XIII. ³Ibid. ⁴Ibid. ⁵P. XV. ⁶P. XVII. ⁷Preface, p. XVII.
⁸P. 94. ⁹Ibid. ¹⁰P. 96. ¹¹Preface, p. 15.

morphic" theism. The cosmic theists are Athanasius, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Spinoza, Lessing, Goethe and Schleiermacher. Among the anthropomorphic theists are ranged Tertullian, Augustine, Paley, Calvin, Voltaire, and most of the modern theologians. He is, therefore, as anxious to make clear his thorough-going assent to the position of Athanasius as to have clearly understood his complete disavowal of the doctrine of Augustine.¹

Both these theistic views, according to Prof. Fiske, are polar opposites. The anthropomorphic theists conceive God as existing apart from the world in solitary, inaccessible majesty. The world itself is but an inert lifeless machine impelled by blind forces which have been set acting from without. The origin of a position such as this Prof. Fiske traces back to primitive ancestor-worship, which gradually suggested a single ghost-deity far away from the world of sense as the original ancestor of all the others. Thus was the Roman mind imperceptibly inclined to certain fixed habits of judgment concerning the Divinity which had much to do with ostracizing God from the field of natural phenomena.²

To the nature-worship of the Greeks, however, must we look to find the root-conceptions of cosmic theism. Students of the physical universe from the earliest Ionic days, the Greeks were enabled to frame the conception of God as acting in and through the powers of nature without the aid of grossly anthropomorphic symbols. The traditional idea of the sea-god and the sky-god actually at work in the upheaval of things caused them to drift further and further apart from their less fortunate Roman compeers who were led along the lines of ancestral worship to look upon the Deity as the head supreme of a world of ghosts. For the Greeks, God was never a localizable personality remote from the world, acting upon it by occasional portent and prodigy, nor was the world a lifeless machine blindly acting after some preordained method and only feeling the presence of God in so far as He now and then saw fit to interfere with its normal course of procedure. To their thinking, God was the life of the world. It is through Him all things exist from moment to moment and the world is ever hallowed by His indwelling presence.³

Thus it was that Athanasius, formed under the influences which shaped the idea of God among the Greeks, fell in with the main line of thought and naturally became a cosmic theist. Augustine, on the contrary, was the direct product of Roman mythologic influence and never rose higher than the crude anthropomorphic notions of the Deity bequeathed him as a

¹Pp. 15, 112. ²Chap. VI, pp. 87-97. ³Pp. 82, 83.

legacy of thought by previous Roman thinkers. While Athanasius looked upon God as immanent in the universe, Augustine relegated Him to some far-off sphere out of all immediate touch with the realities of nature.

The question now arises, Is this the concept of the Deity which Augustine framed? If so, we join Prof. Fiske most heartily in its repudiation. A Being characterized by human passions, localizable in space, and acting on the world by an occasional display of miraculous power, answers but meagrely the concept of a God. It is but a degree removed from pure humanity. The feebleness of such a notion is the best indication of its impropriety, and suggests some other intellect for its birthplace than the vigorous one of Augustine, when finally illumined by the light of Christian truth. Nor is such lack of fitness the only reason for this persuasion. Augustine himself in many of his latter writings has so unmistakably disavowed all doctrine such as this that it is with difficulty we are brought to realize how Prof. Fiske could have persisted, notwithstanding such explicit denials, in fastening this unworthy notion on him. The statements of Augustine on this one point in all his latter works are unmistakably clear and emphatic, and the construction Prof. Fiske puts on them shows a surprising unfamiliarity with Augustinian theology.

II.—THE POSITION OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

To understand Augustine it must be borne in mind that his mental development was after the manner of a chambered nautilus. He was forever leaving his low-vaulted past and building more stately mansions for his unresting soul. At first the study of the Aristotelian categories led him to conceive God as of bodily shape and nature. From the crude idea of a God embodied in human form, it was but natural he should drift into Manicheanism and profess, as he did for nine years, a belief in the dual principle of good and evil—a gross materialism. He seemed forever committed to a philosophy of sense, when Plato's treatise on the Logos broke on him as a light through the gloom, opening up a purer and a nobler view. The Sacred Writings, notably the Epistles of St. Paul, at length became objects of minute study. Plato and Paul argued out their respective lines in the mind of the young African. Suddenly it dawned upon his soul that both were reconcilable, Plato and Paul, scripture and reason, philosophy and revelation. He became a Christian, a priest, a bishop. Materialist, Manichean, Neoplatonist, Christian, theologian—such is the grad-

uate development of Augustine, which his works make known and describe with a vigorous clearness.¹

“Year after year beheld the silent toil
That spread his lustrous coil.
Still as the spiral grew,
He left the past year's dwelling for the new,
Stole with soft step its shining archway through,
Built up its idle door,
Stretched in his last-found home and knew the old no more.”

Taking facts as they are, the scholar is not privileged to attribute to Augustine what he himself has most emphatically rejected as the rubbish of his pagan notions.² The Christian Augustine took great pains to refute Augustine unregenerate, and the christian, not the pagan, Augustine is at the bar of reason for judgment. Whatever Augustine may have held in his earlier years, when blown about by every wind of doctrine, the historical fact nevertheless remains that, when fuller grown, his old beliefs had vanished into mist, and in their stead there came a newer and a nobler conception of things divine and human.

III.—FAULTS OF INTERPRETATION.

Prof. Fiske's failure to indicate directly the passages of Augustine which might substantiate his view, is, we must confess, out of keeping with critical methods. If his view of Augustine be the fruit of long and careful research, it should be critically supported, not badly stated. As a consequence, therefore, we are compelled to oppose every statement Prof. Fiske makes by counter-statements from Augustine, with as little glossary as possible, preferring to allow the text itself to speak out Prof. Fiske's praise or condemnation.

In the third book of his *Confessions*, Augustine makes the following observations anent his gradual unfettering from Pantheism and the dawn of a higher and purer conception of the Divinity.

After stating his full assent in his younger days to the Manichean doctrines, he says: “I did not know that God is a spirit without members extended in length, and breadth, without matter;”³ and again: “I thought, O my God! that your grandeur and beauty were in you as accidents are in substances—for instance, in bodies—while you are your own grandeur and your own beauty. I thought that you were a lumi-

¹Cf. *Confessionum*, Lib. VIII., cap. VII.: Lib. IX., cap. I.: VII., cap. IX. Also, *Epistola CXXXVII.*, cap. IV.

²Cf. *Confessionum et Retractationum Libros*, passim. Especially, *Confessionum*, Lib. VII., cap. XXI.: *Ibid.* Lib. VI., cap. V.

³*Confessionum*, liber III., Cap. VII.

nous body of enormous size, and I a small part of this body.”¹ And still further: “Yet, when I wished to think of God, I represented Him to myself only under the form of a corporeal mass, and all that was not corporeal appeared to me non-existent.”² Finally: “If there is anything more excellent than the truth, it is surely that which is God. If not, truth itself is God.”³ . . . What is supreme truth, beauty without alloy, goodness itself, if not God Himself?”⁴

Thus he describes his own progress and acknowledges his debt to Plato, whose books, he says, taught him “how to seek out an incorporeal truth.”⁵

With this contention in the foreground, supported by the dictum of Augustine himself, we are now prepared to take up Prof. Fiske’s several statements and compare them with the original text.

To do no violence to Prof. Fiske’s position, the substance of his view is literally the following: “The idea of God, upon which all this Augustinian doctrine is based, is the idea of a being actuated by human passions and purposes, localizable in space and utterly remote from that inert machine, the universe in which we live and upon which He acts intermittently through the suspension of what are called natural laws.”⁶

To observe his own order, we have as first point that the Augustinian idea of God is that of a “being actuated by human passions and purposes.” We quote in opposition: “We do not adore a God who repents Himself, who is envious, who is deficient, who is cruel, who finds pleasure in the blood of animals or of bullocks, who is appeased with shamefulness and crime, whose domain has for bound a corner of the earth.”⁷ “His inerrant virtue and His divinity marvelously surpass all language human in its kind, and even in our human frailty itself, we are made aware that what is humanly said of God, appears despicable even to humanity.”⁸ The knowledge which results from daily habit and which is the fruit of long experience, opens to us a way towards the sublime conceptions which are becoming to God. Thus, let me take away from human science its mutability, let me suppress the steps from thought to thought, those returns we make to impress upon the mind afresh what a little while before we had conceived, so much so that we understand things but partially and with the aid of frequent acts of memory—let me suppress, I say, those imperfections, in order

¹Confessionum Liber IV., cap. XVI. ²Ibid, Lib. V., cap. X. Compare also Lib. VII., cap. I., II., V., XIV., XX., and Lib. VIII., cap. I. Likewise: De Civitate Dei, Lib. IV., cap. XII. and cap. XIII.; VII., cap. VII., VIII. ³De libero arbitrio, Lib. II., cap. XV. ⁴Ibid, Lib. II., cap. VIII., X., XIII. ⁵Confessionum Lib. VII., cap. XX. The very opposite of Mr. Fiske’s contention, which is to the effect that Augustine’s intense feelings of man’s wickedness dragged him downwards. ⁶The Idea of God, p. 94. ⁷De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, Lib. I., cap. X. ⁸De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, Lib. II., Quaest II.

to consider solely the life-likeness of the substantial and unchangeable truth, which in one eternal vision and one only takes in the universality of things; and I will have in this wise some idea of the knowledge of God.¹ In like manner let me take from human anger its disorderly emotions in order to leave there the sole force of legitimate vengeance, and in a certain measure, I shall conceive what is called the anger of God. Or still further, if you take from pity that division-by-shares of the suffering of him whom you pity, in order to leave there but a tranquil goodness which is drawn to succor those who suffer and to deliver them from their straits, you will have, after a fashion, some notion of the divine mercy."²

Elsewhere, he calls anthropomorphic notions—"turpiter vana cogitatio."³ More pertinently still: "I ask also of my readers to pardon me where they may perceive me to have had the desire rather than the power to speak what they either understand better themselves or fail to understand through the obscurity of my language, just as I myself pardon them what they cannot understand through their own dullness."⁴ . . . And we shall mutually pardon one another the more easily, if we know, or at any rate firmly believe and hold, that whatever is said of a nature unchangeable, invisible, and having life absolutely and sufficiently to itself, must not be measured after the custom of things visible and changeable, mortal and self-sufficient."⁵

The trail of the serpent of anthropomorphism is not traceable over these passages, that is, if human language have any power at all. Prof. Fiske, in the preface of his own work, is very careful to remind his readers of the symbolic nature of certain words and phrases.⁶ He should have given equal credit to Augustine, who, like Prof. Fiske himself, craves it indulgently of his readers.

The second point Prof. Fiske makes against Augustine is that the latter believed God "a being localizable in space." We confront this statement with the text of Augustine. "God is not somewhere. For that which is somewhere is contained in a place; that which is contained in place is a body. Now, God is not a body. Therefore, He is not *somewhere*. And yet, as He is, and is not in place, things are in Him rather than He anywhere. On the other hand, however, things are not in Him in such a way that He Himself is a place. For place is in space, that which is occupied by length, breadth and thickness of bodies, and God is nothing of this kind. All things are in Him

¹Ibid. Ibid. ²Ibid. Ibid. ³De Trinitate, Lib. XII., cap. VII., No. XII. ⁴De Trinitate, Lib. V., cap. I. ⁵Ibid. Ibid. ⁶The Idea of God, preface, page XVII. Compare also: Aug. in Ioannis Evangelium, cap. III., Tract. XIII., No. 5. De Haeresi, cap. L.

and He is not a place.¹ He who fills heaven and earth is nowhere absent, neither shut in small spaces, nor spread over large, but is everywhere whole and entire, and contained in no place."² If therefore, he says that God is everywhere without being contained anywhere, what becomes of the contention that Augustine believed God a being localizable in space?

The next statement of Prof. Fiske is to the effect that God, according to Augustine, is "utterly remote from that inert machine, the universe in which we live." The passage just quoted tells against Prof. Fiske quite pointedly here. But there is abundance of disproof elsewhere throughout his works, as when he says that God is at the same time affirmed and denied as everywhere present in order to "resist carnal thoughts and call away the mind from the bodily senses."³ What clearer than this? Augustine says the reason why some Christians make God remote is simply to prevent a gross material misunderstanding. He, it will be observed, actually explains and disavows in others the "doctrine of remoteness" which Prof. Fiske attributes to him.

Nor is this all. Augustine says most beautifully: "Who are you, oh! my God! Who are you, I ask, if not the Lord God? Exceeding great, exceeding good, exceeding powerful, all powerful, exceeding merciful and exceeding just, hidden and everywhere present, infinitely beautiful, infinitely strong, always the same, incomprehensible, unchangeable and changing all things, ever ancient, ever new, rejuvenating all that is and leading the proud unconsciously on to old age; ever active and ever in repose, gathering from all parts with need of none: upholding, filling, maintaining the creatures to which you give being, nourishment, maturity: asking without cease, though lacking nothing; you love, but without disorder; you are a jealous God, but without unease; you repent but without sorrow, you grow angry but without being troubled. You change your works without changing your plans; you pick up what you find without ever having lost anything. You are not poor and you love gain; you are not avaricious and you put out to usury.—But what are these words, oh! my God! my life, holy sorrow of my soul! What can one say when speaking of you? Unhappy those who hold their tongue, since even those who speak, must pass for dumb!"⁴ In passages such as these the burning heart of the African empties itself in phrase, though he assures us in the

¹De Diversis Quaestionibus, Lib. LXXXIII, Quaest. XX.

²Nusquam absens est qui coelum et terram implet, nec spatius includitur parvis magnisque diffunditur, sed ubique totus est, et nullo continetur loco. Epist. CXII., cap. XII.

³Ad carnali resistendum cogitationi et mentem a corporis sensibus avocandam. Epist. LVII. "Confess. Lib. I, cap. IV.

meanwhile that his intellect is clear and the stream of his thought, crystalline-pure. In this enthusiastic analysis, Prof. Fiske's counter-view is made to vanish. A God who "changes all things, ever active, ever present in the universe, creating, maintaining, nourishing, maturing all things," is hardly seen as remote from that inert machine, the universe in which we live. Especially so, as Augustine says most clearly: "If the power of God ceased at any time from ruling what He has created, creation's kinds and all nature would immediately fall to pieces."¹

The final point in Prof. Fiske's summary statement is to the effect that God, "remote from the universe, acts upon it intermittently through the suspension of what are called natural laws." Evidently Prof. Fiske here alludes to miracles, as he speaks elsewhere of God acting upon the world by "occasional portent or prodigy."² It is with reluctance we bring ourselves to believe that an historical scholar such as Mr. Fiske unquestionably is, could imagine, much less prove, that Augustine thought God's action on the world to be merely intermittent. But Prof. Fiske's statement about the "inert universe," "man cut off *entirely* from his Maker by original sin," and the two words "intermittent" and "occasional," deprive him justly of the benefit of a doubt. They are too clear to mean anything else than that miraculous intervention was the sum total of God's activity in the world of realities. Again we appeal to Augustine for enlightenment. He says:³ "The miracle of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which He changed water into wine. is not a source of wonder to those who knew that *God* did it, For in those six vessels commanded to be filled at the wedding feast, *He* made wine who makes it every year on the vines. For as that which the servants put in the vessels was changed into wine by the work of the Lord, so also that which the clouds outpour, is changed into wine by the work of the self-same Lord. The latter we do not wonder at, because it comes to pass yearly: by constantly happening, it has ceased to be a source of wonderment. Yet it meets with more consideration than what was accomplished in the vessels of water. For who is there that considers the works of God, by which the whole world is governed and administered, and is not dumbfounded and overwhelmed by the miracles? If he consider the power of a single grain, or any seed, it is a mighty fact indeed, and palsies the investigator. But because men, on other things intent, have lost their appreciation of the works of God, in which

¹ *Virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis, si cessaret aliquando: simul et illorum cessaret species omnique natura concideret, IV. Lib. super Genesi, cap. XII.* ² *The idea of God, p. 83: "acting upon it only by means of occasional portent and prodigy."*

³ *In Ioannis Evangelium, Tract. VIII. Cap. II., (from the beginning).*

they might give the Creator their daily praise, God, as it were, kept in reserve some unusual works of His, to bring back sleeping humanity to His worship from sheer sense of wonderment. A dead man arose and humanity wondered. Myriads come daily into life and no one notes it." If God's work in the universe, as Augustine phrases it, be as equally portentous and miraculous as His actual changing of water into wine at Cana, what becomes of the idea of a God remote from the world and acting on it by *occasional* portent?

Should anyone still doubt the mind of Augustine touching the point under discussion, there are many passages to dispel all misgiving. Among these there is in his commentaries much that is pointedly relevant. Thus, commenting on the words of Our Lord, "My Father worketh still and I work," Augustine says: "Continuationem quamdam operis eius, qua universam creaturam continet atque administrat, ostendit." And again, what more opposed to the idea of an absentee God, as Carlyle took creator to mean, than the simple decade of words: "Non fecit atque abiit, sed de illo in illo sunt."¹ Finally, what more witness of words is needed than the following passages against Faustus: "When God does anything against the usual course of nature as known to us, His works are called great or wonderful."² "At times God does something against the usual *course* of nature. But the Creator and Founder of all natures does nothing against nature. For that shall be natural to each and everything which He, the source of all movement, number, and cosmic order, shall have done. In no wise does He act against the highest law, because He does not act against Himself."³

No comment is needed on passages such as these. Miracles are not the only actions of God in the world. They are simply extraordinary events worked by the same God who changed water into wine at Cana, and who to-day changes the rain-drops of the clouds into the wine we press from the grape after vintage. Miracles are not the only government of the world, and man lives not by the bread of portent alone, but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

Such is Prof. Fiske's view of Augustine and Augustine's view of himself. Not one of the points raised can be critically established against Augustine. The idea of the Godhead which Prof. Fiske fastens upon him is without support, whether critical or hermeneutical, and we repeat our surprise that a scholar such as he should have entertained and published it.

¹Comment. ad Act. XVII. ²Cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia vel mirabilia nominantur. Contra Faust., Lib. XXVI., cap. III. ³Ibid. Ibid.

IV.—ADDITIONAL FAULTS OF INTERPRETATION.

In the light of passages such as these, clear, direct, and incisive, Prof. Fiske's contention vanishes in mist. Ideas of the Godhead such as he attributes to Augustine are searched for vainly in these pages. The very absurdity of constructing God after human fashion, which Prof. Fiske endeavors so strenuously to avoid in his essay, and for which he rebukes Augustine, is distinctly pointed out by the latter and characterized as a crude and empty conception.¹ One looks in vain for passages wherein Augustine makes God so anthropomorphic as to be a monster of human passions. A certain strength of phrase and vigorousness of expression in his treatise on predestination might incline an uncritical reader to interpret Augustine's views in an anthropomorphic sense. But Augustine has so unmistakably repudiated the crudities of such a view that to still fasten them upon him is alike unscholarly and unwarranted.² Not a stray hint of meaning here and there, but the general drift of thought which tempers the extravagance of some particular turns of phrase, should be the source of a scholar's judgment.

There is, therefore, nothing clearer in Augustine than that he disavowed the constant underdrift of anthropomorphism which always lay beneath the human terms he was compelled by usage to employ. Yet Prof. Fiske quotes piecemeal, without reference or comparison of texts. His interpretation of Augustine's doctrine on original sin is likewise most unpardonable in an historical scholar. He says that Augustine imagined man cut off by original sin from all relationship with his Maker.³ Nothing could be further from the real meaning. Augustine does not father the thought that man was absolutely cut adrift from God, but only supernaturally.⁴ Created in the supernatural order, man simply lost his superadded gifts and privileges, but was left untouched in all his natural relations. Augustine would have descended to a glaring contradiction if he held what Prof. Fiske alleges, because his main drift of meaning was that God kept man in existence by a continuous exertion of divine power, without which man would have lapsed into his original nothingness.⁵ Original sin deprived man of all connection with God as the author of his supernature, but still left him dependent on Him—as Creator, Upholder, and Provider—for every breath he drew and every action he performed.

¹ "Turpiter vana cogitatio; De Trinit., Lib. XII., cap. VII., no. XII. ²De Trinit., Lib. V., cap. I.
³p. 94. ⁴"Induite novum hominem, eum qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis; ecce quid perdidit Adam per peccatum." (De Genesi, ad Litt. l. 6; c. 24-26.) Likewise: De Civitate Dei, Lib. XII., 9; Lib. LXXXIII., QQ. 9, 21; Lib. II, De Peccato Orig. c. 4; In Psalmo CIII., Sermon. 4. ⁵IV. Lib. super Genesi, cap. 12.

Neither is Augustine an advocate of total depravity, for he explains most clearly that man's disposition to sin was not from nature—for then God would be the prime author of his sin—but from the fact that the grace of original justice which subjected man's animal powers to reason once removed, man found himself thereby greatly weakened when sense had no longer a higher force to curb it hard and fast under the sway of reason.¹ Mistakes like these are not expected in men of critical attainments. To infer from the fact that man was cut off supernaturally, the additional fact that he was entirely abandoned, made subsistently independent of God in his natural powers, shows lack of logic and critical insight. Again the statement of Prof. Fiske that after original sin man, according to Augustine, could regain relations with his Creator solely through the offices of an organized church, is misleading. He makes it with Augustine a political act inspired by the tendency towards an imperial church. Yet Augustine argues out his view from considerations of the Sacraments instituted by Christ and the necessity of an organic custodian of the truth which he so keenly felt in the unsatisfying philosophies through which he had successively passed in his several evolutions.² Prof. Fiske argues from an assumed condition; Augustine from fact and experience. Which shall we believe?

Still further, Prof. Fiske makes out the Bishop of Hippo the product of the Gnostic thought of the day. Which Augustine does he mean? Augustine pagan or Augustine christian? We readily admit the full sweep of Gnostic influence on the young African when a paganizing philosopher, but where is its influence on him when turned towards higher things within the pale of Christian thinking? Augustine retracted. He retracted in order to emphasize what he retained. Yet Prof. Fiske proceeds as unconsciously as though Augustine never became a Christian, or as if, what is worse, his Christianity was but Gnosticism flowering into fruit.

V.—FAULTS OF METHOD.

One's curiosity is somewhat aroused to know precisely how Prof. Fiske comes to stand sponsor for so many unwarranted statements. The answer is simple enough. His fault is mainly one of method. Prof. Fiske looks at things through an evolutionist's glasses. He studies history in the light of a preconceived idea and suggestive hypothesis, instead of confining himself rigorously at first to questions of actual fact.

¹Comparatur homo pecoribus per vitium, non pecoris vitio, sed naturae. De Pecc. Orig. c. 4. Original sin was the privation of original justice; not total depravity.
²De Doctrina christiana, prob. No. 6; De moribus eccles. cap. I; De Milit. credendi, cc. 6, 7, 14, et 17: Lib. II, cap. 10, No. 27.

To look at history from an arbitrary ideal standpoint is fatal alike to facts and truth. It is a speculative method and is bound to result in extravagance. The history of philosophy has not been without showing the vices of such a mode of procedure which starts with an idea—an hypothesis, and concludes therefrom the impossibility of facts or so reshapes them as to suit preconceived requirements. Descartes started from the idea of the Infinite and found in it the distinction which marks off God from the world of limit and imperfection. Spinoza took the same idea and identified God and the world as one substance. Malebranche, arguing from the same ideal source, over-zealously gave unto God the monopoly of all activity. In like manner, Schelling looking on the content of reason as the infinite draws thence an inference in favor of free-will. Hegel follows, and with the same apparent rigor concludes from the same source as Schelling, not freedom, but universal, eternal necessity. Something evidently is wrong with the instrument of logic which turns out such contrary conclusions. Facts alone should be the starting point. The mind should not be hampered in its capacity to grasp facts as they are, by the colorings of hypothesis, which strains them to its purpose. *C'est l'a priori à outrance.*

The reason is that all hypothetical views must unconsciously be colored. The entire question is begged at the out-start, for in the point of view that everything is evolved, everything becomes connected. The subjective continuity which the hypothesis furnishes is projected into things and the same delusion takes place that is so aptly seen in the kinetoscope—objectively discontinuous images succeed each other in such flash-rapidity that consciousness looks upon them as a unified whole when in reality they are but a succession of distinct and separate pictures. The impressions made upon percipient consciousness by the kinetoscope, none the less than those made upon the intellect by the evolutionistic assumption cannot fail to make us see connection where there is but sequence, cause where there is but condition, proof where there is but suggestive hypothesis. Is it not plain to the mind's eye that where history is written in the way Hegel wrote it—namely, with a view to discover the foreshadowing of his theory in the writings of past thinkers—that what is merely a suggestion, an inkling, a vague similarity, becomes in the light of his preconceived idea, an assured fact—an undoubted exemplification?

The question is scarcely debatable from a methodologist's point of view that the attitude of the mind towards the objects of its attention especially if historic, is and should be the

simple one of action and reaction. The particular person whose works we are to study should be considered according to every circumstance contributing to his formation, in order that a just estimate be formed of the conditions in which he lived and the influences under which he labored. This no one denies. It is scientific, philosophical. In such a wise we may hit upon the general law which motivated his actions and in a measure shaped the very trend of his conclusions. We are thus carefully feeling our way from particular facts to general laws and assuring ourselves from point to point of proper footing. But when, hypothesis in hand, we look to see how facts fall in with its exactions, we forget that we are viewing things in an arbitrary light and unwittingly judging what is absolute from the pure standpoint of our own philosophic consciousness, instead of allowing the latter to be deepened, broadened and corrected by the instreaming light of the very objects themselves, as they are in their nude reality, not as they appear when refracted through the medium of an assumed idea.

Evolution as a theory is after all but a point of view, and a point of view is generally a colored glass through which we look at things. Scientists are wont to forget that though induction gives them some warrant for the principle of evolution as an hypothesis—a sort of general law of continuity—it becomes deduction as soon as they begin to use it for the conclusion of particular facts. No one would think of taking Fechner's rules of Psycho-physics for the determination of a general mean or average as a principle from which we could deduce the precise nature of particular facts, the actual time-rates of sensation or actual curve-description for any given individual. The individual is either above or beneath the mean. If he coincide with the average, it is purely accidental, not rigorously consequent on the mean as though it could be deduced precisely from it.

The reason is that the principle is not purely universal—*i. e.*, rigorously true of all things contained under it. There are leaps in the process. Whatever science may prove concerning evolution, by reading backwards through contiguous species and overlaid strata does not insure the reverse employment of the principle on a strictly universal basis of logical deduction until science has *shown*, not postulated the over-leaping of the individual barriers. Sequence is not consequence, however much it may suggest the latter. If, therefore, we employ the hypothesis of evolution to deduce the precise tenets of any particular individual's belief, in the course of the history of philosophy, we have gone beyond the

bounds which science has staked out for us and are open to the broadsides of logic and philosophy.

This is the fault of method of Prof. Fiske. He is so prepossessed with his idea of the ghost-ancestors as entertained by the Romans that he makes out Augustine not as he actually is but what he should be to suit his hypothesis. The Gnostics and Manicheans believed in a God remote from the evil world. Augustine formed under their influence must have been of like belief. He must have been in the hyposthesis, certainly. But was he in point of fact? That still remains to be proven. We should not read into facts more than we find in them, neither should we be so logically unwary as not to detect the insertion of our subjective coloring into colorless objective facts. Methods of this kind will make things more what we would have them seem than what they really are in their unadorned reality. Our logical sense is certainly benumbed, if we make the transit from a general theory to a particular fact with nothing else than an hypothetical bridge as a warrant for our transition.

Of like nature is Prof. Fiske's interpretation of Athanasius as a product of the continuity of Greek thought and a believer of God's immanence in things. As a matter of fact, both Augustine and Athanasius believed in God's immanence in things. Their absolute divergence is required by Prof. Fiske's arbitrary view of Augustine's formation on the lines of ancestral worship and that of Athanasius on the lines of an indwelling cosmic Deity, and what hyposthesis requires, he proceeds to set apart in point of fact. His method is again at fault. He forgets that the assumption of his hypothesis has settled the question from the outset. If his hypothesis be true, Augustine and Athanasius must come in line with it. The *fact* of the whole matter is quietly dropped from view. Both these great thinkers are interpreted to suit requirements. A preconceived idea, not the hard realities of facts, is the arbiter of discussion. If we have to reconstruct history because of evolution, why then we must simply admit without demur that Augustine did not know his own doctrine and that Athanasius was not understood even by himself. Is not this the arbitrary speculation Prof. Fiske repudiates in the Schoolmen? Why should we look at any man's doctrine from our point of view and not from his? Let men endeavor to gather all the additional light they can from the view of Evolution, but facts should never be brushed aside to afford their hypothesis passage.

Be it borne in mind that this criticism tells against Prof. Fiske from his own principles. I am criticising him from his own point of view, on his own principles, not mine. Evolution, if

it have any scientific worth at all, must not be made deductive. Spencer's own definition of it is incompatible with such a notion. It is only the hasty generalizers that have lifted it to a sphere in which it is out of place. My contention does not imply that I hold any theory of evolution but simply that I criticise the service to which Prof. Fiske has put it in writing history. Its utter discrepancy with facts, its scientific fault of method when made deductive, is its own refutation. Evolution is based on facts, biological and otherwise. From a consideration of facts, the idea, the hypothesis sprang to mind. At most it can give us but the general law of continuity, if you will, the formative influences of environment and the like, but the individual thinker may or may not be in keeping with these. To admit Greek thought as a formative factor and deny Revelation the benefit of any formative influence, is to take a partial and a biased view, to drop from consideration a fact of history and of thought certainly not without its share of influence.

If therefore, from a few particular facts, evolutionists conclude to an idea, what warrant is there in making the idea conclude to all particular facts, until they have sufficiently established its absolute universality? Must we not examine facts first to see if they square with our hypothesis? If we do not, we have changed our method and become untrue to our principles. Admitting the hypothesis in its sweeping generality, in the sense that all things are products of transition, we cannot conclude that any particular thing should be otherwise than it is, until we have proven it thus and so. If otherwise, hypothesis is fact and fact the production of hypothesis.

VI.—FAULTS OF INFERENCE.

Still another fault of method which brings Prof. Fiske to strange conclusions is the inference he repeatedly makes from the retention of pagan names and customs by the Christian peoples. It would seem, according to Prof. Fiske, that Yuletide and Easter were adopted directly from the old nature-worship, the adoration of tutelar household deities survived in the homage paid to patron saints, and the worship of the Berecynthian Mother was continued in that of the Virgin Mary. Again his hypothesis. Because suggestions of all these Christian customs occurred in pre-Christian days, Prof. Fiske proceeds to connect them, to make the development continuous. Why omit the historic ideas of early Christianity as giving rise to these forms of worship? The statement that they are continuations one of the other requires proof, not hypothesis. There may be a similarity, a resemblance. No one

doubts it. But the question at issue is not are they viewable as similar, but are they in point of fact developments in a higher stage of older beliefs, with their roots struck fast in some prehistoric soil? Against this is the historic fact that the veneration of the Blessed Virgin was of purely christian origin. Because such veneration followed after cruder beliefs is sequence, not consequence. Prof. Fiske begs the question at issue. His contention would be good if he could prove that continuity in a given line, say of worship, was never broken, but so long as hypothesis is his sole warrant for connection, the stain of arbitrariness still attaches to his view. The whole connection is in his hypothesis, not in the facts themselves.

To argue from the retention of old pagan names to the retention of pagan notions along with them, is not of rigorous inference. It does not take into account what evolutionists should, if true to their own principles, namely, the historico-philological fact that old names are constantly pressed into service as conveyors of new and very different ideas. A sort of sacredness lingers about certain words that have long done duty as vehicles of thought. The ancients were loath to part with such, and gave a new shade of meaning to the old terms rather than invent a substitute. Even now the years come and go with all their wondrous birth of new conceptions, their myriad ways of making old things new by the magic of a turn of phrase and still the world of phrase-makers respects the consecration of years of usage and bows before the majesty of a long-used word.

Words grow in meaning as the blossom flowers into fruit. They take upon themselves varieties of significance at different times and from different writers, and so in their last stages of development it is not unnatural they should have overleaped their conventional barriers and reached a state of meaning quite at variance with their original employment. Were we to neglect this law which governs their development and take their meaning at an earlier stage as the clue to their later shade of significance, a budget of paradoxes must be the penalty of the law's transgression. For we would thus unfairly judge the mere burgeon of a blossom by the fullness of the ripening fruit.

The consecration of usage as well as the desire to keep unbroken the continuity of thought and expression, had so much to do with the employment of a worn-out terminology that the ancients would rather patch an old word with a new strip of meaning than dress out an entirely new phrase. Their words were custom made and not to order. This accounts for the retention amongst Latin writers of such words as "*species*," "*intentiones primae et secundae*," "*similitudo*, *imago*," and

the like, long after they had outgrown their original crude significance. The word "species," which the Latins used as a corresponding term to the *εἶδος* of the Greeks, originally meant a roving image, a sort of miniature picture or fire-atom (according to Democritus) which migrated into the eye from an outer object. Aristotle retained the term with scarce a vestige of its former meaning in it,¹ to signify the modification effected in consciousness by the action of an outer object, through which the soul was in some wise likened to the object it perceived. "Species was thus mustered into a service utterly out of keeping with its first rudimentary meaning. Its etymology was considerably lost in its new employment and it was no longer the ideograph—the picture-word of Democritus, but the poor conveyor of a much nobler idea. Yet men continue to argue from its etymology that scholastic philosophy is still immersed in the ignorant belief of roving images. They forget that it was retained to express an entirely new idea and that its etymology has nothing to do with the meaning which was, as it were, thrust into it by the Schoolmen.

It is certainly very difficult to realize how in these days of critical study Scholasticism should be judged from etymology and philology, with never so much as an attempt to reach the meaning, the ideas, encased as it were in a severe terminology. And it is still more difficult to realize from what logical sense those proceed who would argue from the etymology of a word to the fact that all ideas under it are but continuations of its original meaning—developments of it from stage to stage successively. We have seen that this is unwarranted, because it leaves out of consideration a by no means negligible factor, to wit: the conventional use of the term which only too often differs widely from what etymology would exact or even justify. Words are elastic. They will not infrequently bear the noblest thought if you fit them to it. And for this very reason you can but very seldom conclude from identity of term to identity of thought beneath. The continuity has been broken. Thus one would not conclude from the term "Manitou" still used by Catholic Indians to express the Great Spirit, that the idea which it formerly conveyed to the untutored savages and the idea which they learned from the lips of the black-robe were identical, for the very reason that the same term is retained to express an utterly different concept. The terms may be the same to the very letter and yet not afford logical grounds for concluding a continuous development of thought.

Thus it is that the law of evolution—at best but a very general law of continuity—cannot be applied to particular facts

¹Human Intellect, Porter; Theories of perception, heading, Aristotle.

(for these latter invariably come under conditions which nullify hypothesis and speculation), unless you have proven, not postulated, the connection. There is certainly no warrant for deriving the idea called up to-day by the word "pontiff" from its first sense of "bridge builder," although the term is identical and traceable to a pagan source. There is an enormous difference between etymological and actual significance. The former may be homogeneous, but you cannot drop from view the heterogeneity of the latter. The reason is that novel ideas are oftentimes engrafted on words and the continuity broken. We should not be etymologists merely, but philosophers also.

What difference, therefore, does it make if the Teutonic word for God be Wodan, the Roman carnival suggestive of the old pagan saturnalia, the worship of the patron saints reminding of pagan devotions to household gods, the retention of pagan names a hint at pre-christian customs? The facts we all admit. The inference we deny, at least till further proof than a sweeping hypothesis be furnished. You cannot prove the individual connection between particulars from a principle which is established as only generally true. Sound logic and scientific instinct forbid it.

VII.—ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND ANALOGY.

The apparent conviction of Prof. Fiske seems to be that the modern world owes a lasting debt of gratitude to the promoters of evolution for the death-blow which they have dealt to the old notions of the Deity. He even ventures the assertion that the Church has for centuries entertained an idea of God which it received from the Latin writers and retains to-day in almost the same crude outlines in which Augustine left it centuries since.¹ How far Prof. Fiske's statement is true concerning Augustine, we have already critically examined. We have seen that his contention is decidedly at a loss for support in the writings of the Bishop of Hippo. We now propose to examine briefly what grounds there are for believing with him that theologians, generally, have inherited the Latin genius for representing God in a human shape and after the frailties of our much-abused human nature. In doing so, we single out the prince of theologians and the peer of synthetists—St. Thomas of Aquin, whom Haureau accuses, as Prof. Fiske accuses Augustine, of constructing God in human terms and expressing in mere human relations.

Thomas of Aquin wrote in a terminology which requires considerable technical education to decipher. Years of usage

¹The Idea of God, p. 35.

had given the words which he employed to express his meaning a definiteness and at the same time a rigidity which baffles the skill of the uninitiated: and we are not surprised to learn that those who stopped at the letter never reached the spirit that underlay his phrases. So many strange and 'bizarre' doctrines have been attributed to him by those who study his views in second-rate sources, that a succinct outline of his manner of conceiving the Godhead will dispel forever the false imputation of his having entertained anthropomorphic ideas and will evidence the perfect fitness of his view even in the light of the rigorous demands of modern science.

St. Thomas and Herbert Spencer, arguing from the same source, are both agreed that the human mind is compelled to admit something "self-existent." St. Thomas says:¹ "In physical things we find a series of efficient causes, without finding, without the possibility of finding, that any given thing is the cause of itself. For, on the supposition that anything was its own cause it would have to exist prior to itself, which is impossible. Now an infinite series of efficient causes, on the other hand, is likewise impossible: because in a series of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is the cause of the last, whether the intermediate be one or many. Therefore, on the supposition that there is no first cause, there will be no last effect, nor any intermediate causes: an inference counter to experience. Whence the necessity of admitting an efficient First Cause which is God." Spencer says in the same vein:² "We cannot think at all about the impressions which the external world produces on us without thinking of them as caused, and cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causation without inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First Cause."

Thus far they are agreed, St. Thomas and Herbert Spencer. Both start from the same considerations. According to both, no inquiry concerning the facts of nature can be carried out legitimately without the eventual admission of an Absolute First Cause.

But Spencer drew back from the concept, thus thrust into his observations of nature and magnified by him into an insuperable difficulty—namely, the concept of self-existence. He felt and saw that we can have no adequate, comprehensive conception of self-existence. A concept of this kind, manifestly impossible under the finite conditions of human intellect, he made the goal of his efforts and the object of his mental research. Naturally he was baffled in his quest of a comprehensive notion of self-existence which He alone can fully for-

¹Summa Contra Gent., Lib. I. cap., XIII, prope ad finem. ²First Principles, p. 37.

multitude who is self-existence itself. His fault was in putting too much into the concept itself as we know it and thereby belying experience. When he said that self-existence was literally unthinkable, he meant that it was such according to the peculiar tenets of his own philosophy. If the acts of the human intellect be nothing more than certain refined effects of organic impressions and all human thinking reduced to ideographs reproducible in and by imagination, we certainly cannot conceive of self-existence, if to conceive of it be equivalent to picturing it on the retina (if one may so speak) of the imaginative faculty. In such a view which is his, all universal concepts would be alike inconceivable. If, in addition, eternity be nothing else than infinite past time, which he asserts it to be, eternal self-existence is a conceptual impossibility.

But Spencer's difficulties are of his own making. He makes no distinction between "comprehending a thing thoroughly" and "conceiving it at all." He sets up ideal requirements and because the concept which he actually has concerning self-existence falls short of the arbitrary one he imagines he should have, he proceeds to fritter away into the unknowable the little knowledge we actually do possess concerning the Absolute. Instead of holding hard by the concept, such as experience furnishes it, he endeavors to criticise it away by subjecting it to tests which are foreign to it—namely, comprehensiveness and the imagination's power to reproduce it. But his criticism is valuable in so far as it emphasizes the recognition of an old truth that "something self-existent is somewhat conceivable." If it were not, his elaborate criticism would have a more than Hegelian nothingness for its point of rebuttal, and so much ado about nothing would certainly not be very flattering to the philosopher of Down.

The ways between the two are not long in dividing. Spencer dwells upon the meagreness of detail which the concept of self-existence contains and relegates it to the sphere of the unknowable. St. Thomas, however, holding to the fact that such a concept is actually given, essays the analysis of its content. The necessity of a First Cause, which Spencer deems unavoidable, the great Dominican takes as the ground-stone on which to rest his subsequent reasonings. The concept of a being wholly uncaused and wholly independent, to which human reason is impelled by reflection on the data of experience, is for him in very reality a concept of self-existence. On this he lays stress and upon its elaboration he concentrates his attention.

With him, the domain of such a concept is the intellect. An after-idea such as this is not pictureable in the imagination, neither is it essentially cognizable nor fully and intimately

known. Nay more, a comprehensive concept of such an existence is not only not had, but is impossible, whether in this life or in the vision of the blessed. In its full nature and essence, self-existence is beyond the ken of human thinking. In this sense he agrees with Spencer that the Absolute is unknowable. But all the while he never once loses sight of the great known fact, to which all searchers of nature are irrevocably committed, that there is a self-existent Being, surely though inadequately known, really though inadequately conceivable. For comprehension is not the only kind of knowledge but the highest, and the knowledge which we actually have concerning self-existence cannot be rejected on the grounds that such knowledge is not full, all-embracing and thoroughly comprehensive.

Thus Spencer's impossibility of infinite past time is irrelevant. The concept of self-existence, by the very fact that it is inadequate, does not set forth and explicitly express the duration of such a being. The nature of its duration is implicitly discoverable in the fact that the laws of empirical phenomena and of change cannot apply to an existence unique and apart from theirs. The conception of indefinite possible time is very easy when we reflect on the possibility of an indefinite series of successive changes before or after any given moment. But to say with Spencer that self-existence implies the conception of actually infinite past time is to measure the unchangeable continuance of a self-existent being after the manner of beings subject by their very nature to the vicissitudes of change. It is an unphilosophic attempt to apply the same standard of measurement to two essentially distinct kinds of duration. After all, succession is essential to the proper conception of time, and where there is and can be no succession, time is an impossibility. The concept of self-existence which excludes succession cannot therefore be measured by time, whether finite or infinite, actual or possible. A self-existent act is not guageable by the standards of imperfection. Agnosticism at its best is but an extravagant confusion of the monotheistic position.

Thus while Spencer's analysis is an attempt to judge self-existence by conditions which are utterly foreign to its concept, St. Thomas remains within the sphere of the legitimate idea afforded him by experience and proceeds calmly to the work of its elaboration. Induction is his basis, deduction his guide to further conclusions.

Agreeing with Spencer that the Absolute is not fully comprehensible as to its innermost nature and, therefore, in this sense unknowable, he does not, like the latter, lose sight of the one great fact that the existence of the Absolute is demanded

by experience as a necessity and is known and formulated through the agency of a painstaking analysis. He does not commit the logical fallacy of asserting that because God is not comprehensively knowable in the intimacy of His essence, His existence is likewise unknowable. Had he done so, he would have shut his eyes to a truth into which all causal research must eventually resolve itself.

After establishing that God is inadequately conceivable and as inadequately knowable, St. Thomas notes that God and creatures each exist: the one as demonstrably uncaused, the other as demonstrably caused: the one with the full reason of His own existence within Himself, the other with the reason of its existence in another from which it must needs borrow its every shred of reality. He proceeds forthwith to compare these existences and ends in the assertion that both are in some wise similar.

Here lies the rock of scandal for many. The word "similarity" calls up anthropomorphic shudderings into the consciousness of those who are unacquainted with the delicate meaning of the term. What is the nature of this similarity? Let us turn again to the great Dominican for answer.

From what has just been said it can be nothing else than a similarity in existence. The question is thus reduced to tangible form by the statement that both God and creatures are real actual existences. We are using, it will be observed, but two ideas, both guaranteed by clear experience—the caused existence of things, the uncaused existence of the Creator, which these very things in the mind of Spencer himself imperatively demand.

Nor can we be accused of fault of method when we thus compare the Creator and His creatures. We have first argued from the data of experience and reached an idea of the Uncaused Reality. We have postulated nothing, neither have we begged the question at issue when so doing. For it is only after reaching an idea of the Absolute, *i. e.*, of God, that we have begun to compare our ideas each with the other, God with creatures. In doing so we have the products of two analyses, and on the comparison of these two products the nature of similarity must now be made to rest.

From a comparison of these two analytic products it is clear that the similarity of existence is neither specific nor generic. Self-existence stands in an order peculiarly its own, and is therefore unclassifiable, for it can have no generic or specific agreement with objects which necessarily involve a received and borrowed existence. The similarity, therefore, in exist-

ence can be none other than analogical—namely, a real proportional relation.

St. Thomas proceeds to elaborate the notion which induction and deduction have furnished by showing that the similarity between the world and God is not reciprocal, that is, the reverse is not true of God with regard to things. Nor should this surprise us. Similarity between two things is reciprocal when each possesses properly and fully some common quality. But where one thing alone possesses the quality to the full and the other only an imitation, a participation of it, the latter is similar to the former, although the converse does not hold good. A painted portrait is like the hero which it represents. The hero himself, we would not think of saying it strictly, is like the portrait. Thus creatures have through a deficient participation that which God has in all perfection—namely, existence. And so it is that though things be like unto God, it does not follow that God is like unto things.

From this it is clear that the likeness, the similarity is imperfect. Creatures are like unto God in so far as they represent His perfections, and at the same time are very unlike Him, because their perfections are found in God in a vastly different way and according to a self-existent, not a finite nature. In the light of similarity such as this, the spectre of anthropomorphism is made to vanish.

Here is the very essence of the Catholic notion of God's knowableness—analogical proportion of existence between creatures and God. The similarity, the likeness of creature to the Creator is, properly speaking, expressible only in an agreement of two proportions. Creatures: Their existence:: God: Pure self-existence. In this manner alone is the great problem of the Absolute to be studied. The knowableness of the Absolute depends upon a similarity of proportions, just as if one were to put it mathematically 6: 3:: 100: 50. The greater or lesser distance between the perfections of different natures does not affect the proportionality,—2: 1:: 6: 3 remaining unaffected, should we choose to write it 2: 1:: 1,000: 500. When men begin to realize the force and beauty of reasoning such as this they will be spared a great many, and alas! too frequent logical pitfalls. To say that this view fritters away the idea of God to a mere abstraction, is to acknowledge one of two impossibilities, either that we, as finite, should be better able to grasp the infinite, or that the infinite should become finite for the sole sake that we might compass it with knowledge.

The knowableness of God corresponds to this analogical similarity between creatures and Creator. We conceive the perfections of creatures to be in God originally and superabundantly.

Originally: because, as all efficient causes contain their effects in the active power they have to produce them, self-existence which is really and conceptually the source of all, must of necessity hold all within itself after the manner of its own sublime nature. For existence is the perfection of all things, whether substance or quality, attribute or property. Superabundantly: that is, without imperfection and in the most noble manner.

The imperfections of creatures do not come from God as cause, but result from their original nothingness, and the fact that they borrow existence from Another who could not create an infinitely perfect being for the reason that infinity and created reality are, in combination, self-destructive, impossible. The infinite power of God is not exhausted in creation, any more than the power of an atom of oxygen loses its efficiency to enter into combinations though it may have done so for ages. If a simple atom does not lose an iota of its power by the constant work it is perpetually accomplishing, what a lesson for us concerning the infinite power of Him, who is a boundless sea of essence and existence! He has without imperfection the perfections of all superabundantly.

Again, we have said, God contains all perfections of creatures in a most noble manner, that is, in the highest possible degree. For there is nothing to limit His existence, and what is scattered piecemeal through a multitude of effects, is united in Him in one completely rounded whole of pure and infinite actuality. In this sense is God truly remote from all and dwelling in inaccessible majesty.

From all this it is clear that the perfections of creatures, whatever they be, cannot be attributed to God in the deficient manner in which they are found in creatures. The imperfection of the mode is denied of God; the perfection, whatever it is, is affirmed of Him in the highest degree. We will go further. There are certain perfections in things which conceptually involve no defect, as wisdom, goodness. Such as these are, with all propriety, affirmable of God, who, in one simple existence, possesses all perfections unitedly, fully, and absolutely. Here it may be remarked that the metaphysical reason back of the attribution of all such perfections to God, for example, wisdom, is not the sole derivation of wisdom from the fountain-head of the Deity—the cause has nothing from the effect—but the imitation by creatures of the Divine Wisdom itself. The motive of this observation lies in the fact that God was intelligent and full of wisdom before creatures sprang into existence and did not acquire this attribute from them, but reflected it in them.

Other perfections there are which imply in themselves a certain amount of modal imperfection as the direct result of their finite nature. Such, for instance, would be the attribution to God of the powers of sight, understanding thereby a knowledge of visible objects through a faculty conjoined with an organ of sense. These cannot be affirmed of God except in a metaphorical sense. The reason is that, though perfections in their way, they are not pure, and result directly from finite and less noble conditions. All that pertains to the nobility of creatures does not pertain to the nobility of the Creator, who exceeds all beyond measure. Ferocity ennobles the lion. It would redound to man's conceptual discredit, even though he be the lion's superior as the centre-piece of creation.

Thus it is that the Angel of the Schools weighs well in the balance of a critical reason his every statement concerning God. He has left us page after page in his *Summa Theologica* of careful discernment between the words and ideas through which we stammer out our notions of the Deity. So far from being anthropomorphic, he carefully discriminates against any such interpretation. His two ways of expressing God, to wit, by denying all imperfections and by affirming all perfection, cover the ground required in the problem.

Perhaps the criticism Hamilton made of the argument from analogy might strike some readers of these pages as weakening the position we have been sustaining. To such as these we would suggest a consideration of the following. According to the doctrine which we have just been exposing, God is known by affirmation and denial. By affirmation, God is known from those perfections *which He is*¹ and by negation He is known from those things *which He is not*.² The latter is, as apparent, the chief mode relied upon in our investigations of the concept of God. We affirm perfection and at the same time deny its mode, its limit, its condition in creatures. We remove all imperfection entirely from Him and in this wise essay to reach some glimmering knowledge of God's eternal self-hood.³

This would appear to make God, as Hamilton said, a product of negative thinking, a bundle of negations. Let us look critically into the worth of this statement.

It is a well known fact of logic that the more we penetrate into and discover the differences of any object from all others, the more perfect knowledge do we reach of the object itself. Whence, in establishing its definition, we first classify the genus and then add the differences which mark it off from all others.

¹Ex iis quae est. ²Ex iis quae non est. These striking expressions are from St. Cyril of Alexandria. De Sancta et Consust. Trinit., Dial. I. ³For theory of analogy in St. Augustine, cf. Aug. in Ioannem, III., tract. 39, No. 7; Ibid, tract. XIII.; Ibid, Sermo de verbis Apostoli; Lib. contra Mendacium, cap. X.; De Trinitate, Lib. V., cap. XIII.

In this wise we acquire complete knowledge of the object's nature. But as this is impossible with the Divine Nature, which is above all classification and irreducible to any genus or species, we cannot distinguish it from other objects by affirmative differentiations. Thus when I deny of God that He is corporeal, a body, I distinguish him from all such. If I deny again that He is an accidental being, I affirm implicitly that He is something else. Proceeding thus, I come to know what God is not. But all the while I am denying, I am implicitly affirming, just as when I deny that man is a lion, I do not deny all reality of him, but that only which is comprised in a lion's nature. A residual product is left over after denial—namely, He is not the particular object denied, but something else. I do not deny perfections of God in order to exclude them from Him, but to demonstrate His sublimity and excellence. If I did not know something of God, I could not deny anything of Him, because affirmation must precede denial.

If therefore, I affirm before I deny, what is the result? I first affirm wisdom and I say that God is wise. But as wisdom is in God in a more perfect way than in creatures, I deny that God's wisdom stops at the nature of human wisdom such as I see it. Does not this mean that God is over-wise as compared to creatures? The negation does not destroy what has been said in the affirmation, but simply denotes that the thoughts expressed in the affirmation should be understood in a sense more noble than we are prepared fully to comprehend. In this wise, so far from destroying our positive knowledge negation perfects it, because in the denial of an imperfection a greater perfection is indirectly affirmed.

Consideration of thoughts such as these cannot fail to impress us that in St. Thomas we are dealing with a genius who was acquainted with every inch of ground over which the human intellect is forced to travel carefully and slowly if it would be sure of firmest footing. Once the nature of the similarity between creatures and Creator is sifted down to proportional analogy, no fear need be entertained that we are constructing God after human fashion or projecting Him without warrant out of our own finite consciousness. Close reasonings there are and must be in such a problem. But these in no wise impair the discussional worth and objective validity of the position of St. Thomas.

Such is the nature of similarity, such the basis of attributing to God the perfections of creatures in a way compatible with His self-subsisting nature. God is not reconstructed through the principle of analogy as though he were a sum total of abstractions, but the concept of self-existence which expe-

rience intrudes upon us is broadened, deepened, rounded out by such considerations. Nor should this surprise us. The nature of the human mind is such that it understands the simplest realities by breaking them into a multiplicity of partial considerations, and by piecing these latter together again into the synthesis of a whole. The piecing together is a mental process, an aid to a further conception. It is as serviceable and as useless as a scaffolding; serviceable and necessary in reaching the heights we would attain unto; useless once the goal is reached.

VIII.—THE CREATION-IDEA AND MODERN SCIENCE.

The underdrift of modern science is toward an all-pervading unity. Powerful research work has called forth from the depth of things an answer which Augustine received long ages since from the flowers of the field when they bade him seek their cause above and beyond their floral selves. The scattered fragments which mere analysis yields up to the painstaking observer will not remain apart. They are beaded together in a rosary of relations. The more one plunges into the consideration of realities for the sole sake of the pleasureable knowledge afforded by the plunging, the more does one feel that each apparently separate reality reaches out to some other of its kind by a hidden bond that makes for unity and suggests the presence of some great polarizing power. The spectrum has made the heavenly bodies tell their mute story of themselves and assert their kinship with the elements which we know and see more immediately about us. The ether acts as a vast telegraphic system between the wheeling worlds, flashing the quivers of the one into the very heart of the other. Purpose is seen in the steady march of the universe towards its goal, and is discernible under the petals of the meanest flower that blows. In the midst of variety, do what one will, order thrusts itself into consideration. Events that seem the furthestmost apart are on deeper search found to be in close communion. Analysis has at last made evident the need of its consort, synthesis; men are gradually beginning to realize what St. Thomas struggled to express some centuries since, that the vast network of interacting objects which men call Nature is throbbing with the unison of a mighty purpose and impelled ever onwards toward the goal, dramatically, irresistibly.

Considerations such as these, suggestive of an all-pervading Unity actually at work in the heart and fibre of the world, have impressed modern theistic thinkers with the solemn

thought that the idea of God hitherto entertained needs radical reshaping. The fact that in the midst of so much change there is constancy of development, in the midst of death, decay and apparent confusion there is the steady march of purpose, has burst upon some minds with all the brilliancy of a new revelation. When examined critically, however, it all turns out to be an old truth arrived at by new avenues, the mere accentuation of an old belief, not the trumpet-blast of a new discovery. The hypothesis of evolution in the minds of many has brought God closer to things, has made it impossible to banish Him from the field of phenomena. To read the writings of such men and to note their insistence upon God's presence in nature one is tempted to think that the whole world was of opposite persuasion.¹ The notion seems prevalent among such that the doctrine of creation carries with it the idea of a God who completed the world in the twilight of the ages and remained away from it ever since lost in the compass of His own infinity. Fabulous derivations of the creation-idea are peddled out in the guise of scientific hypotheses and men are urged to reject it on the ground that it no longer answers the needs of science which demands a Deity that has actually something to do with the world of realities in which we live, who is its heart, its life, the controller of its forces, the goal of its destinies.

Nothing could be further from the truth than the thought that Creation implies subsequent inertia on the part of the Creator, a sort of "divine absenteeism," to paraphrase Carlyle's sneering allusion.

Creation, rightly understood, gives to the idea of God the one essential characteristic which saves the divine Being from gross confusion and identity with the force and matter of the universe—the characteristic of complete distinction from it in nature. It implies none of the crudities to which Prof. Fiske refuses to subscribe. Distinction does not mean God's absence, nor does creation imply utter inactivity. God's separation from the world by nature does not involve his separation from it in power, guidance and continuous development.

A creator who is not also an upholder, a conservator, is a myth. There is as much absurdity in admitting continuous existence of reality without continuous creation, as there would be in admitting actual sunlight from a sun that had ceased to irradiate. When conservation is called perpetual creation, it

¹One of the great sources of misunderstanding nowadays is the new terminology which has come into use. The old phrases seem weighted down with a meaning they can no longer carry. Especially is this seen in economics and philosophy. Perhaps a new St. Paul will come to tell men that the God whom they have hidden under phrase and thus made unknown is the God of patristic and christian conception.

is not meant that things are constantly dropping out of existence and as constantly returning to it. This would be the height of absurdity. It simply means that if there is nothing in things to warrant our belief in their power of self-production—nothing to warrant their eternal existence of themselves, there certainly is nothing to make us scientifically believe that a reality which owed the entirety of its being to another for the first moment of its existence, does not remain debtor to the same power every additional moment that such existence continues to endure. If the sun produced illumination of the atmosphere centuries since, it must continue its action to-day, else all actual illumination is impossible.

The Creation-idea has all the virtues of the other cosmic theories with none of their vices. It rejects emphatically their one most ignoble feature. It excludes God as the formal cause or formal constituent of this universe of realities. God is the efficient and the final cause, the Beginning and the End. He hurled the universe into existence, and He has as much to do with it to-day as on creation's dawn. Out of His power, infinite and eternal, things that were not, came to be. They came from no preëxistent, except the preëxisting power of God, the infinite actuality of which they are but meagre participations. It rejects God as part of things, as compounded with them, as identical with their fleeting, finite selves. It does not preclude His presence, His power, His actual working in things. It rejects Pantheism as ignoble, a sort of blind necessity and gross confusion. It lays down the facts that God made things exist that were previously non-existent, that He upholds them by His power, that He rules their actions, supplies them with actuality to be and power to do, that there is not a shred of reality in them that is not of His pure giving. But it denies that things are God or that God is things. He is distinct from them as all-perfect reality must be from the finite and imperfect, as the Giver from the gifts of His hands.

But it admits all the while that He is intimately present in them, that He has more to do with their workings than they have themselves, that their myriad individual natures act of themselves through Him and He in them. He is not a far-off deity, but a God creating, conserving, provident and predestining. The existence of the tiniest atom as well as every particle of its force comes from Him. The outlay of its little store of power is by virtue of His infinite reservoir of self. He gives without losing. Things receive their nature, their powers, their every act from Him, are moved by Him in every operation, remain within the bounds He set them, and march ever onwards toward the purpose that He wills. Everything they

have is borrowed, yet none the less is all reality real without being the reality of God, and God is real without being the reality of creatures. The crudity is in Professor Fiske's conception, not in the traditional idea that has come down to us from the Christian Era.

Things and God act simultaneously. Two causes are at work—the Creator and the creature. The universal and the particulars. Every finite effect is due to both, referable to both, though unequally and in different measure. There is unity in the individual causes when at work, because He gives the power to work and the instinct that seeks the goal particular, and thus contributes the quota of light and shade to nature's picture of purpose. He is everywhere, though not contained in space. He acts everywhere a pulse of life is beating or a coral reef is forming in the depths of a silver sea. He is in all, acts in all, moves all, guides all, controls all, yet is He none of the works of His hands, though the universe is a purposeful activity and the heavens a rosary strung with beaded stars.¹

He is infinitely distant from them in nature. But this does not imply absence from the field of phenomena. It means that despite His presence He is the pure actuality infinitely different in His constitution from the petty realities which are but as nothing in His sight.

¹Some of Professor Fiske's conceptions of the "Dark Age" theology are, to use his own word, barbaric. He says (page 103): "To conceive of physical forces as powers of which the action could in any wise be substituted for the action of the Deity would in such a case have been absolutely impossible." Such a conception involves the idea of God as remote from the world and acting upon it from outside. The whole notion of what theological writers are fond of calling 'secondary causes' involves such an idea of God." First of all, no philosophic writer of the "Dark Ages" would dream of saying that physical forces were powers whose action could be substituted, etc. Only in our own day have the distinct notions of force, power and action been grossly confused, to the real detriment of science. (Cf. *The Correlation of Physical Forces*, by Grove, pp. 13, 15, and 36.) Professor Fiske reads into the scholastic notions the peculiar phases of Mill's Philosophy of Causes. He judges the Schoolmen from Mill's point of view without first ascertaining theirs. We know no scholastic writer of repute who conceived of physical forces as powers whose action could be substituted for that of God. Action is the exertion of power. Force, properly speaking, is the amount of the exertion, or the quantity of the action, as measured by the effect it is able to produce. To say therefore that forces were powers was past all scholastic belief. But what is more unworthy still is Professor Fiske's view of the then current theologic position. No one ever dreamt of holding that the actions of secondary causes were substituted for those of the Deity. Professor Fiske simply describes a past that never was a present. The doctrine held then as now is simply this: God and creatures are not partial causes. They are two complete causes, each producing the same effect, but in a different manner. The effect is due to both, but the mode of producing it is different in each. God acts as the universal cause. Creatures act as particular and finite causes. It is the same philosophic fact that underlies the production of a statue by a sculptor and his chisel. Both contribute to the effect, each in the proper way. The thought that the creature's action was substituted for that of God no more crossed the imagination of a scholastic than the thought that the action of a chisel is substituted for that of the sculptor would be entertained nowadays. How could they hold such a view when the keynote to the position of St. Thomas on God's indwelling in nature is such that he gives expression to his thought in the following: "The first cause exerts more production activity on the effect of the second cause than the second cause itself." (*Causa prima est vehementioris impressionis supra causatum causae secundae quam ipsa causa secunda*. IV. Dist. 12, art. 1, ad. 2.) The second cause was never a substitute for the first. Such an idea is puerile and unphilosophic. Yet Professor Fiske says it is common. He gives no reference and cites no authority. He may not believe in cause as implying the notion of production, since he follows John Stuart Mill's system, which Jevons (*Pure Logic and Other Minor Works*, p. 201) does not hesitate to characterize as an incubus of bad logic and bad philosophy. But because he does not believe in cause as implying production is no reason why he should judge those who do believe such, by the standard of those who do not. Professor Fiske is stating a position, and should state it fairly, not invent it.

Without creation, distinction is impossible. Without distinction, Pantheism is the legitimate outcome. Prof. Fiske distinguishes in vain when he makes out the God of the Theist different from that of the Pantheist, on the score that he is not blind force but omnipresent energy. What is this energy at the heart of the circling worlds? Is it the very cosmic energies themselves or something apart and distinct from them? If it be these very energies, no process of reasoning can make his position other than Pantheistic. Recourse to omnipresent energy as against blind force is a makeshift. For intelligent or blind, force is force still, energy is energy, and if God be either, the world is God, however much subtlety may distinguish or ingenuity substitute.

Theism is removed from Pantheism in words, in formula only and not in the thought that lies at the heart of each. And if Prof. Fiske objects to this view as foreign to his considerations, he must simply be struggling to express what the nobler stream of thought within us all must outpour eventually—the idea of a God which Augustine outlined and Thomas of Aquin developed to the highest—Eternal, Infinite, Personal Intelligence, Will and Power, back of all phenomena, under the petals of the meanest flower, nowhere absent, everywhere at work, the source of all phenomena, because the cause of them, yet not identified with any single phenomenon, for the reason that they are not made out of Him but by Him, are not emanations from Him, but productions of His infinite power.

Such a concept is the only one worthy of science, of philosophy—of religion. It is not anthropomorphic, unscientific, unphilosophic. It would need no modification even if Evolution had made good its myriad claims. The very insufficiency of all other concepts of God to realize Him satisfactorily is a lasting monument to the victorious truth of the Creation-idea. Such a God alone is one whom scientists can afford to adore and whom knowing not, their very struggles at expression reveal and their meagre makeshifts proclaim as the only legitimate outcome of modern science. Lest this latter statement be thought a burst of fervor merely, or as some would view it, the trumpery of a defunct metaphysic, we append in conclusion the scientific suggestion of the Creation-idea by Prof. Clerk-Maxwell, F. R. S., the eminent English mathematician and natural philosopher.¹

¹This quotation furnishes us with interesting and suggestive considerations. No one disagrees with Mill when he says that by reasoning from the facts of experience we can never rise to the conviction that the specific elementary substances of things (i. e. the elements) are created out of nothing, for the reason that they are not known to us as beginning to exist, but as constantly enduring throughout all changes. To argue thus is faulty in the admission of all. The method pursued by St. Thomas is to argue from experience to a First Cause of changes.

"The molecule, though indestructible, is not a hard, rigid body, but is capable of internal movements, and when these are excited, it emits rays, the wave-length of which is a measure for the time of vibration of a molecule. By means of the spectroscope the wave-length of different kinds of light may be compared to within one ten-thousandth part. In this way it has been ascertained not only that molecules taken from every specimen of hydrogen in our laboratories have the same set of periods of vibration, but that light having the same set of periods of vibration is emitted from the sun and from the fixed stars. We are thus assured that molecules of the same nature as those of our hydrogen exist in those distant regions, or at least did exist when the light by which we see them was emitted. . . . Light, which is to us the sole evidence of the existence of these distant worlds, tells us also that each of them is built of molecules of the same kind as those which we find on earth. A molecule of hydrogen, for example, whether in Sirius or Arcturus, executes its vibrations in precisely the same time. Each molecule, therefore, throughout the universe, bears impressed on it the stamp of a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives of Paris or the double royal cubit of the Temple of Karnac. No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of molecules; for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature, since the time when nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent.

Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes

which Spencer says is an inevitable conclusion. Once this First Cause is established, it is in order to inquire into its nature and the relations between the primitive elements of matter and the First Cause itself. Such a procedure is soundly methodological. Yet Mill attacks at great length the former method, forgetting, evidently, that in so doing he strikes no antagonist. The quotation from Clerk-Maxwell is from: A Lecture on Molecules delivered before the British Association at Bradford.—*Nature*, September 25, 1873.

we call natural. Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing.¹ We have reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that, because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent, it must have been created. That matter, as such, should have certain fundamental properties, that it should exist in space and be capable of motion, that its motion should be persistent, and so on, are truths which may, for anything we know, be of the kind which metaphysicians call necessary. We may use our knowledge of such truths for purposes of deduction, but we have no data for speculating as to their origin. But that there should be exactly so much matter and no more in every molecule of hydrogen is a fact of a very different order.

. . . Natural causes, as we know, are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy, all the arrangements and dimensions of the earth, and of the whole solar system. But though, in the course of ages, catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens; though ancient systems may be dissolved, and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which those systems are built, the foundation-stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn. They continue to this day as they were created, perfect in number and measure and weight, and from the ineffaceable characters impressed on them we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, truth in statement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are essential constituents of the image of Him who, in the beginning, created not only the heaven and earth, but the materials of which heaven and earth consist."

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

¹It is competent, however, to furnish the philosopher with all the materials of such a reasoning, as this very passage clearly shows.

RELIGION IN POLITICS.¹

In the opening lecture of this course on social economics for the academic year 1895-96, I took the liberty of pointing out to you the fundamental principles relating to ethics and economics on which my lectures would be based, and I then took the ground that while ethics could not supplant economics, neither could economics rule at the expense of ethics; that there must be a coördination of ethico-economic principles in order to secure the establishment of just industrial conditions. In the present course many lectures will be devoted to subjects wherein the discussion of legislative action will become prominent. Suggested reforms through legislative action can have no force unless the standard of legislation is of the highest character. It is well, therefore, in opening the work of the present year to fix our minds upon those qualities and those elements in politics which must inevitably secure the very highest grade of legislator, and consequently that form of legislation which shall comprehend and crystallize the truest and the best elements of the thought of the nation. I have therefore selected for the subject of the opening lecture of this year's course, Religion in Politics.

Religion, in a comprehensive sense according to definition, includes a belief in the being and perfection of God, in the revelation of His will to man, in man's obligation to obey His commands, and in man's accountableness to God; and it also includes true godliness or purity of life, with the practice of all moral duties. As distinct from theology, religion is godliness or real purity in practice, consisting in the performance of all known duties to God and our fellow-men and ourselves, from love to God and His law.

Politics, in the true sense, means the science of government, or that part of ethics which consist in the regulation and government of a nation or state, for the preservation of its safety, peace and prosperity; comprehending the defense of its existence and rights against foreign control or conquest, the augmentation of its strength and resources, and the protection of its citizens in their rights, with the preservation and improvement of their morals.

¹An abstract of the opening lecture in the course for 1896-7 on Social Economics, delivered at the Catholic University of America November 2, 1896. In constructing this lecture free use has been made of "Politics for Young Americans," by Charles Nordhoff; "The Nation," by Elisha Mulford, and "Comparative Politics," by Edward A. Freeman.

Religion in politics means that line of action in human, public affairs, which best does honor to God's laws, preserves the rights and conserves the peace and welfare of the greatest numbers; which requires of us that high duty of obedience to God, loyalty to our own consciences, and love to our neighbors.

Any political precepts, parties or platforms, demanding less are mere machines for the manipulation of the masses by which private ends become superior to public needs.

We, Americans, have been called a nation of politicians, because all men had the right to seek and hold office. We should be, and I believe will be, a nation of politicians, because we will be able to hold our public men and ourselves to the strict line of action which has for its results the good of the town, the state or the nation. Public men should have that element of religion which carries us through all great trials, and which will give to them the courage at all times and under all temptations to do the right; to vote for those measures which mean the most in the interest of the people. They need that strength of character which perseveres to the right, and dares too, whether it brings applause or ridicule or vilification; they must, before public service will reach the plane the best morals demand, be men who will not be weak in office, for weakness in office is only another name for wickedness.

We all demand in public men more than we are willing to secure to them, and while we may believe weakness in office to be wickedness, we must have a care that as electors we possess sufficient strength to demand the men to serve us who will be found at all times ready to serve us instead of personal ambition. If the lofty duty of administration demands the very best elements of character, then we have a right to use the term religion in politics and to associate the two words closely; we have a right to discuss politics in the light of religion.

The consideration of these suggestions naturally leads us to inquire into the character of the nation, and our subject logically assumes three distinct points or features,—the obligation of citizens to perform political duties, the obligation of officials to faithfully administer their trusts, and the obligation of nations to observe the great laws of humanity in the treatment of subjects or members, and in their dealing with weaker powers. Above these propositions there arises the question whether the state or nation has soul or is born of God; if it is not, if there is nothing divine in the superstructure, man as an individual has no moral obligation resting upon him calling him to political duty.

Love of country is born of love of God. This may be, is,

denied, and the conclusion avoided by extremists and pronounced enigmatic by the press, but I believe there has been no age in which it has been more clearly recognized in the thought of statesmen than in this. Even Napoleon III. said, in 1868, "We cannot separate our love of country from our love of God." It is in such a religious sentiment that citizenship finds its significance as a relationship to a creative and overruling power. It is not carelessly that human lips have called their country the fatherland, nor is it with vague and idle phrases, but in a spirit of holy and son-like sacrifice and in solemn crises, that men have turned to their country as the protector of all. Dear fatherland has called forth the willing sacrifice of those who were worthy. The life of the individual has been given for the life of the nation. The offering has been laid upon that, which in the holiest spirit has been held as an altar, and life has been given in that sacrifice in which life is found. Our country holds the homes and the temples, the shrines and the altars of men, the types of the thought and endeavor and conflict and hope of humanity. It has been the power and the minister of God in history by its moral personality, and it is in its moral being that it has been the foundation of that which is enduring in politics, and it has been embodied in the political thought and will which alone have been constructive in the state. Aristotle tells us, "the end of the state is not merely to live, but to live nobly," and Hegel, that "there is one conception in religion and the state, and that is the highest of man."

There is no other conception, that of fatherland, which has such power in the thoughts of men, and in this age it has the greater significance when it is drawn, not from a school of puritan politics, but from those most widely separated from puritanism, and finds its expression in the literature of a people which is rising to great political might. All, from different ages, who have been masters of political science, repeat this conception. Milton recorded that a "Nation ought to be but as one huge christian personage, one mighty growth or stature of an honest man, as big and compact in virtue as in body." And Shakespeare—

"There is a mystery—with whom relation
Hast never meddled—in the soul of state;
Which hath an operation more divine
Than breath or pen can give expression to."

The testimony of great minds, the aspirations of great souls, teach us the truth of these premises and emphasize the meaning of my subject. In the political work then of our country we have high religious duties to perform, and duties which should be approached with not only understanding but a deep

conviction of responsibility not only to country but to God. This something we call the soul, and it does not obey the law of living, but the law of duty.

Men perish for principle's sake alone, martyrs to truth, but they violate the law of life. The captain of a ship stands till the last, in his endeavor to save passengers and crew, knowing full well the probable result. Men join in the service of their country, leaving home, comfort and safety, for the field, danger and death; they abandon their professions, break up the careers they had planned for themselves, and face hardships to which they are unaccustomed. They all deserted the law of life, they died and suffered, not to benefit themselves or to gratify any of the desires or passions which men have in common with the beasts, but in the hope of perpetuating some living principle, clearer than life, or to maintain a form of government which they believed to be pre-eminently calculated to elevate mankind or to increase the happiness of their fellows.

To curb the body, and keep it under control, to subordinate our envy, our greed, spite, covetousness, jealousy and rage to the nobler instincts, to subdue every desire tending to the disregard of the rights of others, would appear, aside from the commands and instructions of religion, to be the course of every man who believes himself to have an immortal part or soul. With the commands of religion calling upon him to weave into his public and private life the precepts of the Golden Rule, how imperative becomes the course we have considered.

Logically then we arrive at a fundamental truth in American politics, that the course of life which is best calculated to fit the immortal part of us for the future and spiritual life, is that course also which will make us the best citizens of our town, our state, our nation.

Nor does this mean that we shall give such prudent obedience to the laws as will keep us out of jail. And in this connection a brief consideration of the good citizen's special duty, and rights which always precede duty, cannot be otherwise than instructive. Our rights are, to protection under the laws; to bear arms in defense of our rights; to serve on juries; to speedy trials; to freedom of the body from arrest except by due process of law; to freedom of speech so long as we slander no man, etc. These rights are called inalienable, because we cannot, even by our own will divest ourselves of them; so with our political duties, which we cannot justly neglect or lay aside. It is our duty to obey the laws, whether unjust or unwise, while they exist. It is our duty, if we are voters, to vote at all elections, and to inform ourselves beforehand what measures and men we ought to support. It is our duty to insist upon



the prompt and proper execution of the laws, and to be ready to aid in their enforcement. It is our duty to watch the conduct of public officers, to see that they perform their duties and observe their constitutional limitations, and if they do not, it is our duty to help expose them, and at the elections to punish them.

These, with many others which will naturally suggest themselves, are political duties which we cannot neglect or adjure without disgrace to ourselves and harm to our country; and it is a knowledge of these and kindred duties which should make up a large part of the science of politics; but when these high duties are mentioned as the true elements of real politics, we are met with slurs as to parties and caucuses and primary meetings and politicians. Are there not religious duties here also? It should be remembered that all ideas find progressing power only in party.

Says Nordhoff, from whose writings I have freely drawn, in all free states there are usually two political parties, where motives are independent of their names. One of the two great parties is generally composed of men who desire change, and the other of men who cling to that which is. As temperaments differ so men belong to one or the other party according as their characters lead them to be conservative, dreading change when it is for the better, or progressive, welcoming change even if it is for the worse. Party government is necessary in a free state. The organization of political parties is the only means by which the sense of the people can be had at elections upon questions of public politics; and by party government only can responsibility be fixed upon political leaders. It is the duty of all men, after careful consideration, to act generally with some political party, and to exert all the influence possible upon its leaders to induce the nomination of capable and honest men for office. Party leaders however do not always declare their opinions and intentions, and then the citizen must choose the least of two evils, not forgetting that a party may have the worst principles with the best men locally, and the other the best principles with some of the worst men, and as a rule when the issue is a vital principle, measures must take precedence to men.

In a free government like ours inefficiency or corruption will be punished by the people as soon as they become really dangerous to the nation.

Reforms in politics always grow slowly, but when it becomes evident that a party is corrupt, the virtue of the people comes to their assistance and the whole complexion of affairs is changed in a day. Political parties, with all the dirt and filth which seems to surround them, in spite of all the intrigues, trades and

petty work of selfish wire-pullers, are and have been the bulwark of free government. Do not cry out against them but act with one or the other and do your utmost to make the one you belong to pure and devoted to the conservation of principle. If parties do carry nations on in the great march of civilization, as I believe they do, if as history shows, no free government can exist without them, then it should be part of our religion to act with them, to take a stand according to our honest convictions, and rest assured we shall form part of that ever existing third party little heard of without organization, which seeks no office, holds no meetings, owns no banner, but which holds the balance of power, and silently decides the elections. This third party, without a name is comprised of the men who think for themselves, who are not moved by passionate appeals, but who vote for the policy which on the whole seems likely to best further the good of the state. This party is the terror of professional politicians, and often their confusion. It is this party, which puts up no candidates, that punishes inefficiency, corruption or maladministration of any kind. It is to this party the nation owes its safety and will in the future look for protection, and it is to this nameless party every true democrat or republican should belong.

I believe with an eminent divine, that it is a Christian duty to vote as well as to pray; that God always takes care of the man, no matter who he is, who takes up and performs the duty that comes in his way, without regard to its cleanliness or propriety. Political work is the work of Christians. If, as we have seen, party government is inevitable and necessary in a free country, it is the absolute duty of every citizen to take part in the primary meetings of the party with which he acts. If the welfare of the country depends upon honest government, a proposition no one will deny, and it is the bounden and religious duty of every citizen to stand by his political convictions, a proposition equally axiomatic, it follows most conclusively that the first political act to claim his attention, is to be present at the caucus and express by presence and by voice and by vote his preference for delegates, and thus indirectly his choice for candidate. No man has any moral right to complain that his party or his state is going wrong who keeps away from the caucus, and the man who says he has no interest in politics, or not enough to bring him out at the evening primary, should be made to hang his head in shame at the state of affairs he cries out so loudly against. Every man should remember that when a party becomes the tool of corrupt or ignorant men, it is in danger and deserves not only temporary but lasting defeat.

Politics have always been in every free country an enticing profession, followed by many honest and high-minded men out of a desire to see their private principles prevail; by others to advance their private fortunes. I believe our own politics are less corrupt, and our own politicians taken as a class are far more scrupulous than those of most free nations have been, either in ancient or modern times. When therefore men talk or write about the peculiar debasement of our politics do not entirely heed them. I believe the average of political morality is higher in the United States than in any other nation in the world.

Speaking of corruption, did it ever occur to you that crime would not be recognized in a community of criminals? that corruption could not be seen by a corrupt people?

The purer and more virtuous the masses, the more easily crime and corruption are detected, and the more intelligent the members of the great political parties the more readily do they detect the inefficiency of a magistrate. How pre-requisite then becomes the purity, the virtue, the intelligence of the primary meeting, and how obligatory upon all good citizens to take part in them and do all in their power to rebuke any encroachment upon the democratic right of every man to the free expression of his opinions of measures and his choice of men. All the evil that can come from the caucus system—and it is immense, for it is here the fountain is poisoned—can be exorcised by the presence of all men of the party. The caucus is the political tree, and virtue or corruption is the political fruit, as sure as harvest follows seed-time. If religion in its broad sense of duty to God, to man and self demands anything at our hands by way of labor, of sacrifice, of effort, of intention or action, and if we demand of our governments purity of administration, the caucus as surely claims our attention, our presence, our encouragement. A man had better remain away from the polls, if he cannot attend both, than the primary.

I have considered the duties of a man as to his citizenship and his elective privileges as voiced by party at the polls and the primary meetings. What has he to do when he holds a position bestowed by his fellow-citizens?

The instances in history of the utter political oblivion of men who have dared to desert the line of conviction for policy's sake are numerous and striking. When a public man, occupying a prominent position, forsakes long expressed theories of action, or makes overtures to powerful parties by seemingly adopting some measures then held by as sound, or seeks alliance with a faction governed by a different political code than his own, for sake of votes, how surely and swiftly too do the peo-

ple consign him to that political rest which knows no awakening. Perhaps the life and career of Aaron Burr furnishes as striking an illustration as will be found in the early history of this country. Burr, one of the most talented and brilliant of American politicians, courted and petted, with the mind and power to have brought all places he sought to his feet; with a keenness and a magnetic force to subdue any opponent; the very ideal in all accomplishment of a politician and a statesman combined, gives us an example of the fate which awaits the public man devoid of political principle. Burr's private character was bad enough, but for all that he stood upon the ladder of fame so high that he became dazed, and instead of holding steadfast to the principles of national unity, as the sheet anchor of the hope of the United States, ambitious dreams took possession of his mind, and the glorious possibilities which the peer of all men of his time held for his country, were swamped in treason. Had Burr possessed the integrity of Hamilton, or even Jefferson, of Lincoln, or Sumner, the living fame of the Father of his Country would have lost half its lustre, and Aaron Burr's name would have blazoned on the brightest roll of loved and honored names of the young republic. Religion played no part in his actions, and his politics were as devoid of patriotism as his loves were of fidelity. Burr's is an extreme illustration of the truth of my position. Others of milder type fill us with sadness at the political wrecks resulting from want of steadfastness to principle. Our own time has furnished many examples you will readily call to mind.

The ruler who recognizes and follows only the popular voice and the popular opinion becomes himself a slave, and he only is truly a public servant and truly free who recognizes in the sovereignty of the nation the divine source of its unity and power, whose actions in it are therefore in immediate responsibility to God. It seems to me perfectly well established that the application of religion in politics, as to individual action, both in voting for, or in holding an office, is not only demanded but is prerequisite to individual political success. In fact politics, which have been called the science of expedients, at the best means really the welfare of a nation, and there is no more difficulty in applying to their conduct the precepts which we teach for all other human affairs than to the conduct of the affairs of church. Perhaps politics in religion is easier to be comprehended and acted than religion in politics, but there is no valid reason why the same tests of honest conduct should not be applied to all affairs of politics as to business and social matters. The man who is honest in every thing but politics is not an honest man, and deserves as much the condemnation of his

neighbors as if he was dishonest in business. Yet we hear it said of men, "They are perfectly reliable in everything but politics." Now, I do not believe a man can be honest in business and dishonest in politics. If a man lies in one matter he is a liar. If he is dishonest and tricky in politics he is a dishonest and tricky man. I would not take a man's word under oath who would give false testimony if not under oath, nor would I take a man's business word if his political word were not good. If this test should be applied generally we should be far on the way to political purity.

Does my subject apply to states and nations? As states are governed by men of one or the other existing parties, and the government reflects the principles of the party, most assuredly; and doubly does it apply, for I hold that a nation—which bear in mind is not the government, the government being only the means or machinery by which the nation's will is expressed—has soul or the equivalent; not immortality, but a power of a divine origin. "The powers that be are ordained of God." "There is no power but of God." No individual has any divine right to be king. Whoever exercises legitimately any function of the civil ruler, whether he be king or president, legislator or judge, is exercising an authority which is as divine in its origin as is the authority of a parent over his child. Power is lodged in the people; it is held by the nation as a whole, and not by them as individuals. The power of a nation does not come from the individual members, but it belongs to the nation as such, and the nation receives it from God, as a parent receives from God his right to govern his children. But although this power or sovereignty is in the people collectively, they have no right to exercise any authority which God has not bestowed upon them. The parent has no right to govern his child except for the child's good; neither has the nation any right to do anything which is not for the good of the people. But sovereignty is not absolute; it must be exercised in subordination to a higher sovereignty, which recognizes the dignity and worth of the human being.

The nation as it exists in its necessary conception, is the Christian nation. This has its clearest assertion from those who have been called to their work in the foundation of nations; it has been, in the crises of nations, their strength and their stay; and its principle has wrought with the power of a divine inspiration in the spirit of the people. There has been a constant recognition of this great principle repeated in the writings of the fathers and founders of our Republic. The Christ is the King from whose authority no nation is excluded. The statesman may recognize this only as, in some rhetorical

phrase, he strengthens his appeal in conformance to popular impressions; the journalist may dismiss the truth as belonging to the dream of the mystic, but having no relation to events as the days go by; the economist may apprehend the nation only as the commonwealth, and insists upon a sustained indifference to it, as alone consistent in politics, until there comes some great crisis, when the maxims of economy are unheeded, the craft of parties is confounded, and the systems of theorists are burned as stubble in the flames that try all things, and they learn that the unity of the nation is in no visible bond, and is determined by no confine of land and sea, but that the unity and continuity of fatherland is in God, by the revelation which he made to all, "I am the God of thy fathers."

There is not in literature so deep an expression of the existence of the nation as an heritage to be transmitted from the fathers to the children, but the fulfillment of the divine righteousness is always made the condition of the permanence of the heritage. The education of the people through the ages of their moral and political advancement, was in the knowledge of the relation in which they stood to the visible and invisible. They were learning in their national wars and trials, and through all changes and crises, to look to a being who was not made in the likeness of things in the heavens above or in the earth beneath, and to know Him as their Lawgiver and Deliverer and Judge. The truth which underlies all this comes into clearer light in the higher development of the nation. The sovereignty of the nation is from God, and of the people. The representative of the sovereignty is therefore responsible to God, and accountable to the people. The nation has a divine foundation, and has for its end the fulfillment of the divine end in history. The constitution of a nation is made by the people for the guidance of the government. The government cannot change the constitution, but the nation can.

You will at once perceive that so long as the nation is virtuous, and sustains its christian character, its constitution will demand all things in the best interest of humanity, but when the general moral condition of a people becomes so low as to allow them to change their fundamental law, which is the constitution—from that deep religious concern which cares for the welfare of humanity, and the progress of civilization, to the perpetuation of a great wrong; then begins the downfall of sovereignty and a relegation of authority to God.

This nation, had it engrafted upon its organic law the right to hold slaves, would have violated the conditions on which it received power, that is, the welfare of the people and the rights

of humanity. God rules for the happiness and well-being of his creatures, and by inflexible laws he demands like conditions from nations, and when these conditions are broken he takes away all sovereignty. All the ages of history teach this lesson so emphatically that instances accumulate and establish the principle beyond contradiction.

No nation can exist in peace that does not observe the great truths of humanity as taught by the Christian religion ; the lesson of obedience has always been swiftly and surely taught, and the result has been the awful castigation or utter destruction of the people violating the principle. Nations must act up to a standard protecting human rights with religious duty or the governments they establish will totter and crumble. Individuals must observe the same great truth in all their political duties ; parties must guard well the principle or no lasting power can be held by the people.

If the kingdom of the spirit of Christ comes on earth, as I believe it will, I believe it must come through the establishment of a perfected national existence, when the Golden Rule and all the precepts of Christianity shall constitute the organic law of the land. How preëminently essential it becomes that all in authority be pure, and as the stream can rise no higher than the fountain, the people must be righteous in politics before the establishment of the kingdom can be secured.

The lesson I would have sink into your minds and hearts is fidelity to the divine commands reiterated again and again, and embodied in the Declaration on which is founded our own government. Equality before the law means obligation to the highest attributes of law, and it is based upon divine laws, and a government founded upon them cannot endure except in a Christian community. We must learn to be faithful to God's ordained rule of action, which means faithful following of Christ's precepts in all private and public work.

CARROLL D. WRIGHT.

SOURCES OF ANGLO-NORMAN CHURCH HISTORY.

It is related of a certain professor, who had spent most of his literary life in a study of the cases of the Greek noun, that, being asked upon his deathbed if he felt satisfied of having found out all that could be found out about them, he replied: "By no means; the subject was too vast; I should have confined my labors to the dative case alone." Such specialism of course no one would advise except in rare instances, and it is far from our intention to recommend the student of history to confine his labors to any one particular event with the affection and self-sacrifice bestowed upon the dative case of the Greek noun by that eminent philologist, but nevertheless, since history as studied to-day is following in the footsteps of all other sciences by becoming more and more special, and has driven out the old literary method of historical writing, it would be well for us to take warning in time so as not to fall behind. Certainly, whatever may be said of the relative merits of the two methods the student from a practical point of view should have little hesitation in following the more recent as being for the present at least, that one best fitted for the defence of whatever system he may be identified with—whether religious, economic or political, so that the difficulties besetting his entrance upon the study of history reduce themselves down to a choice between particular periods of it.

I.

For the English-speaking student, whether of church or civil history we suggest that period denominated, for the want of a better title, as Anglo-Norman, extending from the arrival of the Normans in England to the Magna Charta (1066-1215), during which the Norman and Saxon elements were gradually welded by the fierce struggles in church and state into the English people, one in sympathies if not in language, and possessed at least in germ-form of all those political rights whose evolution has up to the present day constituted and still explains English history. It is perhaps the most important period, since all before it was but preparation and all after it but consequence.

Lest this should appear unfounded, a glance at the political and religious movements of the age will not be amiss. In

the Church most important changes were taking place. Contemporary with William the Conqueror, Gregory VII. occupied the papal throne and inaugurated that policy which has made him such an important character in the Middle Ages. He first sounded the battle-cry to that long desperate struggle with the state that was to be fought out along the lines both of the theory of the Holy Roman Empire and of the independence of the national churches; a struggle marked in England by the exile of Anselm, the murder of Becket and the feudal submission of King John to the Papacy; a struggle to the death because involving the self-respect, the very existence of the English Church as a church worthy of the name and of its divine Founder.

In the state even more momentous changes date from that period. Under the iron hand and wise guidance of the Norman invader order gave place to the preceding state of chronic disturbances; the courts of law were organized into permanent tribunals in place of the former intermittent administration of justice; the fiscal system was arranged with a comprehensiveness and accuracy of detail which only avarice could have suggested and a conqueror carried out; on broader lines feudalism takes its rise but is by both clergy and kings gradually extinguished, until the lords were forced to come out of their castles and unite with the clergy and burgher-class against royal aggressions, thus preparing the way for the unification of the English people and planting the first seeds of representative principles; and finally the towns then began to acquire those chartered liberties which have ever since rendered their possessors such a powerful factor in the governing body.

In the world of ideas from that period dates the rise of the great universities, whose full expansion was however reserved to the following; Norman and Gothic architecture take the place both of the Roman basilica and crude Saxon buildings, proving unmistakably that the nation was breaking away from the domination of Roman ideas and forgetting its Saxon traditions; and although the English language, or better the Saxon, was seldom heard in the royal or law-courts, and still less in the lecture halls, which resounded almost exclusively with French or Latin, yet it is allowable to suppose that the same process which was bringing all classes of people into closer contact and binding ever closer the proud Norman abbot and his Saxon monk, the cruel Norman lord and his Saxon villein, was also slowly but surely developing a common language for the expression of their now common ideas. In a word, during the twelfth century England and the English-speaking race were made what they are to-day, in spite of the accidental changes induced by time, so that the student of English history, whether

ecclesiastical or civil, can hardly afford to be ignorant of that period, however wisely he may dispense with the knowledge of any other.

But to thoroughly understand those times a far greater knowledge is required than that acquired from a hasty reading of the standard historians, and this brings us to the question of the value of original authorities in general. To be brief, then, the value of an original authority lies above all in the fact of his having *seen* what he describes, or of having heard it from the lips of those who did see it, or at least of having been a member of that society whose mental, physical and social condition was influenced by it. This fact alone gives him a superiority to which a later writer, however acute and laborious and brilliant, can never aspire; it constitutes between the two a difference in authority, not merely of grade but of kind. Moreover, unless a succeeding historian be an exception to the mass of mankind he will invariably reflect more or less intensely the prejudices of his own age, look at past events from the standpoint of the theories in vogue around him, and unconsciously seek for an accommodation between them and the past which may have no foundation in fact. But what the student wishes to know are the opinions of men contemporary, not posterior to the events; what they ate and were clothed with, their amusements and griefs, their opinions, political and religious, the amount of liberty enjoyed by them,—in a word, all those innumerable great and little facts which made up the life of the day and which only those who experienced them can adequately describe. And if he can, as it were, catch them narrating not in the set form of history but in the unguarded freedom of epistolary correspondence and of satirical poetry, so much the more will his information gain in accuracy.

It is to the conviction of the immense value of original authorities that are due the vast labors undergone chiefly in the latter half of the present century in the editing of them. Before this investigators like Matthew Parker, Sir Henry Saville, John Seldon, Thomas Gale, Joseph Sparke and others had done not a little towards making them of easy access. Their labors were supplemented by the publication in the beginning of the last century of the famous *Foedera* of Thomas Rhymer; of the rolls of parliament in 1767; of the public records begun in 1830; of the Journals of the Houses of Lords and Commons; and finally of those of the many historical societies which sprang up all over England during the first part of the present century, but which however failed for the most part on account of financial reasons, not however without editing much of great value. But these attempts were far from fur-

nishing the materials required by the advancing spirit of historical inquiry, the failure being due among other causes to the gigantic nature of the task which needed for completion all the resources of the general government. This condition of affairs did therefore induce the latter to take up the work by the appointing of the famous Rolls Commission in 1856, which continues to open up year by year the treasures of the past.

Let us note the results upon the trend of historical studies. Suspicion of the Middle Ages has given place to a better understanding, at times to admiration; and, speaking for the Church the obloquy which has so long damned her past record in the eyes of outsiders has so far been removed upon nearer acquaintance that many are often now as lavish of praise as before of rebuke. But far more reaching is the effect upon the reputation of the standard historians, upon whom posterity has ceased to look with the old-time reverence, howsomuch it still feels grateful for their pioneer work in enlarging the limits of historical knowledge. They themselves have become original authorities for their own age, but have ceased to be the guides of the past or the prophets of the future. Such is their fate. They build upon the wreck of their predecessors' fame, and in like manner others will build upon their basis a temple to their own evanescent glory. They kill and are killed like the dwellers in the Vale of Ariccia,

“ The priest who slew the slayer,
And must himself be slain.”

II.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHRONICLES.

To any one, therefore, whom the foregoing has convinced of the necessity of original investigation and of the importance of the Anglo-Norman period of English history the following notices of sources whence his information is to be drawn may not prove altogether useless. It is to be regretted, however, that the short space of a magazine article will not allow an examination of any but the most noted, enough, however, will, it is hoped, prove sufficient to give a fair estimate of their general characteristics.

First of all, the student should possess a clear idea of what the chronicle in general looks like, because the sources are, with few exceptions, reducible to this head. Now the character of the chronicles, like that of any other book, was determined by the motives which caused them to be written, and since most of them have issued from monasteries, we must

find out what were the motives that inspired the monks to watch with such keen interest in the quiet recesses of their cells the events happening in the world without. Certainly the motive was rarely money, and never for the monk's own profit, which his vow of poverty forbade him to seek. More often, however,—in fact it may be put down as a general rule,—the historian wrote to extend the fame of his own monastery, and frequently out of obedience to a superior who might have had the wisdom to realize the value of such productions, and the good sense to entrust their composition to one more capable, even if more unwilling than himself. In fact every monastery of importance possessed its scriptorium, where its historiographer and his assistants were continually employed in transcribing and illuminating missals, copying the works of the fathers, and composing the house-chronicles; such, for instance, was the famous monastery of St. Albans, where grew up in time a regular school of able historians like Wendower and Matthew Paris. When, therefore, a work issued from these printing "presses," it was known as the production not so much of this or that monk as of the whole monastery, by whose name it has ever since been known, thus, e. g., *Chronicles* or *Annals* of Burton, of Waverly, of Winchester, etc.

To men working under such conditions fame was consequently of little moment, especially when we take into account the small audience to whom any literary work could appeal; their whole object, at least in the beginning, was to produce a monument to the good name of their house, without being too scrupulous concerning the means employed. Their work grew, like the monastery itself, by degrees, each succeeding writer adding something more, correcting or incorporating the labors of his predecessors, but seldom leaving any notices which would inform the reader what portions of the book were the labors of each historiographer; the most that one ever finds being after this sort, "*Huc usque Dominus Rogerus de Wendower, incipit Matthaëus Parisiensis.*" From such a practice confusion had quite naturally arisen concerning the authorship and consequently the date and authority of many, although much of it has been dissipated by the labors of critics. However the reader even yet must be on guard continually to detect when the author is plagiarizing, when he is writing from his own observations, or merely putting into his own words what he had received from his predecessor. These remarks apply in general to many of the writers mentioned below; but there is one chronicle, called the *Saxon*, which is peculiar enough at least as regards its origin and its language to justify a notice by itself.

III.

THE SAXON CHRONICLE.

This extends, in at least one copy, from the invasion of Britain by Cæsar to A. D. 1154, where it abruptly ends. Whether composed by King Alfred (which is more probable), or by others before him, is not of much consequence except from a literary point of view, because on the latter supposition it becomes the oldest piece of historical prose in any Teutonic language. Henry Sweet calls it "the first history of any Teutonic people in their own language, the earliest and most venerable monument of English prose. In it English poetry sang its last song; in its death old English dies. It is not until the reign of John that English poetry in any form but that of short poems appears again in the *Brut* of Layamon, and until the reign of Edward III. that original English prose again appears."¹ A more detailed description of it would here be too lengthy, but an idea of its importance can be gained from the fact that up to the reign of King Stephen it is the only vehicle for the practical expression of the thoughts of the down-trodden native English,—the Norman, French and Latin being no less ascendant in literature than Norman force in government.

IV.

POST-NORMAN ANNALS AND CHRONICLES.

The Saxon chronicle was in form at least but a poor affair, suited perhaps to the narrow, insular character and needs of its composers, but never to the cosmopolitan Norman, who was what the Saxon never had been, a European, a busy organizer, a patron of learning, a curious traveller, requiring for both entertainment and instruction a history in the larger sense of the term; which would tell of other lands besides his own, of their customs politics, and wars; which would depict the ever-varying phases of his own struggles in both church and state. Hence history with the arrival of the Conqueror immediately expands in bulk and is adorned with some attempt at good style. But it could not at first be expected to reach all at once that vivacity and general high grade afterwards attained in the latter half of the twelfth century. The times would not allow it, for they were years of organization in church and state, when both the clergy and the laity were rather too busy to read his-

¹Stopford Brooke, *Early English Literature*, London, 1892, p. 243; and the same, *English Literature*, London, 1880, p. 21; Ten Brink, *History of English Literature*, New York, 1889, vol. I, pp. 67-83.

tory merely for amusement's sake, so that the general characteristics of these early Norman writers are, with one exception, laboriousness and investigation, seriousness in the matter described and sobriety in expression.

1. *Eadmer* (d. 1124?).

One of the first to use his pen is Eadmer, a monk of Canterbury, friend and biographer of St. Anselm. ¹His chief works are the "Life of St. Anselm," a detailed account of his early life and after struggles with William II. and Henry I. concerning the royal right of investing clerics with their benefices, written with an affection and fairness of spirit worthy of its hero; also the "Historia Novarum," apparently the most circumstantial and correct source of information upon that first battle of the English Church with the State, although it is not to be blindly followed as absolutely unprejudiced or even exact. He was held in high esteem by his contemporaries, by for instance, William of Malmesbury, who modestly disclaims a comparison of his own writing with those of Eadmer, because "he has told everything so lucidly that he seems somehow or other to have placed them before our eyes."

2. *Ordericus Vitalis* (1075-1143).

Born of an English mother and French father near Shrewsbury, but at ten years of age was taken to Normandy, where he spent the rest of his life, varied with occasional visits to England, for which he always retained much affection, a circumstance of no small importance in estimating the value of his writings. Between 1125 and 1141 most probably he composed his "Historia Ecclesiastica," ²originally intended as a chronicle of his monastery of St. Evroult, but which insensibly grew into a full history of the times. Its defects, which are many, consist chiefly in the clumsy arrangement, faulty chronology, involved and turgid style, and a pedantic, amusing habit of calling Norman barons by such classical titles as tribune, centurion, etc. On the whole it is a work of immense importance, whether we regard its fairness of spirit or its circumstantiality of detail, wherein even the "Historia Novarum" must yield the palm. Therein we see the life not merely of one man but of contemporary society; details of war, customs, local legends and natural phenomena; all those great and small details which bring before us a complete picture of how men thought, spoke and lived in Orderic's own day. For the events immediately

¹"Vita Anselmi Cantuariensis, Archiepiscopi, auctore Eadmero." "Eadmeri Monachi Cantuariensis Historia Novarum, sive sui saeculi, libri sex." Migne, P. L., Vol. CLIX.

²"Orderici Vitalis Angligenae, Coenobii Vitiensis Monachi, Historiae Ecclesiasticae libri XIII. ad annum 1141. Migne, P. L. CLXXXVIII.

preceding the conquest he drew from other authors like William of Poitiers, William of Jumièges, Guy of Amiens and Eadmer.

3. *William of Malmesbury*¹ (1095-1143?).

A Benedictine monk of Malmesbury, also the offspring of Norman and English parentage, but with sympathies manifestly on the side of the former, which somewhat weakens the authority of his statements, particularly regarding Henry I. Malmesbury is an exception to the general sober character of the average historian of his day, anticipating, as he does, the vivacity of the later northern school of Hoveden and Newbury. Although no more correct or well-informed than Orderic, he is decidedly superior as a philosopher of history, which rôle the latter rarely attempts except by occasionally moralizing upon the death of some eminent person. Moreover he has the dramatic power of striking off a character by a passing reference to some physical peculiarity, as when he speaks of the "ferocious snarl of the Conqueror, or the brutal horse-laugh of Rufus." On the whole he is perhaps the best representative English historian after Bede, at least up to his own day.

4. These three above-mentioned writers are the great historians of the first half of the twelfth century, but there are others, who though of less importance, deserve a passing notice.

a) *Simon of Durham*² (d. 1130).

Chiefly valuable for events in Northumbria; largely derived his materials from Bede's History and Life of St. Cuthbert, and other sources not known.

b) *Henry of Huntingdon*³ (d. after 1154).

Chiefly remarkable as a diocesan priest composing in an age when monks were almost the only writers, and valuable for having preserved from oblivion many ballads and early folk traditions. Otherwise his work is but a compilation from Bede and the Saxon chronicle, diminishing in value in proportion as it approaches his own time.

c) *Florence of Worcester*⁴ (d. 1118).

His work in the early portion is compiled from the Saxon chronicle and Marianus Scotus, also an eleventh century compiler from Bede and the Chronicle; after 1030 he becomes an independent authority.

¹ *Historia regum Anglorum. Historiae Novellae. De Gestis Pontificum Anglorum. De Antiquitatibus Glastoniensis Ecclesiae.*

² *Simeonis Dunelmensis Opera et Collectanea.* Ed. by J. H. Hinde, Surtees Society, 1868.

³ *Henrici Archidiaconi Huntingdonensis Historia Anglorum: A. D. 55-1154, in eight books.* Ed. Thos. Arnold, Rolls Series, 1879.

⁴ *Florentii Wigornensis Monachi Chronicon ex chronicis, ab adventu Hengesti et Horsi in Brittauniam usque ad ann. 1117.* Ed. by Benjamin Thorpe, 2 vols., 1843.

d) *Geoffrey Gaimer.*

Wrote about 1140 a "Histoire des Angles" in French verse, extending from King Arthur to William II., based upon the chronicle and some other sources common to Florence and himself. He speaks of Henry I. like a personal acquaintance and of Rufus like an eye-witness.

e) *Early Norman History and the doings of William I. after the battle of Hastings.*

1° Dudo of St. Quentin (d. 1030), "De gestis Ducum Normanniae."

2° William of Jumièges, "Historia Normannorum," the early portion of which is taken from Dudo. His sympathies are of course Norman, although not so much as to seriously impair his accuracy. This work formed the basis of the famous "Roman de Rou," a metrical history of the Conquest composed by Wace, a canon of Bayeux, in the twelfth century.

3° William of Poitiers (1020-1089). Wrote the "Gesta Will-emi," the most complete history of the Conqueror from 1036 to 1067, but vitiated by undue admiration.

4° Guy of Amiens. Wrote "De Bello Hastingsensi," a metrical account of the battle of Hastings.

In looking over this first period of Anglo-Norman historical writing one is forcibly struck with the rapidity with which the young plant grew up to maturity under the fostering protection of Norman rule. Before the arrival of the Conqueror there is hardly a single English writer of prominence, certainly none to compare with those above mentioned, or who cared enough about his country to follow in the footsteps of Bede and Alfred and write her history, a sign that both learning and national pride had become warped by the insular character of the people and then extinguished in their fratricidal jealousies, not even a bit of poetry being written to soften the pain of the defeat at Senlac. Certainly the absence of Saxon literature, so noticeable at this date, cannot be laid at the door of Norman contempt or devastating ignorance, since the early Norman writers were too conscientious and laborious to neglect any source however insignificant, whilst the armed noble was too sensible to destroy for the mere sake of destroying. No wonder then that such a people as the Saxon should have gone down before the first shock of the Norman cavalry, and still less wonder that all learning should have fallen into the hands of the conquerors. And yet in spite of it we cannot help admiring the fairness with which these writers, Norman by sympathy, if not all by blood, treat the subject race, all the more so when we remember its political oppression. A rare instance

of history freeing itself from political prejudices, a quality which ranks men like Eadmer and Orderic in an infinitely higher grade than many after them, who love to dwell with such compassionating complacency upon the ignorance and untruthfulness of that unlovable creature whom ignorance has created in their imaginations and malevolence has ever since called with most unurbane persistence—"monkish."

V.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT.

The second half of the twelfth century, which can, without impropriety, be termed in a literary sense the age of Henry II., witnessed a twofold change in the character of historical writing. In the first place a new school of history arises in the north, owing doubtless to the complete pacification of the whole country as far as Northumbria, which, being further away from the royal supervision than the rest of the country, might naturally have become the last refuge of Saxon freedom and of disorder. Such names as Peterborough, Hoveden, Diceto, Rievaulx, now dispute the palm with Canterbury, Newbury, Hereford and Salisbury in the south. Again, the character of literature in general and of history in particular changes from the sometimes oppressive seriousness of the earlier writers to the more lively, chatty, and brilliant style of such as John of Salisbury, and unhappily to the licentiousness of a Walter Map or the spiteful Cambrensis. Such a change was due partly to the general progress made by the nation in legislative, economic and political organization,—a progress that relaxed men's minds from the consideration of serious problems and disposed them to the enjoyment of the benefits conferred by peace and order; and partly also to the licentious Queen Eleanor, whose court became a rendezvous for all the wandering troubadours and other manner of adventurers and which delighted in the ribald songs of such as Walter Map.

From these sources the stream of history issued more sparkling, more abundant, but more bitter to the taste and corrupting in its influence. From that period dates Giraldus Cambrensis, the first of the great English historians who, to our knowledge, made his learning a channel for detraction of his opponents. Moreover, the Becket controversy adds still more bitterness, so that by the side of those who followed in the peaceful paths of the older schools there now arose others who seek the arena of politics, civil and religious, there to use their historic learning as a weapon of warfare. True, the works of men like John of Salisbury, Newbury, and Roger Hoveden

mark a great advance in historical writing in the way of brilliancy of style and breadth of view, perhaps also of impartiality, but the blasting element of partisanship in the works of others has come to cloud the vision and make us regret the simplicity of "dear old Orderic." From this date history will no longer flow peaceful and undefiled, but will become troubled and foul in proportion as it approaches the sixteenth century, from whose venom and filth it has only of late been to any great extent purified.

1. *William of Newbury* (1136-1208).

A canon regular of the monastery of Newbury in Yorkshire. His chief work¹ is the "Historia or Chronicon," valuable principally for the reign of Henry II. Its impartiality, independence of thought and vividness of narration rank it as a history of a very high order and its author as one of the foremost representatives of the new northern school. Surely it must have required no small amount of moral courage to enable a man of his day to criticise Becket's conduct during the famous conflict with King Henry; at a time especially when his faults were fast becoming forgotten in the popular veneration of his sanctity; yet Newbury in the face of this popular reverence with astonishing boldness expresses his unqualified disapproval of many of the Saint's actions, without however, on the other hand, approving of all of Henry's. It is indeed doubtful if many living writers would be capable of such frankness in the teeth of popular prejudice as this monk who lived in times wherein all freedom of thought and expression are commonly supposed to have been utterly suppressed.

2. *Roger Hoveden* (d. 1201).

A native of Hoveden, or Howeden, a possession of the See of Durham in Yorkshire; clerk of Henry II. who employed him in various affairs both at home and abroad, and at whose death he probably retired from public life to compose in solitude his work, known as the *Chronica*, a series of annals extending from A. D. 732 to 1201, of which the portion extending to 1169 is mainly a compilation; that from 1170 to 1192 corresponds with the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, although differing in the treatment of the materials; the remaining is wholly Hoveden's work. Concerning this writer we can do no better than quote Bishop Stubbs:² "It is in Hoveden that we have the full harvest of the Northumbrian historian. Studied as the primary authority on the history of a reign of

¹ "Historia Rerum Anglicarum" in five books, extending from 1066 to 1198.

² *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Hovedene*. 4 vols. Edited by William Stubbs, Rolls Series, 1868-76.

great importance, this work affords material for discussion of the most interesting kind on an immense variety of points, constitutional and political."

Regarding the Becket controversy he at first strives to be neutral, but towards the end is influenced by the saintly character and bloody death of the martyr, a fact which must be kept well in mind when determining the relative guilt of the opposing men, since the merits of the controversy hang not upon its latter phases when it had developed into a mere personal quarrel, but upon the preceding ones, where principles were more in question. If, as it seems, Hoveden was a diocesan priest, his work becomes still more interesting in an age given up almost exclusively to monastic writers.

3. *Benedict of Peterborough* (d. 1193).

Abbot of Peterborough, and intimate friend of Richard I., composed a history of the passion and miracles of Becket, but was probably not the author of the work most often connected with his name, namely the above mentioned "*Gesta Henrici Secundi*," extending from A. D. 1169 to 1192; another monk most likely composed it under the direction of Benedict. It is chiefly valuable for the history of Scotland, North England and Richard's Crusade, but touches the Becket affair quite gingerly. Additional value is leant by the detailed manner of narration, by the number of documents inserted, the style being exceptionally easy and flowing.

4. *Ralph of Diceto*¹ (d. circ. 1203).

Was for fifty years archdeacon of Middlesex and dean of St. Paul's, which positions gave him access to the best information. Wrote: a) "*Abbreviationes Chronicorum*," a work of comparatively small value; b) "*Imagines Historiarum*," which is of great value for the reigns of Henry II. and Richard I.

5. *Richard of Devizes*.²

A monk of Winchester, who composed in the last decade of the twelfth century an account of the affairs of England from 1189 to 1192, and of the exploits of King Richard during that time in the Holy Land, for whose reign it is one of the earliest and most authentic narrations. His style is amusingly sarcastic especially when he defends his brother monks.

¹"*Radulphi de Diceto Decani Londoniensi Opera Historica*." 2 vols. edited by William Stubbs, Rolls Series 1876.

²"*Chronicon Ricardi Divisiensis de Rebus Gestis Ricardi Primi*." Edited by J. Stevenson, 1838.

6. *Hugo Candidus or Albus*.¹

A monk of Peterborough who composed a history of that monastery extending down to 1175 and including notices of some others, a work chiefly valuable from the fact of its author having used the Peterborough version of the Saxon Chronicle, but which is otherwise almost destitute of general information.

8. *Gervase of Canterbury* (d. circ. 1205).²

A monk of Canterbury. Made a compilation from Henry of Huntingdon, the continuator of Florence of Worcester, and the *Gesta Henrici Secundi*, that extend from the reign of Stephen to the death of Richard; is a prejudiced writer and though valuable, not of the first rank.

9. *Giraldus Cambrensis* (1177-1222).

A Welsh ecclesiastic, chiefly famous for his "*Topographia Hiberniae* and *Expurgatio Hiberniae*," a description of the natural history, miracles, inhabitants and conquest by Henry II. of Ireland; wrote also "*Gemma Ecclesiastica*, *Speculum Ecclesiae*," a somewhat exaggerated picture of ecclesiastical and court life at this period.³ As to his impartiality, especially as to the accuracy and truthfulness of his Irish histories, the reader is referred to the famous "*Cambrensis Eversus*" of Dr. Lynch.

10. *John of Salisbury, or the Little* (d. 1180).

A companion of Becket during the exile, afterwards Bishop of Chartres. His chief works are: "*De Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum*," very similar to the last-mentioned works of Cambrensis: a life of Becket; and many letters, (Migne, P. L. CXCIX.) This writer, says Stubbs, "for thirty years the central figure of English learning was the true representative of the learning which France at that time afforded, and no writer of the Middle Ages can be placed beside him for extent or depth of classical learning. In fact he was a humanist, ahead of his age in his love of classical learning. Of course he was also a Schoolman of the day, and above all in his views was a theologian; his theology was based upon sound patristic learning, but it was tempered by his moderation of judgment and solidity of character. He has a worthy record in the church at Chartres." "*Vir magne eruditionis totiusque scientiae radiis illustratus, verbo, vita moribus Pastor omnibus amabilis, soli sibi crudelis, a pedibus usque ad coelum cilicio semper carnem domans.*"

¹"*Hugonis Candidi Coenobii Burgensis Historia*." Printed in the "*Historiae Anglicanae Scriptores varii*" of Joseph Sparke, 1723.

²"The Chronicle of the reign of Stephen, Henry II. and Richard I." by Gervase, the Monk of Canterbury." Edited by William Stubbs, 2 vols. Rolls Series 1879-81.

³For all his works see "*The Works of Giraldus Cambrensis*," vols I-V, edited by J. S. Brewer, M. A.; vols. V-VIII, edited by James F. Dimock, M. A. Rolls Series, 1861-77.

11. *Walter Map* (1140-1210).

The very opposite of the former. Had been like him a student at Paris, became a clerk at the court of Henry II. which he for a long time amused with his sharp but licentious wit, earning for himself the unenviable name of "The drunken Archdeacon of Oxford." Was quite a learned man in both theology and law, but is best known for his wit and satire which he employed with telling effect in his criticisms of the church and state. His best known works are the "*De Nugis Curialium*," a collection of legends, gossip and other odds and ends of information, interspersed with his own witticisms; also some verses, known under the general name of Goliardic, a sample of which may be not out of place:

"Resolutus sum in taberna mori,
Vinum sit appositum morientis ori,
Ut dicant cum venerint Angelorum chori,
Deus sit propitius huic potatori."

12. *St. Thomas à Becket*.

This paper cannot be closed without a passing notice of the materials for the study of the acts of à Becket. The life of this remarkable man gave rise to two distinct parties in the English Church, the other side rallying around the principles and name of Gilbert Foliot, Bishop of London. In like manner after his death the controversy regarding the prudence and justice of his course has continued even to our own day with a bitterness almost equal to that then existing.¹

13. Lastly, for the study of manners, vices, and follies of the period one should read the "*Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century*," edited by Mr. Thos. Wright, Roll Series, London, 1872, 2 vols.

Such is a brief outline of at least the principal sources for the study of Anglo-Norman history. Now a word concerning the audience to which they were then addressed and the motives which influenced the writers.

At best the audience must have been extremely small, because, if we except the clergy, and a small portion even of them, it is not unsafe to set down the average twelfth-century Englishman as illiterate. Among the higher classes learning consisted for the most part in the insipid, jingling verses about the exploits of Arthur, Alexander or Charlemagne, with a few exceptions such as Robert, Earl of Gloucester, who, according to Malmesbury, "condescended to honor with his notice those *literary characters who are kept in obscurity*;" or Henry I., Beauclerc, who had imbibed "the sweets of learning," and was wont

¹"Materials for the History of Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury." Vols. I. II. and III. Edited by J. C. Robertson, Rolls Series 1875-1877.

to repeat for the edification of red-headed William that "an illiterate king is a crowned ass." No better off therefore could the lower classes have been, whose chief mental pabulum must have consisted in the wondrous accounts of prodigies and devilish apparitions in those good old days of yore when his Satanic majesty was "unchained;" so that we can well understand the same writer's complaint that "so much unhappiness should attach to the learned of our times; as patronage alone can foster genius, when that is withheld every exertion languishes." Nor in opposition to such a view can the learning at the universities be alleged, because, passing over the fact that it affected only the studious few, it is doubtful indeed if even it was of a kind to have much influence upon general education by reason of its blind servility to the current treatment of logic:

"Ut garrire queas, noli percurrere libros;
Si garrire potes, gloria certa manet.
Disputat ignave qui scripta revolvit et artes,
Nam veterum fautor logicus esse nequit."

In a word, then, the class for whom the historian wrote was small indeed and almost entirely confined to the walls of the monasteries. Fame, therefore, was seldom his object, but rather the innate love of knowledge forcing him to write in the silence of his scriptorium those records of the past and the present which only the eye of a much later student was to read. The outside world was rarely appealed to or influenced by them; their works were purely labors of love, and therefore in most cases free from those evil passions which so frequently divert the historian from the path of truth.

To sum up now our general estimate, the church history of the time may be said to have been child-like, because that was the age which practically gave it birth. It had all the imagination of the child who fancies that he sees extramundane influences forever operating in the daily concerns of life, all his simplicity and directness of address, his lack of concentrated attention that keeps an older man from prattling about all manner of events, great or small, from battles and deaths of royal personages down to the petty quarrels in his own little convent. Hence one must not expect to find in the pages of these simple men any general considerations upon manners, politics, or the state of learning: such knowledge must be gathered up from innumerable mediæval sources with infinite patience and labor; least of all can be expected anything at all approaching to what we term "philosophy of history," that habit of mind by which we distinguish the relative importance of events and the great forces working underneath the surface of society, of which the putent facts are but the phenomena.

But what we do find, and have a right to expect, in these children of historical science, is child-like sincerity. Because, when it is borne in mind that these men were with few exceptions ecclesiastics, living in an age when the Church was engaged in a death struggle with the State, their honesty and independence in describing its various phrases are well-nigh inconceivable, at least according to the popular conception of mediæval monk. What surprises us most is their fearlessness, for we of to-day, whatever be said of our honesty, possess a small quota of the freedom of speech enjoyed by writers of that age. We would not dare to criticise the great authorities in either Church or State with the boldness of an Anselm laying down before the Red King himself the fundamental principles of liberty, or with the directness of those "terrible letters" of Becket that flame as with prophetic wrath. Such a freedom as this made possible the men at Runymede and lends an eternal lustre to the infancy of English history, which in this respect, instead of advancing, has rather retroceded.

Lastly we must note the care bestowed by our chroniclers upon the reading and insertion of original documents, wherein lies the essence of the true scientific method. Bede writing to all possible quarters for original information, and Orderic journeying to England in search of manuscripts, are but instances of the care taken by most writers of the day to acquire accurate knowledge and to do original work, notwithstanding their well known habit of plagiarising. The mere fact that so great a number of letters of popes, kings and prelates has come down to us, either separately or incorporated in the works of historians, proves the high value set upon them as historical evidences.

Comparing then the history of the twelfth century with that of yesterday and to-day, the chief advance evidently lies in the development of form and grasp of sequence. From this point of view the clumsy Latin of Eadmer and Orderic looks pitiful indeed beside the well-balanced, majestic sentences of Macaulay. Above all, on the side of philosophy of history the advance is strikingly manifest. The Saxon Chronicle compared to the "Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire" or Allie's "Formation of Christendom," bears about the same proportion as the anthropoidal ape to a civilized Caucasian, or the bungling narrative of a rustic to a professional discourse. Then again history has become more specialized, branching off into countless separate treatises on manners, arts, commerce, etc., so that a universal chronicle has to-day become either an impossibility or must be reduced to the size of a manual. In other directions advance is not so apparent. From the point of view of patience in investigation, accuracy, detailed comprehensiveness of narration, and candor of spirit, those old monks reached

long ago an eminence to which not many writers of to-day can aspire, which few reach and none perhaps excel.

Thus passed the first period of English historical writing. With the exception of the thirteenth century it has had up to our own day no superior. During that "century of splendor" the great northern school diminishes in importance by the side of the new school of the south at St. Albans, whence issued the versatile Matthew Paris; but with that burst of glory English history expired like a setting sun. Up to the close of the fifteenth century Adam of Murimuth, an indifferent chronicler, is our chief authority, whilst it is a significant proof of the dearth of literary talent in England at that period that our best sources for information with respect to national history, so far at least as they assume a narrative character, are from the pens of foreigners, like Polydore Virgil and Bernard Andre. Bad as this condition of affairs was it was rendered much worse by the venom of party spirt, at first religious then political, and by the discouragement of original research brought about by the destruction of the monasteries that contained the old manuscripts, under the influence of both of which causes history languished more or less up to our own day. We are therefore justified in designating this period as that wherein, our own age excepted, the most robust and clean history of the English Church was penned, and as a consequence the most lasting.

What a tribute it is to the memory of those monks laboring centuries ago in the quiet of their scriptory over the pages which few of their contemporaries were to witness, which a rude destroying hand was to scatter broadcast from their old resting-place, but which modern science to-day collects with an avidity more than equal to the former neglect. Well-nigh seven hundred years have passed since Orderic and Eadmer and their congeners laid down their pens to go to their reward and to-day the student thinks himself poorly equipped unless he has read what they found worthy to write. Only the truth could have thus survived the wreckage of centuries; none but good and true men could have been its authors, and none but men who follow their footsteps will ever win the like immortality. The man who writes for a party, whether religious or political, writes for a day and will receive the reward of a day. The true historian is he who like "dear old Orderic" writes for truth's sake; who will at least refuse to lie even if circumstances will not allow his speaking the truth; who therefore writes for all time, and whose memory like a mighty hill, grows in outline and becomes more majestic in proportion, according as we are removed from him by the stretches of time.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

PREHISTORIC LAW AND CUSTOM.

Recent investigations into the condition of Prehistoric Man have thrown a flood of light upon the subject. The patient labors of M. Boucher de Perthes mark a veritable epoch in the history of archæologic exploration. From that time onward, in the course of comparatively few years, many discoveries have been made. Such indeed is the nerve and energy wherewith the matter has been pursued that a mass of evidence has been accumulated, and the still recent sciences of geology, philology, anthropology and craniology have been duly requisitioned and made to yield their quota of information to the common fund. Inasmuch, however, as these branches of study are, all of them, comparatively new we venture to enter a mild preliminary *caveat* against wild and irresponsible theories and against the undue hauteur of tone adopted by some recent scientists. Theories, no doubt, have their proper place in the history of human thought, and are useful in directing attention to some specific point. All that we deprecate is an imperious demand that we should accept them while the proofs are still far from complete.

In reckoning the age of deposits, for instance, demands of a very extravagant character are often made by distinguished geologists, the said demands standing in ludicrous contrast with the hyper-conservative statements of the early part of the century. As this subject is, of necessity, so closely allied with archæology, it requires at least passing mention. It would seem as if sometimes eminent scientists are too automatic in their method of calculation. No account is taken of other attendant and possibly accelerating causes, of climatic differences, of seismic disturbances, of the possibly stupendous effects of some incidental flood. A few years ago specimens of pottery were discovered in the delta of the Nile at a depth of thirty-nine feet. By a purely mechanical reckoning, based on the present rate of deposit of the river, a trifling antiquity of thirteen thousand years was immediately claimed for the *trouvaille* by Sir C. Lyell and Sir John Lubbock. Sir R. Stephenson, however, at a still greater depth, found a brick with the stamp upon it of Mohammed Ali. According to Sir C. Lyell, Mohammed Ali must have lived more than thirteen thousand years ago; but such is not the teaching of history.

The little theory, therefore, must fall to the ground. One rebuff like this (and many more might be cited) should incline us to adopt an attitude of reserve and to deprecate scientific sensationalism.

The case is the same with regard to another of the allied sciences, philology, which, if girt with becoming modesty, might prove an estimable handmaid to archæology. As it is, the genuine archæologist is inclined of late years to look askance at philology and to prefer the material evidence furnished by cave or barrow, dolmen or menhir to the finest-spun linguistic theory. And the reason is not far to seek. The so-called "results" of philology are not easily capable of verification. Moreover this still youthful science seems to undergo a radical and drastic reconstruction on an average about every ten years, and after each decade shows itself as dogmatic as were its misguided votaries in the days before reconstruction. The medley of contradictions thus produced is at times decidedly confusing. Thus, on strictly philological grounds, the home of the Aryans is placed, "beyond reasonable doubt," in each of several districts many hundreds of miles apart.¹

On similar grounds, the migrations are described and the characteristics of the parent race duly portrayed. Following upon this, on equally irrefutable philologic deductions, we are calmly informed by another and still more recent "discoverer," that there never was a parent race, that the various peoples were autochthonous and that their migrations are a myth! One celebrated Oxford professor, Max Müller, waxes poetic on the primitive word for daughter. He declares it means "little milkmaid." Hereupon uprises in wrath another philologist, Isaac Taylor, and slays him with the scornful remark that it only means "little suckling." Thus do the minds even of philologists become exacerbad! Meanwhile the plain, truth-seeking student calls aloud for facts and would fain dispense with unsubstantial theories and with dogmatic utterances which are sure, in the course of a few years, to be met by other pronouncements equally infallible and equally destined, in their turn to be relegated to the limbo of forgotten things. We may therefore not unreasonably be excused from an absolute acceptance of results which are as yet somewhat contradictory and which are not capable of proof in the present meagre condition of the infant sciences. Such is the deliberate judgment of the Marquis de Nadaillac, who has shown rare industry in collecting facts.²

¹Taylor, the Origin of the Aryans.

²"Prehistoric People," and "Prehistoric America."

The best attitude of mind for the archæologist is one of reverence and reserve. This might fairly be laid down as the first canon of archæologic investigation. Without reverence it would be altogether impossible for us to enter into the spirit of the ages that are past, to sympathize with prehistoric man in his daily struggle with the mighty forces opposed to him, and to depict, in some sort, his life, manners, and customs. Without reserve we should forever be the prey of some passing and evanescent theory. In this spirit, then, of reverence and reserve let us start out upon our modest quest, and endeavor to discover such evidences as may exist with regard to the laws and customs of prehistoric man. We shall prove free-traders in ascertained facts, believing with von Ihering¹ that "*chacun peut se servir de ce qui est le bien commun de la science, sans s'exposer au danger d'être accusé de plagiat.*"

Information of unimpeachable character comes to us, in the first place, from the cave-dwellings of primitive man; from long barrows, round barrows, and funereal mounds; from the remnants of primeval settlements, such as the "Pictish" villages of Scotland, or the lacustrine dwellings of the Swiss.² From all of these we have evidences of genuine significance. The patient explorations of the pioneers in cave-hunting have unearthed a certain number of human skulls, and archæologists have attempted a rough classification of the various types into dolichocephalous, brachycephalous, orthognathous, and so forth. But so imperfect is the condition of the skulls, and so meagre are the actual specimens in point of number, that it would be unsafe in the present state of knowledge to draw any final conclusions.

Somewhat sweeping generalizations have already been hazarded with regard to the racial affinities and also the mental capacity indicated by the skulls. Perhaps, however, a slight check has been given to some of these generalizations by the discovery that the skull of Robert Bruce was of the lowly (Canstadt) type—a type which some hasty philosopher has broadly characterized as "undoubtedly simian" in form. We leave it to the descendants of

"Scots wha hae wi' Wallace bled"

to defend the intellectual capacity of Robert Bruce. For us it is enough to note that the quickness wherewith he voiced national aspirations and the tactical disposition of his forces at Bannockburn would scarcely seem to indicate a "simian" intellect. The truth of the matter would seem to be that the craniological remains are, in the present state of the science,

¹ Von Ihering, *Les Indo-Européens avant l'histoire*, Paris, 1895.

² Hutchinson, *Prehistoric Man and Beast*, London, 1896.

insufficient to warrant any far-reaching deductions, though they may ultimately furnish useful data as to the order of successive immigrations, and may even help to explain certain racial peculiarities which linger to this day, as historic anachronisms, amongst the Southern Irish, or the Highland Scots.

The bones of animals yielded by the caves afford us evidence of infinitely greater value than anything as yet proven by the human skulls. It is clear that the climatic and other conditions (in Europe, for instance) must once have been markedly different from those which now prevail. It is equally certain that man was once contemporary with animals now extinct, such as the mammoth and the cave-bear. Hugh Miller waxes enthusiastic in his "Testimony of the Rocks" upon the fauna of the British Isles in those days. "Tigers," he says, "as large again as the biggest Asiatic species lurked in the ancient thickets; elephants of nearly twice the bulk of the largest individuals that now exist in Africa or Ceylon roamed in herds; at least two species of rhinoceros forced their way through the primeval forest, and the lakes and rivers were tenanted by hippopotami as bulky and with as great tusks as those of Africa." A charming picture, truly, from the naturalist's point of view, but presenting also its pathetic side. Close by, and in the same cave, we see the weapons wherewith man was accustomed to meet and to master his unwieldy prey. They consist of crude stone weapons—arrow-heads, hatchets, spear-heads, etc.—rudely chipped by means of other stones. Such were the clumsy implements with which, in early times, man used to fare forth and encounter the huge fauna of the day. For him the *fin de siècle* expression, "the struggle for life," was in no sense a figure of speech. Of other remains of tools and weapons we have abundant examples, hammers, wedges, scrapers, cunningly-devised saws and knives, with edge literally as keen as a razor. The rude palæolithic-worked flints are, as time goes on, gradually superseded by others displaying marvellous ingenuity and skill. Though the use of metals was, of course, still unknown, the stones were worked and polished with wondrous cleverness, and with much ingenuity fastened to handles of wood or bone.

In neolithic times the results are, in some respects, unexpected. Spoons, dippers, and vessels of earthenware have been discovered, and are, of course, evidence of civilization infinitely beyond that of the original hapless dweller in the cave. Fish-hooks, skilfully fashioned after a bear's tooth, are not infrequent, but perhaps a still more uncomfortable mouthful is to be seen in the bone-flake hook astutely pointed at either end, and with a hole neatly drilled in the middle. Besides

the barbed arrows and harpoons, the strips of coarse woven cloth and the needles, "as fine as any that now exist," are in themselves proof of no small progress and furnish collateral testimony as to the condition of the people who used them.

After recent contemptuous allusions to the "savagery" and general uncouthness of prehistoric man, it is somewhat refreshing to find in him genuine attempts at art. The polished obsidian weapons are often beautifully wrought. But perhaps the most artistic object of all is one that comes from La Madeleine. It consists of an antler on which a couple of horses have been cleverly carved. The whole conception is spirited and realistic. The contour of the limbs is capital; the wind seems to whistle through the flowing mane and tail; the horses are full of life and ready at a moment's notice to start at full gallop across the plain. The cave at Thayngen (Belgium) proves a veritable academy of the fine arts in neolithic times. It is from this cave that we have taken the representation of a reindeer grazing, which displays delineative skill of a very high order. Perhaps the most humorous specimen of all (also from Thayngen) is the carving of a bear which has evidently been unexpectedly disturbed in his meditations. The clever way in which he is depicted, erect on his haunches, with monitory paw in mid-air, and a general air of attention to the business in hand, makes it a very delightful and entirely realistic specimen of neolithic art. Once more, from the same cave, we have carved staves of office, made from the antlers of a deer. These are doubly interesting. They not only show artistic power, but imply organization and submission to constituted authority in the infant community.

M. Joly, in his interesting book, "Man Before Metals," claims for prehistoric man, not only a sense of the beautiful, but also some notion of barter and commerce. The use of amber, white coral and turquoise in localities far removed from the region whence they were originally obtained, might seem to indicate this: and the jade axe from the east, found at Panillac, is cited as evidence in the same direction. Rudimentary notions of navigation are even to be deduced from certain remains. Thus the bones of the cod, a deep sea-fish, are found amongst Scandinavian rubbish heaps and force us to the conclusion that sea-going boats of some sort were in use. Of the more modest river-boats, the relics are distinctly numerous. They either took the form of the roughly-hollowed trunk of a tree, or possibly, like the British coracle, consisted of skins skilfully stretched, so as to form a tub-shaped canoe. Specimens of the coracle may still be seen in use on the river Severn.

The food of palaeolithic man, as evidenced by the remains in

the cave-dwellings, in the kitchen-middens and elsewhere, seems to have been chiefly animal. In neolithic times remains of cereals are also found, a fact of some significance for us in our inquiry. With very little trouble we can picture the prehistoric dinner-table and we might construct a very pretty menu, beginning with huitres à l'écaille, and winding up with côtellette de grand ours, tranche de Mammouth, or even renne roti. The immense quantity of oyster and mussel-shells found in the kitchen-middens of Denmark, Georgia and elsewhere, and which from their vast extent have puzzled investigators, are fairly easily accounted for if, as was probably the case, they furnished at certain times the sole food of hapless and hungry man.

The groundal cave occasions somewhat of a surprise by yielding the bones of the moor-fowl, the partridge and the wild duck. To a lover of horses, the evidence of the Solutr  cave is unpleasant reading. Judging from the huge quantity of bones it would seem that horse-flesh was a much-esteemed article of diet.

Such is a brief and (of necessity) entirely imperfect resumé of the facts which are presented to us by relics discovered in cave-dwellings, lake-dwellings and other haunts of early man. It will be seen that the examples quoted come mainly from Europe. This is merely due to the fact that some limitation was necessary and that the vestiges of prehistoric man in Europe are capable of being promptly compared with those of the races who now occupy the ground.

Archæologists of the present day are practically agreed in recognizing certain provisional epochs, entitled respectively, the stone age, the copper age, the bronze age and the iron. Figuier, who always writes moderately, suggests various subdivisions of the stone age: *a*) Period of extinct animals, *β*) Period of the reindeer, *γ*) Period of polished stone. This furnishes a workable classification, though a question of doubt seizes us as to the second period, when we bethink ourselves that the Orkneyinga Saga mention reindeer as existing in Caithness in A. D. 1159! These divisions, however useful, are, it must be remembered, entirely relative terms. Thus the stone age overlaps the copper and the bronze. Moreover, what was the stone age with the inhabitants of one district, might be contemporaneous with a higher civilization elsewhere. With this proviso borne in mind, the classification may be fully accepted, as arising quite naturally from the brief summary just given, of what the caves and other prehistoric remains have to tell us. As a further deduction from the facts presented by these relics of olden times, scientists are agreed

upon another division of mankind into certain stages, broadly indicative of his progress towards civilization.

There is the stage in which mankind (in Europe, for instance) had not yet learned to domesticate cattle (or had lost the art) and accordingly *subsisted by hunting*. Hence the immense quantity in the caves of the bones of animals. Hence the skill of the cave-dweller in fashioning missile weapons which should succeed in slaying the mammoth, the great bear and the still greater tiger of that era.

It is easily conceivable that even at this early stage, certain elementary legal questions would inevitably occur. We may reasonably conclude that two cardinal legal conceptions would speedily arise—the *law of torts* and the *law of property*. Difficulties, for instance, could scarcely fail to occur in the division of the spoils from hunting—or, given that an absolutely impartial allotment had taken place, it might conceivably happen that some too greedy hero stole the portion which was assigned to another. Here, in the very earliest days, we can discern the embryo of criminal jurisprudence.

Equally possible is it for us to trace the growth of the idea of property: "The arrow-head or spear, which by much labor, I fashioned with my own hand, is surely mine. The animal, which I, unaided, slew, belongs to me. The skin which I sedulously dressed with my stone scraper is, without doubt, my property."

Here we have distinctly the conception of personal property. The idea of real property was of course a much later notion, though perhaps we may discern the germ of it even in the possession of a cave. Certainly if other huntsmen endeavored to oust the original cave-dweller, unpleasantness might arise and relations between them might become, to say the least of it, decidedly strained. But beyond this, in the thinly-peopled world, law possessed no market value and the conception of real property could hardly be said to exist.

We come now to the second gradation which is universally agreed upon, the *shepherd stage of mankind*. It is necessary to remember once more that the world was still very thinly peopled, and that there was ample room for all. Man in the shepherd stage did not of necessity appropriate land. With the herds, which constituted his wealth, he merely passed from one pasture ground to another, directing his course largely with a view to obtaining water as well as food for his cattle. The nomad life, however, could scarcely have been universal. The lake-dwellers of Scotland and Switzerland must have been stationary. Strangely enough, the shepherd stage is often coeval with and existing side by side with more developed civ-

ilization. As, to quote an instance in historic times, in the case of Abraham, who pursued his peaceful pastoral life, though the "cities" of Canaan were in existence. A very noteworthy incident is mentioned with regard to Isaac. While still living the nomadic life, we find on one occasion that he cultivated land and reaped a plenteous harvest, *though the land was not his*. This would tend to show, what is indeed the fact, that land-tenure in early days had none of the strictness which, in later times, the pressure of population and, we may add, the mischievous activity of lawyers, contrived to bestow upon it.

Finally, we have the third stage, the agricultural, which indicates settled and orderly conditions, but which does not by any means imply *individual appropriation of land*. Towns would inevitably follow with all that they imply of law, order and "municipal" subordination. Originally they were agricultural hamlets like the Anglo-Saxon tunsceipe, mere aggregations of veritable kinsmen; or pile-dwellings placed for defensive purposes in the midst of some lake; or some hill-top fortress with rampart of water-worn stones gathered from the river-bed, and with ample accommodation for cattle; or, under more peaceful circumstances, early trading communities under the favoring auspices of some great river.

The stages of progression in the history of mankind, however indubitable they may be, are not of universal application. The possibility of degeneration from the shepherd, or even from the agricultural stage, to the lower condition of hunters is indicated by emigrants in our own day. The life is in itself attractive from some occult "sporting instinct" of human nature, which may be a "survival" of other days. It calls for less severe exertion than the plough or the harrow, and is infinitely more exciting to ingenuous youth than sheep-tending, varied only by an occasional chase after a wolf. The possibility is strengthened if, as must have frequently happened in prehistoric migration, the emigrants lighted upon barren, marshy or uninviting soil, perhaps in a colder climate than that to which they had been accustomed. The alternative would then present itself: Which is the easier, to attempt the hard task of cultivation, or to find food by means of exhilarating hunts?

In addition to what has been said as to the sources from which we gather our knowledge of prehistoric man, one or two further points may be noted. Much may be inferred from crystallized traces of archaic usage (often in semi-proverbial form) and

from belated specimens of prehistoric custom which are to be found, within historic times, amongst the laws and customs of highly civilized communities. Something may also be gathered from the usages of tribes which to this day are in a seemingly primitive condition. By their means we may learn how the stone hatchet was affixed to the handle by prehistoric man, and what is the probable form of a restored lacustrine dwelling. More than this it would be rash to accept. In dealing with the savages of to-day, great care is required in order to ascertain whether they are genuine samples of primitive life which have survived the wreck of ages, or whether they are merely very ordinary specimens of degradation. The most cursory glance at history shows the continuous upward trend of certain nations, the stationariness of others, and the downward movement of a third class. It is not, therefore, absolutely certain, notwithstanding the special pleading of certain writers with an ulterior object in view, that degradation and antiquity are correlative terms. In this connection it is scarcely possible to avoid mention of a somewhat uninviting subject, with which the names of Messrs. McClellan, Morgan, Sir John Lubback and others are identified. They affect to give support to what has been called the "horde" theory. Mankind, according to them, consisted of an aggregate of human beings impelled to come together by fear. Polyandry was in existence, and by a series of imaginative and unproven stages, this offspring of harlots gradually "evolved" into races of physically fine men, mostly monogamous, from whom sprang the more "modern" conception of the family. And here it is amusing to note that even the trumpet of Sir Henry Maine gives an uncertain sound. He criticizes Mr. McClellan, it is true, but takes care to "smite him friendly as a father." He will not, however, altogether despatch him; it is too good an opportunity for an indirect fling at that book—the Bible—which anticipated him in his discovery of the patriarchal theory, and with whose aid he would fain dispense.

Of the objections to this abominable theory, only a few need be cited. The physiological difficulty is alone insuperable. Moreover, it is scarcely fair to cite as examples of the possible condition of primitive man the worst and lowliest nations, corrupted (sometimes within living memory) by contact with immoral Europeans. The supposition that *all* men were lower than some animals requires considerable deglutition. Suffice it to say, on this point, that so far as this theory is concerned, even Charles Darwin will have none of it.

Other *à priori* theories with regard to primitive man have scarcely proved more of a success: Hobbes, for instance, starts

out with his well-known proposition that man was naturally in a state of war; that he needed protection; that he with other units, similarly placed, made a compact with some chief and so formed the state. The logical deduction (due in part to his sufferings under the commonwealth) was, of course, a strong and absolute monarchy. John Locke follows on somewhat similar lines and his "compact" theory proved eminently acceptable to those well-salaried Whigs who had taken part in a revolution which, as Carlyle somewhat hastily puts it, was "officially styled glorious." They needed a palliative, and in Lockeism they found it. One little difficulty underlies both their theories and is in equal conflict with the sickly sentimentalism of eighteenth century Frenchmen. It is simply this: They are plainly in dissonance with the actual processes of state-making, of which so many cases are on record, in historic times, and of which more will be said anon.

Let us now, after this little dose of theory, refresh ourselves with a few facts. In any honest endeavor to depict the condition of prehistoric man, we must allow full significance to the ideas which were current at the very dawn of history. Their importance cannot be overrated. They were no brand-new conceptions when history began. Their tendrils stretch far back into unknown times. What then is it that they have to tell us? To begin with, we learn the universality, in any nation worthy of the name, of the idea of *respect to the father*. It meets us everywhere in the very earliest records of the most ancient nations of the world. Perhaps due significance has never been given to it, in connection with the theories already alluded to. We find it notably in the case of the Chinese, whose most cherished traditions centre around the nation. If, as is sometimes stated, it has degenerated into ancestor-worship (to use a vague term), the change is easily comprehensible and only serves to accentuate the existence of the filial respect. The same fact is notorious in the case of Egypt. The extravagance of respect paid to the deceased father was even the occasion of the impoverishment of families. And when in later times a desire was shown to inflict the worst possible social stigma upon a recalcitrant debtor, the law allowed, as a *dernier ressort*, the coffin of the father to be seized. Brahminical law accounted filial disrespect amongst the worst of crimes. And every tyro in history is aware of the mighty influence possessed by this principle during the period of pure Quiritarian law, and even for many subsequent generations. And there are men now living who can remember the awe that attached to the person of the father of the household in Scotland. This then,

is one fact that meets us from the time of the earliest recorded history.

Closely connected with it is another, still more ancient, in unmendacious stone. We refer to those marvellous megalithic remains which stand to this day as mute witnesses to an age that is past. In Britain alone, beside the well known circle of trilithons at Stonehenge, we have still larger circles at Avebury, and even the haughty legions of Rome, unaccustomed in their road-building to regard either mountain or stream, turned aside at Avebury and respected the resting place of the dead. The standing stones of Stennis (Orkney) are supposed to form portions of still larger circles than those at Avebury. Other huge circles exist at Penrith, Rollright and Stanton Drew: lesser ones at Moytura (Ireland) and at Aspatria which, though in Cumberland, contains in its name lingering reminiscences of St. Patrick. Within the circles have been found evidences of burials with weapons belonging to neolithic times.

Similar megalithic structures are to be found in huge quantities in France and India (another link of east and west), and in various quarters of the globe. What are we to gather from them, or from Egypt, where the earliest buildings are not unlike trilithons in form? The earliest inscribed Pyramid gives us the key to the mystery, and the human remains near the trilithons furnish corroborative evidence. The dominant notion of them all is *respect for the dead*, the preservation of the name and fame of him who lies buried beneath. In nations as wide apart as the Irish and the Japanese, the Shetlanders and the Algerians, the same notion prevails—the desire to show respect to the memory of ancestors. It is somewhat pathetically illustrated in later and historic times by the supreme longing of the childless man for an heir and the various methods of adoption in early Indian, Jewish and Roman law to supply the place of one. With an adopted heir, the old man would now have no fear that he would descend into the grave and “his name be clean put out forever.”

This one fact alone—the universality in all ancient nations of the respect to the father and the various crude efforts to perpetuate his name—is of itself sufficient to give the *coup de grace* to the guess-work of the revolting “horde” theory. Another significant fact that meets us at the very dawn of history is that the “family” is everywhere the unit of organization and the origin of such law as exists. If we carry our mind back beyond the epoch which Hobbes’ theory would suggest, we shall find it presumable that man was in a state, not of war, but of peace. We must remember once more our old

thesis, that land was plentiful and men were scarce. Hence one fertile source of quarrel, which runs like a continuous thread through later history, was absent from the world of primitive days. The "family," therefore, in early times was at once self-sufficient and necessary. That is to say, a larger unit than the family was not, in the first instance, required as a matter of protection against their fellow-men. Yet to provide food and to protect the young (the most helpless of all animals) against wild beast or the forces of nature something was needed, and, once more, the "family" meets the case. Nor are we left to theory alone in this matter. The archaic usages to be found amongst Greek and Roman, Celt and Teuton, Slav and Indian, unanimously point to the family as the unit, to the patriarchal system as government in its most rudimentary form.

Starting, then, from the family as unit, it is not difficult to trace the subsequent course of affairs, and with it the slow growth of a system of law. In the long course of many centuries divergent interests would of necessity arise amongst men, and these would call for legislative or judicial treatment. As population increased, land gradually became a matter of contention. "The earth," we are told, "was filled with violence." An aggregation of kinsmen would become a necessity, in order to resist increasing violence from outside. The head of the clan would be the natural chief, or, in a given case, an election of some leader would relieve them from the terrors of war. In course of time he would become the mythical hero of the race, like Woden, who it is thought was a veritably existent personage, the first true head of the nation. Or another process might take place: The growth of law and custom, remarkably slow under normal conditions, was occasionally quickened by some leader who towered head and shoulders above contemporary men—some Menes, Mann, Moses, or, once more, Woden,—of such insight and acumen as a codifier of existing custom, or as a skillful innovator upon it, that men, in after times, looking back upon what he had done for the race, were ready to accord him the highest posthumous honors, and even on occasions to enroll him amongst the number of the gods.

And here perhaps we may be allowed to say an incidental word upon a subject upon which some jurist, perhaps needlessly, have puzzled themselves, viz., the "*sanction*" which, in primitive times, converted a custom into a law. It arose from the high respect paid to the chief, and this respect had a twofold origin: It may have proceeded (and often did proceed)

in early times from the gathered wisdom of the patriarch, the ripened experience of many years. In the childhood of the human race, when truths which to us seem truisms, were to them matters which had carefully to be verified by experience, it may be imagined how weighty was the opinion of the chief, who had lived many years and in whose breast was stored the wisdom of olden time. Or, again, it may have proceeded from respect to the military chief, whose powers rendered the community safe, or who first gave them the glad feeling of nationhood, or who as legislator, so left the imprint of his genius upon the people, that their whole subsequent history is, in effect, a working out, a development of that *ethos* which is discoverable in every nation worthy of the name and which it was his merit to have affixed upon them as their predominant national characteristic.

Of the processes of aggregation, it is not difficult to form a conception. With unrivalled brilliancy and patience, Sir Henry Maine has gathered instances from the archaic customs of the East Indian, the early Irish, the Slavonic, and Teutonic races, of the early development which took place. And, through the medium of veteran missionaries, unexpected evidence on the same point reaches us even from the hitherto inaccessible inhabitants of China. From these various sources we are enabled to reconstruct the processes of aggregation, *a) The family*; *β) The family, expanded*, but still undivided; *γ) Severalty of households, but community in cultivation*; *δ) The clan, or sept*, still founded on *real* kinship. [In this connection it may not be amiss to take the extreme importance attached to genealogical trees by the Highlander, the Irishman, and the Jew.] *ε) The tribe*, and, *ζ) The loose confederations of tribes* in which the recollection of kinship was still fresh and which contained within it the makings of a nation. Side by side with these, it is possible to note a segregative or disjunctive process. Occasionally it would happen that the self-reliant elder sons would branch off and form an establishment of their own. The youngest son would remain at home and would succeed to the father's property. Kemble has clearly pointed out, with regard to English place-names, indications of the process in question. Thus Woking is the original homestead of the "Woking" family, while Wokingham represents a colony. The elders had fared forth to carve out a fortune for themselves, and so it happened that the custom of "ultimogeniture" arises. Traces of this strange custom are still discernible at Paddington and elsewhere, and are also occasionally to be observed among the Jews. These customs, though extremely ancient, are evidently of exceptional occurrence, and the ulti-

mate development of the separated families would doubtless take place on lines similar to those already indicated. Thus, by a simple synthetic process, by utilizing the evidence of pre-historic remains, and by availing ourselves of the admissible testimony which comes from the most ancient nations of the world, we have been enabled to trace the rise of a system of law from primeval times and to witness the evolution of the nation, with all that the term connates of a complex body of municipal regulations.

There is, still, however, one class of evidence which has not been pleaded, and which we have purposely reserved to the last. It comes to us from a book, second to none in antiquity, and which, as a mere historic record, is of infinite value to the student of ancient times. We allude, of course, to the Bible. We make no apology for citing it, any more than we should apologize for the introduction as evidence of a Babylonian tablet or a mutilated Egyptian papyrus. Of the treatment which this ancient record has received, it is difficult to speak without acerbity. It has either been calmly ignored, as if no such book existed or, in the writer's knowledge, had ever been heard of. Or it has been treated with considerably less respect than some third-rate anonymous pamphlet. The undisguised glee of the aggressive school at some imaginary "mistake" in its pages, scarcely betokens a spirit of philosophic and judicial calm, such as is absolutely necessary in weighing evidence, while, again, the accusations of *mala fides* are absolutely beneath contempt. Yet, point by point, the record has been slowly verified. Not only in matters of history, but in minute questions of topography, in statements of archaic custom, in details where (from our ignorance) the book stood uncorroborated, it has been slowly but emphatically vindicated by the discoveries which have recently been made. Surely if Tübingen has any blushes left, it might wax crimson, on account of some of the many inanities which, in this century, have been uttered in its name.

Regarding the Bible then as a venerable historic record, and putting aside, for the nonce, all theological prepossessions, we proceed to inquire what is the evidence which it furnishes in our present quest. From the book of Genesis alone we have results that are surprising from a juristic point of view. A considerable portion of the headings of Blackstone's Commentaries might be used to designate the subjects treated of. Thus we have the relations of: 1. Husband and wife. 2. Parent and child. 3. Master and slave, and so on. Moreover, we soon touch upon legal questions of greater intricacy. We have the

conception of personal property and in a passage of rare pathos and beauty, with, moreover, the strictest attention to detail, we have an account of Abraham's purchase of a plot of ground from the children of Heth. The formalities that took place, the witnesses, the weighing out of the money, "400 shekels current money with the merchant," the due specification of the property, "the field and the cave which was therein and all the trees that were in the field, that were in all the borders round about," are all duly recorded. And yet this was more than 1,000 years before the era of the haughty Roman, with his *libri pens*, his witnesses and other formalities. Even the late Dean Stanley cannot, as an archæologist, refuse his meed of praise to the historic and topographic accuracy of the biblical writer. In the same book of Genesis we have instances of other legal conceptions. We have record of a *law of contract*, only attested in durable stone (Gen. XXXI. 51); of *Suretyship* in a passage whose beauty no critic can defile (XLIV. 32), and of *Adoption* (Gen. XLVIII. 5), with the principle of which Roman law has rendered us so familiar. "And now thy two sons, Ephraim and Manasset, which were born unto thee in the land of Egypt, before I came unto thee into Egypt, are mine; as Reuben and Simeon, they shall be mine. And thy issue, which thou begetteth after them, shall be thine, and shall be called after the name of their brethren in their inheritance." So the aged Jacob addresses Joseph, on "adopting" his two sons into the number of the twelve.

The immense autocracy of the *patria potestas* is everywhere in evidence in Genesis. Even grown men, themselves middle-aged, obey without demur. The penalty for overt crime is, as in the case of the Anglo-Saxons, the terrible one of outlawry (Gen. IV., 12). We might go a step further, and by an excursion into Exodus and Numbers show how the functions of the patriarch, the king, the priest and judge (legislator) of his little domain become formally differentiated. We might show the vitality (we will not say of primogeniture, in order to avoid confusion of term, but) of the *droit du fils aîné* and that the rebellion of Core, Dathan and Abiron was simply a re-vindication of this right against Moses, the *ad interim* leader. We might point out the growth of equity jurisdiction so far as inheritance of daughters is concerned (Numb. XXVII). We might trace the process of confederation, whereby the tribe, dependant on kinship, merged into the nation, with land as the bond of statehood. But we have quoted enough. From the simple yet fascinating pages of this early archæologic record we have received ample corroborative evidence of results reached by another route.

One final word remains to be said. We have committed ourselves to not one word as to the religion of prehistoric man, but here we receive unexpected help from a member of the aggressive school. Isaac Taylor ("Origin of the Aryans") has, on purely philological grounds, disproved the identity of the Greek-Latin and Indian gods, with the whole cumbrous system of comparatively recent mythology. He has done greater service in his iconoclastic career than he probably imagined. He has cleared the way and has given us to understand (what indeed was the case) that Aryan theology was remarkably simple. Its chief religious legacy has been a commemoration of ancestors, which is the simple cult evidenced by the early customs of Greek and Roman. Couple this with the fact that (with all the will in the world to make the discovery) not one solitary idol has been found in any prehistoric burying-place, and what is the result? Instead of an elaborate mythology, or the loathsome fetichism of the debased savage, we find absolute simplicity. Everywhere there is evident a savour of paternalism, which is in striking concord with the pages of Genesis.

FREDERICK W. PELLY.

PRINCIPLES OF A NEW LINE-GEOMETRY.¹

When two straight lines A and B meet in space, they determine a magnitude called *angle*; when the lines A and B do not meet, they determine two magnitudes, i. e.: their angle Q and their shortest distance P , but these two magnitudes can be considered as one complex magnitude of the form $(P + Q I)$, where I is a geometrical unit symbol, like $\sqrt{-1}$ in algebra. This complex magnitude $(P + Q I)$ will be called *distangle* (abbreviation for distance-angle). According to the law of homogeneity, the symbol I must be treated as a length, and since this symbol must be an imaginary unit, we may regard I as representing the absolute unit of length.

The symbol I can be operated upon, like the symbol $\sqrt{-1}$ in algebra, so that the complex magnitude $(P + Q I)$ can be treated like an ordinary complex quantity. Our three-dimensional space contains a quadruple infinity of straight lines; an imaginary surface contains also a quadruple infinity of points; hence a correspondence can be established between each straight line of our space and each point of the imaginary surface. If this imaginary surface be a sphere of radius $i = \sqrt{-1}$, the spherical distance between two points of the surface is measured by the length $(p + q i)$ of the imaginary great circle joining the two points, and the angular distance of these points is $\left\{ \frac{p + q i}{i} \right\}$. In the same way, the distangle $(P + Q I)$

formed by two lines in space is a linear measure of the interval existing between these lines: the quantity $\left\{ \frac{P + Q I}{I} \right\}$ will be regarded as the angular measure of the same interval and will be known as the *codistangle* formed by the two lines.

Let $(\overline{A B})$ denote the codistangle formed by two lines A and B in space; P the shortest distance, and Q the angle between A and B ; we have then by definition:

$$(\overline{A B}) = \frac{P + Q I}{I}$$

A codistangle being of degree zero with respect to homo-

¹An account of these principles has already been published in the "Comptes Rendus" of the Academy of Sciences of Paris (November 9th and November 16th, 1890). See also a previous article of the author in the "American Journal of Mathematics" (vol. XVIII, No. 4).

geneity, any function of a codistangle must be itself a codistangle, i. e.:

$$F \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} = \frac{y_1 + I y_2}{I}$$

and such a relation is equivalent to two relations between x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 . Now, we have by Taylor's formula:

$$F \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} = F \left\{ x_2 + \frac{x_1}{I} \right\} = F(x_2) + \frac{x_1}{I} \frac{d F(x_2)}{d x_2} + \text{etc.}$$

The first two terms of this series form a codistangle, while the other terms are of an essentially different and irreducible nature, since they contain the successive powers of I in the denominator; these terms must be dropped as having no meaning in the equation, so that we have simply:

$$F \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} = \frac{x_1 \frac{d F(x_2)}{d x_2} + I F(x_2)}{I}$$

According to this formula, the trigonometric functions of a codistangle $\left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\}$ will have the following values:

$$\begin{aligned} \sin \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} &= \frac{x_1 \cos x_2 + I \sin x_2}{I} \\ \cos \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} &= \frac{-x_1 \sin x_2 + I \cos x_2}{I} \\ \text{tang} \left\{ \frac{x_1 + I x_2}{I} \right\} &= \frac{\frac{x_1}{\cos^2 x_2} + I \text{tang } x_2}{I} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

The addition of two codistangles offers no difficulty, for it is obvious that:

$$\left\{ \frac{a_1 + I a_2}{I} \right\} + \left\{ \frac{b_1 + I b_2}{I} \right\} = \frac{(a_1 + b_1) + I(a_2 + b_2)}{I}$$

For the multiplication, we shall have:

$$\left\{ \frac{a_1 + I a_2}{I} \right\} \left\{ \frac{b_1 + I b_2}{I} \right\} = \frac{(a_1 b_2 + a_2 b_1) + I(a_2 b_2)}{I}$$

by dropping the term $\left\{ \frac{a_1 b_1}{I^2} \right\}$, which has no meaning in the product. By putting $b_1 = a_1$ and $b_2 = a_2$, we have also:

$$\left\{ \frac{a_1 + I a_2}{I} \right\}^2 = \frac{2 a_1 a_2 + I a_2^2}{I} \quad (2)$$

The law of division is easily deduced from the law of multiplication, and is as follows :

$$\frac{a_1 + I a_2}{b_1 + I b_2} = \frac{\left\{ \frac{a_1 b_2 - a_2 b_1}{b_2^2} \right\} + I \left\{ \frac{a_2}{b_2} \right\}}{I}$$

In the same way, for the extraction of square roots :

$$\sqrt{\frac{a_1 + I a_2}{I}} = \pm \frac{\left\{ \frac{a_1}{2 \sqrt{a_2}} \right\} + I \sqrt{a_2}}{I}$$

and for the differentiation :

$$d \left\{ \frac{u_1 + I u_2}{I} \right\} = \frac{du_1 + I du_2}{I}$$

By means of these laws, it is found that any formula of algebra or trigonometry will still be true, if we suppose that all the letters a, b , etc., contained in the formula denote codistangles. We shall find for instance :

$$d(a b) = a db + b da$$

$$\sin^2 a + \cos^2 a = 1$$

$$\sin a = a - \frac{a^3}{3!} + \frac{a^5}{5!} - \text{etc.}$$

and so on.

Since, to any system of points on the fundamental sphere corresponds a system of straight lines in space, any relation existing between the distances or angles determined by these points will also exist between the corresponding distangles or codistangles determined by the lines in space. For instance, if x, y, z be the vertices of a trirectangular spherical triangle and m any other point on the sphere, it is known that :

$$\cos^2(m x) + \cos^2(m y) + \cos^2(m z) = 1$$

In space, the system, which corresponds to a trirectangular triangle, is formed of three lines X, Y, Z meeting in a common point at right angles ; for it is obvious that :

$$(\overline{Y Z}) = (\overline{Z X}) = (\overline{X Y}) = \frac{0 + I \frac{\pi}{2}}{I} = \frac{\pi}{2}$$

Hence, if M be any straight line in space, we shall have also :

$$\cos^2 (\overline{MX}) + \cos^2 (\overline{MY}) + \cos^2 (\overline{MZ}) = 1$$

Or, if $\alpha_2, \beta_2, \gamma_2$ denote the angles and $\alpha_1, \beta_1, \gamma_1$ the shortest distances between the line M and the axes X, Y, Z :

$$\cos^2 \left\{ \frac{\alpha_1 + I \alpha_2}{I} \right\} + \cos^2 \left\{ \frac{\beta_1 + I \beta_2}{I} \right\} + \cos^2 \left\{ \frac{\gamma_1 + I \gamma_2}{I} \right\} = 1$$

or again, shorter :

$$\sum \cos^2 \left\{ \frac{\alpha_1 + I \alpha_2}{I} \right\} = 1$$

But, according to equation (1), this can be written :

$$\sum \left\{ \frac{-\alpha_1 \sin \alpha_2 + I \cos \alpha_2}{I} \right\}^2 = 1$$

and according to equation (2) :

$$\sum \left\{ \frac{-2 \alpha_1 \sin \alpha_2 \cos \alpha_2 + I \cos^2 \alpha_2}{I} \right\} = 1 = \frac{0 + I}{I}$$

Whence, by identifying the two members :

$$\begin{cases} \cos^2 \alpha_2 + \cos^2 \beta_2 + \cos^2 \gamma_2 = 1 \\ \alpha_1 \sin 2 \alpha_2 + \beta_1 \sin 2 \beta_2 + \gamma_1 \sin 2 \gamma_2 = 0 \end{cases}$$

In other words, any formula concerning a system of points on the sphere leads to *two* relations between the angles and the distances of the corresponding lines in space. The number of points considered on the sphere may be either finite or infinite, so that the theory of spherical curves will lead to an identical theory for ruled surfaces and congruencies of lines in space.

This method can also be applied to mechanics, and furnishes the means for deriving the general laws of motion of a rigid body in space, from the laws of spherical motion, i. e.: from the laws of motion of a rigid body around a fixed point. All that is required for that, is to suppose the rigid body in space to be made of material straight lines instead of material points.

Let us fix a point P on the surface of the fundamental sphere; then the only possible motion the sphere can possess with respect to itself is a rotation around the point P as pole. The great circle, whose pole is P , is the equator of the rotation and the motion of the sphere may be completely defined by means of a certain arc AB , taken anywhere on the equator, this arc being proportional to the angular velocity of the rotation. The arc AB , which defines the rotation both in magnitude and position, may be called a *spherical vector*.

In the same way, if we fix a straight line \bar{P} in space, the only possible motion, which space can possess with respect to itself, is a twist around the line P taken as axis or *pole*, and the twist may be completely defined, both in magnitude and position, by means of two straight lines A and B intersecting the line P at right angles. The shortest distance between A and B is measured on P and is proportional to the velocity of translation, while the angle between A and B measures the velocity of rotation, so that the codistangle $(\bar{A} \bar{B})$ represents a twist velocity. It does not matter where the lines A and B intersect P provided the codistangle $(\bar{A} \bar{B})$ remains the same.

All that has been said concerning velocities applies also to forces; for a spherical vector $A B$ may also define a couple applied to the fundamental sphere; in this case, the pole P of the vector indicates the position of the axis of the couple, while the arc $A B$ is proportional to the moment of the couple.

In the same manner, two lines A and B in space may define a wrench; the line P , which meets A and B at right angles, is the axis or pole of the wrench; the shortest distance m , measured on P between A and B , is the moment of the couple, which forms part of the wrench; the angle f between the lines A and B , is the measure of the force, which completes the wrench.

The codistangle $(\bar{A} \bar{B}) = \frac{m + If}{I}$ is then a complete representation of the given wrench. It is to be noticed that an ordinary force is here defined by an angle, whose plane is perpendicular to the line of action of the force.

The laws for the composition or decomposition of wrenches and twist velocities, will be the same as for spherical vectors. Let for instance, a wrench

$$W = (\bar{A} \bar{B}) = \frac{m + If}{I}$$

whose axis is a line P given in space, be applied to a rigid body and let it be required to find the effect of this wrench on the body: if X, Y, Z denote the three principal axes of inertia of the body, the given wrench W is equivalent to three wrenches W_x, W_y, W_z , whose poles are X, Y, Z respectively, the value of these component wrenches being obtained by the complex equations:

$$\begin{cases} W_x = W \cos (\bar{P} \bar{X}) \\ W_y = W \cos (\bar{P} \bar{Y}) \\ W_z = W \cos (\bar{P} \bar{Z}) \end{cases}$$

Each one of these wrenches produces around the corresponding axis of inertia, a twist equal to the intensity of the wrench divided by a constant depending on the mass of the body and its moment of inertia taken with respect to said axis. If T_x , T_y , T_z denote the twists thus produced, the resultant twist T will be determined by the complex equation :

$$T = \sqrt{T_x^2 + T_y^2 + T_z^2}$$

and the axis of the twist T will be a certain line Q defined by the relations :

$$\begin{cases} \cos (\overline{Q X}) = \frac{T_x}{T} \\ \cos (\overline{Q Y}) = \frac{T_y}{T} \\ \cos (\overline{Q Z}) = \frac{T_z}{T} \end{cases}$$

Two of the codistangles $(\overline{Q X})$, $(\overline{Q Y})$ or $(\overline{Q Z})$ are sufficient to determine geometrically the position of the line Q in space.

As a last illustration of the method, let us find the conditions for the equilibrium of a rigid body acted upon by any number of wrenches W_1 , W_2 , W_3 , etc., whose respective poles are given lines P_1 , P_2 , P_3 , etc.

If X , Y , Z be three rectangular axes of coördinates, we must have :

$$\begin{cases} \sum W_i \cos (\overline{P_i X}) = 0 \\ \sum W_i \cos (\overline{P_i Y}) = 0 \\ \sum W_i \cos (\overline{P_i Z}) = 0 \end{cases}$$

These three complex equations are equivalent to the usual six equations of equilibrium.

RENÉ DE SAUSSURE..

BOOK REVIEWS.

Theological.

The Ambassador of Christ, by James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, author of "The Faith of Our Fathers," and "Our Christian Heritage." John Murphy & Co., Baltimore, 1896; 8°, pp. xi-404.

A new work from the pen of Cardinal Gibbons is always welcomed, not only by the clergy and laity of this country, but by our separated brothers, who have long since learned to see incorporate in him a most attractive Catholicism, true and thorough and loyal, but at the same time gentle and winning in a high degree. There is a rude and rugged polemic, and there is a mild and winsome one, and we may well doubt whether St. Francis of Sales has not won as many souls as writers of a more vigorous manner. "The Faith of Our Fathers" and "Our Christian Heritage," are manuals of Catholic doctrine that will go on for many a day, enlightening and moving, consoling souls that are groping for truth and peace and rest, and know not that they are to be found in the bosom of the Catholic Church alone, until such time as an affectionate hand is laid upon them and they are guided into the desired refuge.

The work before us is addressed to the Catholic clergy, and covers the entire period of the clerical career, from its inception to its close. In thirty-one chapters the Cardinal treats of the Christian Priesthood—its excellence, its acquisition, its formation, its qualities, and requisites, its extrinsic activity through study, prayer, teaching, preaching, and administration. It may well be called a *vade-mecum* of the Catholic clerical student and the priest, and ought to be in the hands of all such. There is nothing commonplace in the book, unless one chooses to call commonplace the excellent choice of Scriptural texts, the examples and teachings borrowed from the most illustrious Christian bishops and writers, and a well-digested and sensible commentary on traditional doctrine and practice, made attractive by personal anecdote and appreciation. When St. Jerome wrote the golden booklet *ad Nepotianum suum*, he no more introduced novelties of thought than did St. John Chrysostom when he wrote his *De Sacerdotio*, or St. Gregory the Great when he compiled his *Regula Pastoralis*, or any of the admirable mediæval writers on the excellence and duties of the priesthood. The pastoral epistles of St. Paul laid down the law of

the Christian priest at the very outset of the Christian religion, and since then the same doctrine has been forever repeated to every generation of the ministers of the altar.

When such manuals are models of didactic prose, it is an added charm, as in the case of Cardinal Manning's "Eternal Priesthood," the grave music of whose pages haunts the reader like the echoes of some muted organ, and whose phrase moves stately and solemn as some mediæval bishop across the spaces of his sanctuary. But the pedagogical manuals for the clergy were never intended to attract by their form alone, a mere accident of personal gift, but rather by the fulness, exactness and sobriety of their doctrine, and by the character of the writer. The style of Cardinal Gibbons is familiar and colloquial, clear and concise, devoid of all that is trivial, and stamped with a certain ease and grace, a certain tactfulness in the use of words and in the shading of his thought, that recall the phrase of St. Augustine: "*Ut veritas pateat, ut veritas placeat, ut veritas moveat.*" It is the style of a Christian bishop who has long moved in the highest ecclesiastical and political society, and who understands how best to convey unchangeable truth in tones and phrases that themselves make propaganda for the truth, instead of hardening the ears of the auditor against its reception.

In this excellent book the Cardinal has embodied the fruits of a long and varied experience and of mature observation, and of experience and observation among the clergy for whom, in particular, the work is destined. His work bears the double stamp of religion and patriotism, and will be read with avidity, not only by those who are young in the ministry, but by those who have grown old in the discharge of its duties. The former will learn from it how best to bear the yoke of the Lord, and the latter will rejoice to hear from the lips of one who has been their fellow-worker that the yoke of the Lord is still sweet after decades of labor, and that not cynicism, not pessimism, but buoyant hope and joyous confidence in the triumph of right are the natural results of true priestly toil. The laity, too, and all non-Catholics may profitably read this volume, for to the first it will recall the care and the piety with which the Church forms her ministers; to the latter it will reveal how little there is to fear, and how much there is to gain, from a body of men whose souls are early formed to the most solid virtue, and whose only weapons of offence are prayer, study, charity, devotion, and unconquerable patience.

The Church and Modern Society. Lectures and Addresses by Most Rev. John Ireland, Archbishop of St. Paul. D. H. McBride & Co., Chicago and New York, 1896.

In a general way, the views of Archbishop Ireland are well known. On various occasions they have been presented from pulpit or platform with a forceful eloquence which is characteristic of the man. Fourteen of these addresses are now gathered into a handy volume and brought within reach of a larger audience. Though ranging over a broad field of thought and delivered under widely differing circumstances, these addresses have certain traits in common which secure their unity and add to their strength. They are full of actuality. They deal with the most urgent problems that confront the Church and society. They offer solutions which are inspired by an earnest devotion to Catholic principles and by the loftiest patriotism. They are at once a faithful echo of Leo XIII. in his encyclicals and a complete answer to those who would harm the Church by insisting that she is un-American. The love of country which breathes through these pages is none the less sincere because of the boldness with which certain national evils are attacked; nor is Catholic teaching in any wise diminished by the spirit of charity in which non-Catholics and their opinions are treated. The key-note to the whole series of discourses is contained in a single paragraph of the Introduction: "For the sake of the world, therefore, the Church must be in close contact with life, and must face the living issues of the age; she must continue to follow all the relations of man with the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, and bring to bear upon the world the vivifying energy of the Christian idea." And these words have all the more weight because they are less an exhortation to do than a summing up of what their author, in many ways, has done.

Pastoral Theology, by William Stang, D. D., Vice-Rector of the American College, Louvain, and Professor of Pastoral Theology at the same; late Rector of SS. Peter and Paul's Cathedral, Providence, R. I. Brussels: Société Belge de Librairie; New York: Benziger Bros., 1897; pp. 299.

Dr. Stang gives us in this volume of pastoral theology the fruit of many years' labor in the vineyard of the American Church. His work treats in three books of preaching and catechising; of the administration of the sacraments; of pastoral direction. Works on pastoral theology, numerous enough in some other languages, are quite rare in English. Hence the value of this volume, which we can recommend to our readers as marked by great good sense and judiciousness, e. g., the chapter on "What not to preach" (pp. 21-27), and the chapters on the catechetical office of the priest. Every priest may peruse

with benefit the chapters on pastoral direction (pp. 211-288), and in general we may say that such a work ought to be read frequently, not alone by aspirants to the priesthood, but also by those who have long been laboring as missionaries of Christ. They will find here, compressed in brief space, a sure doctrine, a pleasing style, and a sober and attractive exposition of the many minute rules and laws of priestly conduct in dealing with the flock of Christ. When the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII., c. 14. de ref.) says that all priests must possess, before ordination, sufficient knowledge "*ad populum docendum et ad administranda sacramenta,*" it puts in a few words a very important condition. The knowledge required is not only absolute in quantity, but also relative. Circumstances change, and the modicum of knowledge sufficient at one period, in one land and in one civilization, becomes utterly insufficient in another land and another stage of culture. The *plebanus* of the time of Charlemagne did not need so much learning as one of our modern parish priests, and the university preacher may be expected to know more theology than one who has to deal with a plain unlettered congregation of the faithful.

The young American priest is obliged to assume, immediately after his ordination, a heavy load of responsibility, for which, in other countries and other times, years of gradually gained experience are required. Hence the need of reliable instruction in the practical workings of his sacred calling, not as they manifest themselves in Europe, but as they are visible in our own society. The book of Dr. Stang is an excellent beginning of our literature of pastoral theology, and we trust that it may be followed by others from the pens of men equally capable of offering instruction to our American youth.

Science and the Church, by Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph. D., C. S. C.; Chicago: D. H. McBride & Co., 1896; 8°, pp. 299.

This book is made up of eleven essays contributed by Dr. Zahm to various American periodicals. Apologetic and scientific in their general trend, they are well worth a fresh perusal by those who have already read them, and the attentive consideration of those who have not yet met with them. Such studies are needed to-day, especially when they are written in a spirit of appreciation of what is really new and great in modern science. Many observers think they see an era of faith dawning in the century that opens before us. Surely it will be accelerated by the candid acceptance of the undeniable accomplishments of our own age, and their assimilation with the results of past endeavor and conquest in the field of philosophy, history, and the natural sciences.

Dr. Zahm possesses the candor and boldness of strong Catholic faith, and his work deserves to be encouraged. There are not so many literary toilers for the cause of Catholicism that we can afford to do without a single one of them. Criticism is, indeed, a welcome thing and a useful one in the domain of letters, but encouragement and sympathy have also their rôle in the development of the modern apologist. And if, occasionally, a Catholic writer be treated to a sharp dose of the first, he may rightly claim a fair amount of the second, especially when, as in this case, he furnishes us a book, solid in material, elevated in concept, and breathing throughout the ardor of devotion to religion and science. Why not put such books into the hands of our young college graduates that they may catch at the outset of public life a little spark of intellectual zeal and enlightened devotion to these great ideals?

Sermons and Discourses. By Rev. John McQuirk, D. D., LL. D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, New York; Fr. Pustet & Co., 1896.

This volume contains twenty-five sermons on some of the most fundamental speculative truths and the most urgent practical duties of the Christian religion. Being doctrinal and moral in character, they enlighten and interest the mind, they warm the heart, and they move the will. We need not add that they are characterized by varied ability and by the most solid theological learning. The style is clear and transparent and simple in the very laudable sense that direct language, dignified statement, and straightforward enunciation of truth, make the meaning so obvious that it cannot be misunderstood by the casual reader. There is here, on all points of doctrine, a strong, full supply of instruction' blended with denunciation of vice and encouragement to virtue. Clap-trap and straining after effect are remarkable for their absence, and, instead, the truth is presented in precise terms, and in vigorous, elegant language. To both preacher and people these sermons are useful for instruction, for meditation, and for spiritual reading.

In such works it was once the custom, now, unfortunately, gone out of date, to use pictorial illustrations for the purpose of impressing religious truths on the mind of the reader. We are pleased to see that this volume is elegantly illustrated, containing reproductions of the most famous paintings of the great masters. Each sermon is accompanied by an engraving adapted to the subject of the discourse. The paper is the best; the type is clear and bold, and throughout the pleasure of reading the orator is enhanced by the skill of the artist.

This collection of sermons is described by Most Rev. M. A. Corrigan, Archbishop of New York, as "beautiful in form, attractive in illustration, and sound and rich in matter."

Religion et Critique, oeuvre posthume de M^r l'abbé de Broglie, recueillie par M. l'abbé C. Piat, professeur à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris, Lecoffre, 1896. Pp. LX.-357.

Under the heading "*Religion et Critique*," Professor Piat presents us with a number of essays from the fertile pen of the late Abbé de Broglie. There are four main divisions naturally suggestive each of the other, and eminently in keeping with the actual lines of thought along which criticism has latterly been running. The first bears on the definition of religion which Abbé de Broglie has brought into close contact with the views nowadays current. The second deals with the transcendent nature of Christianity as judged from comparison with other forms of religion. The third brings out the relations between religion and science, while the fourth is engaged with the relational points of contact between philosophy and religion.

The problems enunciated in these divisions are of actual importance and vital interest. The works of Balfour, Brunetière and Von Eucken mark the beginning of a reaction along such lines as this work has developed and have created for it a need which it admirably fills.

The work of M. Piat in compiling and editing these essays should not pass without the share of recognition it deserves. Though engaged as a member of the actual teaching-staff of the Institut, M. Piat has found time within the last few years to publish two very praiseworthy volumes, "*La Liberté*" and "*L'Idée*," and to undertake the editing of the work upon the outlines of which we have just been descanting. His preface to these essays of Abbé de Broglie shows that he is thoroughly alive to the needs of the hour and contains many keen and useful reflections. He has been a sincere friend of the "mariner-apologist" in life and death, as this carefully edited volume abundantly proves.

Philosophy.

Essays Philosophical, by Brother Azarias, with preface by the Rt. Rev. John J. Keane, D. D.; D. H. McBride & Co., Chicago, 1896.

Essays Miscellaneous, by Brother Azarias, with preface by Brother Justin; D. H. McBride & Co., Chicago, 1896.

These two volumes together with the "*Essays Educational*," which were noticed in the October BULLETIN, form an admirable series. The first of these volumes mentioned contains five essays: Aristotle and the Christian Church; the Nature and Synthetic Principle of Philosophy; Symbolism and the Cosmos; Psychological Aspects of Education; Ethical Aspects of the Papal Encyclical on Labor. The second volume contains seven,

which deal in the main with the religious aspects of education and the religious influences of true literature.

Both these volumes are equally commendable. The nature and range of the subjects dealt with, the literary graces of the author's style as well as the actuality of the topics treated, appeal to a wide class of readers. Though the thoughts expressed are oftentimes profound, as befitting the philosophic nature of the subjects which he treats, the mind is assisted and the interest increased by the delicate imagery with which he relieves his heavier phrase. Brother Azarias clearly realized his subject and endeavored to convey the most intricate of thoughts through the aptest as well as most pleasing simile. He has done so without sacrificing his line of thought in the least degree, and there are many passages which we recall from his noble pen that will enshrine him in our memory.

The history of philosophy is not the most facile of subjects to treat. Unfamiliar phrases, and as unfamiliar names, throw about it a sort of mistiness in all minds except those of the closest students. Yet Brother Azarias has traced out the rise and gradual development of Aristotelian thought throughout all its vicissitudes of change in a language which is not only correct and precise, but eminently instructive as well. Especially is this noted in his description of the Arabic influences on the thought and purport of many of the writings of St. Thomas. He displays in his essay on Aristotle a wealth of information and incident, and compasses a great deal in these pages which cannot be too carefully perused.

Engaged in teaching from his earliest years, interested in educational work of all kinds, practically familiar with the needs of our youth, he was certainly qualified to speak. We cannot refrain from looking on these essays of his as the last will and testament of a noble soul, and we recommend them to the reading public.

The Case of Wagner, by Friedrich Nietzsche; Thus Spake Zarathustra, by the same. Macmillan & Co., New York, 1896.

These two works of the German philosopher Nietzsche, though intended as an attack on Christian ethics, will in reality prove a blow to those English Protestants who wish at the same time to destroy Christian belief and to retain Christian morality. Nietzsche, in trying to form a system of ethics on the principles of evolution, recognized that all which men now call virtue is directly opposed to those theories by which evolutionists have explained the development of the human species. Rejecting the inconsistencies of Spencer and others, he reverted to the physiological principles of inequality, the

survival of the fittest, *i. e.*, of the strongest, and the sacrifice of the individual for the perfection of the type, as the true bases of a system of morals. In a word, he retained the ideas of good, virtue, and progress as he learned them from the theory of evolution. He attacks Christianity for having favored the supernatural, or, as he says, the unnatural, the immoral. Its great principle of charity preserves the weak types, and thus retards the development of the Uebermensch, the higher type of man to which nature tends. Accordingly he rejects not only the higher doctrines of Christian morals, such as chastity and humility, but also those to which Positivists yet cling, as charity, benevolence, sympathy, continence, democracy. The strong man, the man of brutal passions, of intense individuality, or, as we would say, of monstrous pride and selfishness, is his type of the moral man. The criminal is a man of moral instincts degraded by Christian surroundings. The good old Roman way of abusing slaves, the Mohammedan methods of dealing with women, are examples of how weaker types should be treated. Suicide is the duty of those who are threatened with continued illness or a decay of powers, and doctors can spread the light by recommending it to their patients, thus purging the race of weaknesses. Nietzsche has presented this, his message of salvation, to the world in a style worthy of the matter. It is filled with crudities and absurdities, senseless apothegms and paradoxes, unfinished sentences and uncorrected ideas. But the teaching is sufficiently clear, and it is this: that morality is unnatural, that God is a myth, religion a curse, charity a sin, crime an indication of virtue, selfish strength the highest form of virtue, and physiology the criterion of all good. It is infernal teaching; but it will be a matter of satisfaction to Christians to have thus boldly presented to them the real gospel of Positivism. Nietzsche has clearly drawn the lines of conflict, and it will be henceforth less possible for self-deceiving philosophers to stand with one foot in each camp. The translator records a personal fact which is of interest. The non-believer may regard it as the irony of fate, the Christian as the hand of Providence, that this man who spoke so vehemently of the disgrace of living on when faculties had begun to decay, was in less than a year afterwards an inmate of a Swiss madhouse.

Der Grundgedanke der Cartesianischen Philosophie, aus den Quellen dargestellt von Prof. Dr. Otten. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1896. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. \$1.15.

The appearance of a work of this kind on the occasion of the tercentenary commemoration of Descartes' birth is of itself

a recommendation to philosophical readers. Descartes is hailed as the father of modern philosophy, and an acquaintance with his writings is imperative on all those who would understand the old and study the rise of newer systems. To master the thought of Cartesian philosophy in detail requires much painstaking reading. On some of the most vital points in his system, Descartes has not expressed himself very clearly, and it is quite difficult to form from his writings a clear idea of what he meant by "clear idea" itself. The work above mentioned facilitates the study of the most important and fundamental principles of the Cartesian school. The exposition is very fair and the criticisms are searching. The portrayal of the basic principles which underlie the whole fabric of Descartes' thought is very well done in eight distinct chapters, which will repay careful perusal.

Die Uebersetzung der Platonischen Gesetze, durch Philipp von Opus, von Dr. Max Krieg. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1896. Price \$0.32 net.

This brochure, of some forty pages, is a critical literary study of the text of Plato in his political treatise on the State. It deals especially with the *νόμοι* or laws which Plato conceived as basic in his system of government. The fragmentary nature of the Platonic text in its actual shape as well as the unmistakable evidence that the text itself underwent revisions by several writers, inspired this inquiry of Dr. Krieg into the relative merits of opposing views. The result of his inquiry has been a vindication of Bruns and a rejection of the views of Praetorius embodied in a work entitled: "De legibus Platonis a Philippo Opuntio retractatis."

While we do not agree with all the writer says, his effort is praiseworthy and of interest to students of political history. The work is marred by only one feature. Had the author divided his considerations into chapters with accompanying headings, he would have made the work more readable and much more serviceable for purposes of study. Altogether, it is well worth a perusal.

Gaelic Literature.

1. Folk and Hero Tales, collected, edited, translated, and annotated by the Rev. J. Macdougall, with an introduction by Alfred Nutt, and three illustrations by E. Griset, (Waifs and Strays of Celtic Tradition, vol. III). David Nutt, London, 1891; pp. xxix-311; 10s. 6d.
2. The Flans; or Stories, Poems, and Traditions of Fionn and his Warrior Band, collected entirely from oral sources by John Gregorson Campbell, Minister of Tiree, with introductions and bibliographical notes by Alfred Nutt, portrait of Ian Campbell of Islay, and illustrations by E. Griset (Waifs and Strays of Celtic Tradition). David Nutt, London, 1891; pp. xxxviii.-292; 10s. 6d.

3. *Beside the Fire*, a collection of Irish Gaelic Folk Stories, edited, translated, and annotated by Douglas Hyde, LL. D., M. R. I. A. (Anchraoibhin Aoibhinn), Member of the Council of the Gaelic Union, Member of the Pan-Celtic Society, etc., with additional notes by Alfred Nutt. David Nutt, London, 1890; pp. lviii.-203.
4. *The Vision of McConglinne* (Aislinge Meic Conglinne), a Middle-Irish Wonder Tale, edited with a translation (based on W. M. Hennessy's) notes, and a glossary by Kuno Meyer, with an introduction by Wilhelm Wollner. David Nutt, London, 1892; pp. liii.-212; 10s. 6d.
5. *The Voyage of Bran, Son of Febal, to the Land of the Living*, an old Irish Saga now first edited with translation, notes, and glossary, by Kuno Meyer, with an essay upon the Irish Vision of the Happy Other World and the Celtic Doctrine of Rebirth, by Alfred Nutt. Section I. The Happy Other World. David Nutt, London, 1895 (Grimm Library, No. 4); pp. vii. 98-331.
6. *The Irish Odyssey*, edited, with English translation, notes and glossary, by Kuno Meyer. D. Nutt, Strand, London, 1896.
7. *The Elements of Gaelic Grammar*, by H. Cameron Gillies, M. D. David Nutt, London. 1896.
8. *The Gaelic Class Book*, by H. Cameron Gillies, M. D. David Nutt, London. 1896.

1. The first of these volumes is a collection of ancient Celtic folk-tales taken down from the lips of Highland Gaelic narrators within the last few years, from aged men who had heard them from their fathers and religiously preserved the archaic language and the conventional sequence of these strange tales. There was a time when the popular tales of the Gael were not allowed a hearing in good literary society—"the poor, despised, popular tales, which are branded as wicked lies in the West Highlands, and which such men as Grimm and de Villemarqué believe to be some of the oldest known products of the human mind." This contribution of ten exquisite tales to the folklore of the Gael makes one of the most charming volumes we have ever read, and the editor, Lord Archibald Campbell, may well say of them that they are "second to none in picturesque and graphic description of the events therein detailed." That a rich harvest even yet remains to the investigator, is evident from this volume, and from the similar works of Douglas Hyde, Jeremiah Curtin, William Laramie, and others. It has been well said by Mr. Alfred Nutt, the accomplished author of the learned introduction, that "whereas to know other races we must chiefly turn to the higher minds of the race, to the individual thinkers and artists,—to know the Celt we must familiarize ourselves with a vast body of anonymous and traditional legend which has at all times faithfully reflected folk-beliefs and folk-aspirations, and which can be neither understood nor appreciated without constant reference to a conception of life and nature, the very existence of which is unknown to most men of the educated classes" (p. xxix).

Are these marvelous tales, so remote and foreign to our mind, survivals of old religions and old-world philosophies, or are they survivals of an immense system of nature-myths?

Mr. Alfred Nutt touches on this interesting discussion, to which Professor Zimmer has lately made a contribution by claiming for the Finn cycle of tales a Norse and not an Erse origin. His theory may be found in the *Academy* (February 14, 1891), and has met with opposition from Whitley Stokes, Kuno Meyer, D'Arbois de Jubainville, and other Gaelic savants.

Elsewhere (p. xxvii.) Mr. Nutt outlines the special value of the Gaelic folk-lore, in a page which we gladly insert, since it is a very neat presentation of the spirit and the intention that prompt so many men to turn to this precious mass of mental débris that lies *perdu* in the memory and the imagination of the home-abiding Gael of Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the islands :

“Apart from all minor and secondary points, there is but one issue involved in the study of folk-lore—are the phenomena with which it deals, in the main, phenomena of growth or phenomena of decay—are they remains of successive stages of culture through which every race and all members of the race have at one time or another passed, and in which the folk-masses have lived on—ay, and are still living, to a great extent—whereas the educated classes have long since grown out of them; or are they the remains of definite systems of cult, custom and art special to particular races, and transmitted from them to their neighbors, systems which we mostly possess at first hand, and in a form far more perfect than that recoverable from the distorted fragments preserved by the folk? Advocates of the second view hold, for instance, that all folk-tales come from India, or all cosmogonies from Babylonia, or all municipal and manorial organization from Rome; that the Celt was incapable of conceiving the idea of blood-brotherhood, or the Norseman that of a future world of punishment and reward. The mind of every race was apparently a blank before it became fertilized by contact with other races, and every considerable manifestation of human thought and practice would seem to have sprung into existence fully grown, as Athene from Zeus' head.

“Celtic legend, Celtic custom, afford, perhaps, the best means obtainable for testing the worth of these rival theories. The field of investigation is not so large that it may not be surveyed with thoroughness, and the historical factors in the problem are comparatively simple. We can trace with approximate accuracy the story of Gaeldom, whether in Ireland or Scotland, from the fourth century onwards; and the facts that the Gaels were largely isolated from the remainder of Europe by a more powerful and hostile race; that for most of this period all their energies were exhausted in the struggle

for racial existence; that geographically and historically, Gaeldom represents a back-water, so to speak, in the main stream of European life—these facts have contributed to perpetuate with singular vividness the archaic ideas which underlie the civilization of the past, the modes of expression which differentiate primitive from modern art.”

2. The thirty-two tales that make up this volume are all taken from the old Fenian cycle, and bring before us the familiar figures of Finn and Caoilte, of Deirdre, of Oscar and Goll and Dermid,—the battle of Gavra, the wars and the pastimes, the loves and the hates of this semi-legendary body of pagan Irish Compagnacci. The tales were taken down in Tiree by the minister of the place, John Gregorson Campbell,—a name blessed in Gaelic literature since Campbell of Islay began his wonderful collection of Gaelic folk-tales from the Highlands.

The value of these old tales is undoubted. The oldest manuscript evidence takes us back to the eleventh century,—in fact there is perhaps no continental tale so well evidenced as the Pursuit of Dermid and Grainne. They were copied by Gaelic monks and scribes who surely did not invent the abundant paganism, the weird occultism, and the non-Christian views of life that they often contain. Many of the modern tales, taken down from the lips of peasant or fisherman, are paralleled by Gaelic themes that reach back to the seventh century, and the beautiful tales of the mediæval Welsh Mabinogion are thought to have been influenced by the Gaelic cycle of romance.

Incidentally Mr. Nutt demolishes the crude contention of W. W. Newell (*American Folk-Lore Journal*, XII., p. 84), that folk-tales like Campbell's and those lately printed by Curtin are simply translations or trifling alterations of a common European stock, as though the incidents and themes which form the staple of the best majority of their tales could not be traced back on Gaelic soil, far beyond the appearance of collected tales in Italy, France or Germany.

Perhaps we can not better enforce the importance of these echoes of the pagan days of the Gael than by reprinting a few paragraphs from Mr. Nutt's preface to this volume (p. xxxvii.): “There is but one other race of modern Europe which has preserved to the present day an heroic epos reaching back into a far distant past. I allude to the Finns, and to their noble mythico-heroical poem, the Kalewala. Contrast the loving care with which the official and academic Finland has cherished the Kalewala, the scientific thoroughness with which every variant has been noted, the pride and national solicitude, with the treatment of the Ossianic ballads in Scotland, a contrast all to the discredit of the richer and more illustrious people.

“And yet who shall say that the Fenian hero-tales are unworthy the care, the study which every other European race has bestowed upon its national traditions? Let us not forget that for hundreds of years these tales were the delight and solace of our forefathers, that they spring from the heart’s blood of the race, that they have become bone of the bone, flesh of the flesh of the Gael wheresoever he has fixed his dwelling. Simply consider the cold, abstract, scientific value of an oral tradition which is still quick and flourishing. So long as men live the tale of Troy divine will be to them both a delight and a wonder, an imperishable source of beauty and a problem, the fascinations of which may not be gainsaid. The great Karling may perchance live longer as the white-bearded emperor of the *Chanson de Roland* than as the heir of the Cæsars. And the German songs proudly vaunt, and not without reason, that the praise of Siegfried and Dietrich shall never die from out men’s mouths. Of Arthur, too, the same boast was made. But all these mighty epics, although they form a part of humanity’s most precious treasures, are yet dead in a certain sense; they have faded out of the folk-consciousness; we know of them from books alone. But if every book in the world were to perish we could find the tale of Finn and his men still entire in the memories of men who know nothing of books, whose culture is due solely to oral tradition.”

3. Mr. Douglass Hyde is, perhaps, the most active, enlightened, and uncompromising champion of the Gaelic spirit. It is largely owing to his voice and pen, his personal endeavor, and his rare gift of song, that the charm of old-Gaelic literature is at last known and appreciated in a society whose life and ideals are as foreign as they can well be to those of the ancient Ireland, pagan or Christian. The son of a minister, he is in the closest and most sympathetic touch with the venerable religion, the history, and the romance of the Gael. It would not be unjust to say that he is the true literary chief, the Thomas Davis of the gifted band of singers and artistic writers whom Ireland has loaned to English literature within this generation. His “*Love Songs of Connaught*” revealed a soul aglow with literary piety of an order as high as it is rare, and saturated with the dews of the most sacred human emotion and the most pure and unsullied human affection. Had these elegant paraphrases been made out of any other tongue than the despised Gaelic, the literary world would have been raving with admiration. As it is, they open a door upon the heart-culture of the ancient Irish, and betray in the mediæval past a people sprightly, musical, tender, mobile, and alive to every fascination of the witty or the humorous, christianly pure, too, and

deeply religious, and able to live within the barriers of the mind and heart, when all else was lost, and to feed all its mightiest nature-impulses on simple affection and the sweet fruits of the memory and the fancy.

In the volume before us, Dr. Hyde has gathered some fourteen folk-tales from the lips chiefly of Roscommon or Sligo peasants, and given them to us pretty much as they came from the narrators. It is no easy task to collect thus the débris of the old bardic literature, the immemorial old Aryan traditions that have yet their counterpart in every European land over which the ancestral wagons once rolled. And we have reason to thank Dr. Hyde for his patience and devotion. May his example be followed by many, and the scattered pearls of old Irish song and tale be saved with as much skill as the chants of the Nibelungen or the Kalewala.

Of the folk-tale in general, Dr. Hyde says in his valuable preface, that "no one can tell us with certainty of its genesis, no one has been consciously present at its inception, and no one has marked its growth. It is in many ways a mystery, part of the flotsam and jetsam of the ages, still beating feebly against the shores of the nineteenth century, swallowed up at last in England by the waves of materialism and civilization combined, but still surviving unengulfed on the Western coasts of Ireland, where I gathered together some bundles of it, of which the present volume is one." The preface contains also brief considerations on the relations between Irish and Scotch Gaelic Tales, the runs (or free alliterative, adjectival descriptions) in the same, the classification of the tales and their genesis, popular or literary or mixed, and some interesting facts as to the actual status of the work of collecting these precious relics of popular belief and hope and love among the long-dead Gael and their kinship. A postscript by Mr. Alfred Nutt touches upon the philosophy of the folk-fancy of the Gael—its animus (or subtle pantheism), its fatalism (neither Moslem nor Calvinistic—Shakespearian rather), its tragic character, its conventionalism, its medley of divine and human—the "sons of God and the daughters of men," and *vice versa*—its manifold vitality, and the unity of its manifestation through many various forms of narration—myth, legend, saga, *maerchen*, tale, chant, song, epos, and the like.

To conclude, Dr. Hyde has taken up in a scientific manner the work of collecting Gaelic tales in English translations begun by Crofton Croker, continued by Patrick Kennedy, Lady Wilde, Jeremiah Curtin, William Laramie, and others, none of whom, however, are the compeers of Ian Campbell of Islay, or MacInnes, to whom the presentation of the world of Scotch

Gaelic tales is owing, as well as the awakening of the proper spirit for the continuation of the work. How far we are from the day when Macpherson could get no hearing for the substantially Gaelic origin of his Ossian!

4. The "Vision of MacConglinne" is a wild fantastic tale, taken chiefly from the *Leabhar Breac*, a miscellaneous Irish manuscript of the fourteenth century, preserved in the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, and containing materials chiefly ecclesiastical and religious. A second version of this curious extravaganza is found in Trinity College, Dublin, in a paper manuscript of the end of the sixteenth century. The story has been already translated by the late Mr. W. M. Hennessy, but in the volume before us we have a new translation from the pen of Prof. Kuno Meyer, of Liverpool, and an introduction by Prof. Wilhelm Wollner, of Leipsic. Thus, for the first time, all the oldest known texts of the tale are printed, and laid before the English-speaking reader with a learned account of the genesis of the narrative, its sources, and parallels. The translation, notes and glossary are the work of Professor Meyer; the treatment of the literary questions connected with the tale is the contribution of Professor Wollner. Professor Meyer, from a "comparison of the language of the *Leabhar Breac* text with that of a fair number of dateable historical poems in the (twelfth century) Book of Leinster and the early manuscripts," comes to the conclusion "that the original from which this copy is descended must have been composed about the end of the twelfth century," though Prof. Wollner is of opinion that portions of the tale are several centuries older.

Its burden is the delivery of King Cathal of Munster from the demon of gluttony. Cathal has long been afflicted with an unappeasable hunger, and if it continues much longer, all Ireland shall be laid waste. His salvation comes through the scholar MacConglinne, who has become tired of the reading of the Scriptures and taken to "poetry," *i. e.*, he has joined the wandering gleemen or minstrels of the country, the *loterphafen* or *goliardi* of the time. In his travels MacConglinne reaches the "Monks of Cork," from whose abbot, Manchin, he receives scant hospitality, which treatment he repays by some bitter satire, especially by making up a "food-pedigree" for the abbot, and by a general reviling of the monks. The "food-pedigree" and a vision of rich and luscious edibles related by MacConglinne recall to the abbot the sad plight of Cathal. The latter, *en passant*, became possessed, through the eating of love-apples that his betrothed, Ligeach, had sent him, but into which her jealous brother, Fergal, had put "charms and heathen spells," and which Cathal was per-

suaded to eat by the all-powerful old Celtic spell of the elements, "the seven universal things, the sun and moon, the dew and sea, heaven and earth, day (and night)". On hearing the wild vision of MacConglinne, the abbot recollects that the recital of such a tale is to cure Cathal, and he releases from endurance vile and threatened crucifixion his wandering cleric-gleeman, who thereupon hastens to the court of Cathal, "at Dun Coba, on the confines of Iveagh and Corcalee." Arrived here, the ancient tale relates, "he began juggling for the host from the floor of the royal house (a thing not fit for an ecclesiastic), and practising satire and buffoonery and singing songs; and it has been said that there came not before his time, nor since, one more renowned in the art of satire." MacConglinne ties the king to the wall of the banqueting room, and relates his wonderful vision of lakes of gravy and sweet milk, houses of suets and cheeses, fortifications of beef and mutton, and similar extravagant food-descriptions, in the meantime passing rapidly before the king's mouth great strips of meat. The result is that the poisonous little demon called into being by the wicked spells of Fergal was enticed to the very lips of Cathal, whence he darted forth after the tempting morsels, only to have the caldron turned down upon him. "Great respect and honor had they that night for the scholar," says the tale, which concludes with a list of the rewards given MacConglinne, chief of which was the relic-cloak of the saintly Manchin.

There is a Rabelaisian color to this ancient story which recalls certain continental tales of the "pays de Coquaigne," or the Lenten satires like the *Bataille de Karesme et de Charnage*. It is however independent of them, as, indeed, it claims for itself strictly local origin, alleging, viz., the "books of Cork" and the tales of the elders or seanachies. It betrays quite an advanced anti-monastic spirit, which is intelligible when we remember how severe the mediæval Church was on the wandering gleeman, or *clerici vagantes*. "Habent spem joculatores," says Honorius of Autun, "Nullam; tota namque intentione sunt ministri Satanae." The vision itself may be a parody on the famous visions of the early Irish saints, like the vision of Fursey, and the "food-litanies" surely strengthen this suggestion. It is possible, too, that into it are worked old pagan memories of a vanished golden age, an age of simple pastoral plenty, such as a cattle-breeding people of shepherds and rancheros would love to remember and to embellish. To the archæologist, or lover of Gaelic antiquity, this vision is a treasure-house, for it contains many texts, words, and phrases that throw light on the life of the early mediæval Gael,—his

food, dress, and habits, his architecture and artistic accomplishments, his social and ecclesiastical life. In its present form it may be, as Professor Wollner shrewdly conjectures, only a patchwork of related fragments, only the libretto of the vagabond *musicante*, who wandered from one "bally" to another, from one green rath to the next one, a real shuttle of social life in that semi-patriarchal state, a gleam of sunshine, a ripple of laughter in the hard vicissitudes of Irish mediæval life.

5. It is well known that, outside of the classic literature, the oldest navigation-tales are those that have come to us from Ireland. In the "Voyage of Bran, son of Febal, to the Land of the Living," Prof. Kuno Meyer has presented us with the oldest of the navigation tales known to the vernacular languages of Europe. The Irish text has reached us in seven manuscripts, most of them being of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries,—the oldest, that on page 121*a* of the *Leabhar na h'Uidhre*, (circa 1100 A. D.) contains, unfortunately, only the end of the story.

The story opens abruptly with the summons of Bran to go to—

A distant isle
Around which sea-horses glisten ;
A fair course against the white-swelling surge,—
Four feet uphold it.

Feet of white bronze under it,
Glittering through beautiful ages.
Lovely land throughout the world's age,
On which the many blossoms drop.

The summons comes from a damsel who shakes over Bran a branch of silver with white blossom, and sings to him of the beauties of the over-sea country in fifty quatrains, of which the manuscripts have preserved but twenty-eight. The land is one of "thrice fifty distant isles, in the ocean to the west of us," and its inhabitants are—

Without grief, without sorrow, without death,
Without any sickness, without debility.

It is called the Land of Women, and lies beyond the clear sea, which is peopled by fairy hosts, friendly and beautiful, and across which Manannan, the son of Lir, will pilot the fated Bran. The latter embarks, indeed, for the fragrant isle, which he reaches with the loss of one companion. Here he is detained among the sinless men and women of fairyland, who say of themselves :

We are from the beginning of creation,
Without old age, without consummation of earth,
Hence we expect not that there should be frailty,
The sin has not come unto us.

The many years they pass in the fairy isle seem but as one year. Eventually, longing seizes one of the band to revisit Ireland, which is permitted them on condition that they do not touch land. On reaching Ireland they learn that they have been absent for centuries, and that the Voyage of Bran is already one of the "ancient stories" of the bards. At this juncture the homesick Nechtan, the cause of their return, leaps to the shore from the coracle, but is at once reduced to ashes, "as though he had been in the earth for many centuries." The fine tale concludes as follows: "Therefore to the people of the gathering Bran told all his wanderings from the beginning until that time. And he wrote these quatrains in Ogam, and then bade them farewell. And from that hour his wanderings are not known."

In the damsel's mystic chant over Bran there is introduced a prophecy of the rebirth of Manannan, an ancient Irish marine-god, in the shape of Mongan, son of Feethna (an historical character of the early seventh century), though perhaps this rebirth is meant to be in the person of the famous Finn, the son of Cumhal.

Thus we have in this old tale two subjects of surpassing interest,—the paradise ideal of the ancient Irish, and their messianic idea. And the Irish text is very old, luckily, quite close to the conversion of the nation, for Professor Meyer, with Professor Zimmer, agree that the "Voyage" was originally written down in the seventh century, and that when the tenth-century copy was made, the poetical portion was left almost intact (as comparison with the Wuerzburg Irish glosses shows), while the prose was subjected to some modification, chiefly in the verbal forms.

It is the paradise ideal, as set forth in the Voyage of Bran that gives Mr. Alfred Nutt the theme for the study which he prints in this volume on the Irish Vision of the Happy Other World, and which he dedicates to the memory of two departed friends of the Gaelic, the Rev. Euseby D. Cleaver and the Rev. James Keegan, of St. Louis, Mo. Mr. Nutt has collected here a number of old Irish parallels to the Voyage of Bran,—the various similar *Imrama* or oversea voyages, like the Voyage of Maelduin, the Navigation of Brendan, etc. Quite entrancing also is the view of the old pagan Celtic philosophy as to the future, which we can gather from the Adventures of Prince Condlá, Oisín in the Land of Youth, the Sick Bed of Cuchullin, the Wooing of Etain, Leaghaire MacCrimthainn's and Cormac Mac Art's Visits to Faery, the Dinnsenchas, the Fís Adamnain or Vision of Adamnan, and other archaic presentations of the happy world beyond this bourne, the laughing,

flowery, deathless world of Tír Tairngiri. At times it seems to be a land beyond the western sea, or even under the waves, and again it is a great plain in the hollow of some hill, where the musical hosts of Faery are drawn up in array, "white curly-headed bands, that march amidst blue spears, warlike sons of kings and queens, invisible to mortals because of Adam's fall."

With smooth comely bodies,
With bright blue-starr'd eyes,
With pure crystal teeth,
With thin red lips.

In these texts, and the traditions connected with them, we have the remnants of the old pagan Irish Pantheon, which was once as minutely organized as that of the Germanic races, but melted away before Christianity—the malevolent members of it being converted into giants and monsters, while the friendly tribes were located either over-sea or under-sea, or in the mounds and hillocks that had been from time immemorial the *loca sacra* of the Irish. To all these stories there clings the pantheism of the pagan Celts, and the close-related animism—the respect of and veneration of all the forces of life. This is especially true of the forces in which power, order, grandeur, irrevocable finality, are most manifest, e. g., the operations of the elements, the sun and moon, the stars, the winds, heaven and earth, day and night. The oath by these elements was the most ancient and solemn that the Celtic man could take, as may be seen in texts so far apart as Diodorus Siculus, the oath of King Leaghaire in the "Four Masters," the oath of King Cathal in the "Vision of MacConglinne," and the oath which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of King Lear :

By the sacred radiance of the sun,
The mysteries of Hecate, and the night,
By all the operation of the orbs,
From whom we do exist, and cease to be.

Christianity erased or modified much that was contrary to its tenets in this folk-literature and belief, or relegated them to the harmless circle of the fireside or the banquet-table, where they eventually became mere echoes of national or patriotic memories, natural links between the Christian present and the pagan past. And the process was not unlike what Gregory the Great was willing to tolerate for the Angles and the Saxons. The doctrines of the Incarnation of Christ and original sin, were worked into the great tales, often with literary violence to their symmetry and movement, and by the insertion of prophecies of their conversion, the pagan Irish, who had held zealously aloof from Rome and the Continent, were worked into

the great Christian body. Thus the "adze-head" prophecy about St. Patrick, the Redeemer-prophecy of the Voyage of Bran, that offsets the pagan messianism of the story, the lovely tale of the conversion of the third century King Cormac Mac Art, the prophecy in the Three Children of Lir, and its exquisite fulfillment. Christianity did not completely triumph in Ireland before the middle of the seventh century, and there is more fact than fiction to the splendid epic of "Comgal," in which Sir Samuel Ferguson has shown us the tenacity of old Druidism battling even then in remote and inaccessible sites for its ancient power and influence. It is no wonder, therefore, that tales like the "Voyage of Bran," written between the conversion of Ireland and the arrival of the Danes, should offer many traits of pagan Celticism, shaded and subdued, or elevated and transfigured,—foreign, nevertheless, to Roman Christianity, with which these traits reconciled themselves only slowly, and in the persons of the monastic clergy, at once orthodox men, and passionate lovers of their island vernacular.

6. As author, editor and publisher, Mr. Nutt has rendered effective services to Gaelic literature. A painstaking and enthusiastic student of Gaelic folk-lore, whether preserved in ancient manuscripts among the most valued treasures of great libraries or shrined in the loving traditions and retentive memories of the Gaelic-speaking peasantry, he holds an honored place among the men who have labored most devotedly and effectively in the new movement for the preservation of the language and literature of the Gael.

As a publisher Mr. Nutt has been distinguished for his public spirit and the unselfish energy with which he ventured on the experiment of placing Irish books on the English market, at a time when pecuniary success seemed at best but problematical. That his laudable endeavors have been duly appreciated by a discerning public is a source of gratification to all who have derived pleasure and profit therefrom.

Among the erudite German scholars distinguished for their achievements in the field of Celtic literature there is no one whose name is more familiar to Irish readers than that of Kuno Meyer. This comes from the fact that his translations from ancient Irish manuscripts (and more especially those from folk-lore tales) have been brought more under their notice than have any of the more serious works of his co-laborers and fellow-countrymen.

In the "Irish Odyssey," Professor Meyer's valuable discovery in Irish manuscripts, dating from the fourteenth century, he has shown not only great discriminative research (resulting in the conclusive proof that the greater portion of the

story was not derived from any version of Homer's *Odyssey* extant at the time, but was the pure invention of the Irish scribe, based on some slight knowledge of the main incidents of the Homeric poem acquired in ways still unknown), but in his English translation he has exhibited an almost intuitive familiarity with Irish mode of thought and expression, a gift which few save native-born writers ever acquire.

We regret that the space at our disposal will not permit our noticing this interesting little book at more length, for it affords the most ancient authentic corroboration of a fact long known to us,—that the popular versions of ancient folk-lore tales scattered all over Ireland are the work of successive generations of imaginative *Seanachies*, based upon a more or less hearsay knowledge of the contents of ancient Irish manuscripts which they had never seen.

7. The compiler of "The Elements of Gaelic Grammar" states in his preface that it partly follows the plan of Dr. Stewart's more elaborate work. That the method he worked upon was by exclusion; that the purpose of the book was to afford assistance to such as may desire a living and intelligent acquaintance with the Gaelic language of Scotland, hoping to be able in some degree to enlighten and smooth the way of the elementary student, and of others who may undertake the same interesting travel."

8. "The Gaelic Class Book," by the same author, is a small work of carefully graduated exercises running parallel with the order of the Grammar, and including classified declensions of nouns, verbs, and adjectives.

English Literature.

Yorkshire Writers: Richard Rolle, of Hampole, and his Followers, edited by C. Horstman, vol. II. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1896.

The edition of the works of Richard Rolle (1300–1349), has conferred a favor not only upon scholars but upon all who like to get nearer to the heart of a great and neglected past, and who do not pretend to be specialists of any sort. To the philologist,—whether he be a student of middle English or an examiner of the special Latin forms of the time,—the book has much value. The Yorkshire metrical Psalter attributed to Richard Rolle,—although he was undoubtedly the author of a prose translation,—is most carefully edited, the three texts being given with admirable notes. The effect of corrupted Latin on the English dialect preceding Chaucer is evident in all three versions. One slight lapse in a note might be pointed out for the benefit of the reader who does not carefully read

the introduction. In the introduction it is implied that Richard Rolle died in 1349, and the supposition is that he was born in 1300; but in the introductory note to the Psalter we are told that he died "an old man," and that "his earlier life belonged to the thirteenth century." This inconsistency would not be so important were the dates not used to explain certain seemingly otherwise inexplicable changes in the style of the metrical psalter. Nothing can show better that Chaucer's influence was conservative than a study of Richard Rolle's Yorkshire dialect, in which Northumbrian poems constantly occur,—poems which are found in Yorkshire to-day, though eliminated from the language that Chaucer crystallized.

Philological documents are sufficiently common, but human documents like these records with a living heart and an exalted spirit are rare. It seems singular that the editor so far misunderstood the attitude of Richard Rolle to the Church as to name him as the "predecessor of Wyckliff and Luther." But this may be passed over, for we find on page 25 of the "Introduction," this note, which explains why "he himself never left, or meant to leave, the unity of the Church." "His difference from Wyckliff," the editor says, "is this: 'he is all love, Christ-like; Wyckliff all hatred, negation.'" Rolle was a mystic and a lyrist, a man of the school of St. Francis d'Assisi, but more given to contemplation. He sings even in his prose; he is more English than Chaucer. The form of his metre is affected by the early poets of his own country, from whom he borrows the head-rhyme. His devotion to Mary is apparent everywhere, and the careful reading of his prose and verse,—difficult as it is from his lack of taste and love for ruggedness,—will reveal as much beauty as Thomas à Kempis or Bonaventura. Richard Rolle is permeated with the sweetness of the love which belongs neither to the Italy of St. Francis nor the Spain of St. Teresa, but is as universal as the spirit of God. "The Prick of Conscience," Englished into modern speech, would be recognized and acclaimed as a vital expression of a living soul. The men who prefer the things of the mind are called upon to thank the editor and the publishers of this good book.

Archæology.

The Swastika, the earliest known symbol, and its migrations; with observations on the migration of certain industries in prehistoric times, by Thomas Wilson, Curator, Department of Prehistoric Anthropology, U. S. National Museum. Washington Government Printing Office, 1896. 8°, pp. 252.

Few archæological problems are more interesting, or have called forth a more varied literature within three centuries than

the sign of the cross, taken as a mere geometrical or decorative sign. Among its many variations that known as the Swastika, or *Croix pattee*, remains yet the most deeply interesting, and provokes the widest range of discussion, according to the bias or the scope of the student or investigator who approaches the subject.

Mr. Wilson approaches the subject with absolute impartiality, and his work is a specimen of scientific fairness and thoroughness. The volume contains the most complete collection of all forms of the Swastika cross,—square, ogee, Egyptian meander, curved, spiral, triskelion, and tetraskelion,—and for the future is an indispensable aid to all workers in this field, already so well cultivated by such writers as Burnouf, Gregg, Goblet d'Alviella, Ludwig Müller, Ohnefalsch-Richter, Max Müller, Goodyear, Brinton, Gardner, Thomas, Simpson, Sayce, Zmigrodzki, Perrot and Chipiez, and others.

The Swastika cross, in its genuine form, is a Greek cross, with rectangular prolongations of both arms, usually to the right, sometimes to the left. It has been found in nearly all parts of the habitable world, and on monuments of human culture that antedate by many centuries the Christian religion. This peculiar rectangular combination has been in use from a remote antiquity in farther Asia, China, Corea, Thibet, and Japan. It is engraved on the breast of the statues of Buddha, and on the pedestal of his statues. It was found on a leaden female idol at Hissarlik, deep in the ruins of pre-Homeric Troy. While not found in Babylonia, Assyria, Phenicia and Egypt, it was, and is yet, known in Persia. The Scandinavian warrior engraved it on the scabbard of his sword, and the pre-Patrician Celts of Ireland and Scotland were acquainted with it. It is an ornament of Greek and Roman art, and may rightly claim to be the oldest and most wide-spread symbol known to mankind.

The word comes from the Sanskrit, and signifies benediction, fortune, good luck, prosperity. But beyond the ancient name and the universal use of this sign, little is known with scientific finality, and a wide margin is left for the fancy of the archæologist. Whence did it originate? Its oldest monuments are in the remotest Orient, and it persists there yet in daily artistic and religious use. Yet it is discovered amid the relics of pre-historic antiquity in America, and its distinctive angles are traceable on objects found in the mounds of Ohio, Tennessee, and Missouri. It is in common use among the Kansas and Sac Indians, the Pimas and the Navajoes of Arizona. How did this strange symbol find a universal acceptance among people so widely scattered? Mr. Wilson rejects all forms of the theory

of independent invention and holds to a migration or inter-communication from one people to another at dates and in ways beyond our ken.

It seems to have arisen in the age of bronze, and to have followed the vicissitudes of that metal. It seems too to have been a favorite symbol of the early Aryan peoples—and whether it signified for them the wheeling sun, or the driving winds, the forked lightning or rain, the principle of fecundity, or the attributes of their supreme deity, it is impossible to say with accuracy.

Many hypotheses have been invented to explain its peculiar formation. Is it the hammer of Thor or the conventionalized sepals of the Egyptian lotus? Is it an amulet or talisman, a mere sign of good fortune, a luck-penny as it were, or is it like the Christian fish, a compendium of old-time wisdom, human and divine?

It is found more frequently on objects of every day use than on religious objects. Thus, the Swastika sign is met with on pottery, on whorls and spindles, on coins and ornaments, on utensils and textile fabrics, whether the latter be old Coptic gobelins, the garments of Sac Indian women, or the blankets of the Navajoes. The study of the Swastika raises many problems as to the migration of symbols, the ease and probability of early human inter-communication, the action of the average human mind in similar circumstances, the tenacity of prehistoric custom, the movement of commerce and industry, such as the Hopewell Mound reveals. Mr. Wilson touches on all these unsettled questions, but wisely forbears a decisive answer. In fact he lets us see that he considers several of these problems as unlikely to ever receive a satisfactory solution. In the meantime he collects all the facts and references, and leaves the reader to infer therefrom as he may.

We have reserved for the last the most interesting feature of the Swastika literature, its relation to the sign of the cross among the primitive Christians. It has been maintained that the cross-sign is only the symbol of a very ancient and occult religion, and that with the symbol Christianity borrowed from the Orient the tenets of this ancient system. Hence so many modern studies on the pre-Christian sign of the Cross, on the *croix ansée* of the Egyptians and the Swastika,—both found in the catacombs. Now, there is no need of postulating such fantastic origins for the pre-Christian forms of the cross found in the catacombs. They are few, and may have been introduced by Oriental Christians, with as little sense of the anomalous as was possessed by that Coptic artist who modelled his figurine of the Blessed Virgin and Child on the model of the seated Isis with Horus.

The cross was recognized by the Christians at an early date as the specific *signum Christi*. It is true that before Constantine its use was concealed, but more than one figure of it can be traced in the ornamentation of the catacombs, and its use is otherwise recognizable in the Christian art of the first three centuries. The epistles of Barnabas, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian are evidence of the domestic use of the cross as a symbol among the Christians, and they always speak of it in the historic sense. These writers illuminate the darkness made by the absence of the monuments, just as the "Spotcrucifix" of the Palatine illuminates the silence of the written records, and shows that the usual pre-Constantine form of the cross was of the traditional Christian type. The early Christian artists had a large freedom of design and invention, as did their mediæval brethren, and they may easily have introduced fantastic forms of the cross on their individual responsibility, just as easily as Justin Martyr could see the cross in the barred mast of a ship or in the figure of a flying bird, or the Spanish Dominicans could believe in pre-Columbian Christianity when they saw the cross in Mexican art. The early Christians were known as *crucicolæ*, and their art is largely borrowed from the gospels and the epistles, in which the material figure of the cross plays so large a part. For the rest, the Swastika was well known to Greeks and Romans, and its shape furnished, like the *croix ansée*, a convenient means for hiding the Christian symbol from the uninitiated or the blasphemous, especially in the domestic circle. In his treatise on the Christian Inscriptions of Carthage, De Rossi has illustrated the use of the cross-sign in the catacombs with rare erudition (*Spicilegium Solesmense*, IV., 505, 517 sqq) completing the valuable work of Gretser, *De Cruce Christi*, (Ingolstadt, 1598-1605). If to these monumental stories one adds the writings of Zmigrodski and Zöckler, Brock¹ and Von Bunsen², he will have a fund of the most curious and instructing information concerning a symbol that is at once the most ancient and the most holy known to man.

The Tell El Amarna Letters, by Hugo Winckler., New York : Lemcke & Buechner. Berlin : Reuter und Reichard, 1896.

During the winter of 1887-88, the archæological world was startled by the discovery on Egyptian soil of a collection of cuneiform tablets which, after a summary inspection, was pro-

¹Brock, The Cross, Heathen and Christian, a fragmentary notice of its early pagan use and subsequent Christian development. London, 1882.

²Das Symbol des Kreuzes bei allen Nationen, Berlin, 1878.

nounced to be nothing less than the Archives of Foreign Affairs under Kings Amenophis III and Amenophis IV of the eighteenth dynasty. The tablets were unearthed at Tell-el-Amarna now an insignificant village, on the right bank of the Nile, between Nineveh and Anrout, once the gorgeous capital of Amenophis IV. This king, as was long known, was of a monotheistic tendency. Soon after the death of his father he had exchanged the worship of the national gods of Egypt for the religion of the solar-disk, a divinity apparently of Asiatic origin. He endeavored to force the new religion on the whole Egyptian nation. For this purpose he had abandoned Thebes to build another capital where the new religion could assert itself in new temples, without being checked in its growth by the places of worship of the old Egyptian gods. With the seat of government the heretic king transferred to Tell-el-Amarna that portion of the Egyptian archives relating to the administration of his father.

The archives of Egypt written in Assyrian characters and language! That sounded absurd; several of the most eminent archæologists, Renan, for instance, were so skeptical about it as to pronounce the collection of tablets to be nothing but a huge and bold forgery, a joke played by some humorous Assyriologist on the candid Egyptologists. In the meanwhile most of the tablets had found their way to the museums of Boulak, London, and Berlin, and since have been the subject of methodical and conscientious study by such men as Sayce, Bezold, Budge, in England; Scheil and Halévy, in France; C. Abel and Winckler, in Germany. The first verdict of the Assyriologists proved to be right. The decipherment, however, was a slow and tedious process, many difficulties arising from the novelty of the matter, the bad condition of several of the tablets and the lack of familiarity with the Assyrian languages on the part of most of the writers. Moreover, the work was necessarily done piecemeal, the publications we have just alluded to treating of some portion only of the known tablets. Hence Assyriologists welcome the latest publication of Dr. H. Winckler, in which we find for the first time, in readable shape, a transliteration and translation of the entire collection of Tell-el-Amarna, together with a carefully compiled dictionary and several precious indexes. No doubt, as the author modestly states, "this book does not aim at giving the final exposition of the letters, but only the beginning of such an exposition, and for the future Assyriologists there remains more to be done than a mere gleanings." In spite of this, Dr. Winckler's volume will prove highly instructive, both to Semitic philologists and

scholars of oriental history. As early as 1892, C. Bezold, in the introduction to his "Oriental Diplomacy" (London, 1892), expatiated on many grammatical and syntactical peculiarities "which, when properly worked out, will certainly modify many of the received notions concerning the development of the Babylonian and Assyrian dialects." Moreover, as most of the writers of those letters were not of Assyrian tongue they often used instead of the genuine forms well known to us from the pure Assyrian texts, cognate forms of their own dialects. This practice assures us most valuable assistance for the reconstruction of the Palestinian and Syrian Semitic languages at that early period—an immense gain for the study of the comparative grammar of the Semitic languages.

The historian is not less favored than the philologist in this collection of ancient Oriental documents. He will find in the tablets of Tell-el-Amarna, quite a series of synchronisms, showing him a complete political *tableau* of the East at as early a date as the fifteenth century B. C., and furnishing him with many helps for the framing of Oriental chronology. There are, moreover, long lists of countries and cities, kings and governors, which fill nearly as many blanks in this field of historical research. Finally they furnish the general reader a rare enjoyment by bringing before him a correspondence of 3,500 years ago, one which betrays so well that mixture of naiveté and astuteness which even yet is the chief characteristic of Oriental diplomacy. We wish merited success to Dr. H. Winckler's book, and we hope that the author will continue to devote himself to the study of this interesting collection, and thus crown the work of which he has been the chief inaugurator.

The Menomini Indians. Extract from the Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, by Walter James Hoffman. Washington, 1896.

This is a production of one endowed with immense capacity for labor and no less judgment in the disposition of his materials. It is a careful description of the history, tribal government, social organizations, mythology, folk-lore, customs and general social condition of the Menomini Indians, a tribe located in the north-eastern part of Wisconsin, first discovered by Sieur Jean Nicollet about the year 1634. A more complete picture of the life and social condition of a nature-people could not be given. The chapters on mythology and folk-lore teem with information of a most interesting and valuable character.

Chemistry.

A Manual of Quantitative Chemical Analysis, by Frederick A. Cairns, A. M. Third edition. Revised and enlarged by Elwyn Waller, Ph. D. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1896.

Since its first appearance, in 1880, Cairn's *Quantitative Analysis* has been a very useful book, both to the student and the professional chemist, but its utility has been much enhanced in this new edition. This is due not only to the introduction into the methods of analysis given of the modifications brought about by progress in chemical science, but also to increased and more minute directions in regard to the treatment of the material under examination. This latter improvement is especially noticeable in the two chapters on the analysis of iron, in which the forty pages devoted to the subject in the first edition have grown to eighty pages in the new one.

A valuable feature of the present edition is the addition of an appendix on the Properties of Precipitates. Here are described the different compounds sought for by the analytical chemist on which are based the numerical results of his analyses. The methods of obtaining these, their behavior towards different solvents and reagents, their stability, etc., are carefully discussed, and the student who finds it impossible to "make his results agree" will be amply repaid by a study of this chapter.

Elementary Practical Chemistry, by G. S. Newth. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.

Laboratory manuals in chemistry are as plentiful as publishing houses, and generally have a wonderful sameness of matter, though they vary in the order of its presentation. There are some features of this new book, however, which raise it much above the common level. The author, a demonstrator in the Royal College of Science, of London, has given a great deal of attention to the devising of experiments which bring forth strongly the various points of chemical doctrine, and has been so successful in his work that his "*Chemical Lecture Experiments*" is the best book of its kind in the language. The present book deserves equal success. Throughout the entire volume the principle of the conservation of matter is prominent, great stress is laid upon quantitative work, and the student is trained to accurate observation from the very outset.

The chapters on manipulation, especially in the working of glass, are very clearly written and fully illustrated. The book is more than a laboratory manual as ordinarily understood; it is more than a collection of receipts, with a few leading ques-

tions annexed, for it contains quite an amount of chemical theory, but this is presented in such a manner that it seems to come to the beginner without any studious effort to obtain it on his part. This is especially noticeable in Chapter XXII., on ozone, where the author takes occasion to bring the phenomenon of allotropy to the attention of the student. Not the least praiseworthy feature of the book is the extent to which it introduces and discusses those physical operations which are so necessary to all quantitative work in chemistry. The illustrations are numerous and very well executed.

Miscellaneous.

St. Edmund, King and Martyr: a history of his life and times with an account of the translations of his incorrupt body, from the original MSS., by Rev. J. B. Mac-kinlay, O. S. B. (Benziger Bros., 1893).

This is not altogether a new book, but its striking merits warrant even a late notice for the purpose, if none other, of calling the attention of Catholic historical students to a good specimen of the results of scientific methods of study. The author has sought for his information among many uninviting original sources with a patience of investigation that brings to mind the indefatigable labors of the famous Benedictines of old, and his book ought to prove not only a source of valuable information regarding a period of history wherein few have had the courage to follow in the footsteps of Dr. Lingard, but a guide as well to the young historical student in methods of historical research. It is, however, to be regretted that the author has not applied his evidently brilliant abilities to a more extensive study of the social conditions of the period, which would have for most readers more interest than the somewhat tedious accounts of the translations of the Saint's body.

La Politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin par Édouard Crahay, Avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles; Louvain, 1896.

St. Thomas is so universally and exclusively considered in the light of a mere theologian, that the very title of this book will probably cause a shock of ideas to many readers who are not accustomed to look upon him as also a great thinker in the domain of economics and civil government. Unfortunately, this side of the great Dominican's teaching has, comparatively speaking, been neglected, much, we fear, to the injury of his good fame, so that a change in the opposite direction is indeed a welcome sign of the times. Louvain seems to have the honor of leading the way at least in Catholic circles under the able guid-

ance of Mgr. Mercier, superior of the School of St. Thomas. The author of the present book, although apparently not a disciple, pays a tribute to the influence excited upon him through this newest and most original school of Thomists.

The title of the book explains the contents. It is a study of the teaching of St. Thomas upon the origin and nature of the State, of civil authority and forms of government, and upon the relations of the State to the Church ; all considered parallel with these existing political conditions and later theories of liberty and government, principally with the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau. It is evidently the work of one thoroughly familiar with his subject, although a more profuse citation of texts from St. Thomas would have forestalled a possible objection that he might perhaps be reflecting his own unconscious preconceptions to an undue degree. In fact, the somewhat pessimistic tone of the conclusion suggests that his comparison of St. Thomas with existing political theories was not instituted with much respect for the changed conditions that have forced themselves upon society.

On the whole, however, the book is a brilliant effort and ought to have a ready introduction, particularly into our theological seminaries, for the purpose, if none other, of enlightening them upon a new method of studying the great Doctor. The mere fact that it is written by a layman and in the tongue of his country is a fact worthy of serious attention to those who hope for the influence of scholastic philosophy upon the world of thought. If, as we suspect, this is a fruit of the labors of Mgr. Mercier, it is a sign that he is meeting with the success due to his labors, and most gratifying to his well-wishers.

Chautauqua : Chap. XIX., from the Report for 1897-'99 of the United States Bureau of Education, by Herbert B. Adams.

Surely an institution for the study of the whole range of education under the impulse of religious earnestness which in less than a generation has received into its halls 225,000 members ought to be of intense interest to any Catholic who has the interest of his Church at heart. The present report offers us such a comprehensive description of the scope and influence of this organization, as well as of those of the Catholic Summer School, which is its direct application to Catholic needs. If nothing else, it proves to us that there are tremendous forces at work in our society which the Church must take serious account of in her attempts at conversion ; that there are some new elements in the world of thought which she cannot afford to ignore or manage according to older methods.

The Secret Directory, by Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren. H. L. Kilner & Co., Philadelphia; 330 pp.

This is the story of a young man of noble birth and lofty aspirations, who becomes entangled in the Masonic schemes for the spread of Liberalism in America and Italy. Incidentally it contains two love stories which display the strong imaginative faculty of the writer, and a disclosure of the results of Masonry. The interest of the book centers in the able way in which the author has presented the effects of the opposing ideals of Christianity and Liberalism—the elevation of man by humility, and his degradation through selfishness and pride. She has chosen for hero a youth who has within him the stuff of which saints are made. She gives him to see, on the one hand, the inner workings and principles of that body of which Mazzini was the acknowledged head, and, on the other, the heroism and devotion of a Franciscan friar. The result can be imagined. Disgusted with the crimes committed in the name of liberty, he seeks refuge for his soul in a life of Christian prayer and mortification.

It may be remarked in this connection that Mrs. Dahlgren is writing for the current numbers of the *Rosary Magazine* the story of her conversion. Such narratives always possess psychological and religious interest, and more especially when written with the insight which the author's long study of character enables her to bring to bear on her own change of mind and heart.

Katalog der Herderschen Verlagshandlung zu Freiburg im Breisgau, 1801–1895; 8°, pp. 255.

We welcome this catalogue of the house of Herder in Freiburg. It contains the long list of their many publications in Catholic theology and philosophy, in canon law and history, ecclesiastical and profane; also a list of their works of natural science, travel, piety, Christian art, geography, etc. For a century this printing-house has been foremost in the service of the Church, and this catalogue is the best proof of the durable services rendered, especially by the enlightened zeal, liberality, and energy of Mr. Benjamin Herder, the late lamented head of the house.

Early Education in Middle Georgia, by Richard Malcolm Johnston; **The Atlanta Exposition**, by James C. Boykin; **English Teaching of American History**, by Dr. Weeks; **Chapters from the Reports of the U. S. Commissioners of Education for 1894–95**. Washington, D. C.

1° What strikes the reader of the first chapter is the extraordinary disproportion between the lack of what would now be termed a good system of schooling and the number of eminent

men possessed by Middle Georgia in the period anterior to the war. Surely a people must have been gifted with unusual energy and keenness of intellect to have been able to turn out of its relatively inefficient schools so many men eminent not only in their own little section but also at the nation's capital; or else it must have enjoyed to an unusual degree the advantages of superior private schools.

2° Mr. Boykin's report is remarkably clean-cut, and ought to be read side by side with the former, if one desire to find out what advance the South has made in education during the last thirty years of poverty, above all in behalf of the negro. This latter is well summed up in the report upon the Negro Building: "On the whole the showing was very favorable for a race which was in the darkness of absolute savagery within a few generations and in abject servitude within a single generation, but as a whole the exhibit did not show so much what the negro is doing as what is being done for the negro." At the end is the well-known speech of Booker T. Washington, the most remarkable utterance which, to our knowledge, has ever yet come from a negro, and which ought to be memorised word for word by his friends, protectors and other "somethings between a hindrance and a help."

3° The last chapter will be a revelation to the average Jingo who believes in an irreconcilable enmity between the two great families of the English-speaking race, showing as it does what genuine efforts are being made across the water to correctly teach to the rising generation the history of the Revolution of '76 and thereby draw nearer to one another nations akin in language, political ideals, and blood.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Acknowledgement under this rubric does not preclude further notice.

Clare Vaughan, by Lady Lovat; new edition, with original illustrations and some hitherto unpublished letters. New York, Cathedral Library Association, 1896.

The Illustrated Catholic Family Annual, 1897. New York, Catholic School Book Co.

Historia Exercitiorum Spiritualium S. P. Ignatii de Loyola, fundatoris Societatis Jesu, collecta et concinnata a P. Ignatio Diertins, S. J., Sacerdote, Pars. I., Liber I. Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1896; pp. 322.

Allard, *Histoire des Persecutions*, 5 vols., 8°. Paris, Lecoffre, 1890-1895.

Frantz, *Geschichte der Christlichen Malerei*, 3 vols., 8°. Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1887-1895.

Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*. Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1894; 8°, pp. 635.

Bibliothek der Katholischen Paedagogik, vol. VIII., *Ausgewählte paedagogische Schriften des Desiderius Erasmus*, von Dr. Dietrich Reichling. *Johannes Ludovicus Viues' paedagogische Schriften*, von Dr. Friedrich Kayser; 8°, pp. xxxvi-436; \$2.00. Vol. IX., *Die Studienordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu*, mit einer Einleitung von Bernhard Duhr, S. J. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1896; 8°, pp. viii-286; \$1.25.

SCIENTIFIC CHRONICLE.

The Gases of the Atmosphere.—The History of their Discovery, by William Ramsay, F. R. S. (Macmillan & Co.) The following quotation, from the preface, explains the reason for the existence of this book: "But persons without special scientific training have frequently expressed to me the hope that an account of the discovery would be published, in which the conclusions drawn from the physical behaviour of argon should be accompanied by a full account of the reasoning on which they are based." The interest in the discovery of argon and, somewhat later, helium, is little, if any, less vivid than when the existence of the first-named element was announced early in 1895 by Lord Rayleigh and Professor Ramsay, and excepting possibly the detection of the so-called X-rays from an excited Crooke's tube, no discovery in natural science has in recent years excited such widespread and intense interest. Professor Ramsay, a joint discoverer, has felt and recognized the demand, as he acknowledges from the above quotation, and it is very fortunate for the public that the task has fallen to a man who, besides his recognized talent as an investigator, is possessed of great erudition and wide culture. The style of the book is charming, and one's interest is not allowed to flag at any time. It is another beautiful illustration of the success with which so many English scholars, without sacrificing any scientific interests, are able to present their work popularly, and raises the very serious question: Why is this so rare among others?

In the first four chapters the history of "pneumatic chemistry" from its inception to the present time is given. It is practically a history of the later periods of chemistry, concise, it is true, but sufficient to give a fair idea of the development of the science. Biographical sketches, accompanied by illustrations, are introduced of Hales, Boyle, Mayow, Black, Rutherford, Priestly, Lavoisier, Cavendish, and the investigators more prominent in the chemistry of gases. This material is presented in a most interesting way, and is sufficient in itself to give the book considerable value.

The three chapters following are specifically devoted to an account of the discovery of argon, and incidentally of helium, their properties, physical and chemical, and the theoretical considerations involved. Presumably these facts are very well known to specialists, for the literature while very voluminous,

has been published in such a manner as to be easily accessible. But to the specialist as well as the layman this work will be of great value, as the more important part of the literature is here summarized and systematically arranged for the first time. The modesty of the author in stating his own part in these investigations, and a readiness, amounting in fact to eagerness, to give credit to others, is a very striking and pleasing feature of these chapters. His success in placing the theoretical considerations, necessary to the subject, but usually regarded as rather difficult technicalities, in a clear and readily comprehended way, is remarkable.

He closes in these words : "The object of science, as indeed of inquiry in all departments of human interest, is to reconcile the world of man with the world of nature, and to endeavor to know in part that of which we hope one day to attain to a perfect knowledge." And to this end this book will be of no inconsiderable aid.

The Analysis of Air by a Mushroom.—Dr. T. L. Phipson has been conducting experiments on the growth of plant life in different gaseous media, and some of his experiments recently published are of considerable interest. The following extract is taken from the account in the *Chemical News*. In a bell-jar over water, filled with nitrogen and containing a little carbonic acid, he placed certain plants, for instance, moneywort, *Lysimachia nummularia*, and observed the gradual formation of oxygen, until after a few months the contained gaseous mixture was richer in oxygen than the atmosphere. In another experiment the bell-jar was filled with nitrogen containing some oxygen, and a specimen of the mushroom, *Agaricus atramentarius*, was introduced in such a way as to avoid contact with the water. The oxygen was soon absorbed, carbonic acid formed, which dissolved in the water, and thus the volume in the bell-jar became reduced. After standing some time the mushroom ceased to grow and dried up. On introducing now a specimen of the *Lysimachia*, within a few days the mushroom recommenced growing, and as the formation of oxygen exceeded its absorption, the volume of the gases in the bell-jar gradually increased.

The author is led by his experiments to a number of speculations as to the nature of plant life, and expresses his conviction that herein lies the explanation of the free oxygen in the atmosphere. Admitting the value of his experiments and the plausibility of his arguments, nevertheless, they can scarcely be allowed as yet the validity of established proof.

Another Example of the Interdependence of Science and the Arts.—No better example of the advance in modern chemistry could be selected, perhaps, than the rapidly accumulating knowledge of the *terpenes*, a generic name for a class of compounds to which belong, or are closely related, many of those substances regarded generally as indispensable. Under the leadership of Wallach, Armstrong, Tindall, and more recently of von Baeyer, Tiemann, and other prominent investigators, not to make invidious distinctions, many valuable researches have been conducted in this field. But, as with the so-called "coal tar dye stuffs," the aromatic aldehydes, etc., we have here a beautiful illustration of the interdependence of pure science, and the commercial needs demanded by modern conditions. There is a rapidly growing demand for india-rubber, camphor, and some other products all closely related to the *terpenes*. The present natural sources of supply are rapidly becoming inadequate, if not entirely exhausted. These sources must be carefully conserved and augmented, or artificial methods of production must be devised, or both. There appears to be but little promise in these directions until the nature and relationship of these compounds are more clearly understood, and thus a most powerful incentive to investigation is developed, and pure science must be the richer in supplying the needs of her sister, applied science. As in so many other directions of modern life, the influence of the bicycle is felt here. The enormous, and rapidly increasing use of rubber tires for city vehicles, its many household applications, and its extensive use as an insulator in electrical apparatus, have brought about a condition where the supply of this material is sorely taxed to meet the demand for it. Very recently, we are informed, attempts have been made to regulate the gathering of caoutchouc, and preserve and propagate the trees. It is stated that about two pounds per annum may be drawn from the average tree without injury if proper care be taken in making the incision, and the accompanying details. Reports from British Guiana, indicate a large development of the trade in the gum from the balata tree. While satisfactory for many of the purposes to which ordinary caoutchouc is put, it is, however, said to make but poor insulating material. There are several artificial methods of making rubber already announced, but the details yet given are too vague to allow of any judgment of their probable value.

In the case of camphor the problem seems to be quite as serious. Its expensiveness is rapidly increasing, as its use in medicine and the arts is extended, since the supply seems, if anything, to be getting smaller. The camphor of commerce is obtained principally from a laurel (*Cinnamomum camphora*)

which is found growing extensively in Japan, Formosa and China, although quite a large number of other trees yield it in lesser quantities.

A valuable memoir on this subject, by Dr. E. Grassman, has recently been published. It appears that the principal uses of camphor are in the preparation of celluloid, as an important constituent of most insecticides, in medicinal preparations, and to a limited extent in the preparation of high-power explosives. Suggestions as to the preservation of camphor-yielding trees are made by Dr. Grassman, which unquestionably deserve the attention of the officials in the countries producing them. Attempts to prepare camphor artificially, or substitutes for it, are neither new nor few, but so far have not proved of any special value.

The Etching of Glass Vessels by Contained Solvents has long been known, and the subject of an immense amount of investigation, from the classic experiments of Lavoisier up to the magnificent researches of the German government stations now in progress. Recently much attention has been attracted to some experiments of M. Henri Lavouroux to determine the effect of the material in glass bottles upon the wine contained in them. The investigation seems to have been inspired by a recent case in the French courts, where a large and valuable lot of wine was sold and delivered in bottles. But when drawn from the bottles it was found to differ materially from the sample upon which the sale had been made, and a lawsuit followed. Investigation developed that the bottles had become so badly etched from the loss of lime, potash, and soda as to be quite opaque, and these bases had formed salts with the acid ingredients of the wine, and were present in solution to such an extent as to completely destroy its potative value.

A Curious Surgical Operation.—In *La Nature* of recent date M. F. Crestin describes an operation involving the use of an electro-magnet. The patient was a woman, in whose hand was imbedded a broken needle, which had been there about two months. Her hand was placed between the poles of the magnet and current sufficient to produce a force of about three grammes was used. After about twenty hours, in two-hour sittings, the needle was drawn, without pain or loss of blood. Operative surgery appears to be enriched by a new instrument.

Contribution from the Museum of Ethnology and Anthropology.—Amongst the material in the possession of the University which is now being catalogued and arranged under the direction of Dr. W. J. Hoffman, the curator, an unique specimen has been found illustrating the development of pictography amongst our

Western Indians, and that gentleman has kindly supplied the "Chronicle" with the following descriptive notes:

Indian picture-writing is at all times of interest as illustrating one of the most primitive methods of communicating ideas without the aid of gesture-signs or oral speech. In an example recently received by this Museum, are evidences of a highly conventionalized system of pictographic writing, certain unique marks which have not before been observed in pictorial records known to have been made by the same tribes from which the example under consideration is known to have been received.

The specimen consists of a light gray wool hat, such as are worn by frontiersmen, and was painted by "Wolf-Voice," a Cheyenne Indian of Fort Keogh, Montana. The whole outer surface of the rim and crown is decorated with markings in blue, black and red colors, the entire record embracing a biographic history of the wearer, "Spotted-Bull."

The record begins with the indication of a battle, in which "Spotted-Bull" took two scalps, these being indicated by two small red discs from which the black lines, denoting hair, are suspended; while above each is the portrayal of a knife, the weapon with which the scalping was performed. The victims were Shoshone Indians, while in another illustration of a like exploit two Crow Indians and one Pani are represented, the former by the topknot projecting upward from the forehead, a practice common to that tribe; while the Pani is indicated by a short curved line above the head to represent an elongated ear, as suggested by the slightly curved forefinger when held to the side of the head to denote a wolf, or Pani, the latter being known to the early writers as the Loup, or Wolf Indians, this being the pictorial imitation of the common gesture-sign for this tribe.

The most interesting variant is the practice of representing the horse; the simple horse-shoe to indicate the unshod Indian pony, and the same mark, with short bars at the heel of the shoe, to denote the iron shoe worn by the so-called American or Eastern horse. In the present illustration the horse-shoe marks are practically alike and without the short heel-marks, but in lieu thereof a blue spot is placed within the curved shoe to denote a mule, while a red spot is represented to indicate a horse, the spots being intended to represent nails, while the entire absence of such "nail spots" would, according to one Indian opinion, denote an unshod horse or Indian pony.

Five red-bowl pipes are shown in another place, to indicate that the subject of the record had led five war parties; his position at the head of the column until out of sight of the

enemy, with the pipe carried aloft before him, denoting his rank as a partisan, or leader, of a party organized by him for the purpose of avenging a personal grievance.

The representation of a row of Indian whips, or quirts, denote his presence at an Indian fight where the enemy were defeated and their bodies struck with the whip or *coup* stick. This method of striking the enemy is a mark of degradation of the one struck, and no greater insult could be offered any one. Various other exploits and ceremonials of a mysterious nature are represented, but a review of these would demand too much space.

Various meteorologic signs are shown to denote day, night and darkness, and the chief's personal status as a medicine man, together with his own private charms and fetishes are graphically shown.

Altogether, the specimen is believed to be unique, and one of the most interesting examples of biographic history portrayed within so limited an area.

ANALECTA.

LITERARY.—Two little volumes of exquisite poetry have lately fallen into our hands, "Verses by the Way" and "Poems," by Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Blake. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) It is not often that verse so elegant and chaste, so musical and picturesque, arrests the attention of the casual reader. Mrs. Blake possesses no small share of the divine afflatus. The thought of these little volumes is always elevated and pure, and the beauty of language is sustained from cover to cover, in a way that denotes a writer at once gifted and experienced in the admirable art of words. Had this woman chosen to sing less lofty and more popular themes, no doubt a more general fame would already be her reward. Still, what is fame? Is it the noisy shout of the multitude, whose gross ear is temporarily tickled, or is it the calm and enduring approval of the select and the skilful, an approval that alone can secure admission to the Golden Book of the realm of art. Mrs. Blake has treated many topics in these small volumes, and she lends fresh grace to each one in turn,—her ideal renderings are such as one reads gladly a second time,—no small tribute in an age of multitudinous poetry. Religion, patriotism, virtue, nature, the charm of childhood and the grave beauty of motherhood, the odds and ends of life, are the burden of her song. She treats each subject with dignity and moderation, without exaggeration or flamboyance, and with a precision of expression that is relieving just now, when the vague, the foreign, the indefinite are running riot in our literature, as well as in our art,—those truest mirrors of the uncertain conditions of the American soul. Mrs. Blake has a rare skill in writing of childhood, and we commend to every reader the beautiful poem entitled "A Little Sailor Kiss," which nothing but the gravity of this publication prevents us from reprinting. Its almost perfect "lilt," its sweet truthfulness, the strong motherly passion of the thought, and the glorious "pictura" of the language,—all color and outline and glow,—make the little poem a nursery gem, and earn for it a right to be softly sung forever, or so long as childhood is graceful and motherhood is holy. One might speak with just praise of the poem on "The Christian Martyr" (Saint Salsa of Africa), of the painter Paul Delaroche; of the lines on "June," of the feeling verses entitled "Our Record," "Greeting" and "Erin

Mavourneen," in which the Celtic ardor flames uncommonly bright and strong, and tinges the ideas and the words with the glow of holy devotion and ideal love. The poems on "Wendell Phillips" and "The Women of the American Revolution" will always repay perusal,—strong evidences as they are of that quick assimilation by the Gael of all that is noblest and worthiest in our American life, history, ideals and spirit. Mrs. Blake is of the school of John Boyle O'Reilly, and a prominent figure in the circle of singers, story-tellers and critics which centred about that gifted man, and yet lend a charm to his adopted city. We hope that the world of letters will welcome for many years the verse of one who can write so charmingly of flowers, children, love, and all other things beautiful and holy.

SEMINARY OF BRUGES.—Among the theological seminaries of Europe which have distinguished themselves by contributions to theological science during the past forty years, that of Bruges, in Belgium, deserves special notice. In the department of Sacred Scripture it has produced the commentaries of Van Steenkiste on the Psalms in three volumes, on the Gospel in four volumes, on the epistles of St. Paul in two volumes. It has contributed to dogmatic studies the "*Praelectiones Theologicae dogmaticae generalis*" of D'Hollander; the "*Institutiones Theologiae dogmaticae specialis*" of Jungmann; the learned work, "*De Ecclesia*," of De Brouwer, and the dissertation on the Hexameron, by De Gryse. Among the more numerous works on moral theology may be named "*Theologia Fundamentalis*" and "*De Virtutibus Theologicis*," by Bouquillon; "*De Jure et Justitia*," "*De Temperantia*," many dissertations on Co-operation, the Obligation of Civil Law, Scandal, and the Breviary, by De Waffelaert, the present Bishop of Bruges; in Canon Law, the "*Compendium Juris ecclesiastici civilis*," by Debrabandère, formerly Bishop of Bruges; in Philosophy, the "*Elementa*" of De Gryse; in Social Science, "*Le Droit National et la Revolution*," by the same author.

This intellectual activity is far from waning. Recently the president of the Seminary, M. Van den Berghe, former professor of canon law in the University of Louvain, published a learned canonico-moral work on Law, and another on Church and State. Three of the professors of the Seminary, M. Coornaert, Dignan and Van de Putte, with Fathers Corluy, a Jesuit, and Haghebaert, a Dominican, have undertaken to complete the Flemish translation of the Bible begun by the celebrated Beelen. This year the professors, under the direction and with

the coöperation of Bishop Waffelaert, commenced the publication of a periodical, *Collationes Brugenses*, containing studies on theological questions proposed in the diocesan conferences.

A History of the Seminary has been begun by a former professor, de Schrevel, at present secretary of the Bishop. A preliminary volume containing a rich collection of documents was published some years ago and the first part of the work itself appeared recently. It contains the history of the chapter-school of Bruges, of the chairs of Theology and Belles Lettres founded in the sixteenth century by the Dominican Jean de Witte, third Bishop of Cuba, and of the erection of the Seminary in 1571, according to the wish expressed by the Council of Trent. The work is learned and critical, containing a great fund of information. We note as especially interesting the chapter on the repression of begging, with the controversies to which it gave occasion, and the remarkable study on the famous George Cas-sander.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 8.

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THE TWOFOLD AUTHORSHIP OF SACRED
SCRIPTURE.

In a very wide circle of readers inside, and more especially outside, the Catholic Church, one very interesting topic of conversation to-day is the proper position to be assigned to the Bible. Many are asking themselves and asking others, What is the Bible? What is its value? Is it human? If so, how far? Is it divine? If so, how far? What is Inspiration?

All who call themselves Christians agree that the Bible is inspired; but most of them have the haziest notions about the subject, and, when asked for a definition of its nature, they are not prepared to give any, beyond saying that it is some mysterious influence of God's grace on the souls of the sacred writers. It is a remarkable fact that in all ages, both Jew and Christian, both orthodox and heterodox have agreed as to the existence and main idea of Inspiration. The Catholic Church, for instance, has defined, with a good deal of precision, the Fact and Extent of Inspiration in a decree in which she declares that "All the Books of Scripture with all their parts are inspired." As to any definition of the Nature of Inspiration, the Church has done little more than to declare that "God is the Author of the Sacred Books." However, the absence of a more precise definition need not blind us to the general or essential idea of the thing.

Though we can not accurately define Inspiration in detail, or explain its precise nature, or measure the exact amount of Divine assistance rendered in each case, still we can, by a process of elimination, arrive at a tolerably clear notion of what it is, or, rather, what it is not. To this end it will help us, if we can draw definite lines within which all discussion must be conducted, and beyond which we can safely say that the true notion of Inspiration does not exist. Now it so happens that there are two theories, the "Mechanical" and the "Natural" which are so extreme and unreasonable that they seem to indicate the limits of thought on the subject for all who believe, in any true sense of the word, in the Inspiration of Holy Writ. Hence, if, by any process of elimination, we can dispose of these extreme views as too unreasonable to be entertained, we shall have narrowed down the limits within which the true notion of Inspiration must be found, and thus come so much nearer to a solution of the problem.

THE "MECHANICAL" THEORY OF INSPIRATION.

The polemics immediately following the Reformation led many Protestants and a few Catholics to give an undue emphasis to the divine, and an almost total denial to the human, element in Sacred Scripture. A theory of Inspiration, justly called the "Mechanical," was advanced by Quenstedt, Calovius, and others among our separated brethren, and adopted even by some Catholics. This theory leaves little or no room for the conscious and voluntary activity of the writers whom the Holy Ghost employed, but regards them almost as mere machines.

It would seem that it was the Protestant Reformation that led to the preponderance of this strict view of Inspiration. At the same time it must be admitted that some Catholics, who did not wish to have it appear that Protestants held Holy Scripture in greater esteem than they, allowed themselves to be influenced to some extent by somewhat similar, though usually more moderate, views on the subject. It was the fundamental principle of the Reformers to give exclusively to the Bible all the authority which had hitherto been shared by it and the tradition of the Church. Hence, thought they, the

one foundation on which the whole fabric of Christianity should rest must needs be wholly divine and without the least admixture in it of the human. This rigid theory soon brought into vogue some very palpable exaggerations, and it became customary to speak of the sacred writers as "hands of God," "scribes and notaries of the Holy Ghost," "secretaries," "pens," "reeds," "harps," "flutes of God."

To insure a fair presentation of this theory, it may be well to quote the opinions of some of its best known advocates. The theological faculty of Wittenberg declared, in 1638, that, to speak of barbarisms, solecisms, and grammatical errors in Scripture is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. Calovius says: "It is impious and profane audacity to change a single vowel-point in the word of God, or to substitute a smooth breathing for a rough, or a rough breathing for a smooth." (Calov. *Systema*, l. c. 4; II. c. l.). "Hellenistic Greek, with a mixture of Hebraisms, indicates a desire on the part of the Holy Ghost to make the New Testament like the Old." "Hellenistic Greek is simply Holy Greek; it is the peculiar language of the Holy Ghost." (Pfeiffer, *Herm. Sacra*, c. 8). "The Scriptures are given and guaranteed by God, even in their very language. The writers neither wrote nor spoke one word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the Spirit put it into their mouth to utter." (Gaussen, *Theopneusty*, p. 61). "Every syllable of Scripture is just what it would be if God had spoken from Heaven without the intervention of any human agent." "The Bible is none other than the voice of Him who sitteth on the Throne. Every book of it, every chapter of it, every verse of it, every word of it, every syllable of it, is the direct utterance of the Most High—supreme, absolute, faultless, and unerring." (Dean Burgon.) The climax was reached in the discussion in which it was seriously debated whether Scripture should be considered a "creature" or not, and the opinion defended by Nitsche was that it cannot be called a "creature," but "a divine effulgence, a part of God himself." (Hollaz.)

To such extremes did many go at that time that the "Formula Consensus Helvetica," in 1675, expressly declared it to be the teaching of the Swiss Church that, not only the consonants,

but also the vowel-points, the accents, and the entire punctuation in the present text of our Hebrew Bible were all inspired when the several books were composed. Yet it is an established fact that this complicated system of punctuation was invented and slowly elaborated in the Rabbinical Schools of Babylon and Tiberias sometime between the sixth and the tenth century of the Christian era, and 1,000 or 1,500 years after the composition of the latest book in which this system of punctuation is now found.

Similar views have at times prevailed among the Jews. The earliest writer on this subject is Philo, the Jewish scholar, Alexandrian philosopher, and brilliant exponent of Judæo-Hellenic thought at the time of Christ. He tells us that the sacred writers were "passive," and "in an ecstasy," while writing. "The prophet gives forth nothing of his own, but acts at the prompting of another in all his utterances. As long as he is under inspiration, he is in ignorance, his reason departing from its place; for, yielding up the citadel of his soul, the divine Spirit enters into it and dwells in it." (*De Special. Leg.* 4, 8.)

About fifty years after Philo, Josephus, the great Jewish historian, says that Balaam prophesied, "Not as master of himself, but moved by the Holy Spirit to say what he said." (*Antiqu.* 4, 6, 5.) He represents Balaam as saying to King Balak, "Thinkest thou that it is in our power to speak or to be silent . . . , when the spirit of God takes possession of us? For he causes us to utter such words and such speeches as he wishes, and without our knowledge; for when he has entered into us, nothing that is in us is any longer our own." (*Contra Appion*, c. 8.)

The Jewish Rabbins, according to all accounts of them, were, at a very early date, believers in the strictest theory of inspiration. Many of them held that God Himself handed down from heaven the Mosaic writings, already written. They had a tradition that, when Moses arrived at the summit of Mount Sinai to receive the Ten Commandments, "He found God writing with His own hand the ornamental letters at the head of the chapters in the book of the law." In their superstitious reverence for the law of Moses, the Rabbins taught that

God Himself was so fascinated by the ineffable perfection of the Pentateuch that he spent three hours a day studying it. They counted every verse, every word, and every letter of the Hebrew Bible ; they recorded how many times each letter of the Hebrew alphabet occurs in their Old Testament ; they tell us how often the same word occurs either at the beginning, or at the end, or in the middle, of each verse ; they give the middle chapter, the middle verse, the middle word, the middle letter, of each book and of the entire Hebrew Bible. Thus they tell us that there are in the Hebrew Bible 23,206 verses ; that the letter "aleph" occurs 42,377 times and "beth" 35,218 times ; that the "breastplate" verse (Lev. VIII, 8.) is the middle verse, that "sought" (Lev. X, 16) is the middle word, and that the letter "vav" in the word "gahon" (*Ibid*, XI, 42) is the middle letter, of the Pentateuch.

It was also the common opinion of some Jewish doctors that this complicated system of Massoretic punctuation was originally revealed by God to Adam ; that it was orally transmitted by Adam to Moses ; that Moses in like manner handed it down to Esdras ; that Esdras passed it on to those who finally inserted it into the Hebrew text.

As to the Fathers of the Church, the great majority never admitted, but stoutly repudiated, this exaggerated theory of Inspiration. A few of them, it is true, sometimes use expressions which have been understood to imply that they considered Holy Scripture mechanically inspired. However, it seems more probable that they used such language merely for the purpose of illustrating in a rhetorical way that Scripture was composed under a powerful divine influence. There have been some Catholics also who held the mechanical theory of Inspiration in one form or another, but the theory has never had the approval of the Church.

As is evident, this is but an imperfect resumé of the facts in the case. It is a curious piece of history, but none the less true ; the Bible has been placed on the throne of God and worshipped. There never was an idol or pagan god that received more superstitious homage than this Book. There never was a charm that was supposed to possess greater power to protect its votaries from all manner of harm than

this Book. There never was an oracle so confidently and so blindly consulted, on even the most trivial affairs of life, as the pages of this same Book. At the same time it must be admitted that none of these things deserved this reverence so much as does the Bible. Its power has had no parallel in its range of time and space. Its worshippers have been counted by the million. They are found among the most cultured and enlightened races of mankind, and among the most intelligent adherents of the most pure and spiritual religion in the world. There is, even yet, as profound a reverence for the truths of Scripture and as lofty a concept of its Divine Author as ever there was in the past; only it takes a more sober form and is considered more wise and discriminating. But there still remains some of the blind fanaticism of the past lingering in the minds of many a reader of the Bible, a fanaticism which converts the good Book into a fetish as vain, as awful, as absolute, and as preposterous as ever was made by human hands on the banks of the Congo or the Ganges.

THE "NATURAL" THEORY OF INSPIRATION.

The extravagant over-statements made by extreme dogmatists shortly after the Reformation soon caused, as is usual in such cases, a rebound to the opposite extreme, and became responsible for much of the disquiet and doubt which now prevail in religious circles outside the Catholic Church. One result of this recoil is that quite recently a view, the very opposite of the foregoing, has become current under the name of the "Natural" Theory of Inspiration. Its advocates hold that Inspiration is nothing more than the higher development of that natural insight into truth which all men possess in some degree; that it is an order of intelligence which, in morals and in religion, naturally results in the production of sacred books of the same sort as the Bible, just as, in secular and worldly matters, a corresponding order of intelligence gives rise to great works in art, science, and philosophy.

This theory is closely related to Rationalistic notions about man's independence of God, as well as to the Pantheistic position that man is himself the highest manifestation of an all-pervading but unconscious intelligence which naturally,

though only occasionally, displays itself in writing just such books as the Bible. The advocates of this theory are accustomed to describe Scripture in the most complimentary phrases and in the most glowing colors. They frankly admit that it is inspired throughout ; but they degrade Inspiration so far as to identify it with strong emotion, with fervid imagination, with mere poetic imagery, with natural genius, all which, in some very vague and general sense, is occasionally called Inspiration, and even divine Inspiration. It was customary in ancient times to imagine that signal talents were the special gift of God, and that the painter, the poet, the sculptor, the brilliant orator, the dashing general, and the conquering hero were all impelled by an impulse of the Deity called Inspiration or genius, a genius which came not by the slow course of nature, but was conferred by the swift interposition of the Deity. Such is the inspiration ascribed to the divine Plato, to Homer, to Socrates, to Dante, to Milton, to Shakespeare. Thus mere natural genius is mistaken for the strictly supernatural impulse and divine guidance of the spirit of God.

1° In opposition to the “mechanical” theory the correct view, which is sometimes called the “*dynamic*,” holds that the Bible is human, that it is truly the word and the work of man, and that it bears on its very face all the evidences of its human origin as clearly and as unmistakably as any other book ever composed by man. Moreover, this human authorship extends to all the parts of Holy Writ.

2° In opposition to the “natural” theory the correct view holds that the Bible is divine, that it is the word and the work of God, and that it is the result of a strictly supernatural operation of a personal God acting directly on the souls of the sacred writers. Moreover, this divine authorship extends to all the parts of Holy Writ.

I.—THE BIBLE IS ALL HUMAN.

The mechanical theory is to be rejected, because it ignores any real human authorship whatever in the Sacred Scriptures ; because it assumes an exercise of divine power for which there is no guarantee, and for which no sufficient motive can be

assigned ; because it does not remove the presumption that every book written in human language is supposed to be the work of man, until the contrary is proved; and because it does not satisfactorily explain the clear evidences of individuality in the Sacred Writers.

At times in the past the human element in Sacred Scripture has been reduced to a minimum, or even quite eliminated. This, no doubt, was a mistake. The tendency of later times is to make it appear that this human element is larger than it was formerly supposed to be. To some it has even appeared that the human has been allowed to encroach too much upon the divine. However that may be, it is probably true that the human in Scripture is more extensive than many good people in the past, and not a few good people in the present, have imagined it to be. Yet, when rightly understood, this very humanity of the Bible is a proof of its divinity. The reason for thus calling attention to the human in Scripture is that this is the side of the Bible which, up to the present, has been much ignored by a certain class of religious people. At the same time, while recognizing fully the human medium through which the divine message has been transmitted to us, we should remember that it is only a medium, only a means to an end, and that the end is the divine element which lies beneath, and behind, and above the human, and which gives to Scripture all its exceptional value.

But why, it may be asked, did God use human instruments in the composition of the Sacred Books? He might have written them Himself, as he wrote the sentence of Belshazzar on the walls of his palace at Babylon, or as he wrote the Ten Commandments on the tablets of stone for Moses on Mount Sinai. He could have written the Bible "with an iron pen and lead on the rocks forever," or carved it in huge indelible hieroglyphics upon some inaccessible crag of the Rocky Mountains; or He could have blazoned it forth in letters of burnished gold on the blue vault of heaven, where all the world might read. He could, no doubt. But he preferred to write it with the cooperation of a human intellect, and with the consent of a human will, and with the resources of a human memory. He preferred to instruct and save men by the instrumentality of men.

He preferred to use human instruments, so as to make the Bible a human book, and to give to it all the peculiarities which characterize the works of man. He preferred to use human minds as the channels of his communications, because thus the message would be more readily received and more thoroughly assimilated, and more lastingly retained by the minds of those to whom it is addressed.

As a matter of fact, and, no doubt, as a result of its human origin, the Bible with its endless variety of human characters and temperaments, with its ceaseless display of human emotion, human sentiment, and human passion, and with its ever-varying aspects of God's many-sided truths illustrating and supplementing each other, is by all means the most intensely human, and the most intensely interesting book in the wide world. St. Cyril of Jerusalem uses a beautiful simile to explain the varying action of the Holy Ghost on the souls of differently constituted men. "One and the same rain falls from heaven upon the whole world, yet it becomes white in the lily and red in the rose, and purple in the pansy and violet. In itself, however, it is invariable and changes not, but, by adapting itself to the nature of each thing, it becomes what is appropriate to each."

No doubt God could have dispensed with human instrumentality in the composition of the sacred books, but it does not pertain to us to consider now what God could, should, or would have done in any possible case, but only what he has actually done in the concrete case before us. Now, this can be easily ascertained; for the same Scripture, which claims to be the word of God, claims, also, to be the word of man. The Scriptural evidence to the human authorship of the Bible is as direct and explicit as is its evidence to the divine authorship, and it is embodied in similar forms of language. We find this evidence in the testimony of the sacred writers themselves, who speak of their share in the work in almost the same terms as if there had been no other agency employed. In many instances merely the nominative case of the verb is changed and instead of reading, "Thus saith the Lord," we find, "Thus saith Isaias the Prophet;" or, "Then was fulfilled what was spoken by the Prophet Jeremias," or, "I Paul say unto you."

In a word, the biblical proofs of the human authorship of the Bible are of exactly the same sort as might be found in any uninspired book, the author of which might have occasion to mention the fact that he had written the book; nor could the proofs have been more explicit than they are, if there had been only a human agency concerned in its composition. Moreover, we should not forget that, until the contrary is proved, the presumption is that every book written in human language is, of course, the work of man.

In addition to the above mentioned and many similar statements made by the authors themselves, we discover human features impressed upon the whole framework and upon every individual page of Holy Writ. These features are quite analogous to the divine, and prove that the individuality of the writers is preserved and that inspiration did not remove, but rather pressed into its service, all the personal peculiarities of the writers. Every man has a combination of peculiarities and idiosyncracies which clearly distinguish him from every other man. This combination forms his individuality. It arises from many sources, from birth, heredity, nationality, climate, early education, habits, experience, occupation, religious convictions, personal and local environment, one's own will, and from the degree of civilization and form of government under which he has lived.

But, from whatever source it arises, it is human nature, it is a permanent institution, and has come to stay. Consequently, it in some way affects the writer's whole being, it influences his every action, it moulds his thoughts, it prompts his feelings, it suggests his expressions. Now it is precisely this individuality of each writer that furnishes the materials upon which and is the channel through which, the spirit of God must work in the inspiration of the Holy Books. We know that grace does not destroy nature; it does not substitute new faculties for the old ones; it simply changes the direction of the currents, which continue to flow on in the old channels. So is it in inspiration, which is itself a grace. One of the inspired writers is naturally warm, ardent, and impulsive; another is naturally solemn, majestic, deliberate, and phlegmatic. One is cultivated, another is rude; one pours forth his eloquence

like a mountain torrent, another breathes forth notes as soft and soothing as "the still small voice," which the Prophet heard at the entrance to his cave in the mountain. The same should be said of all other peculiarities which originate in age, race, climate, habits, education and constitution. They are as compatible with inspiration as they are with the grace of God ; and we know that the grace of God admits the play of human passion, human emotion, and human sentiment, that it coöperates with the will and the memory, and is consistent with the greatest brain work in searching for information from every source of human knowledge. In fact, the continued exercise, in undiminished vigor, of all the intellectual and volitional faculties of the writers is one of the most marked peculiarities of Sacred Scripture, and is manifest on every page. Indeed, it is the most obvious fact that presents itself to the careful student, and even to the casual reader. It is, besides, a fact which must never be forgotten, if we wish to understand correctly the sacred volume.

There was a time when some, whose faith outstripped their knowledge, maintained that the Bible was exclusively Divine. This is now generally recognized as a mistake, for no one can candidly study the phenomena presented on every page of the Book without finding in it much that is human. The Bible is all human, because it was written in human language ; it was composed by members of the human family and addressed to the human understanding, to the human heart, to the human soul. The thoughts came from God, but they were moulded into shape and took form in the mind and under the hand of living, throbbing, active men ; they stirred the blood, they quickened the pulse, and they moved the heart of men like ourselves. It was a human hand that held and guided the pen ; the words, when written down, were human words, belonging to some family of human languages, and they were written according to the general laws of human speech, though the particular forms of expression were not always as perfect as if written by the classical writers of the language. This is most reasonable : for, if we reflect upon it, it will be clear that, if God is to teach man by inspiration, He must teach him, not in the language of angels

or of monkeys, but in the language of men,—the only language that man can understand. Hence, if we ignore the presence of this human element, the Bible will be a riddle to us; whereas, if we recognize it frankly, the Bible will appear much more simple, more beautiful, more divine, and more consonant with God's ways of dealing with man. Nor can we deny that it adds a singular charm to the book, to find the human thus blended harmoniously with the Divine.

We might also add that, from an evidential, as well as from a hermeneutical point of view, it is a matter of great importance that the individuality of the writers be maintained, in order that Scripture may have the corroborative evidence of many concurrent and independent witnesses. Also from the standpoint of the higher critic, the same holds good. For since each book reflects the character, the genius, the trend of thought, the tone, the color, the sentiment, the modulations of mood and passion, and even the very atmosphere in which the writers lived and moved, and since so much of what they wrote received its tinge and shape from the age, the place, the people, and the civilization under which they wrote, it is difficult to conceive how any man, living at a much more recent date, can so completely strip himself of his own identity, can clothe himself in the individuality of another, and, projecting himself into a distant past age, write as if he belonged to that age. To a great extent this holds in sacred as well as in profane literature; for God adapts himself much to the peculiarities of his intelligent instruments. This principle is now so generally admitted, that the human characteristics of a sacred book are often taken, in the absence of sufficient external evidence to the contrary, as proof that the book was written at such a time, in such a place, by such a man, among such a people, in such an environment, under such a grade of civilization, and under such a form of government. These form what are generally called the "Internal Criteria" for proving the human authorship, date of composition, etc., of biblical works.

Indeed one need not have read much of the Bible to be satisfied that not all its writers wrote alike. Each writer had his own way of expressing his thoughts; Peter is involved and familiar; Paul is nervous, learned, didactic, and as subtle as could

be expected of a man who had been educated at the feet of Gamaliel, and trained in all the methods of the Rabbinical schools. When we read John, we perceive at a glance that it is not the style of Paul. For John is rustic and simple in style, and sublime in thought, a profound thinker, and a great saint lost in contemplation of the "Word made flesh," Who dwelt from the beginning in eternity and on Whose bosom John once leaned. Whereas, Paul is remarkable for his fiery zeal, his broken style, his sudden transitions, his love for argument, his nervous, energetic reasoning, his lofty thought, and his tortuous logic.

As to the Old Testament writers, who does not perceive at a glance the broad distinction between the fervid and majestic poetry of Isaias, the lyrical poetry of the psalms of David, and the sententious wisdom of Solomon? Who does not instinctively feel that Jeremias was of a melancholic, atrabilious, lugubrious temperament, and fitted by his very nature to be an instrument in the hands of the Holy Spirit for writing Lamentations? Also from a casual perusal of his poetry, who does not see that Amos had been brought up in a country home among shepherds? In all that he writes, he still lingers among the flocks, he wanders with them in the pastures, he remembers the cultivation of the fields, the harvests, and the sowing season; and his illustrations and comparisons are drawn from the blight that falls on the vineyards, and from the lion that invades the sheep in the fold. The rustic simplicity and natural beauty of his language, unlike the refined diction of Isaias, the courtier prophet, is perfectly natural to one who had spent his youth as a "herdsman and a dresser of sycamore trees." Nor can any one doubt that he had more than once witnessed the scene which he describes, a shepherd rushing to the rescue and snatching out of the very jaws of the wolf or the jackal "two legs or a piece of an ear" of some innocent sheep or unfortunate goat.

We read that "holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Apropos of these words we remark that, though they were "holy" men and were enlightened, and purified, and ennobled by the Holy Spirit, yet they were "men." They had human hearts, human feelings, human prejudices,

human passions, human weaknesses, and all the other limitations of human nature. Inspiration did not destroy their individuality nor abolish the differences of character and education. Now, we may lay it down as a principle that, whenever God uses his creatures He uses them according to their respective natures. He uses inanimate beings as such, and governs them by physical laws. He uses brutes as brutes, and governs them by instinct. He uses angels as angels, and governs them, we know not how, but in a manner suited to angelic intelligences. He uses man as man, and governs him through reason and free will. Since, then, God uses no man as he would use a dumb beast, we must conclude that man's faculties of reason and free will are not suspended under the influence of Inspiration. "For the gifts of God are without repentance." The Sacred Writers were not, as the Montanists contended, merely passive; they were not in a trance; they were not in an ecstasy; they were not, like the Cumæan Sibyl, bereft of their senses; they were men, and in full possession of all their mental faculties. In inspiring them, God did not deprive them even momentarily of any of those gifts which distinguish man from the beasts of the field. On the contrary, it is more in harmony with what we know of God's ways of dealing with man, to suppose that in inspiring men he lifted them up into His own supernatural atmosphere, and perfected their nature by heightening their faculties and guaranteeing them their continued exercise.

Hence we infer that, when inspired, the learned scholar continued to write as a scholar; the poet remained a poet; the philosopher remained a philosopher; the historian remained a historian; and the shepherd and the fisherman betrayed, in what they wrote, their provincial training, or rather their lack of training. Each retained his own methods, his own habits, his own customs, his own talents, his own way of looking at things, his national, local, and personal prejudice, his own previous grade of education, the experience of his own life, his own logical methods, his own literary acquirements, his own dialect, his own pronunciation, his own peculiar accent and tone of voice, his own handwriting, his own gait and manners, and his own peculiar endowments, whether natural or acquired. While Inspiration may have improved some of

these peculiarities, it destroyed none of them, and probably affected others as little as it promoted digestion or accelerated the circulation of the blood.

This enables us to understand much that would else be enigmatical. For instance, we are assured that the choice of language depends not exclusively on the Holy Ghost inspiring, but also on the writer inspired. If a Hebrew is inspired, he writes in Hebrew; if a Chaldean, he writes in Chaldee; if a Greek, he writes in Greek; if he speaks two languages, he writes in either or in both. Similarly, the selection of the individual words in that language depends also on the writer; and it is left to him to put those words together into sentences, and the sentences into paragraphs, and to combine the paragraphs into chapters and books, all according to his own will, which grace has made conformable to the will of God. From what has been said it follows that the whole arrangement and distribution of materials and the sequence of thought are human as well as divine, and that to write even an inspired work industry and application are needed. For the author of the Second Book of Maccabees, who informs us that the effort cost him labor and sweat, would never have labored as he says he did, would never have been so solicitous whether his task was well done or not, and would not have spent so much time in vigils and consumption of midnight oil, if, not only the thoughts, but the very words had been put upon the tip of his pen. Still less would he have asked to be excused for the style, if God had done all, and he had done nothing.

So, also, many parts of the Bible are taken up with the expression of thoughts, and sentiments, and feelings distinctively human, sentiments entertained, not by God the primary author of Scripture, but only by the human writer. Of course there can be no doubt that the writer was inspired thus to give vent to his feelings. Thus Paul's words, "I am a fool," may have been quite fitting and appropriate to express Paul's humble opinion about himself, but were hardly suited to express the judgment of the Holy Ghost, either on Himself or on any other Person of the Blessed Trinity. The same should be said of the feelings of loneliness, doubt, fear, anguish, despair, hope, sorrow, and contrition for personal sin. They were

not divine in origin or character. They were the appeal of the creature to the Creator for help, light, strength, pardon and comfort. They were just such feelings as men often experience in the great crises of life, in joy, in sorrow, in faith, in doubt, in hope, in despair, in the hour of temptation, and in the fierce struggle against sin. Thus in the psalms God moved the individual heart of David to utter the sentiments of the universal heart of mankind and to express the yearnings of all men for the unseen God.

Because of his partial dependence on his own efforts the inspired historian was obliged to prosecute his studies and to compose his work much after the same fashion as historians do now, only much better. He had to draw his materials from experience, from the testimony of witnesses, from oral tradition, and from musty old documents stored away in family or public archives; and all the while he was obliged to exercise great care to make none but a proper use of his sources of information. One result of this is that what he wrote was tinged by the sources whence it was derived, and colored, though not, of course, discolored, by the ideas prevalent at the time; for the scientific knowledge of the writer was to some extent circumscribed by the same horizon as that of his contemporaries. All this, it will be found, enhances, instead of diminishing, the value of the Bible as a book of religion.

Thus does God usually act both in the world of nature and in the world of grace. Hence it is no more a slight upon Holy Scripture to say that it is human as well as divine, than it is a slight on the earth to say that it is not perfectly spherical, because slightly flattened at the poles, or to say that it does not revolve around the sun in a perfectly circular orbit, or to say that Jesus Christ is human as well as divine.

It is, therefore, manifest that the human features impressed on Holy Writ are precisely such as we should expect to find there, if the writers had exercised their intelligence and all their other natural endowments; from which we conclude that they did exercise them. Therefore God used conscious, willing men as instruments in stamping those features on the Book. It is

then a perversion of the proper notion of inspiration to represent it as reducing the writers to mere machines. They were not pens, they were not penmen, they were not secretaries, they were not mere amanuenses; they were authors, instrumental authors, if you will, but yet authors. We may therefore infer that Inspiration did not suspend their reason, did not destroy their liberty of choice, did not impair their memory, did not kill out their imagination, did not deaden sentiment, did not curb all the emotions. Inspired men did not receive the Bible already printed, and bound, and clasped, and illuminated, from heaven. Nor did they, as painters have sometimes described, copy from a golden book hanging from heaven by silver cords and held open by angels floating in the sky. They wrote it with conscious exertion of head and heart and hand. They reasoned on what they wrote and exercised every natural faculty in order to do well what they had to do, God at the same time assisting them by His grace, by the grace of Inspiration. Thus energized, strengthened, and intensified, their whole soul was awakened and they were better able to perform the task assigned them. The presence of God in the soul is the best guarantee of the continued exercise of man's faculties, for the divine presence is perfectly consistent with the possession of the most active intelligence, of the most calm and dispassionate judgment, and of the clearest perception of speculative and practical truths. We know that the bush in which God appeared to Moses on Mount Horeb remained a bush and was not consumed, while glowing with the brightness of God's glory, and uttering the divine oracles; and that when God made Moses a prophet He did not unmake Moses the man.

II.—THE BIBLE IS ALL DIVINE.

In spite of the wide scope thus given to human topics, to human thought, and to human action in the Bible, still the divine element which lies behind, which pervades and overshadows the human, and which gives the book all its exceptional value, is not less real, nor less actual, nor less efficient. The body, the external shape and form, "is of the earth,

earthly," but the spirit which quickens this body "is of heaven, heavenly." Now it is precisely its inspiration that makes Scripture heavenly and divine. But inspiration is by no means an exclusively Jewish or Christian word. Some of the classical writers of antiquity were accustomed to ascribe artistic talents, poetic genius, oratorical powers, and the gift of prediction, to a divine afflatus, to poetic frenzy, to inspiration. The word afterward passed over into theological language, and was there used in a higher and truer sense. The word occurs but once in the New Testament, II Timothy, III, 16; but this passage does not help us much to understand its precise meaning. It means an "inbreathing by God." But God is not corporeal. He has no breath. Hence the word is figurative and metaphorical. It denotes some mysterious divine influence, and means that the man or the book into which God has breathed, is inspired and hence divine. The Church, relying on other sources of information than the bare word, has authoritatively defined that "*God is the author of Scripture.*" Inspiration, then, is the act by which God becomes the "*author*" of the sacred books.

It will help still further to understand Inspiration if we consider some of its effects. It may have varied from case to case, sometimes merely helping a man to tell more correctly and more edifyingly than he otherwise would have done something which he had learned by experience or observation, and sometimes enabling him to write things which, if left to himself, he could never have known at all—prophecies, mysteries, secrets of the heart, and the deep things of God. It helped one man to be a historian, another to be a poet, another to be a moralist, another to be a psalmist, another to be a legislator, another to be the editor of musty old documents, and another to compose such canticles as the "Magnificat," the "Benedictus," and the "Nunc Dimitis." It enlightened the intellect, it elevated the thoughts, it moved the will, it excited the imagination, it stirred the emotions, it gave a clearer perception of the nature and majesty of God, a higher appreciation of truth, a quicker intelligence, a calmer judgment, a more glowing warmth and devotion to God, and generally a heightening, quickening, and enlarging of all the faculties

of the soul. It gave all these, or more than these, or less than these, as the circumstances of each case demanded ; but the result of it was always a divine and infallible Book.

St. Peter speaks of the prophecy of Scripture which "Came not by the will of man at any time, but holy men of God spoke, being borne along by the Holy Ghost." II Peter, I, 21.

The word "borne along" is the literal translation of a Greek verb used in the New Testament when speaking of the action of the wind. It is also used to describe the descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles on the first Pentecost: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as of a mighty wind *borne along*, and it filled the whole house where they were sitting." But it was mighty only in sound and in the spiritual effect produced on the souls of the apostles.

Our Lord compares His Spirit to the wind. He says: "The Spirit breatheth where it will," or "The wind bloweth where it listeth." (John III, 8.) This explains one of the most remarkable features of Inspiration,—its fitfulness. The action of the Spirit of God on the delicately-strung human soul is like the action of the wind on an æolian harp. It does not rise and fall with the regularity of the tides. It does not swell and then die away in accordance with well ascertained laws of nature. It comes and goes by fits and starts, and in the most unaccountable manner. When you expect the harmony to continue to the end, so as to give a pleasing cadence to the ear, it suddenly dies away, and again as suddenly wakes up another melody still more sweet, and wild, and weird, only at its close to baffle the anticipations to which its opening had given rise, or continues to wheel around in circles over the same course like the whirlwind. This may explain the apparent lack of logical sequence in the ideas, and the frequent repetitions and abrupt transitions noticeable in Genesis and in the Gospels, and, in general, in all the biblical writers. As an instance of this fitfulness see how strange, how sublime, how overpowering is the majestic sweep of the exordium in the opening chapter of St. John's gospel! "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." But the trumpet-note soon dies away and suddenly drops down to this prosy, unvarnished tale, "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John."

Another peculiarity of inspiration is its power of coördination. The Bible presents a unique phenomenon. There is nothing else like it in the entire range of literature. Here is a collection of writings belonging to different ages and to different countries, and composed on different occasions, and scattered over a period of 1,500 years, and over three continents, and comprising laws, histories, biographies, genealogies, speeches, proverbs, maxims, psalms, lamentations, hymns, songs, and canticles; yet, strange to say, all have a close affinity, all breathe the same spirit, and all display a remarkable general identity of scope and purpose. In fact, all the books of the Bible have as real and as close a unity as the several members of the human body, though so numerous and so unlike in size, shape and function.

How is it that the Old and New Testaments breathe forth Christ from almost every page? It is precisely because the spirit of Christ was once breathed into them, and because the one spirit of Christ pervades them all. Hence it is because the several books are so closely knit into one organic unity that no explanation of their origin is so satisfactory as that which St. Paul gives when he says: "All Scripture is inspired by God." For as one soul permeates and animates all the members of the human frame and makes them one body, so the one Spirit of God animates this collection of books and makes them one book—the Bible. And as there may be parts of the human body the use and purpose of which are unknown to even the best anatomists, though no one should say that a man would be as well off without as with such organs; so, too, it is possible to imagine in Scripture the presence of parts, the doctrinal and ethical significance of which might not be apparent either to the casual reader or even to the profound scholar. At the same time, we should not deny that such parts have some religious purpose. Though all are animated and unified by the same soul, yet not all the members of the human body are equally vital, not all are equally serviceable for every purpose. A man might lose a hand or a foot and yet live, and many a man has lost the hair of his head, and yet survived the loss. But the head itself and the heart are vital; if these are lost, all is lost. So it is one thing to say that every part of Scripture is in some

way useful, and it is quite another thing to say that all parts are equally useful, equally important, and equally serviceable for every religious purpose. Some avail mostly for dogma, some for moral, some for history. There may also be in Scripture parts of only secondary importance and of only subordinate significance, parts, if you will, which show a lower level of spiritual vitality, parts which, like the hair, the nails, the bones, and the callosities of the human body, have a lower grade of sensibility than other parts. Thus, many a part of Scripture is not so precious to us as the opening chapter of St. John's Gospel, or as the history of the bitter passion, death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord. Also the command to salute the brethren, given at the end of St. Paul's epistles, has not so vital a connection with our spiritual well-being as the command, "The Lord thy God thou shalt adore and Him only shalt thou serve." Nor does the historical statement about Tobias' dog's tail play so important a rôle in the salvation of souls as does the statement in St. John's Gospel, "And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." For similar reasons we could more easily suffer the loss of the Book of Esther, as not forming so essential a part of the history of Redemption or of the development of revealed religion, and as not mentioning even once the name of God or of any divine attribute, than the loss of St. Matthew's Gospel.

Therefore, the conclusion that is warranted by the facts in the case is that there is in Scripture a twofold authorship; that is to say, the human agency employed in the composition of the books of Scripture was so combined with the divine that one indivisible work is the result. For, in spite of the presence of the human agency employed, the Bible is all divine; and in spite of the divine agency exercised in the work, the Bible is all human. These two elements everywhere coexist in Scripture. "Holy men of God spake," this is the human; "Moved by the Holy Ghost," this is the divine element. Therefore, in the composition of every book of the Bible two agencies were at work, God and man, and thus divine operation and human coöperation went hand in hand throughout. The Bible is the joint production of God and man. It is all *from* God, its first cause, and all *through* man its channel, and all *by* man, who

was much more than a lifeless channel. The primary cause or author of the Book is God ; the instrumental cause or writer is man. Consequently, the Bible is never to be regarded as merely human, nor as merely divine, nor as partly human and partly divine, but as all human and all divine. All human, because written by men, and all divine, because inspired by God. These two factors are everywhere present. Let both be recognized and accepted thankfully, since each contributes its share towards making the Bible more perfectly adapted, as an instrument of divine grace, to the needs of weak and erring men.

We admit this conclusion, and, along with it, we admit the difficulty and even the impossibility of clearly understanding how inspiration takes place. Yet we admit the fact, and we admit it on the very reasonable ground that difficulties that do not amount to absurdities or to impossibilities in the subject-matter, and which derive all their plausibility from our ignorance of the supernatural world, form but a very slight presumption against a thesis which is supported by abundant and reliable testimony, that is, by the clearest testimony of Scripture and the Church.

Inspiration being a vital operation of the Spirit of God on the spirit of man is necessarily a mystery, the mystery of it consisting in the exercise of God's supreme dominion over man and in the simultaneous exercise of man's liberty of will and of action. However, we should not forget that though the union and joint action of these two factors in inspiration is inexplicable, still the mystery is not peculiar to this case, it is not an isolated fact, it does not stand solitary and alone in the world of grace. We find something analogous to it in the adorable Person of the God-man, Jesus Christ. Whatever may be the Metaphysical difficulty in the case, it has been removed by the Historical fact; for we may point to the Person of Jesus Christ and say: There is the solution of the problem.

III.—PARALLEL BETWEEN THE INCARNATE WORD AND THE WRITTEN WORD OF GOD.

The simultaneous co-existence and the harmonious combination of the divine and human in Sacred Scripture can be illustrated by the singular analogy between the divine and human in the Bible and the divine and human in Jesus Christ. In the first chapter of St. John's Gospel Christ is expressly called the "Word of God." "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Also, "His name is called the Word of God." (Apocalypse XIX, 13.) Sacred Scripture also is called, and is, the Word of God. The possession of the same name suggests that there is some remarkable resemblance between them. And a correct understanding of this marvellous analogy, which has often been remarked, will throw a flood of light on Holy Scripture and help us to solve many of the objections brought against the Bible in our days by some modern biblical critics of the destructive school. Let us examine this singular parallel.¹

Jesus Christ is theandric ; that is, in the one person of our Lord there are two whole, perfect, and entire natures inseparably bound together without confusion, without composition, and without conversion or absorption of either by the other. There is in Him the divine nature of the Logos, the Verbum, the Word, the eternal Son of God, the second Person of the ever Blessed Trinity ; and there is a human nature, complete and entire and consisting of an immortal soul, the most perfect ever created, and of a human body like ours, together with all the weaknesses, imperfections and limitations essentially necessary to human nature, "sin alone excepted." The humanity of Christ is not lost, it is not absorbed, it is not transfigured, it is not transformed, it is not confused with the divine. Though personally united with the divine nature, the human remains complete and entire, and performs all its functions no less really than if it were separate.

Similarly there are in the Bible two elements inseparably combined, but in such a manner that the divine does not absorb

¹What follows is reproduced with some modifications from an article written by the author a few years ago and published in the "Catholic Times" of Philadelphia.

the human, nor does the human contaminate the divine. In Christ the two natures are so intimately united that He is, at the same time, the Son of God and the Son of man. Also in Scripture the two elements coexist in such a way that the whole Book is, at the same time, the Word of God, and the Word of man. In each case we are unable to explain how this union is effected, but in neither case are we at liberty to solve the problem by denying either fact. At the same time we should not complicate the question by forgetting that the union of the divine and the human nature in Christ is hypostatical or personal, whereas in the Bible it is merely verbal. Therefore we worship and adore the incarnate Word as God ; but we do not worship the Bible, though we bow to its infallible authority.

The divine nature of the Logos never ceased to be a person, and the human nature never began to be a person, but was from the first instant of its existence united to the Person of the Word. This divine Word, the eternal Wisdom who was in the bosom of the Father from all eternity, is infinitely perfect. But as soon as He revealed himself in the flesh and became man, He partook of the imperfections of human nature. This was the necessary result, if He was to assume complete human nature and bring Himself down by His incarnation to the level of our apprehensions and of our human sympathies. Though there is much that may be thought humiliating in the possession of a human body, on account of its close resemblance to the beasts of the field, still it is not necessarily sinful, but only weak and imperfect. Hence we learn from the Gospels that the human nature of Christ was subject to the necessary limitations of general human nature. It was subject to natural laws, and even to human laws. He was subject to hunger and thirst, to weariness of body and anguish of mind, and became tired and sleepy, just as really as other men do. He was both weary and thirsty when he sat at Jacob's well and asked the Samaritan woman to give him to drink. He wept in sorrow. He prayed in agony. He was put to death. He was laid away in the tomb. In all this we see the weakness of His humanity. He calmed the fury of the storm at sea. He raised the dead. He rose from the dead, and ascended into

heaven in the presence of His disciples, and sent down His Spirit upon them on the first Pentecost. And in all this we see the evidence of His divinity.

So, too, the written word of God in its source or first principle, that is, when spoken by the mouth of God in heaven, is perfect. But as soon as the divine thought externalizes itself in language, clothes itself in human speech, and incarnates itself, so to speak, on the written page, it partakes of the many imperfections common to human language, "sin alone excepted;" that is, to the exclusion of error.

To some good Christians the presence of the human element in the Bible is disquieting. They have been accustomed to emphasize the divine element, not too much, but too exclusively, that is, to the exclusion of the human. They have imagined, "If the Bible is all human, it is all fallible; and if all fallible, it must be in part false, for 'to err is human.' " But they forget that, in Scripture, the human is so strengthened by grace, and so modified by the divine with which it is united and vivified that it cannot err. In this respect also the written word is analogous to the Incarnate Word; for on account of its personal union with the Logos, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, the humanity of Christ, though really and truly, and in the strictest sense of the word human, is yet not ordinary sinful humanity. It is perfectly sanctified, and holy. Since, then, human nature is not essentially sinful, the Holy Ghost can make it infallible on such subjects as require infallibility. Because inspiration is not sanctification, the writers of Scripture, though "holy men of God," may not have been absolutely sinless; yet they committed no error in what they wrote. This result was easily brought about, because the freedom of the human will is no obstacle to the designs of Providence. God can arrange all things with such consummate skill and can direct all with such far-seeing wisdom as to be able in the end to bring about any desired result, and bring it about, too, with the co-operation of man's free will. By regulating the influences that work upon a man, by enlightening his understanding, by terrifying him, or by dispensing His graces more abundantly, God can move, without forcing, the

free will, and can determine it to do any act which He has absolutely decreed shall be done. All this God effects without interfering with man's liberty of choice and with his spontaneous concurrence. As instances of this, Jonas, rather than prophesy, fled from the face of God. Ezechiel procrastinated. Jeremias refused pointblank to play the rôle of prophet. But in the end they prophesied all the same.

In the order both of nature and of grace God often uses human instruments to do His will. The message which He sends us, if not sent through men, could never come so fresh and natural as it does. It speaks to the heart, because, as the Talmud says, "Scripture speaks in the tongue of the children of men." Coming through this channel, it is colored by human experience, by human suffering, and by human reasoning. It is precisely this human tint, this stamp of the children of Adam upon the Book, that makes it appear so human, so congenial, so intelligible in many of its parts and so inexpressibly dear to us. It is this that touches the chords of Adam in our hearts and makes us love the Book as much as we do.

The humanity of the Bible is like the humanity of Christ. God, by a simple act of His will or by a thousand and one other ways unknown to us, could have redeemed us from sin. But how much better it is for us that our redemption was worked out for us by the man-God. How much more likely is it to stir us to co-operate, to know that the thought of our salvation was uppermost in His mind; that this thought sent thrills of joy through His heart; that it made His blood course more rapidly and His pulse beat faster, because of us. It was His work, the work of the man Jesus, as well as the work of God. In the same way the human element in Scripture has had its share in making Holy Writ more loved and better understood than ever it would have been if written by angelic pens and in the language of angels.

Again the Incarnate Word Jesus Christ, though in two natures, is but one person. The divine nature so dominates the human that the personality of the eternal Word is the only person that remains. And His sacred body, though consisting of many members differing in dignity, is yet but one body, the soul animating and uniting all in one. So, too, the

written word consists of many books, yet one spirit originated them all, one spirit pervades all, gives character to the whole collection, and justifies us in binding all into one volume and calling it, as St. Jerome does, the "Divine Library of the Written Word." The spirit that breathes through this collection of books does for them what the human soul does for our physical frame. It makes one of all its parts; it gives it form, character, being, life.

St. Luke tells us that our Lord "grew in wisdom and age and grace before God and men," else He would not have been a perfect man. It is natural that a human being should come to his full growth—to his mental, moral and physical development—only gradually. In some ways, at least experimentally, Christ's mind unfolded as any other child's would have done. His mother bestowed on Him the same care and gave Him the same nourishment that an ordinary mother gives to an ordinary child. She probably taught Him what she knew of the Scriptures; and had Him kneel with her and pray, "Our Father who art in heaven." Now, the development of the Written Word corresponds very nearly to that of the Personal Word. What is the meaning of development? It is a progression from a less perfect to a more perfect state; not from bad to good, but from good to better and then to best; not from falsehood to truth, but from less truth to more truth; from truth of a lower order to truth of a higher order. The human in Christ grew in age and stature, in wisdom and grace before God and men, but yet, while this was happening, He was very God, the second person of the ever Blessed Trinity.

There is an analogous growth in Scripture. The Old Testament does not contain so perfect a revelation as does the New. The law of Moses—the law of fear—was for the servants, the law of Christ—the law of love—is for the children, of God. Then, too, in the Old Testament, the Messianic idea, for instance, is more fully developed in the later than in the earlier books. In Genesis it is expressed merely by the "seed of the woman." From this protevangelium, from this rudimentary and initial beginning, the idea develops through many stages till it finds its fullest realization and consummation in the Infant in the stable of Bethlehem and in the divine Rabbi of Nazareth.

And why should there not be a growth in the truth revealed in Holy Writ? The discovery of the divine will to man is gradual—a truth here and a truth there, but not all truth at once. Even in the religious conceptions of God's chosen people there was a gradual development observable throughout the books. No generation reached the limits of truth at once. Neither nature nor grace proceeds by sudden leaps and bounds. The veil concealing revealed truth was not lifted suddenly, but gradually drawn aside. "God at sundry times and in diverse manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets; last of all, in these days He hath spoken to us by His Son." The greater perfection of the New Testament revelation only shows that that of the Old Testament was imperfect, but not that it was false.

During Christ's childhood and youth at Nazareth His time was frequently taken up with the requirements of daily life, with acts of charity, with acts of courtesy oft repeated, with innumerable apparently trivial actions common to the daily routine life of ordinary mortals. Our social existence is largely made up of these details, and no matter how eminent or above his fellows, no man can escape them. So, no doubt, Christ in his constant contact with his fellow-men, not to be wanting in ordinary civility, must have repeated time and again those many commonplaces by which the business of life is carried on. He sat at men's hearths, He accepted their invitations, He went to their entertainments, He sympathized with their pursuits in life, He entered into their circle of ideas, He spoke their language, their dialect even, with its peculiar barbarisms and solecisms. He was an honored guest at their weddings, as He was at the marriage feast at Kana in Galilee. He was a mourner at their funerals, as He was at the grave of Lazarus. He worshiped with them at the temple or in the synagogues, as He did the day He read for them the prophecy of Isaias concerning Himself. He must often, with His mother at Nazareth and with others abroad, have spoken about things that seemed not to have any, even the remotest, bearing on the great work of redemption for which He was sent into the world. In fact, this perfectly natural way of acting gave frequent occasion to misunderstandings; for, seeing

how thoroughly human He was, they would not believe that he was at the same time thoroughly divine—God himself. They said to one another: “Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?” and they were scandalized in regard to him.

So neither could the Written Word well be perfectly human, unless it shared in the imperfections of human language and in the limitations of human thought. The sacred writers were not exempt from some, at least, of the general characteristics of their contemporaries, and had the same faults of style and diction. They give us long lists of names of persons and places of little or no interest to us, endless genealogical tables, minute details of a purely local, national, or personal character, and sometimes date their books by mentioning the secular princes ruling at the time, just as profane writers are wont to do. They are full of repetitions and abound in things that appear to have no bearing on the end for which Scripture was written. Many of them wrote, not in elegant Greek or Hebrew, but in a debased dialect, full of Aramaisms and popular idioms, and not at all conformable to the standard of literary excellence. Another remarkable peculiarity is that neither logical nor chronological nor ontological order generally prevails, nor any describable sequence of ideas. All this is very natural and to be expected. For the spirit of God, in moving holy men to write, did not make a new language for itself, but simply took and used that which it found ready at hand. We may trust God to impart to a book, in whatsoever language written, whatever character is needed to make that book a fit vehicle for the communication of divine truths to men. Inspiration is the kernel, not the shell; it is the light, not the lamp, and it majestically tolerates, while using, the inelegance of the medium through which it shines. It grandly ignores trivial verbal inaccuracies, grammatical defects of style and diction and imperfect physical science in its writers; but it blazes forth with a divine radiance, ever increasing, in all the divine truths revealed in the Biblical writings, and carries us on with an irresistible sweep to a higher revelation of God and to a fuller manifestation of His will.

Christ, the personal word of God, occasionally allowed rays of that glory which He had from eternity in the bosom of the

Father to flash forth from time to time to strengthen the faith of His followers. He was transfigured on Mount Thabor ; He stilled the winds and the waves of the sea ; He forgave sin ; He opened paradise to the penitent thief, and in other ways showed His divine nature.

So, too, a divine glory shines forth in Sacred Scripture. It calms the storms of passion raging in the human breast, it opens paradise to the penitent, it expels the demons of vice from the heart, it reaches from the beginning to the end, from eternity to eternity, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, from man in the state of original innocence and sanctity in the Garden of Eden, to man redeemed from sin and restored to his primitive condition in the heavenly paradise. Beginning with creation out of nothing, it points the way to the remotest future, to the second advent of Christ, to the general resurrection and last judgment ; then up to the heavenly Jerusalem, the city of God, and to the Lamb that sitteth on the throne.

To conclude, if Christ were not also human, we should not have the comfort of feeling that He sympathizes with us, as we know He does. "We have not a High Priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, but one tempted in all things, as we are, yet without sin." And if Sacred Scripture were not human as well as divine, it would not appeal so powerfully to our sympathies, to our affections, to our conscience.

CHARLES P. GRANNAN.

ON NATIVE INDIAN PICTOGRAPHY.

The various methods invented by man to graphically express his thoughts form one of the most interesting subjects for contemplation and investigation.

All the known alphabetic characters are believed to have originated in pictorial outlines of objects which were, no doubt, intelligible to diverse peoples regardless of their respective languages. These pictorial representations, or ideograms, were slowly conventionalized either through frequent repetition for use, by less careful portrayal, or by intentional simplification of outline, so as to lose much of their original form, thus gradually reaching that stage known as the hieroglyphic, from which, by further interesting processes of evolution alphabetic characters, or phonograms, were created. The length of time occupied in attaining this brilliant achievement it is impossible even to conjecture. The oldest Egyptian record extant is believed to be of about the forty-seventh century B. C., at which time the hieroglyphic system of writing appears to have been an old one with an inconceivable past behind it.

It has been affirmed that various peoples throughout the world, however remote from one another, pass through like stages of intellectual development, and it appears from a careful examination of all available material, as well as special researches among numerous Indian tribes of North America, that the Western continent affords the best field for the study of various primitive attempts to record ideas by means of picture writing; for here the practice survives in various stages of development, as well also as the active survival of gesture language upon which so much depends in the study and interpretation of pictographs. Furthermore, the numerous scripts of the Old World appear to have passed beyond that stage in which the various concepts giving birth to the several individual phonograms might have been readily perceived and compared with the archaic prototypes.

In North America is found an abundance of evidence indicating the existence of three distinct varieties of picture-writing :

I. The more modern practice of etching on walrus ivory, as by the Innuit of Alaska ;

II. The pictorial and mnemonic records, on skins and birch-bark, of the Sioux and other prairie Indians and the Ojibwas of Minnesota ; and

III. The highly developed symbolic—and to a certain degree syllabic—paintings and sculptures of the Maya and Nahuatl of Central America and Mexico.

Numerous and remarkable petroglyphs well known in various portions of the North Atlantic coast states, in the valleys of the Susquehanna, Allegheny and other large rivers, and in the arid regions of Owens valley, California, and the northern area of Arizona, all of which—with the exception of some of the last named—are deemed as prehistoric, will not be specially recognized in this connection. Neither will be recognized such other processes of communicating intelligence, as notched sticks, various rudimentary forms of knotting cords or thongs—suggesting the more highly developed quippus of the ancient Peruvians and Chinese—; the different bands, belts, and like articles decorated with quills, shell and porcelain beads ; and the practice of tattooing, as best exhibited among the Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte's Island.

As the III. variety of picture-writing is also an art of other days, we have remaining in practice, at this date, but the I. and II. varieties, both of which will be commented on at greater length. The II. variety, of which the second group pertains to the mnemonic records of the Ojibwa—is now almost discontinued, being practiced by but a few old shamans, and may for all practical purposes be deemed obsolete.

The graphic art of the Innuit, at first glance, appears peculiar and unique, though upon closer study it seems to partake of the pictorial work of the plains Indians, as also of the more highly developed mnemonic and symbolic characters of the Ojibwa.

To more intelligently appreciate the differences to be noted, it will be necessary to call attention to the customs and en-

vironment of the tribes spoken of. Until quite recently gesture language was very commonly practiced over the greater portion of the western United States, and more especially in that area known as the "high plains," over which the different buffalo hunting tribes were frequently, if not almost constantly, thrown in contact with one another, and being generally unfamiliar with each other's oral speech, necessity brought about the development of gesture language as a simple though perfectly satisfactory means of intercourse.

Thus, in many of the pictorial records of the plains Indians, particularly the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Comanches, are perceived various attempts at the graphic reproduction of gesture signs, especially of subjective ideas which it would be otherwise impossible to record. It is in the delicate outlines or etchings made by the Innuits, however, that gesture signs, and the activities of daily life, are most forcibly and artistically depicted.

It is true that in the shell heaps of the Aleutian Islands fragments of bone harpoon points have been recovered, upon which were perceived markings or scratches which may or may not partake of the nature of property marks. These bone or shell heaps are of comparatively recent age, perhaps immediately antedating the advent of the whites. The sudden appearance, therefore, of an artistic graphic system in which the portrayal of gesture signs and signals form no inconsiderable part, is rather startling, from the fact that such a system, or stage of development, is not apt to be the result of independent invention and accomplished in a period covering little more than a century.

Upon a careful examination of all available Innuits materials bearing pictorial records, or only simple decorative signs, several interesting facts appear :

First, that the Innuits east of Point Barrow, including those even of Labrador and Greenland, exhibit but little artistic expression, and that this is confined chiefly to lines, dots, and other similar rudimentary markings which are employed almost wholly for decorative purposes. This does not refer to various kinds of carvings and outlined flat figures in bone or ivory which are intended to be stitched to clothing, a custom

very much resembling a practice of the Finns. Neither does this refer to the custom of stamping designs upon cloth or buckskin, a practice apparently learned from several Algonkian tribes with which some of the Hudson Bay and Labrador Innuits come in contact.

Second, that the Point Barrow natives are apparently but moderately advanced in the art of recording tribal or individual events, customs, etc.; and that most of their ivory utensils are not decorated; but that where attempts at beautifying are apparent, only those designs are adopted which suggest or require the least amount of manual exertion and artistic ability, so that straight incisions, creases and grooves are most numerous; while nucleated circles and concentric rings are incised, the latter apparently by means of imported metal tools.

Third, that the engravings on ivory and bone from the northern portion of the west coast of Alaska, embracing the region about Kotzebue Sound and northward, and including the Diomed Islands and the opposing coast, as well as the area occupied by the Asiatic Innuits, are more deeply and crudely cut, as shown in the broader and bolder lines seen in the products from any other area.

Fourth, that the general results in graphic portrayals are more artistic among the natives of Bristol Bay and Norton Sound, and improve in delicacy of engraving toward the southward even to and including the Aleutian Islands; that the portrayal of animal forms is accomplished with such fidelity as to permit of specific identification; that the attempt at reproducing graphically common gesture signs becomes more frequent, and various instances of the successful portrayal of subjective ideas also occur.

In North America the study of prehistoric trade-routes, or culture-routes, has thus far received but a limited amount of careful attention, but some instances of curious results of inter-tribal traffic have been observed. Frequently designs of a specific character, such as may be termed peculiar to a special tribe, are carried to remote localities and there adopted by other tribes of an entirely different linguistic family, whereas the same design or pattern of the former may not produce the slight-

est apparent effect upon the recognized art designs or ornamentation of an adjoining body of people of a like linguistic family and with whom there may be frequent social intercourse. This is accounted for, in the instances in mind, because of the absence of like materials and resources quite necessary for a faithful imitation of the imported pattern, the original being fully recognized as a cult symbol, and any alteration, however slight, would immediately provoke the anger of the gods. Therefore, a remote body of people, whose cult beliefs are different and who would perhaps not recognize the sacred or mystic import of a symbol, might readily and without any hesitation adopt such pattern as might suit one's fancy, and subsequently alter it to conform to the shape of the material upon which it would be imposed by incision, impressed in color, or otherwise.

The northwest coast of America, between Puget Sound and Kadiak, is an excellent illustration of a culture-route, and the arts of the various Selish tribes are traceable over a wide area. The peculiar designs of the Haida, both in sculpture and in tattooing, have been gradually carried northward into the territory of the Thlinkits, the Kadiak, and have been even recently adopted, to a limited extent, by Innuits westward of the latter.

Another trade-route which appears to have been of importance on account of the introduction of peculiarities in picture-writing and decoration is by way of the Yukon River, and its connection between the western Innuits and the Kenai Indians of Eastern Alaska, and through them with the Chippewayan tribes on the British side of the boundary, the last named tribes being the northern representatives of our own Apaches, Navajos and others.

The most important culture-route, in fact one of the earliest to influence the crude arts of the Innuits, and probably to give origin to picture-writing among them, was by way of the Diomed Islands, when the natives came in contact with the Cossack outposts in Eastern Siberia.

The traffic which naturally resulted brought among the American natives various articles of Russian manufacture, among which, no doubt, were ikons and other Christian and ecclesiastical objects and prints, articles which are usually highly decorated in both design and color. Such objects would most

inevitably tend to influence the simple art of a people who were naturally given to the ornamentation of various utensils and weapons, as also articles of clothing.

The materials employed by the Innuit upon which to portray pictographic and decorative designs consist chiefly of walrus ivory, though reindeer horn, bone, and rarely wood appear to be utilized. Animal skins, as used by inland tribes and the southern Indians, are evidently of extremely rare occurrence, as such animal tissues would rapidly deteriorate in a moist climate; and the adoption of pigments for picture-writing seems to be only occasional, and then in localities where such pigments may, as a rule, be procured from traders.

The evident development of picture-writing since the appearance on the Alaskan coast of the whites seems furthermore substantiated by the fact that metal tools were necessary with which to readily accomplish such labors. Flint, or chert, flakes are mentioned as having been used in remote times, but it requires steel pointed implements to incise figures such as occur in numerous records with which we are at this date familiar. The intrusion of a limited number of art patterns, and the rapid development of picture-writing, lead one to believe that the latter was furthermore stimulated by contact with visiting whalers and explorers, the latter bringing with them, perhaps, illustrated books and papers, while the seamen exhibited to the natives examples of so-called scrimshaw work—incised pictures on whale teeth, bone, or ivory, after which the incisions were blackened or otherwise colored so as to resemble an etching. In fact, several instances of the faithful reproduction of press illustrations have been noted by various authorities.

The greater number of records consist of the portrayal of personal exploits or the achievements of the villagers, of which the recorder was one; and of ceremonial records, embracing dances, and the invocation or supplication for good luck of various deities and medicine-men. Hunting and whaling scores are numerous, while mortuary records, geographic features, and natural phenomena are rarely indicated.

In numerous excellent illustrations of the frequent portrayal of gesture signs and signals—in which art the Innuit appear to surpass almost all other native American aborigines—there

is frequent evidence that this people had attained special proficiency in conventionalization ; though not that degree of skill or advancement, when ideas are represented by synecdoche—in which but a part of an object is given for the whole,—or by metonymy—when one thing is substituted for another, as the instrument for the work accomplished or the effect produced. On the contrary, however, the Innuit appear to be the only people who, on the hunting scores and in portraying the various animals hunted, so place the several outlines of animals in relation to that of the hunter, that all the game secured is placed with the head toward the latter, while those animals seen or desired, but not secured, are headed in an opposite direction.

Furthermore, in many illustrations indicating exorcism of demons, these evil beings are represented as various grotesque creatures or horned anthropomorphic beings, in the act of quitting the body of the victim, and over which the shaman is shown in the act of operating to encompass such results for their expulsion.

It seems rather singular that the Innuit of Greenland should be so far behind their western kinsmen in pictography, especially in view of the fact that they have had intercourse with Europeans for a period of time covering, perhaps, nine centuries. Still no eastern forms—types—occur, neither is their picture-writing further advanced than the production of a few pencil sketches on paper, made to order, and their almost exact counterpart of sketches as made by the average American schoolboy. Such drawings were made for Dr. Rink, the Danish antiquarian, and no advancement has appeared since that time.

The II. variety of pictography embraces the art of the plains Indians, and of the Ojibwa of Minnesota. This variety is furthermore divisable into two chief groups. The first pertains to the objective representation of ideas as commonly found among the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and other tribes, as illustrated in an Indian's census, winter counts and war records ; by representations of dances in which occur various styles of facial decorations and numerous odd marks upon the person or clothing of the Indian denoting personal exploits

and insignia of brave deeds. The head plumes are also often marked in pictographs to indicate the status as a warrior of the individual so designated.

To be able to interpret such pictographs it is necessary to thoroughly understand the tribal and genetic organization of the people making the record, the cult beliefs and ceremonials, social customs, mythology, and many other minor details of daily life embracing dress, ornamentation, etc. Not least is the knowledge of the gesture language, and especially that group of gesture speech to which the principals belong; such being often modified, and different from other gesture groups, because of different environments, resources, and customs.

The second group comprises the cosmogony charts and mnemonic records and charts of the Ojibwa Indians, and the Walum olum of the Delawares. The last named is really only a mnemonic chant pertaining to the Indian cosmogony.

These records are in nearly every instance made upon the thin elastic bark of the white birch, which occurs abundantly in the territory of the Great Lakes. Very rarely do these Indians adopt the tanned buckskin, so universally employed by their western neighbors. The figures are outlined and incised by means of a sharply-pointed piece of bone or iron. Thus delicate hair-line incisions, or rather depressions, result, which are permanently impressed upon the delicate layers of bark, layers like the leaves of a book between each two sheets of which a thin, almost imperceptible layer of resin occurs. As such records attain greater age the incisions appear to become a little sharper, or more accentuated, because of the slight drying and shrinking of the resin and the sheets. One very remarkable scroll, nearly ten feet long, was discovered at an isolated village in northern Minnesota where it had been hidden for a long time. From various sources of information, as well as collateral evidence, this scroll must have been at least over one hundred years old, yet it had changed but little in coloration or by shrinkage. Other pieces in the possession of the same shaman were said to have belonged to very remote ancestors and medicine priests, and if comparison in coloration and other conditions may be made, they must have been at least four or five hundred years of age.

These mnemonic charts are very different from those of the first, or preceding, group, and seldom relate to exploits in war or the chase. They are part of the stock-in-trade of the medicine priest or shaman, who uses them at ceremonies of the cult society, at initiations of candidates, and for the instruction of candidates preparatory thereto.

The Indian tradition of the cosmogony and genesis of mankind from the basis of the cult ceremonies, and the ritual of initiation is merely the dramatization of that tradition. In some respects it seems to partake of a passion play, the candidate assuming the character of one of the deities and suffering in like manner, even unto death, as he whose career is thus typified.

It is but natural to expect that in symbolic picture-writing of this class, so long in use and handed down through many generations, there will necessarily be much conventionalizing and a vast amount of portrayal of ideas by synecdoche and metonymy. In fact, there are but few characters which are, *per se*, what they seem to denote. Only a full comprehension of the ritual itself, and comparative researches in various individual records and their variants, will aid one to clearly interpret such records.

Great difficulty is experienced at times in the interpretation of such individual charts because of variations in artistic ability of the recorders, exactly in imitation of the numerous styles of chirography met with in manuscripts. It is usually the old or infirm shamans who abbreviate and attempt simplification, thus causing differences in symbols of like significations even upon the same record.

The remote and isolated villages of Ojibwa Indians of Wisconsin and Minnesota, and throughout the area north of the Canadian boundary, afford a highly interesting field for research in the collection of such bark scrolls, and charts, and the oral information that may be obtained as pertaining thereto. Those charts are deemed exceedingly valuable and sacred, and the general belief is that their exhibition to the uninitiated would encompass the shaman's destruction. Only one course is open to the student, and that is adoption into the society ; so

that the preliminary instruction may be obtained, and the explanation of the symbolic writing fully understood.

A careful and protracted study of the Ojibwa mnemonic symbols reminds one of their resemblance, in many respects, to some of the Mexican symbolic ideograms. This resemblance is particularly noticeable in such characters as may be drawn synecdochically and to which are placed, in close contact, dots, or lines, to express numerals. In such figures the former denotes the feast, manido, exploit, or whatever may be intended, while the latter indicate number. Ceremonials are also sometimes noted upon the cosmogony charts in almost exact imitation of the Maya and Nahuatl forms.

Another highly developed form of Ojibwa pictography is indicated by an apparent approach to the adoption of syllabic characters. In numerous examples the figure or symbol portrayed is spoken of by employing only the first syllable instead of the entire number, where more than one are required for its designation. Further examination among the isolated bands of these Indians may afford more and better results than have yet been obtained. The subject is worthy of every effort while there is yet a condition of aboriginal life uninfluenced by intrusion of modern and more civilized customs from without.

From an investigation of the above named varieties of picture-writing it is ascertained that the more recently developed system of the Innuït presents many rudimentary forms of the objective portrayal of ideas, a study of which may be characterized as a preliminary course to the next higher stage, as in that of the II. variety, the one portion of which—still quite common as among the plains Indians—being on a higher plane in evolution and leading to the next group, as illustrated by the mnemonic and symbolic characters of the Ojibwa. This, in turn, naturally leads to the III. and last variety, that of the ancient peoples of Mexico, whose picture-writing had attained the highest development known on the Western Continent.

WALTER J. HOFFMAN, M. D.

UNIVERSITY EXTENSION FOR CATHOLICS.

During the season just closing, a very successful solution has been found for a very difficult educational problem among Catholics. As the solution was one of fact and not of theory, its story may not be devoid of interest for readers of the BULLETIN. The problem was : How to reach the large body of Catholics who, for one reason or another, have been educated in part or almost exclusively under non-Catholic systems, and who, consciously or unconsciously, have imbibed, and are, in great part, guided by prevailing philosophical and critical principles, which, from our point of view, are found to be logically inconsistent with intellectually sound Catholicism. There has been, perhaps there still is, among optimists, a disposition to deny the existence of such a problem because of the unreality of the facts upon which it is based. But for those who come in close contact with the Catholic people of whom we are speaking, both the problem and the fact are, unfortunately, too prominent to be blinked. It is rather paradoxical, but nevertheless true, that a considerable number of Catholics are blessed with obliquity of mental vision, inability to draw logical conclusions, because they remain steadfast in the practice of their faith in blissful ignorance of the fact that to be strictly consistent with their intellectual principles they should be pure materialists. Thus, for the sake of illustration, that large body of reading Catholics who loyally swallow all the resounding verbosity of Herbert Spencer, can scarcely realize that this philosopher, "whose synthetic philosophy towers superbly above all other philosophic achievements of the age,"¹ is an extreme materialist, who denies the slightest respectability to any hypothesis of special creation, and a reasoner who, by his admissions, destroys the value of his own theory, which *aliunde* is full of inconsistencies, contradictions, and philosophical absurdities. Now, Herbert Spencer and variations on his philosophy, form

¹Herbert Spencer : The Man and His Work, Prof. William Henry Hudson, *Popular Science Monthly*, February, 1897, page 435.

almost their entire intellectual equipment,—still they believe in God, in a special creation, etc. Similarly their ideas of education and educational systems are derived from Compayré, Bain, Quick, Painter, Rosenkranz, etc.; yet they believe that the Catholic Church is not the foe of education, and has not enslaved the human intellect. Really, we should be grateful that people are not ruled by logic. But, likewise, we should not be astonished if they choose wrongly whenever it comes to a serious question of reconciling their faith and their pseudo knowledge. That this state of affairs exists is known or can be known by every one who is familiar with the finished product of the education given at least in our New York normal or public schools. To remedy it the Reading Circle movement was started. This prepared the way for the Catholic Summer School. One of the most striking proofs of the necessity of that institution was afforded by the unanimous testimony given by a number of experienced school teachers after one of Father Doonan's lectures in metaphysics, namely, that they had held wrong philosophical principles throughout their whole education and teaching. At the close of the first session at New London, a plan for a winter course of study and lectures was proposed to meet the want that was clearly recognized, but no practical effect could be given to it through inability to meet the financial expenses involved. The action of St. Francis Xavier's College of New York, in admitting women to the course of ethical lectures, solved the problem for one year and in one direction, but the unfortunate rescinding of that action only intensified the need that had thus been recognized. The crisis was precipitated, strangely enough, by the school reform agitation in New York. That accomplished at least one distinct good. It impelled many of the teachers to busy themselves with their own intellectual advancement. Opportunities to do so under secular auspices were not, and had not been wanting. But the work of the Reading Circles and the Summer School had, at length, aroused Catholic teachers to the dangers of modern philosophies, and the knowledge they had acquired through these agencies of the solidity and depth of Catholic philosophical teaching had made them eager to place themselves under distinctively Catholic

influences. A young woman, herself a school-teacher, guaranteed the financial success of the undertaking, and then made a formal and peremptory demand that something be done for this large body of Catholic women, who otherwise would be forced by the exigencies of their position to place themselves under instruction that we hold to be hurtful. With the issue thus plainly stated there was only one thing to be done. With many misgivings, a tentative prospectus was issued last June announcing a course of fifteen lectures in psychology to be begun in October, and promising, if that were successful, a supplementary course of five lectures in literature. The result of the experiment was awaited with considerable anxiety. To the large majority of those addressed, the lectures were entirely unknown. Several courses of lectures on identical subjects were to be given under the auspices of long-established societies, and by men well known in New York educational circles. It was urged that these latter lectures would be more practical for teachers, because they would enable them to answer more questions in the dreaded examinations for promotion, the lecturers being more in touch with the methods and requirements; and the strength of this objection was fully acknowledged: one Catholic teacher, in fact, when reproached by another for refusing to come to our lectures, and for assiduously studying books which it was shown would be sure to endanger her faith, pointedly defended herself by claiming that they, at least, would help her to pass the examinations. Finally, some timorous souls were afraid that those who attended our lectures would come under the ban for being too pronouncedly Catholic. But the event left no room for argument. The first lecture was attended by an audience of about five hundred, among whom were a number of Protestants and some Jews. The attendance, on the whole, increased rather than decreased, and there were really more people in the hall at the closing lecture than at the opening. On one very stormy day, the severest of the winter, there were over two hundred present. Five hundred and ninety-eight course tickets were actually taken for the entire course; thirty-one for the Literature Course alone; eleven single admission tickets were sold for the Psychology, and one hundred and twelve for the Literature Lectures.

With regard to the character of the audience, it may be well to note that for the most part it was composed of public school teachers, among whom were many principals of important schools. There was a very slight representation of lay teachers from the parochial schools. A fairly large number of ladies of leisure, members of convent Reading Circles, and graduates of convent schools and a sprinkling of men made up the company.

The methods followed were those prescribed by the University of the State of New York, of which we became a registered University Extension Centre. After each lecture a class was held, the class work consisting not only of interrogation, but of written exercises in the shape of theses, covering the ground gone over in the lectures.

There is a widespread disposition to sneer at the educational work done by University Extension Centres, and by those who, themselves, are profoundly learned, it is held in contempt. This attitude is theoretically justifiable, but the facts are these: while a considerable part of this work is not only superficial, but what is worse, tends to increase the appalling superficiality that pervades our society and masquerades as intellectual culture, yet the work can be done thoroughly, and the results can conscientiously be considered as thoroughly good. To secure such results the error of seeking to cover too much ground must be avoided, and too much comprehension of elementary principles on the part of the audience must not be assumed. This we soon discovered; and, therefore, although our syllabus announced that we were going to cover the field of the important questions of psychology in fifteen lectures, we confined our efforts to an endeavor to convey what we conceive to be a fairly reasonable idea of the problems of lower psychology. Finding no text-book adapted for just this purpose we distributed mimeographed copies of our notes, forty-six pages in all, containing about 25,680 words, 600 copies for each lecture, a total of 27,600 pages of matter distributed, so that during the lecture the speaker could be followed intelligently, the hearers having become familiar with terms and definitions by previous reading of the notes; and the notes themselves could afterward be consulted with more

interest in the light of the full development they had received in the lecture. Accessible references were suggested. In the class, after the lecture, the whole matter was again gone over in the form of question and answer, whilst the necessity of writing theses gave an opportunity of amplifying the notes, and exhibiting the results of personal reading. Questions, previously submitted in writing, were answered from the platform. These questions were significant as showing the difficulties in the minds of those proposing them, the trend of their thoughts, and the necessity of correcting radically wrong principles unconsciously held.

Moreover, even granting that the work done was superficial, it will be conceded that it is much better to have the superficiality at least of the right kind. The large majority of those who came to these lectures would have gone elsewhere; and we happen to know that their studies would not have gained in depth, and would have received a different coloring.

Again, it was urged that what these people needed were lectures in logic rather than in psychology. As matter of fact they wanted psychology, driven to that want by a very practical necessity. The chances were against their coming to lessons in logic; but we feel certain that while listening to lectures in psychology they realized their need of logic, as was made evident by a distinct demand for a course in logic.

In these lectures, after defending the claims of lower psychology to serious consideration, we discussed the definition of life, examining with critical care that formulated by Spencer in his "*Principles of Biology*." Then followed an exhaustive examination of the differences between living and non-living bodies. Quite a complete summary of these differences was gathered from *Liberatore*, *Urráburu*, and *Mivart*. The importance and practical nature of this subject was enlarged upon, and by quotations from popular scientific writers it was shown that it was highly useful to be familiar with the arguments that established the specific and essential difference between living and non-living matter. The next question considered was the demonstration of the proposition that the vital principle was distinct from, and superior to, the natural forces.

The argument drawn from the difference in the action of these forces in the living and non-living body, was found particularly effective. Having demonstrated the existence of some vital principle, an inquiry into its nature followed. This inquiry was limited, particularly, to the nature of the plant soul. It involved the very difficult task of conveying some notion of the scholastic doctrine of matter and form to minds untrained upon them in scholastic teaching and unacquainted with scholastic terminology; and of impressing the difference between subsistent and non-subsistent forms. The matter of distinction between plant and animal life was only touched upon, as it was felt that the real question centered in the various theories of the origin of life. These were very fully discussed in six lectures, the effort being to refute the theory of evolution or atheistic transformism, rather than to consider the theories of restricted transformism. The controversy concerning man's body, now going on in certain English periodicals, was pointed out with a view to encouraging individual study of that exceedingly interesting subject.

In the supplementary course in literature given by Dr. J. Talbot Smith and Rev. William Livingston the general theme was, "The Spiritual Element in Literature," illustrated by critical appreciations of Newman and Emerson, Shakespeare and Shelley, Tennyson and Longfellow. From this statement it will be seen that, granting superficiality in the highest degree if you will, a positive and well defined residuum of solid truth was secured by stating with emphasis the position of sound Catholic philosophy with regard to some of the most important questions agitating the human mind.

JOSEPH H. McMAHON.

THE VATICAN ARCHIVES.¹

Of all the great repositories of historical documents, the archives of the Papacy possess the widest interest. Other collections may contain more for the history of the particular country in which they have been formed, but the papal archives are unique in being international and universal as well as local. During a period of seven hundred years the collections of the Vatican reflect every phase of the many-sided activity of the Roman church; of the first importance for Rome and Italy, they at the same time contain material for the history of every part of Catholic Christendom, however obscure or remote. "The keys of Peter are still the keys of the Middle Ages," wrote Pertz after his brief visit to the Vatican in 1823, and recent explorations under more favorable conditions have served to confirm the statement as essentially true of the later Middle Ages and to extend it to certain parts of the modern period as well.² It is the purpose of this article to indicate briefly the nature and contents of the Vatican collections and to show the directions in which research and publication have been most active since the archives became accessible to students.

It should be remarked in the first place that the present papal archives, extensive as they are, represent but a relatively small portion of the immense mass of documentary material which has at one time and another been the property of the Holy See. Besides the enormous number of documents which were sent out from Rome in the ordinary course of business and which one would naturally expect to find elsewhere, the papal archives themselves have suffered from carelessness,

¹This article first appeared in the "American Historical Review," for October, 1896, and is reprinted by permission of the editors of that Review. My acknowledgments are due to Father Ehrle, prefect of the Vatican Library, and to the sub-archivist, Monsignor Wenzel, for their kindness on the occasion of my visits to the Vatican; I am also indebted to Hofrath von Sickel, director of the Austrian Institute in Rome, and Dr. von Ambros, its librarian, to M. Coulon, of the École Française de Rome, to Señor Altamira of Madrid, and to Dr. Koser, director of the Prussian archives.

²"Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde," V. 24. Compare Munch, "Aufschlüsse über das päpstliche Archiv," Berlin, 1880, and Pastor, "Geschichte der Päpste," preface to Vol. I.

plunder, and the accidents of numerous transfers, so that the greater part of their contents has passed into other hands or disappeared. While a place for the deposit of archives is known to have existed at least as early as the time of Damasus I. (366-384),¹ the present collection contains no originals of the early Middle Ages and no continuous series before the pontificate of Innocent III., and in the subsequent period the gaps are numerous and important. Serious losses undoubtedly took place in the course of the wanderings of the archives from place to place during the Middle Ages and again on the occasion of their transportation to Paris by order of Napoleon I., but it must be remembered that the documents were preserved primarily, not as historical sources, but as evidences of papal rights or as aids in the transaction of business, so that much which would have the greatest interest at the present time was doubtless destroyed by the officials themselves as of no permanent value. Then, too, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when no clear distinction was made between public and private papers, the archives suffered from spoliation at the hands of the great Roman families, in whose private libraries many important series must now be sought. The Archivio di Stato at Rome also possesses documents and copies from the papal archives, acquired by the suppression of the Roman monasteries, and other pieces are still more widely dispersed.

The various groups of documents which at present constitute the archives of the Holy See do not form a single collection under one administration. Just as in the various European states there exist separate archives of war, of marine, of foreign affairs, etc., so the various departments of the papal administration have their own repositories of records and papers, separately preserved for the recent period at least, when, as in some cases, the earlier series have been united with the central collection. It thus happens that besides the principal collection there exist the separate archives of the Consistory, the Dataria Apostolica, the Tribunal of the Rota, the Secretaria Brevium, the Signatura Gratiae, the Penitentiary,

¹Bresslau, "*Handbuch der Urkundenlehre*," I. 120 ff., where the history of the papal Archives is briefly traced.

and the Master of Ceremonies, as well as those of the Congregations of the Index, the Holy Office, and the Propaganda, and the special repositories belonging to the Sistine Chapel and St. Peter's.¹ The only one of these that is regularly open to scholars is the more ancient part of the archives of the Consistory, whose historical importance was first brought to general notice by Pastor. Here are preserved the acts of the Consistory and many of the reports and documents upon which these acts are based, extending from the beginning of the fifteenth century and containing material of much value for ecclesiastical history.² The archives of the Propaganda, for some years open to the public, are now closed, as their constant use by investigators was found to interfere with the current business of the congregation. The series, which is unusually complete, is of capital importance for the missionary labors of the Roman church; it has been explored particularly with reference to the religious history of Bohemia and the southern Slavs.³ Leaving these lesser archives aside, we shall concern ourselves chiefly with the great central collection, the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, the Vatican archives *par éminence*.

Long kept rigorously secret and utilized only by the officials and by certain exceptionally favored historians,⁴ the Archivio Segreto has become freely accessible to students through the liberality of the present Pope. The signs of the new policy were manifested in 1879, when Professor Hergenröther of the University of Würzburg, one of the foremost Catholic scholars

¹See particularly Hinojosa, "Los Despachos de la Diplomacia pontificia en España," I. xlvii.-lv. The archives of the Master of Ceremonies, containing the greater part of the papal diaries, are described by Ehrle in the "Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters," V. 587-603.

²See Pastor, "Geschichte der Päpste," I². 689-693, and the detailed account, with extracts, in Korzeniowski, "Excerpta ex libris manuscriptis Archivi Consistorialis Romani," Cracow, 1890.

³On the archives of the Propaganda in general and the various publications from them before 1887, see Pieper in the "Römische Quartalschrift," I. 80-99, 259-265.

⁴Pertz, Palacky, and some others succeeded in seeing certain pieces; the Norwegian scholar, P. A. Munch, seems to have been the only outsider admitted within the precincts of the archives, and this by a stretch of authority on the part of Theiner, who was then archivist. Cardinal Antonelli is said to have remarked that only three persons were allowed to enter the archives, namely, the Pope, the archivist, and himself; whoever else entered without a special dispensation of the Pope was ipso facto excommunicated. "Archivalische Zeitschrift," V. 78.

The earlier publications from the archives lie beyond the scope of this article; that they were by no means inconsiderable may be seen by reference to the various Bullaria, Raynaldi's continuation of, the "Annales Ecclesiastici" of Baronius, and the numerous collections edited by Theiner.

of his day, was promoted to the rank of Cardinal and placed in charge of the archives, which were thus put on an equality with the library. After the necessary preparation had been completed, the archives were formally thrown open in January, 1881.¹ Since that date the archives have been enriched by the purchase of the Borghese collections and by the transfer of valuable series from the Lateran, a larger consultation room has been provided, and an excellent reference library, the Bibliotheca Leonina, has been formed for the use of workers in the archives and manuscripts of the Vatican.² Leo XIII. has in other ways shown his interest in historical studies, notably by the establishment of the Historical Commission of the College of Cardinals, for the encouragement of the study of history among the Italian clergy, and by the institution in the Vatican of courses of systematic instruction in paleography and diplomatics, designed particularly for the training of archivists for the pontifical and other ecclesiastical archives.³

Access to the archives is now granted by the prefect to every investigator, without distinction of faith, upon the receipt of a written application accompanied by an official recommendation or a personal letter to one of the archivists. The archives are open every morning from half-past eight until twelve, with the exception of Sundays, Thursdays, and festivals, and during the short vacations which occur at Christmas, Carnival time, and Easter. They are also closed from June 28 to September 30 inclusive, so that the actual number of working days averages scarcely more than three a week throughout the year. The well-lighted consultation room, situated on the ground floor, under the library and opposite the papal gardens, has seats for about sixty readers; although larger than the room formerly in use, it is frequently crowded, so that regular attendance is

¹Of the numerous articles called forth by the opening of the archives see in particular Gottlob in the "*Historisches Jahrbuch*," VI. 271 ff., and Löwenfeld in the "*Historisches Taschenbuch*," 1887, 281 ff. The attitude of Leo XIII. toward historical studies is set forth in an interesting letter to Cardinals Luca, Pitra, and Hergenröther, August 15, 1883, to be found in Vering's "*Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht*," L. 428 ff., and in a French translation in the "*Revue des Questions Historiques*," XXXIV. 353 ff.

²Opened in 1893. See "*Historisches Jahrbuch*," XIV. 477-483.

³The exercises of the school, which was established by *Motu Proprio* of May 1, 1884 ("*Studi e Documenti di Storia e Diritto*," VI, 106-108), are by permission open to others besides members of the clergy. During the past year they have been attended with profit by students of the American School of Classical Studies.

necessary to insure a place. Visitors are struck at once by the air of quiet activity which pervades the room, and the evident determination of every one to make the most of the short time at his disposal. In general, documents anterior to 1815 are freely communicated, although the archivists may reserve pieces of a private nature (*carattere riservato*) "which cannot be given publicity for reasons of public interest, religious and social." Notes and copies must be submitted to examination before being taken away.¹ Where the exact indication is known, documents are brought promptly, but every extended investigation is likely to involve numerous delays and difficulties, for while there are excellent inventories and indexes prepared in the last century, these are not freely accessible nor are their indications always sufficiently sure or precise. "It is true of the Vatican archives more than of others," says Sickel,² "that only a part of the material for a given subject lies on the surface; merely to get track of the rest requires, not only tedious search, but the active assistance of the officials, who alone are familiar with the contents and disposition of the archives and able to follow up what is scattered and misplaced." It should be added that the archivists freely and cheerfully give such assistance, so far as their time permits, and their helpfulness is warmly appreciated.

A description of the contents of the Vatican archives is a matter of some difficulty, as no general inventory has been published, and the system of classification is in many cases the result of historical accidents rather than of the application of any logical principle. In the following brief account emphasis has been laid upon the historical interest of the various groups of documents rather than upon the details of their arrangement.³

¹Regulations established by Motu Proprio of May 1, 1884. They are published, as of 1894, in the "Revue Internationale des Archives, des Bibliothèques, et des Musées," series "Archives," I. 97.

²"Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung," XIII. 371.

³According to Ehrenberg ("Italienische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Provinz Ostpreussen," x.) the number of volumes in the Vatican archives is estimated at 2,450,000. Detailed descriptions exist for many parts of the collection; it would be a great convenience if some one would bring them together into a manual which should indicate, so far as is at present known, the character, number of volumes, and chronological limits of each series. At present the best summary account is that given by Langlois and Stein in their "Archives de l'histoire de France," 743-757.

Probably the most important section of the Vatican archives is the great series of *regesta*, consisting of copies of papal letters, which extends with few breaks from the time of Innocent III. The order of the letters in the volumes is roughly chronological; in course of time they were divided into various classes (*litteræ curiales*, *communes*, *camerales*), according to subject matter or form. Beginning with the papacy of Boniface IX., two series were kept, one at the Vatican and one at the Lateran, and we later find still other registers for the less formal types of letters—breves, signatures, etc.—which came into existence in the course of the fifteenth century.¹ To the historical student these volumes of registers are invaluable. They preserve the contents of a vast number of bulls and breves otherwise unknown, and even where the originals have been preserved, comparison with the registers yields important results for the science of diplomatics. As may be seen from any of the published volumes, the subject matter of the registers is of the widest possible variety, and relates to all parts of Christendom; nowhere else does one gain so vivid an idea of the widespread activity of the Papacy and its intimate relations to every phase of contemporary life. Besides constituting an official and unimpeachable source for papal history, the registers are of much importance for the local, and particularly the ecclesiastical, history of the various countries of Europe, and they yield valuable information for economic history and for the history of literature and the arts. Since 1881 the attention of scholars has been busily devoted to the registers, so that they may now be considered the best known portion of the archives. The registers of Innocent III. were printed by Baluze in the seventeenth century; those of Honorius III. have recently appeared as an official publication from the Vatican, while the registers of the other popes of the thirteenth century and of Benedict XI. have been undertaken by members of the French school at Rome, and those of Clement V. by the Benedictines at Monte Cassino. After the beginning of the pontificate of John XXII. the amount of material con-

¹See Palmieri, "Ad Vaticani archivi Romanorum pontificum Regesta Manuductio," Rome, 1884, a useful inventory of the registers with some account of the history of the collection.

tained in the registers becomes so vast that scholars have given up the idea of publishing it in full, and have contented themselves with excerpting that which relates to each country or locality. The only general publication for the later period is the registers of Leo X., begun by Cardinal Hergenröther and discontinued since his death.¹

A valuable supplement to the registers is formed by the *libri supplicationum*, or records of the petitions in answer to which the papal bulls were issued, which often contain interesting matter omitted in the bulls. The series begins with Clement VI., but is by no means complete; it has been utilized particularly by Denifle, and after him by others who have concerned themselves with the history of universities.²

Scarcely inferior to the registers in interest, are the documents relating to the financial administration of the Holy See, which first become abundant toward the close of the thirteenth century, when the increased need of money and the decline of the income from the patrimony of St. Peter began to lead to the development of new sources of revenue and a more complete system of financial administration. Besides the financial material contained in the registers, of which a special series of *regesta cameraria*³ was formed under Urban IV., we have,

¹Pressutti, "Regesta Honorii papæ III.," Rome, 1888-1895. "Regestum Clementis papæ V.," Rome, 1885-1888; a concluding volume of indexes is in preparation. Hergenröther, "Leonis X. pontificis maximi Regesta," Freiburg i. B., 1884-1888. Of the series published under the auspices of the École Française the only publication as yet complete is the registers of Honorius IV., edited by Prou. The others are appearing with varying degrees of rapidity—Gregory IX. by Auvray; Innocent IV. by E. Berger; Alexander IV. by Bourel de la Roncière, de Loye, and Coulon; Urban IV. by Dorez and Guiraud; Clement IV. by Jordan; Gregory X. and John XXI. by Guiraud and Cadier; Nicholas III. by Gay; Martin IV. by Soehnée; Nicholas IV. by E. Langlois; Boniface VIII. by Digard, Faucon, and Thomas; and Benedict XI. by Grandjean. A number of letters from the registers of the thirteenth century, copied by Pertz for the "Monumenta Germanie Historica" in 1823, having recently been published under the editorship of Rodenberg: "Epistolæ sæculi XIII. o Regestis pontificum Romanorum selectæ," Berlin, 1883-1894. See also the beautiful volume of facsimiles published by Denifle, "Specimina palæographica Regestorum Romanorum pontificum ab Innocentio III. ad Urbanum V.," Rome, 1888.

The more important of the local publications will be mentioned below under the countries concerned. For the numerous discussions of the diplomatic questions arising in connection with the study of the regesta, reference must be made to special works on papal diplomatics. An idea of the activity with which research has been carried on in the registers may be gained from Schmitz, "Uebersicht über die Publikationen aus den päpstlichen Registerbänden des XIII.—XV. Jahrhunderts vornehmlich seit dem Jahre 1881," in the "Römische Quartalschrift" for 1893 (VII. 209-223, 480-491).

²See in general Kehr, in "Mittheilungen des Instituts," VIII. 84 ff., and Erler in "Historisches Jahrbuch," VIII. 487 ff.; and with special reference to the history of universities, Denifle, "Die Universitäten des Mittelalters," I. xx., the cartularies of Paris and Montpellier, and Fournier, "Les statuts et privilèges des universités françaises," with Denifle's additions.

³On which see Ottenthal, in "Mittheilungen des Instituts," VI. 615-626.

for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, six hundred volumes of *collectoriae* and nearly four hundred of *introitus et exitus camerae apostolicae*. The *collectoriae*, together with the related series *libri obligationum* and *libri solutionum*, contain reports of the collectors sent out from Rome into the various parts of Europe, records of payments made directly to the papal treasury, and minutes of the financial obligations of bishops, abbots, and other high ecclesiastics. In addition to their direct value to the student of papal finance, the reports of the collectors are of considerable importance for ecclesiastical geography and local history, and constitute a source of the first rank for the monetary history and general economic conditions of the period.¹ The *introitus et exitus* comprise two sorts of records, the books in which the various officials noted their receipts and expenditures, and the general accounts in which the items of the year were entered. Expenditures are given in minute detail, payments for oil and tapers, oats and fodder, the wages of the cook and other domestics appearing along with those for larger matters, so that an excellent idea is afforded of the daily life of the papal household.² Taken with the *regesta cameraria*, these accounts indicate very exactly the different directions of papal activity; they have been utilized by Ehrle and Faucon for the history of the papal library, and by Müntz and Faucon for the history of art, and are capable of furnishing information on many other subjects.³

¹Besides the earlier publications of Theiner and Munch, see especially Kirsch, "Die päpstlichen Kollektorien in Deutschland während des XIV. Jahrhunderts," Paderborn, 1894, and the first volume of the "Monumenta Vaticana Hungariae." The *libri obligationum* have been of much assistance to Father Eubel, who is engaged in the preparation of a more correct *Series Episcoporum*. The value of the financial records of the Papacy as a source for local history is exemplified by Glaser, "Die Diözese Speier in den päpstlichen Rechnungsbüchern, 1317 bis 1500," published as Vol. XVII. of the "Mittheilungen des historischen Vereines der Pfalz" (1893).

²See, for examples, the first volume of appendices to the "Regestum Clementis papae V." Interesting items of household expenditure were published by Gregorovius in the "Historische Zeitschrift," XXXVI. 157-173, from volumes in the Archivio di Stato at Rome; Gregorovius was surprised at the simple and economical style of living they indicate among the Popes of the fifteenth century. On the abundant material for papal finance in the Archivio di Stato see Gottlob, "Aus der Camera Apostolica des 15. Jahrhunderts," Innsbruck, 1889, and Meister, "Anszüge aus den Rechnungsbüchern der Camera Apostolica zur Geschichte der Kirchen des Bisthums Strassburg," in "Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins," VII. 104-151. Papal accounts from the library at Prato are given in the "Archivio Storico Italiano" for 1884. In a recent paper read before the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, Müntz has examined carefully the expenditures of the Papal court at Avignon, and the publication of this memoir will doubtless throw new light on this interesting subject.

³See the works cited by Langlois and Stein, 753. Hayn, "Das Almosenwesen unter Johannes XXII." ("Römische Quartalschrift," VI. 209-219), publishes the first installment of a study of papal charities on the basis of the *introitus et exitus* of the Avignones period.

Recent researches in the archives have thrown light upon several of the sources of papal revenue, notably the *census*¹ and the annates², the taxes for the Crusades,³ the taxes of the chancery⁴ and the penitentiary,⁵ and the expenses attendant upon letters of provision⁶ and upon ordinations and consecrations at Rome;⁷ but many questions still remain obscure. Indeed, the whole matter of papal finance is one of the least understood subjects in the history of the Middle Ages, and this in spite of its great importance. The administration of the Roman Camera appears to have been exceptionally systematic and complete, as regards both division of functions and control, and its development and possible influence upon other systems possess special interest for the student of economic and institutional history. How far, if at all, the financial measures of the Popes contributed to produce discontent with the ecclesiastical system, is another problem whose solution can come only from a careful examination of the nature of the various sources of papal income, and the amounts actually collected in the various parts of Europe. Such questions have of late years begun to attract attention from scholars, and it is to be hoped that special studies in the archives will be continued until it will be possible to write, with impartiality and a full knowledge of the sources, an adequate history of papal finance.⁸

¹Fabre, "Étude sur le Liber Censuum de l'Église Romaine," Paris, 1892; see also his edition of the Liber Censuum and various briefer articles on the same subject.

²Kirsch, "Die Annaten und ihre Verwaltung in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts," "Historisches Jahrbuch," IX. 300-312.

³Gottlob, "Die päpstlichen Kreuzungssteuern des 13. Jahrhunderts," Heiligenstadt, 1892.

⁴Tangl, "Das Taxwesen der päpstlichen Kanzlei vom 13. bis zur Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts," "Mittheilungen des Instituts," XIII. 1-106; and compare Bacha in the "Compte-rendu des séances de la Commission royale d'histoire de Belgique," 1894, 107 ff.

⁵Denifle, "Die älteste Taxrolle der apostolischen Pönitentiarie," "Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters," IV. 201 ff.; Lea, "The Taxes of the Papal Penitentiary," "English Historical Review," July, 1893.

⁶Mayr-Adlwang, "Ueber Expensrechnungen für päpstliche Provisionsbullen des 15. Jahrhunderts," "Mittheilungen des Instituts," XVII. 71-108.

⁷Schmitz, "Die Libri Formatuarum der Camera Apostolica," "Römische Quartalschrift," VIII. 451-472.

⁸"Der Mangel einer vorurtheilsfreien, documentarisch gut belegten Finanz- und Verwaltungsgeschichte der römischen Curie während des Mittelalters gehört zu den empfindlichsten Lücken unserer historischen Litteratur." Tangl, in "Mittheilungen des Instituts," XIII. 1. Some phases of the financial history of the Papacy are treated by Gottlob, "Aus der Camera Apostolica des 15. Jahrhunderts," cited above; König, "Die päpstliche Kammer unter Clemens V. und Johannes XXII.," Vienna, 1894; Miltenberger, "Versuch einer Neuordnung der päpstlichen Kammer in den ersten Regierungsjahren Martins V.," "Römische Quartalschrift," VII. 393-450; Kirsch, "Die Finanzverwaltung des Kardinalcollegiums im 13. and 14. Jahrhundert," Münster, 1895.

A source of great value for the history of modern Europe is found in the papers of the papal secretariat,¹ of which the most important are the instructions and reports of the nuncii, collected into six thousand volumes and classified into twenty-one groups according to the places where the nuncii were stationed. The various series of reports begin at different dates in the sixteenth century, and are far from complete, although the collections of the Vatican may frequently be supplemented by those of the private libraries of Rome. The reports of the nuncii have been examined for the history of several countries of Europe,—notably for that of Germany in the epoch of the Counter-reformation,—but their study is attended with various difficulties, and the amount so far published is relatively small. The origin and development of the system of permanent nuncii is itself a chapter of diplomatic history as yet little understood.² The collections of the secretariat also contain a great number of letters from eminent personages in all parts of Europe (*lettere di principi, cardinali, vescovi e prelati, particolari, soldati, lettere diverse*), belonging to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, and useful for supplementing the correspondence of the nuncii, and as an independent source.

The archives of the Vatican possess several collections of a miscellaneous nature, many of them ill-arranged and as yet but little explored, comprised mainly in the series "Armaria," "Instrumenta miscellanea," and "Instrumenta castelli Sant' Angelo." Their contents are of the most varied character, including numerous originals of imperial charters and papal bulls, letters of kings and princes, papal diaries, reports of visitations and proceedings before legates, and considerable material on purely Italian affairs. Important sections relate to the Great Schism and the Council of Trent.³

¹Friedensburg, in the "Nuntiatursberichte aus Deutschland," first series, I. xvi. ff.; Hinojosa, I. 1-24; Langlois and Stein, 751, 754; Cauchie, "De la création d'une École belge à Rome," 19-35.

²See Friedensburg's introduction, and Pieper, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ständigen Nuntiaturs," Freiburg i. B., 1894, intended as an introduction to an edition of the instructions of the nuncii from the pontificate of Julius III. to the Thirty Years' War. Also various articles of Meister, especially "Die Nuntiaturs von Neapel im 16. Jahrhundert," "Historisches Jahrbuch," XIV. 70-82. A good illustration of the historical value of the reports of the nuncii is found in Philippson's article "Die römische Curie und die Bartholomäusnacht," "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft," VII. 108-137.

³Langlois and Stein, 754-756; "Nuntiatursberichte aus Deutschland," first series, I. xlix.-xxiii.; Kehr, "Die Kaiserurkunden des vatikanischen Archivs," "Neues Archiv," XIV. 343-376;

From the very opening of the Vatican archives, scholars have been busily occupied in exploring and publishing their contents and in studying the numerous problems to which exploration and publication have given rise, so that the books and articles which have grown directly or indirectly out of labors at the Vatican represent a very considerable portion of the historical output of the last fifteen years. An enumeration of everything of this nature that has appeared would prove of little interest to the readers of the *BULLETIN* even were the material at hand for a bibliographical task of such magnitude; it has, however, seemed worth while to indicate the principal lines along which research at the Vatican has been active, and, in particular, to give some idea of the work there carried on by organized effort on the part of the various European countries. Some mention of recent publications has been inevitable in dealing with the contents of the archives; repetition of works already cited will, as far as possible, be avoided.¹

The oldest of the institutions engaged in the exploration of the Vatican archives is the *École Française de Rome*, which began as an offshoot from the school at Athens in 1873 and attained a distinct organization in 1875. The school is supported by the French government and is under the direction of the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, subject to the control of the minister of instruction. The director, at present the Abbé Duchesne, is chosen for a period of six years. Six members are appointed each year by the minister from among the candidates submitted by the *École Normale Supérieure*, the *École des Chartes*, and the *École des Hautes Études*. The

Fabre, "Note sur les archives du Château Saint-Ange," "Mélanges de l'École française de Rome," 1893, 3-19; Siekel, "Römische Berichte," reprinted from the "Sitzungsberichte" of the Vienna Academy, 1895.

¹ I know of no attempt at a complete bibliography of publications from the Vatican archives. The list of Schmitz, already cited, is useful for the registers; many titles are given in the bibliography of the publications between 1885 and 1891 relative to the history of mediæval Italy, which appeared as the twelfth number of the "Bulletino dell' Istituto Storico Italiano," Rome, 1892.

In the following account emphasis is laid on the results of the organized and systematic explorations conducted by the various missions and institutes. In addition to the publications of individuals noted under particular countries, certain works which rest largely upon researches in Roman archives deserve special mention. Such are: Pastor, "Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters," Freiburg i. B., 1891 ff.; Valois, "La France et le Grand Schisme d'Occident," Paris, 1896; Schottmüller, "Der Untergang des Templer-Ordens," Berlin, 1887; Albanès, "Gallia Christiana Novissima" . . . 1. (Province of Aix) Montbéliard, 1895,

appointments are renewable for a second or third year ; usually there are also a few associate members. The work of the school includes archæological and philological, as well as historical studies, but research in the archives always occupies the attention of some of the members—notably of those who have profited by the admiral training of the *École des Chartes*. The principal undertaking of the school—the publication of the registers of the Popes of the thirteenth century—was begun as early as 1879, and has not yet been completed ; the volumes already issued form the most important series of publications that has been made from the Vatican archives, and reflect great credit upon the school. In recent years the historical investigations of the school have centered about the registers of the Avignonese Popes, where, as complete publication is out of the question, owing to the immense amount of material, they have been confined to the entries relating to French affairs and to the special diplomatic problems involved. One member has also studied the *regesta cameralia* of this period. The resources of the Vatican have also been utilized in many other publications of the French school, notably in Fabre's studies of papal administration and in the important works of Müntz and Faucon upon the history of art.¹

The materials for German history in the Vatican archives are very abundant, and their exploration has been undertaken from many different quarters. Among the first in the field were the representatives of the Munich Historical Commission, who collected and published important acts for the history of the Empire under Louis the Bavarian.² Soon the historical commissions of Württemberg and Baden and the directors of the series of sources published in Westphalia, Mecklenburg,

¹Reports upon the work of the *École Française* appear in the "Compte-rendu des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres." A list of the members since 1873 is printed in the periodical organ of the school, "*Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*," XVI. 3-12. Together with the school at Athens, the school at Rome publishes the "*Bibliothèque des Écoles d'Athènes et de Rome*," an octavo series for monographs and a quarto series for the *regesta*, etc., where the more extended contributions of its members appear. An examination of the reports of the nunci in France was planned not long ago, but I am not aware that it has as yet led to definite results.

²Riezler, "Vatikanische Akten zur deutschen Geschichte in der Zeit Kaiser Ludwigs des Bayern," Innsbruck, 1891 ; compare the earlier publications of Reinkens and von Löhner in the same field. The Vatican archives have also been examined for the edition of the acts of the imperial diets, and the commission originally planned to publish the reports of the nunci of the Reformation period as a supplement to this series.

and the province of Saxony had their agents at work in the Vatican, as did also the provincial authorities of Brandenburg, Posen, and East and West Prussia.¹ Documents have also been collected for the ecclesiastical provinces of Cologne, Trier, and Hamburg-Bremen, as well as for a number of dioceses within and without their limits. Such investigations, carried on independently with reference to the history of each state or locality, naturally involve great waste of effort, since the ground must be gone over anew in each case, and the results are sometimes exceedingly meagre. To obviate the difficulty, the two leading German representatives of historical studies in Rome, the Prussian Institute and the Görresgesellschaft, have undertaken, first, to prepare a "Repertorium Germanicum," or calendar of all the entries relating to German affairs in the registers of the later Middle Ages, and second, to publish the reports of the German nuncii of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The work has been so apportioned that the Prussian Institute takes the registers from 1378 to 1448; the Görresgesellschaft, those from 1448 to 1517 and the earlier volumes of Martin V. With reference to the nuncii, the agreement finally reached by the various investigators that had already begun work in this field assigns to Prussia the reports before 1560 and after 1605 as well as those for the period 1572-1585; the Görresgesellschaft has those between 1585 and 1605, while the important years 1560-1572 are reserved for the Austrian Institute.

The Prussian Institute, founded in 1888, is under the general supervision of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, and the immediate control of a commission of three, consisting at present of Professors Wattenbach and Lenz and the director of the Prussian archives, Dr. Koser. In Rome the institute is represented by a secretary, Dr. Friedensburg, two regular

¹Schneider and Kaiser, "Württembergisches aus römischen Archiven," Stuttgart, 1895 ("Württemberg's Geschichtsquellen," II. 355-566); Schmidt and Kehr, "Päpstliche Urkunden und Regesten aus den Jahren [1295-1378], die Gebiete der heutigen Provinz Sachsen und deren Umlände betreffend," Halle, 1886-1889 ("Geschichtsquellen der Provinz Sachsen," XXI, XXII.); Finke, "Die Papsturkunden Westfalens bis zum Jahre 1378," I. Münster, 1888 ("Westfälisches Urkundenbuch," V.); Ehrenberg, "Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der in der heutigen Provinz Posen vereinigten ehemals polnischen Landestheile." . . . Leipzig, 1892; Ehrenberg, "Italienische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Provinz Ostpreussen," Königsberg, 1895. Other local researches and publications are mentioned in the "Römische Quartalschrift," VII. 216 ff., 487, and in the "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft," VIII. 176.

assistants, and a varying number of other workers; the expenses of publication are borne jointly by the Prussian archives and the ministry of education. Thus far eight volumes of the reports of the nuncii have appeared;¹ work for the "*Repertorium Germanicum*," which receives a special subsidy from the emperor's private funds, has been carried on in the registers of Eugene IV., and the first volume has been published.

The historical section of the Görresgesellschaft, instituted "for the encouragement of the sciences in Catholic Germany," has its regular representatives at Rome, under the direction of Dr. Ehses, and is one of the most active agencies in the scientific utilization of the Vatican archives. Besides two volumes of reports of German nuncii, the society has published an important body of documents relating to the divorce of Henry VIII. of England, and has begun a series of valuable contributions to the history of papal finance.² Work has also been carried on in the registers of Martin V. and Hadrian VI., and a complete edition of the acts of the Council of Trent is in preparation, and is to be accompanied by the various private diaries and minutes of the council's proceedings. Studies from Rome also appear in the society's review, the "*Historisches Jahrbuch*."

The researches of Austrian scholars in the papal archives, begun in accordance with the imperial decree in 1881, have been conducted almost entirely under the auspices of the Austrian Institute of Historical Studies directed by Theodor

¹"*Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken*," Gotha and Berlin, 1892 ff. First period, edited by Friedensburg: I. "*Nuntiaturen des Vergerio, 1533-1536*"; II. "*Nuntiatur des Morone, 1536-1538*"; III. and IV. "*Legation Aleanders, 1538-1539*." Third period, edited by Hansen and Schellhass: I. "*Der Kampf um Köln, 1576-1584*"; II. "*Der Reichstag zu Regensburg, Der Pacificationstag zu Köln, Der Reichstag zu Augsburg*" (1576-1582); III. "*Die süddeutsche Nuntiatur des Grafen Bartholomäus von Portia, 1573-1574*." Fourth period, edited by Kiewnig: I. "*Nuntiatur des Paleotto, 1628*"; a second volume in press.

Reports on the work of the institute appear in the "*Sitzungsberichte*" of the Academy; see also Sybel's preface to the first volume of the "*Nuntiaturberichte*" (first period).

²"*Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte. In Verbindung mit ihrem Historischen Institut in Rom herausgegeben von der Görresgesellschaft*," Paderborn, 1892, ff. I. I. Dittrich, "*Nuntiaturberichte Giovanni Morones vom deutschen Königshofe, 1539-1540*." II. Ehses, "*Römische Dokumente zur Geschichte der Ehescheidung Heinrichs VIII. von England, 1527-1534*." III. Kirsch, "*Die päpstlichen Kollektorien in Deutschland während des XIV. Jahrhunderts*." IV. Ehses and Meister, "*Die kölnische Nuntiatur, 1585-1587*." Compare also the various contributions from Roman archives in the "*Festschrift zum elfhundertjährigen Jubiläum des deutschen Campo Santo in Rom*," edited by Ehses, Freiburg i. B., 1897. (Inventories of the *collectorie* and the *introitus et exitus* have been prepared and are to be published. The last report of the work of the society in Rome will be found in the "*Historisches Jahrbuch*," XVII. 224-226.)

von Sickel. The institute, whose present organization dates from 1890, is supported by the Austrian government; its regular members, who receive an annual stipend, are appointed each year by the minister of education on the recommendation of the director in Rome and the director of the Institut für österreichische Geschichtsforschung in Vienna.¹ In the choice of subjects for investigation members of the institute enjoy considerable freedom, while at the same time emphasis is laid upon the careful and thorough methods which characterize the Austrian school of diplomatics. Of their publications the greater number relate to German history in the century following the interregnum and to the organization and procedure of the papal chancery.² Mention should also be made of the important studies of the director in regard to the documents of the German emperors,³ the monographs of Wahrmund on modern papal elections,⁴ and the numerous contributions of Starzer to Austrian local history. The institute has pushed forward its preparations for the publication of the reports of the German nuncios in the period of the Council of Trent, and the first volume of the series is promised immediately.

Active investigations at Rome have also been carried on by other parts of the Austrian Empire. For Hungary the fine series of the "*Monumenta Vaticana Hungariæ*," edited by Mon-

¹"Statut für das Istituto Austriaco di Studi Storici," Vienna, 1893; director's reports in "*Mittheilungen des Instituts*," VI. 203-223; XIII. 367-376, 663-667. The publications of the institute down to the close of 1893 are described by Starzer in the "*Oesterreichisches Literaturblatt*," II. Nos. 21-24.

²On the history of the empire: Fanta, Kaltenbrunner, and Ottenthal, "*Actenstücke zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter den Königen Rudolf I. und Albrecht I.*," Vienna, 1889 (Vol. I. of the "*Mittheilungen aus dem vatikanischen Archive*," published by the Vienna Academy); Starzer and Redlich, "*Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches und der österreichischen Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts*" (Vol. II. of the same collection); Werunsky, "*Auszüge aus den Registern der Päpste Clemens VI. und Innocent VI. zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs unter Karl IV.*," Innsbruck, 1885; id., "*Geschichte Kaiser Karls IV. und seiner Zeit*," Innsbruck, 1880-1892.

On the chancery: Sickel, "*Liber Diurnus Romanorum pontificum*," Vienna, 1889; Tangl, "*Die päpstlichen Kanzleiordnungen von 1200-1500*," Innsbruck, 1894; Ottenthal, "*Die päpstlichen Kanzleiregeln von Johannes XXII. bis Nicolaus V.*," Innsbruck, 1888; Kaltenbrunner, "*Römische Studien*," Innsbruck, 1884-1886; and numerous briefer studies of the same authors in the "*Mittheilungen des Instituts*."

³Sickel, "*Das Privilegium Otto's I. für die römische Kirche vom Jahre 962*," Innsbruck, 1883; Sickel and Bresslau, "*Die kaiserliche Abfertigung des Wormser Concordats*," "*Mittheilungen des Instituts*," VI. 105-139; and Italian documents contributed to the "*Studi e Documenti di Storia e Diritto*," VI., and to the "*Notizie e Trascrizioni dei Diplomi imperiali e reali delle Cancellerie d'Italia*," 1892.

⁴"Das Ausschliessungsrecht der katholischen Staaten . . . bei den Papstwahlen," Vienna, 1888; "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Exclusionsrechts bei den römischen Papstwahlen," Vienna, 1890; also in the "*Historisches Jahrbuch*," XII. 784-791, and the "*Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht*," LXVII., LXVIII., LXXII.

signor Fraknói and published under the auspices of the higher clergy of the kingdom, well illustrates the resources of the various sections of the Vatican archives and forms a contribution of the highest importance to Hungarian history.¹ Bohemia has been represented in Rome since 1887 by two *Landesstipendisten*, who receive a regular subvention from the diet and are ranked as extraordinary members of the Austrian Institute. They have been engaged in a careful examination of the papal registers with reference to Bohemian ecclesiastical history and have also collected important material for the history of the Counter-reformation in Bohemia.² In the South Slavonic lands the Academy of Sciences at Agram has directed explorations at the Vatican; the documents published come chiefly from the Propaganda and relate to Bulgarian affairs.³

Researches in regard to the material for Polish history in the Vatican archives were begun in 1885 at the instance of members of the aristocracy and higher clergy of Austrian Poland. Since 1886 the work has been directed by Professor Smolka of the University of Cracow, under the auspices of the Cracow Academy of Sciences and with the aid of subsidies furnished by the Galician diet and the Austrian minister of education. More than forty volumes of copies, analyses, and inventories of documents relating to the history of Poland have been sent to Cracow for preservation in the library of the Academy, which has published a summary of their contents and some of the material which they contain for the history of the sixteenth century.⁴ Important pieces for the history of

¹"Monumenta Vaticana Historiam regni Hungariæ illustrantia," Budapest, 1884-1891. First Series: I. "Rationes Collectorum pontificiorum in Hungaria, 1281-1375"; II. "Acta legationis Cardinalis Gentilis, 1307-1311"; III., IV. "Bullæ Bonifacii IX."; V. "Liber Confraternitatis Sancti Spiritus de Urbe, 1446-1523"; VI. contains the correspondence of Matthias Corvinus with the Popes. Second Series: I. "Relationes Oratorum pontificiorum, 1524-1526"; II. "Relationes Cardinalis Buonvisi, 1686."

²Compare "Mittheilungen des Instituts," XIII. 376. Dudik's volume on Moravia, "Auszüge für Mährens allgemeine Geschichte aus den Regesten der Päpste Benedict XII. und Clemens VI.," (Brünn, 1885), I have not seen.

³Fermeudzin, "Acta Bulgaricæ ecclesiastica," Agram, 1888, forming Vol. XVIII. of the "Monumenta spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium."

⁴Korzeniewski, "Catalogus Actorum et Documentorum res gestas Poloniæ illustrantium quæ . . . expeditionis Romanæ cura 1886-1888 deprompta sunt," Cracow, 1889; id., "Excerpta ex libris manuscriptis Archivi Consistorialis Romani, 1409-1590," Cracow, 1890. These have since been combined with other matter to form "Analecta Romana quæ historiam Poloniæ sæc. XVI. illustrant (Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum, XV.)," Cracow, 1894. References to publications in Polish are given in the introduction. See also Lewicki, "Codex Epistolaris sæculi decimi quinti," Cracow, 1891-1894. Reports on the work of the mission in Rome appear in the "Anzeiger" of the Cracow Academy.

Prussian Poland have been collected in Rome under the direction of the provincial authorities of East Prussia and Posen, while from the Russian side noteworthy studies have been made by Professor Wierzbowski of the University of Warsaw.¹

The investigations conducted on the part of the other nations of Europe can be described more briefly. The English Public Record Office has for several years had an agent in Rome preparing a "calendar of all entries in the Papal Regesta of the Middle Ages which illustrate the history of Great Britain and Ireland;" three volumes have appeared,² covering the period from 1198 to 1419. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have each a representative in the Vatican archives, and by a coöperative exploration of all the material relating to Scandinavia avoid the waste of time inseparable from a separate examination for each country. Materials for Swiss history have been gathered both from the registers and from the reports of the nuncii, at the instance, in the one case, of the historical society in Basel, and, in the other, of the Allgemeine Geschichtsforschende Gesellschaft.³ The Belgian government has twice sent Professor Cauchie of the University of Louvain upon a mission to Italian archives; at Rome he has explored various parts of the registers, of the records of the Camera, and of the reports of the Flemish nuncii.⁴ I know of no publications for Holland except the collection of bulls concerning the diocese of Utrecht, edited by Brom.⁵ With reference to the materials for Spanish history preserved at the Vatican a preliminary examination has been made, under official direction, by Ricardo de Hinojosa, who has published some

¹Wierzbowski, "Vincent Laureo, nonce apostolique en Pologne," Warsaw, 1887; "Uchans-ciana," Warsaw, 1884-1895.

²Bliss "Papal Letters," London, 1893-1895; "Petitions to the Pope," London, 1897. A brief note on the materials at the Vatican concerning English history appeared in the "English Historical Review," 1889, 810, where it is stated that the English agent is instructed to carry his investigations to 1688.

³Bernoulli, "Acta pontificum Helvetica," I. 1198-1268, Basel, 1891. Wirz, "Akten über die diplomatischen Beziehungen der römischen Curie zu der Schweiz, 1512-1552" ("Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte," XVI.), Basel, 1895.

⁴See his "Mission aux Archives vaticanes," "Compte-rendu des séances de la Commission royale d'histoire de Belgique," 1892, 185-192, 313-433; and compare the reports of the commission for 1894, 3, 195, and for 1895, 259. The Abbé Cauchie's recent brochure, "De la création d'une École belge à Rome" (Tournai, 1896) did not reach me until after the first appearance of the present article. The author accompanies his plea for the establishment of a Belgian school at Rome with a convenient summary of the contents of the archives (with special reference to Belgian history) and of the work of the various existing schools.

⁵"Bullarium Trajectense," . . . The Hague, 1891 ff.

of the results in a volume on the despatches of the Spanish nuncios.¹ Nothing similar has yet been done for Portugal. The papal archives naturally contain less for the history of Russia than for that of Catholic Europe; the amount of material is, however, by no means inconsiderable, as is shown by the various writings of Pierling on the relations of Russia to the Holy See,² and by the report of his investigations at Rome recently published by Professor Smourlo of the University of Dorpat.³ The Russian government has recently determined to establish an institute at Rome, part of whose time shall be given to historical studies.

Within the Vatican itself the officials have naturally had small leisure to devote to special research, yet the scholars connected with the papal court have not left entirely to outsiders the work of utilizing the archives. We owe to them, and others working under their direction, the publication of three important sets of registers and a considerable amount of scattered material, relating particularly to Italian history,⁴ while mention should also be made of the publications of Pitra and Palmieri on the registers, and of the documents bearing on the German Reformation, brought together by the former archivist Balan.⁵ Material from the archives appears from time to time in the *Studi e Documenti di Storia e Diritto* and in other publications of the Accademia Romana di Conferenze Storico-giuridiche, founded and maintained under papal sanction. At present the most active investigators who hold official positions at the Vatican are Father Denifle, custodian of the archives, and Father Ehrle, prefect of the library, both widely known for their valuable contributions to the ecclesiastical, literary,

¹"Los Despachos de la Diplomacia pontificia en España. Memoria de una Misión oficial en el Archivo Secreto de la Santa Sede," I., Madrid, 1896.

²"Documents inédits sur les rapports du Saint-Siège avec les Slaves," Paris, 1887; *Papes et Tsars (1547-1597) d'après des documents nouveaux*," 1890; "La Russie et le Saint-Siège," 1896.

³See "Revue Internationale des Archives," etc., series "Archives," I. 135. For Livonia see Hildebrand, "Livonica, vornehmlich aus dem 13. Jahrhundert im vatikanischen Archiv," Riga, 1887.

⁴Registers of Honorius III., Clement V., and Leo X., cited above. "Spicilegio Vaticano di Documenti inediti e rari estratti degli Archivi e dalla Biblioteca della Sede Apostolica," Rome, 1890-1891. "Il Muratori," Rome, 1892.

⁵Pitra, "Analecta novissima Spicilegii Solesmensis, altera continuatio," I., Paris, 1885. Balan, "Monumenta Reformationis Lutherianæ ex tabulariis secretioribus S. Sedis, 1521-1525," Ratisbon, New York, and Cincinnati, 1884; and "Monumenta sæculi XVI. Historiam illustrantia," Innsbruck, 1885.

and educational history of the Middle Ages, in connection with which they have drawn freely upon the resources of the papal collections.¹

Of researches at the Vatican with reference to American history there is unfortunately very little to record. Some years ago a Peruvian Jesuit, Father Hernaez, had access to the archives and made some use of them for his collection of documents relating to American ecclesiastical history.² Visitors to the Chicago Exposition will perhaps remember the handsome set of phototype facsimiles from the papal archives which was exhibited in the Convent of La Rabida among the objects relating to the discovery of America. This volume, of which but twenty-five copies were published, *ut illustrioribus tantum bibliothecis distribuerentur*, contains facsimiles and transcriptions of twenty-three letters from the papal registers, relating to the bishopric of Gardá in Greenland,—the first American see,³—the demarcation line between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, and the sending out of the first missionaries and bishops after the voyages of Columbus.⁴ As most of these documents were previously known, their publication was of more importance for purposes of exhibition than as an addition to historical knowledge; it will prove of

¹See particularly Ehrle, "Historia Bibliothecæ Romanorum pontificum tum Bonifatianæ tum Avenionensis," I., Rome, 1890; and Denifle, "Die Universitäten des Mittelalters," Berlin, 1885, and "Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis," Paris, 1889-1894, and the various volumes of their joint publication, "Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters."

²"Colección de Bulas, Breves y otros Documentos relativos á la Iglesia de America y Filipinas, dispuesta, anotada e ilustrada por el Padre Francisco Javier Hernaez, de la Compañía de Jesus." Brussels, 1879. The work, which was brought out by Fathers Garrastazu and de Uriarte after the author's death and does not seem to be widely known, was undertaken at the instance of the Second Council of Quito. A large part of its contents was drawn from the various Bullaria, with some use of South American archives.

³In regard to which several pieces have been published by a Dalmatian scholar, Jelic, under the title "L'évangélisation de l'Amérique avant Christophe Colomb," "Compte-rendu du Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques tenu à Paris, du 1er au 6 avril, 1891," fifth section, 170-184; "Compte-rendu du troisième Congrès . . . tenu à Bruxelles" . . . 1894, fifth section, 391-395.

⁴Also a letter of Julius II. commending Bartholomew and Diego Columbus to Ferdinand. The volume bears the title: "Documenta selecta e Tabulario secreto Vaticano, quæ Romanorum pontificum erga Americæ populos curam ac studia tum ante tum paulo post insulas a Christophoro Colombo repertas testantur, phototypis descripta," Rome, 1893. Compare Ehrle, "Der historische Gehalt der päpstlichen Abtheilung auf der Weltausstellung von Chicago," "Stimmen aus Maria-Laach," XLVI. 367-394. The documents relating to the bishopric of Gardá are reprinted in the BULLETIN for October, 1896, pp. 502 ff. On the establishment of bishoprics in America see also Ehres, "Aus den Consistorialakten der Jahre, 1530-1534," "Römische Quartalschrift," VI. 220-236. I am told that some researches have been made for the history of certain North American dioceses, but have no exact information on this point.

further value if it serve to stimulate among us an interest in the archives and a desire to explore them.

The value and extent of the Roman sources for American history would appear only after a prolonged examination. Unquestionably, the general history of the western world, even of those parts which have always been predominantly Catholic, stands in no such close relation to the papal system as does the history of Europe, and it were vain to expect the same assistance from Roman archives in the one field as in the other. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that the Vatican collections contain much of special interest to American students, particularly in regard to the age of exploration and colonization, and the history of Latin America,—in which direction the material is doubtless most abundant, while our opportunity is at the same time the wider, owing to the backwardness of Spain and Portugal in undertaking researches at the Vatican. A systematic and thorough investigation of the American material at the Vatican ought certainly to be made,—either by a specially qualified agent or, better still, by an American School of Historical Studies at Rome. It is not the place here to insist upon the utility of such a school, established upon the general plan of the classical schools at Rome and Athens, and working in friendly coöperation with them and with the historical institutes already founded by European countries. If it were properly organized and directed, I believe a school at Rome would prove of the greatest value, not only by its actual contributions to historical knowledge, but also by its stimulating effect upon the serious study of history among us. Its activities should not be confined to American subjects, but should also include some of the numerous other problems of general interest whose solution lies in the archives and libraries of Rome and other parts of Italy, so that the idea of such an institution ought to appeal to all who are concerned in the progress of historical science in America, regardless of the directions in which their own special studies may lie.

CHARLES H. HASKINS.

THE MEDIAEVAL TEACHER.¹

The Younger Pliny tells us that only an artist may criticise the works of art, but all mankind may pass judgment on the lives of men who are friends of humanity. Such lives, however short, never melt into the general void, but shed forever a sweet aroma within the circle of their rememberers. And when such lives are prolonged beyond the patriarchal limit they serve as beacon lights, as finger posts, to all who must travel the same pathway in the future.

As I listened to the eloquent gentlemen who have preceded me, and noted the gains which the cause of popular education has made within the present century, my mind, somehow, reverted to a not dissimilar situation in the remote past, to the very dawn of our modern civilization. Then, as at the opening of this century, a world lay before the restorers of civilization; then a mass of civil and religious ruin was added to the obstacles of nature; then the usual difficulties of state building were increased by the immensity of the débris and the utter rawness of the material for the foundation work. The pioneers of education in the United States found at hand Christian character, doctrines, discipline of life, knowledge of good and evil, virtue and vice, an educated sense of justice and a respect of law, ancient and familiar models to imitate, and unity of race and language. But the pioneers of education in Europe found none of these,—they were as men who go out upon a dark and pathless sea without chart or compass or light.

Then, again, it struck me that if ever the law of continuity be true of institutions in particular, it is especially so in the history of education, so that whatever institution has been enabled to reach the present, and to flourish with promise of future growth, must have its roots in its own remote past, and must keep in touch with the long-tried laws of its life history, if it would hope for permanent efficacy. The present is ever the

¹Discourse delivered at Hartford, Conn., January 25th, on the occasion of the celebration of the 86th anniversary of the birth of Dr. Henry Barnard, one of the founders of the common school system of the United States.

child of the past, in human institutions as in human conduct. It may not therefore be amiss to go back a few moments to the days when those European ancestors from whom we are all descended were laying the beams of state and church, when they were emerging from their forests and their marks, to take up the municipal life of the Roman provincials, and to transform the essential paganism of the Roman state into a system of politico-social life imbued with the pure and vital spirit of Christianity. Perhaps, too, in celebrating the history of a century of education it is not out of place that a Catholic priest should say something of the incomparable educational merits of that institution which has seen the rise and fall of so many systems of education, and which alone on earth today can bear trustworthy personal witness to the history of human hopes and ideals for nigh two thousand years.

The Christian teacher of the Middle Ages! It is Boethius and Cassiodorus in Italy, men who collect with reverence the elements of classic science and the principles of human wisdom, to hand them down to a time of wider peace and more varied opportunities,—Roman men of the best classic type, from that Italy in which the lamp of scholarship never went utterly out, and in which the system of schools was never quite suspended. It is Isidore of Seville in Spain, the great Bede and Alcuin in England, Colchu and Dicuil in Ireland. Their knowledge was what we now call encyclopædic, and such too was their method. They affected the manual and the cultivation of the memory,—but we must remember that they were dealing with races young in culture, physically vigorous, and strongly attracted to a manifold external activity; also that they lived in an iron age of change and war, and that no mean of political stability had yet been reached around them.

So they opened their little schools, sometimes in the palace of king or count, oftener in the cathedral close or the cloister of the abbey. Municipal life and civil architecture were yet in embryo,—peace, and books, and rewards, and a logical career, were as yet furnished by the Church alone. Often, too, they were clerics, and they taught on feasts and holidays a divine learning, the complement and sanction of their rudiments of human science. On such occasions they had for

scholars the rude lords of the soil, and the slow tillers thereof, coarse men-at-arms, who were charmed with the teacher's high views of history and human society, his varied learning and his skill in speech.

Such a teacher knew Latin well, and sometimes Greek. He was skilled in the church-song. And so he trained the little choristers and the youthful clerics in the history and literature of the world's mightiest state, and he fitted them to hold the highest offices in the powerful ecclesiastical society that enclosed and protected on all sides the growing body of mediæval states. His students were legion, for progress and culture were then synonymous with the churches and monasteries that were springing up in every Christian state of Europe. He taught arithmetic and geometry, which latter included the elements of mechanics and architecture, sculpture and painting. Astronomy, too, was to be had in his school, and all such mathematical knowledge as was needed for ecclesiastical purposes. The study of grammar meant a liberal education in the classic texts used, for by grammar was meant an all-sided interpretation of them. With it went the study of music, no small element in the gradual softening of domestic manners, and the development of mediæval art. Dialectic, or the art of correct thought, and rhetoric, or that of ornate and persuasive speech for the public good, were favorite studies,—indeed, all these branches made up the seven liberal arts, or the perfect cycle of education as the Middle Ages understood it, and loved to symbolize it in its miniaturized manuscripts, on the sculptured portals of its cathedrals, or the carved bases of its pulpits.

The inseparable text-book of the mediæval teacher was Vergil, and his majestic Latin the highest scientific ideal. Yet by the devotion to Vergil he prepared the ground for the blossoming of the vernacular tongues, whose first great masters had learned from the Latin classics the adorable art of correct and pleasing speech. What a distance between the jabbering barbarians whom St. Gall met at Constanx and the author of the Nibelungen Lied or the Chanson de Roland! In the five or six centuries of classic formation that intervenes, somebody has taught these men the highest architeconic of

literature. It was the mediæval teacher with his Vergil and his Bible, his child-like faith and his true artistic sense. If we could doubt it, the witness of Dante would be there to convince us, for to that crowning glory of mediæval teaching Vergil is ever the 'Maestro e Duca,' the 'dolce pedagogo' from whom he has taken

'lo bello stile che m'ha fatto onore.'

Civil society was also the debtor of such a teacher. It was he who preserved the text and the intelligence of the Civil Law of Rome, as confirmed in the Code of Justinian, and he helped to amalgamate with it the rude customs and precedents of the wandering tribes that had squatted on the imperial soil. He taught the fingers of Frank and Gothic soldiers how to form letters, and he taught their children how to draw up the necessary formulæ for the conduct of public and private interests,—charters, laws, wills, contracts, privileges, and the like.

Nor was he ashamed to handle the implements of the fine arts, like a St. Eloi and a Bernward of Hildesheim, and to fashion countless objects that translated into material form the ideal beauty which haunts forever, though forever unattained, the heart of man. Even the domestic arts—agriculture, fishery, road and canal-making, irrigation,—all the humble arts that bring men closer together, and develop the social instinct, and enable men to dominate the pitiless grinding forces of nature, were taught the people by these men, as endless references in the mediæval annals show, from the Orkneys to the Black Sea.

It is the glory of the Old Church that these teachers were her priests and her monks, and that in every land she cherished them by her councils and by her endowments. If she had nothing else to be proud of, that would be much indeed. It was said of Melancthon, and before him of good old Jacob Wimpheling, that he was "Praeceptor Germaniae." It might be said with greater truth and wider application that the Old Church was "Praeceptor totius Occidentis," the universal teacher of Europe from the Vistula to the Scheld, from Otranto to Drontheim.

One might imagine that in those troublous times such men would be pardoned had they paid little attention to the phi-

losophy of education, to methodology, and to general pedagogics. But the truth is far otherwise. We have in every century a number of pedagogical treatises of a general or specific character, on schools and teachings in general, on the formation of the nobles or the ecclesiastics, all of which breathe the most sincere devotion to the teacher's vocation. Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, Sedulius of Liège, are but a few of these writers, and in the thirteenth century there is an entire galaxy of writers on pedagogics, whose treatises are far from despicable and are indeed worthy of veneration when we recall the extent of their actual influence. On the eve of the Reformation appear the admirable treatises of Silvio Antoniano and Johannes Dominici, two cardinals, of Maphæus Vegius, Aeneas Sylvius (Pius II.) Erasmus and Vivès, while the teaching and the system of the Brothers of the Common Schools in the Netherlands and along the Rhine are the admiration of all the historians of that time. At the same time the secondary education throughout northern Europe, notably in England and Scotland, had reached a high degree of development quite independent of the movement of the Renaissance. But here we are at the end of the Middle Ages; the vocation of its teachers, though not gone has changed; the whole theory of education is about to pass over into other hands, and to be informed by a new spirit, born of the circumstances and needs that followed the great religious upheaval and the shattering of the Catholic unity.

Still for a thousand years the mediæval teachers had worked at the formation of the men and women of Europe. And if in any art, one may turn with pride to the masterpieces as proofs of the skill and the training of the artist, we may do so in a special manner in the art which Gregory the Great called the art of arts,—the government of souls. Great ecclesiastics and prudent statesmen, saints and bishops and popes, princes and kings of high repute, came out of their schools, as well as a brave and patient people, artistically endowed, lovers of poetry and art, and all the higher graces of the mind, dowered, with strong faith, and accustomed to bear the crowding ills of this life by the contemplation of a better one. Names rush to one's lips, but I forbear to recite them,—I will only say that we cannot afford to forget or neglect any system

of study by which the world was enriched with such philosophers and theologians as St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, such historians as Otto of Freising and Froissart, such poets as Dante and Chaucer, such architects as Arnulf of Cambrai and Brunelleschi, such statesmen as Suger and St. Louis. It is on such names, no less than on the fabric of Church and State strengthened and developed by them that the imperishable reputation of the Mediæval Teachers may be allowed to rest.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

ANALECTA.

The Neo-Maurines of Maredsous.

Among the ecclesiastical corporations that fell victims to the Culturkampf was the young and flourishing community of Benedictines, founded by Dom Maurus Wolter and his brother Placidus, at Beuron in Sigmaringen. Though under the protection of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns, its members were expelled from Prussia. Some sought a refuge at Seckau in Tyrol, while others belonging to distinguished families of Belgium turned to the province of Namur, where they found a home among the hills that border the course of the Meuse. A great abbey with a splendid church, the creation of the famous architect, Jean Bêthune, soon arose; vocations increased; the love of labor and the spirit of study kept pace with the growth of religious fervor. A number of the monks opened a college or abbey-school that soon took rank among the highest and best educational institutions in Belgium. Others turned their attention to the advancement of ecclesiastical studies, notably along the lines of historical and literary research. Abbot Placidus and the deeply-regretted liturgist Dom Suitbert Baeumer were the leaders of this chosen land. With them were associated Dom Bonifacius Wolff, a skilled patristic scholar, actually prior of Cesena, and Dom Laurentius Jansen, philosopher and theologian, littérateur and artist, now rector of the College of St. Anselm at Rome, and professor of dogma in the same. Among the younger members of this learned society were Dom Ursmer Beurlière and Dom Germanus Morin. It is to the studies of the latter two that this brief notice is consecrated.

Dom Ursmer Beurlière has devoted his attention chiefly to the ecclesiastical history of Belgium. It is to him that we owe the publication of the "Monasticon Belge", in which he has undertaken the task of correcting and completing the great in-folios of the "Gallia Christiana" as far as the churches and

abbeys of Belgium are concerned.¹ In addition he is publishing a series of "Unedited Documents" calculated to throw light on the church history of Belgium.²

Dom Germanus Morin has devoted his time to patristic studies. For ten years or more he has been busy with an edition of the works of St. Cæsarius of Arles, and though his task is yet unfinished, he has found occasion to bring before the learned public several important discoveries made in the libraries of Belgium, France, Germany, England and Italy. These researches he publishes under the title of "*Anecdota Maredsolana*." The first volume published was a very old liturgical text of the church of Toledo.³ The second excited great interest, for it brought out a rare treasure, a very old Latin version of the Epistle of St. Clement of Rome to the Corinthians.⁴ Until the discovery of this text it was supposed by many that the Latin Middle Ages were ignorant of the genuine Epistle of St. Clement. The third and last volume contains a hitherto unknown work of St. Jerome.⁵ The world of savants has welcomed their writings with great warmth, and Leo XIII. has lately written a congratulatory letter to the hard-working and sagacious critic. In addition to literary undertakings of so grave a character, the Benedictines of Maredsous publish monthly the "*Revue Bénédictine*," in which there appear from the pens of several of the younger members conscientious and admired studies on liturgy, patristics, history, criticism, theology and asceticism.⁶ Maredsous is, indeed, a site on which the religious life flourishes, and

¹*Monasticon Belge*, par le R. P. Dom Ursmer Beurlière, Bénédictin de l'Abbaye de Maredsous, Tome I, première livraison, Province de Namur. Bruges, Desclée, De Brouwer et Cie 1890; 4°, pp. 152.

²*Documents Inédits pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique* publiés par le R. P. Dom Ursmer Beurlière Bénédictin de l'abbaye de Maredsous, Tome premier. Maredsous, 1894; 8°, pp. 324.

³*Anecdota Maredsolana*, vol. I., *Liber Comicus sive Lectionarius Missae quo Toletana Ecclesia ante annos mille et ducentos utebatur* edidit D. Germanus Morin presbyter et monachus ordinis S. Benedicti e congregatione Beuronensi. Maredsoli in Monasterio S. Benedicti 1893; 8°, pp. 462.

⁴*Anecdota Maredsolana*, vol. II. *Sancti Clementis Romani ad Corinthios Epistolae versio latina antiquissima*, edidit D. Germanus Morin presbyter et monachus Ord. Benedicti, 1894; 8°, pp. 75.

⁵*Anecdota Maredsalana*, vol. III., pars I. *Sancti Hieronymi Presbyteri qui deperditi, hactenus putabantur commentarioli in psalmos*, edidit, commentariis instruxit, prolegomena et indices adjecit, D. Germanus Morin, presbyter et monachus Ord. S. Benedicti, Maredsolensis, 1895; 8°, pp. 114.

⁶*Revue Bénédictine*, Maredsous, 13 vols., 1883-1896.

where the best traditions of monastic studies have been again revived with honor. It need not therefore surprise us that Leo XIII. applied to this brotherhood for a man to whom he might entrust the government of the new Bénédictine College of St. Anselm, that when he desired to bind the various corporations of the great Benedictine Order in a solid federation he applied to Maredsous, and received from there Dom Hildebrand de Hemptine, who was made Abbot Primate of the Order under the new constitution, or that his attempt to plant in Brazil the family of St. Benedict was entrusted to a monk of Maredsous, Dom Gerard van Caloen, who governs the monastic colony of Olinda.

We rejoice to see the ancient Order of St. Benedict putting forth such fruits of gladness and utility. The world is its debtor as it never has been to any other society of men. But above all the world of letters owes it incalculable gratitude, since in a long night of war and transition and ignorance it kept trimmed the lamp of mental culture and preserved the best traditions of the ancients, while it healed the ills of a rude imperfect society and kept alive the useful and domestic arts. We rejoice that the traditions of the Maurine editors of the Fathers are flourishing anew, and we follow with deep interest the development of a school that promises to prepare for us new Mabillons and Montfaucons, new Martènes, Ruinarts and D'Achéry's, in other words to lift again the ecclesiastical sciences to the brilliant plane they occupied in the life of the seventeenth century.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Sacred Scripture.

The Life and Times of Jesus the Messias. By Alfred Edersheim, in 2 vols., new American edition. New York: E. R. Herrick & Co.

Although this publication is by no means a recent one, and has already been reviewed in several periodicals, yet the appearance of a new American edition may not be an unsuitable occasion for a few words of criticism.

The author is a divine of the Church of England and a convert from the Jewish faith. As a Christian he writes of his sublime subject with strong and touching faith. The prejudices, however, of Protestant theology show forth here and there throughout the work and mar its correctness. We do not, however, lay great stress on this point, since the author's obsolete errors are not of his own invention, and are easily detected by that class of Catholic readers into whose hands this book is likely to fall.

As a Jewish convert, Dr. Edersheim treats his matter in a masterly fashion; and his method is wholly different from that of previous writers on the Life of Christ. No Life of Christ can be exactly a biography of our Lord; for, as our author well remarks, "to take the lowest view of it, the materials for it do not exist." Most books bearing that title not only contain what we may know of the Life of Christ from the Gospel narrative, but are swelled to large proportions by poetical, philosophical, theological and mystical discussions of the various aspects of the life of the God-man. Such works derive their special value and importance from the piety or erudition of the writer. Dr. Edersheim departs entirely from this plan. Most of the information which his work contains is borrowed from Jewish antiquities with which he is evidently much more familiar than any of his predecessors. It appeared to him that this method of his, when followed out properly, would best illustrate the Gospel narrative, for it shows us the real social phases of Christ's life. It teaches us the Jewish habits

of thought, speech, and action, which must form not only the frame in which the picture of our Lord is set, but also the background on which the scenes of His life are cast. This method, moreover, well vindicates the Gospel narrative, since it represents Jesus as a Jew speaking to Jews. Yet He speaks not as one of them, not even as their best and most learned teachers would have spoken. Given, therefore, this profound divergence of spirit compatible enough with similarity of form, the all-important question arises: "Whence did the Teacher of Nazareth, or, shall we say, the humble child of the carpenter-home, in a far-off village of Galilee, draw His inspiration?" That such a method does not lack dangers is evident to anyone who remembers that most of the rabbinical works were written at a much later period than our Lord's lifetime. The author seems to have borne this well in mind, for, unlike many of his predecessors less conversant with Jewish tradition, he has not fallen into any flagrant anachronisms. Although Dr. Edersheim has made such a generous use of rabbinical literature, he has not neglected the many learned productions of Christian writers. On the margins of the pages are found references to nearly every work of note which the diligent student of the Life of Christ may care to read. After all, though we may admire the skill and respect the motives of the numberless authors of modern Lives of Christ, it remains true that the secrets of that admirable existence are yet, and always will be, in the keeping of the society He founded and to which He committed with His teachings the care and solicitude for His divine person, and the proper intelligence of His acts and their motives.

Answer to Difficulties of the Bible, by Rev. John Thein, Priest of the Cleveland Diocese, Author of *Christian Anthropology*. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897; 8° pp. 628. By mail, \$1.95.

From the more special works of Jaugey, Vigouroux, Meignan and others, Fr. Thein has compiled a useful apologetic volume in defense of the Old and New Testament. Such writings are always in order, because of the perpetual novelty of the objections urged against the Word of God,—a novelty after all that is only seeming, since many of these same objections

are as old as the days of Celsus and Porphyry. The works of Veith and of P. Franco have yet much value, but every nation, every language, requires a special treatment of such matters in keeping with its own temper and genius. We rejoice to see so solid a volume from the pen of a diocesan priest, who rightly calls attention to the "pressure of various pastoral duties" as an excuse for some possible shortcomings. There are several errors of punctuation; the proof-reader has often been found napping; the style is occasionally too familiar and colloquial,—but the deficiencies need not blind us to the merits of a book that is evidently meant more for popular use than for the instruction of advanced students of scripture.

Theology.

"His Divine Majesty," or The Living God. By William Humphrey, S. J. London: Thomas Baker, 1897. Price, 6-6.

This is a volume of some 440 pages on the existence, nature and attributes of God. The author states in the preface that this work is nothing else than a transcription of the notes taken in class from the two well-known professors of the Gregorian university at Rome, Franzelin and Palmieri. He hopes that the writings of his old masters in an English dress may serve to declare that Divine Being whom it has latterly become fashionable to look upon as the great Unknowable. The actuality of the topics discussed, the extensive literature circulated at present concerning the ultimate problems of science and philosophy, the crude idea of God's identity with the forces and matter of the universe, intensify the natural interest in any work which essays to throw light on the greatest of all subjects—God; and Father Humphrey has done well in singling out the all-important question of God's existence and nature as the object of his endeavors.

The present volume, which we are here reviewing, contains much that is valuable and abounds in clearly defined principles which are so many avenues of escape from the meshes of false philosophies and latter-day reasonings concerning the nature and attributes of God. It will serve to define positions which are, and have been, grotesquely misrepresented and cannot fail to impress the painstaking reader with a realizing sense

of the beauties inherent in the idea of a God who is not a part of the universe, nor yet a power in continuous development, but an infinite sea of existence and perfection. Father Humphrey's name is not unfamiliar to Catholic readers who remember with pleasure and profit his "Conscience and Law," which is an excellent summary of ethical definitions and principles.

This volume, however, is open to much criticism. However deferential one may feel towards the reasons which the author adduces in defense of the title which he has chosen for this work, the associations called up by the phrase "His Divine Majesty," are commonplace, to say the least, in our vernacular. In the Latin tongue or those which are kindred to it in genius and origin, a title such as this would serve a most reverential purpose. But it is hard to see what there is to be gained from its employment in a language whose very associations defeat the object for which it was intended. Again, such a phrase as "the human soul of God" (page 56), even when applied to Christ, is harsh sounding and theologically incorrect. It violates the theological rules laid down for the "*communicatio idiomatum*," and theologians invariably speak of "*anima Christi*," and not "*anima Dei*." In addition, some of the direct renderings of the scholastic terminology into English, destroy the force of the original. Instead of saying (page 265) that "angels can also be moved by local motion," why not say "angels can move with local motion?" "Moveri" is not always used in a passive sense. One is not prepared to meet with sentences such as these: "Angels" (page 264) "are, however, in a place, in the sense that when they are in *this* place, they are not in *that* place; when they are *here*, they are not *there*." "Man consists of two substances, flesh and spirit" (page 321). Flesh is not divided against spirit, but against blood, neither of which, philosophically speaking, may be denoted as substances. Furthermore, the author characterizes the possibility of the existence of the created universe from eternity as a chimerical idea, intrinsically involving contradiction (page 257). This is a question which St. Thomas left open, and although the fact of creation in time is beyond all gainsaying, it seems too much to dismiss the possibility of an

eternal creation with the single remark that it is "a confusion of mind between the indefinite and the infinite." This statement of the author is all the more surprising as he is using the very same definitions which St. Thomas employed in the discussion of this question.

The author has marred his work by the heavy and difficult terminology which he has taken no pains to translate into modern speech. Where so many pages presuppose for their proper understanding a knowledge of the Latin terms and the genius of their formation, we fear that the sublime drift of the author's meaning will be lost on many readers. This is all the more regrettable, as there is at present among the English-speaking people, unfamiliar as they are with scholastic thought in Latin, a manifest desire to learn more of those great truths with which every page of Catholic theology and philosophy is replete; which, however, they cannot but fail to appreciate from the very nature of the case, unless the lesson is written in a language the full force of which they are prepared to grasp and understand.

St. Paulus und St. Jacobus über die Rechtfertigung. Von Dr. Bernhard Bartmann, Religionslehrer in Dortmund. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.

This volume forms a part of the "Biblische Studien," which many noted Catholic professors in Germany are engaged in publishing. It deals with the question of justification and is a critical study of the texts touching this point in the epistles of St. Paul and St. James. The controversy between Catholics and Protestants as to the relation between faith and good works, which has been heightened of late owing to the extensive prosecution of biblical studies in Germany, affords the author a good field for research. The opinions of the Fathers, the practice of the apostles in their first missionary journeyings; the nature of faith and good works on the one hand, and their interrelations on the other; the correction which St. James makes of false impressions entertained by the Romans as to the drift of St. Paul's teaching in his celebrated epistle to them, as well as a comparative study of the views of St. Paul and St. James, form the topics discussed in as many chapters throughout this work of Dr. Bartmann.

The author has taken into account the most pertinent views for and against the Catholic position, and displays a wide erudition which he cogently supplements by a series of painstaking analyses. The attitude of St. Paul towards the works of the Old Law is minutely portrayed as one of exclusion, and there can be no doubt in the mind of the reader who pays due attention to the author's line of argument, that St. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, is excluding the works of the Old Law as a part of the Christian dispensation. The counter-view that St. Paul is here engaged in an elaborate denial of the necessity of good works in any scheme of salvation, old or new, is without warrant, either in the text or purpose of the epistle. There are many interesting passages on the nature of Christian Faith and Love in which the latter appears as the soul of the former, and, therefore, a requisite for justification. The inconsistency of admitting charity as necessary for the keeping of faith, while at the same time excluding it as one of the requisite prime factors in justification, is clearly pointed out. The texts upon which so much stress is laid, such as the "just man liveth by faith" and such like, are merely affirmative. The burden of proof is upon those who would make these texts exclusive; in attempting which they would nullify the principles of hermeneutics.

This volume is one which will repay diligent study. The notion of justification by faith alone vanishes into a mist of feeling when one has grasped the author's force of reasoning and detailed explanation of the Scripture texts. To those who would like to have a careful sifting of the arguments bearing on either side of this controversy, and who would wish to judge of the question by its merits, as well as the merits of the debate, this book will prove most satisfactory. There is a fair sprinkling of the old views with the new, and the strength of the patristic and Catholic view of justification comes out unimpaired from latter-day criticism. The work is not apologetic, but direct, critical, and searching.

Institutiones Theologiae de Sacramentis Ecclesiae. Auctore Ioanne Bapt. Sasse, S. J. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1897. \$2.90.

The Sacraments of the Church have always been a matter of much study, and there is an abundant literature on the sub-

ject, both patristic and scholastic, which must perforce be treated in any volume that deals with these sacred things. Man's double nature, his dependence on eternal stimuli for thoughts even of the Creator, the sensible signs in which he expresses his most abstract ideas, mark the path of his history, and bring out into relief the divine condescension to deal with him after the manner of his nature. Some there are who reason concerning man as if he stood out of all relation with the things of sense. They fail to see the perfect fitness of a divine economy which reaches man's innermost self through the ordinary channels of the sensible, as is indeed the way our nature would indicate,—the very lines along which it is suitably developed. To such as these the Sacraments are meaningless, because they fail to realize the great fact that what begins with sense is consummated in the spirit and what is sensibly a sign produces spiritually what it signifies externally. Housed in a tenement of clay, the human soul expresses its most spiritual conceptions in a language of the senses and what wonder that God in His mercy should choose symbols of sense to effect the double purpose of producing grace in the soul as well as a profound impression on the individual recipient, who is made to realize through striking sense-analogies, the hidden work which is being done within him. The fault with many nowadays is that they first construct an arbitrary way of looking at things and then withhold assent from whatever does not square with their position. They color the glass and become unconscious of its coloring.

The present volume of nearly 600 pages deals with the nature and necessity of sacraments in general; develops the difference between the sacraments of the old and those of the new dispensation, and then proceeds to treat singly each of the seven sacraments instituted by Christ. The volume abounds with positive historical and controversial information as well as detailed philosophic reasoning. The divisions are clear and complete and there is scarcely any pertinent scholastic question of moment omitted. The author holds that the sacraments of the New Law are only moral causes of grace and dissents from the view that they are real physical causes.

He does so, however, in a critical spirit and has taken the pains to collect many relevant passages from the older writers. In treating of the Eucharist, for some reason not stated, he narrows down the views respecting the terminus of transubstantiation (p. 398) to those of "adduction and production." This is not a full statement of the case. There is another view exposed by Cajetan which is entitled, at least, to the benefit of consideration. The notion and nature of the sacrifice of the Mass are well presented towards the close of the volume and cannot fail to impress the student with the author's minutely critical method. He supplements this exposition by a number of very practical and valuable principles.

The author has effected a very orderly combination of the speculative and positive methods, which makes this work of value and interest to students and professors. Occasionally one meets with a philological excursus like that on page 316 which is read and remembered with profit. In addition, the style is exceptionally good and well sustained throughout. If externals be a matter worthy of note, this volume is tastily put together and its unique binding cannot fail to please the artistic sense.

Philosophy.

Die Jenseitshoffnungen der Griechen und Roemer nach den Sepulcralinschriften,
 Von Carl Maria Kaufmann; Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau; B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897. 8°, pp. 85.

The conclusion of the great scholar Ernst von Lasaulx in his researches concerning the belief of the Greeks as to the value of life was a disheartening one. From Homer to the last of the Alexandrine poets there is a common consent that it is full of misery, and that man walks forever beside an abyss of darkness. The author of the thesis above cited contests the accuracy of Lasaulx's statement, and maintains that the epigraphic remains of the Greeks and Romans, as well as their iconographic and plastic monuments, show the very early existence and the permanence of belief in a "*vita beata*," a future life of bliss and immortality. Though the most ancient Greek inscriptions from the seventh to the fourth century B. C. are almost utterly silent as to the future life, our author ascribes

this fact to the absolute fixity of the popular belief that never thought of questioning it. Otherwise there would be a chasm between the sepulchre-cultus of Mycenæ and the archaic Athenian Dipylon *tituli*. The proclamation on these epitaphs of the virtues of the deceased and the scenes of departure for the other world seem also to hint strongly at belief in a realm of bliss. From the third to the first century B. C. we meet on the epitaphs with incipient insecurity and doubt, while in the four centuries after Christ the pagan epitaphs furnish a bewildering variation of doubt, denial, and firm hope. Very interesting are the possible influences of Christian teaching after Marcus Aurelius on the language of the Roman epitaphs,—spirits appearing to guide the soul into Elysium, an echo of the “*Communio Sanctorum*,” and the motif of more than one fresco in the catacombs. Thus—

Me sancta Venus sedes non nosse silentum

Jussit et in Caeli lucida templa tulit, (C. I. L. VI., 21521).

Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion was surely not unlike the view, expressed in the following line of a Roman epitaph (C. I. L. VI., 15546):—

Nil est miserum quam totam perdere vitam

Nec vitæ nasci . . .

or in this Greek epitaph that pronounces Hades and Charon mere fables, and death the end of all :

οὐκ ἔστ' ἐν Αἴδου πλοῖον', οὐ προθμεύς χάρων.

οὐκ Ἀιακὸς κλειδοῦχος, οὐχὶ Κέρβερος κύων,

ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες οἱ κάτω τεθνηκότες

ὅστέα τέφρα τε γεγόναμεν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲ ἔν.

The numerous mysteries of the Greeks and the revival of earlier teachings of Plato and Pythagoras contributed to keep alive among the pagans a belief in a future life of happiness in the “Isles of the Blessed” or beyond the ocean, or among the heroes and the gods of old. But cynicism and despair were everywhere eating out the heart of this venerable belief which the scandal of their national humiliations had led the Greeks to abandon almost entirely. We must say that a careful perusal of this otherwise well-executed study has not convinced us that Lasaulx was very far wide of the truth in his judgment on the old Greek faith in blissful immortality.

Dante and Catholic Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century. By Frederick Ozanam ; translated from the French by Lucia D. Pychowska. New York, 1897. The Cathedral Library Association ; 8°, pp. 507.

There is no need to recommend the original study of Ozanam on Dante and Catholic Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century. It ranked at once as a classic exposition of the true spirit and principles of the great poet. The latter has henceforth his place between St. Thomas and the Gothic architecture. As in the latter the mediæval love of order and justice broke out in the great symphonies of granite and marble that the world yet admires, so in Dante the solid framework of reasoning built by St. Thomas was ornamented with all the charms of the most sublime poetry, of a grave and quasi-celestial music that haunts forever the ears and mind of the listener.

In Dante the spirit of the Rue de la Fouarre and that of the Abbey of St. Victor are allied. In his immortal work the aspirations of the mystic are voiced in philosophical language of a faultless correction. The theologians compelled Dante to write his admirable Credo ; but no philosopher of the Middle Ages ever called in question the technical dialectic skill of the man who wrote the most wonderful of didactic epics, nor his formulations of the doctrine of the Angel of the Schools.

If there is to be a revival of scholasticism, Dante will have no small share in the honor. Naturally he appeals to the educated lay world as no Latin-speaking ecclesiastic ever can. As the boatmen of Venice solve all the riddles of life with a snatch from Tasso, so does it come natural to close any line of scholastic thought with one of those grand *terzine* whose authority seems to fall about us in a shower of melody and grace. *Nihil quod tetigit non ornavit.*

The Cathedral Library Association deserves great credit for bringing out this volume. It is a pity that so minute a type should have been used, but in another edition that defect can be easily remedied. There is also wanting an index, something inexcusable in a book of such solid value, and where more than once the same ideas receive a varied treatment. Apart from these defects, the book is highly commendable, and should be in the hands of every lover of the history of philosophy, and of the history of great institutions in general, for apart from the philosophy which governed their actions

and through which they looked on the world about them the men and women of the Middle Ages will be forever unintelligible to us.

Ontologia: Metaphysica Generalis. Auctore P. Carolo Delmas, S. J. Parisiis: Victor Retaux. 1896.

This is a compact volume of some 850 pages, treating the fundamental notions that underlie the science of metaphysics. The author follows the divisions usual with scholastic philosophers in works of this kind, and deals exhaustively with the subject-matter at issue. There are many good points in this treatise worthy of special mention. The whole field of general metaphysics is distinctly divided from the outset, and the points under discussion as well as the conclusions brought out in the course of the author's reasoning, are relieved in larger type, which facilitates the study of an already difficult subject and serve to mark the progress which the student is making from point to point in its perusal. The treatment of the notion, nature and divisions of Being is minute and exhaustive. The author is not afraid to quote an abundant literature, and enforce the worth of his conclusions from counter-considerations. This is especially commendable, as it enables students to realize how well the old philosophy of Being holds its own with the newer, vaguer, and more complex notions which serve as prop and pillar to the pantheist or, as he is now more fashionably called, the cosmic theist. If there be anything in the philosophy of St. Thomas which is capable of the best results in the minds of thinkers who have once grasped the secrets of his method, it is the Angelic Doctor's explanation of that most universal and indeterminate of concepts—the concept of Being. The avenues of escape from pantheism and idealism are made clear to those who would avoid the indignities of the one and the consequences of the other.

Had the author, however, brightened his treatise by a fuller portrayal of modern views, and instead of merely exposing these latter as so many points out of touch with his own, instituted a comparative criticism of their objective worth, he would have accomplished his purpose more directly and established his position more convincingly. The tenets of Hume,

Locke, and others, concerning the nature of causality would have been more easily disestablished, had they been attacked directly. The notion of productive causality suffers when the insufficiency of Hume's view is allowed to pass as a mere matter of inference, without being disproved directly by a criticism of Hume's dogmatic limitation of the sources of knowledge to sensation and reflexion. The latter is certainly a better method of refutation than the one adopted by the author. It strengthens the old idea and criticizes the newer notion of empirical antecedent on the very grounds and principles which its advocates claim for it.

The author's quoting of St. Thomas as in favor of the virtual distinction between essence and existence is shifting. He tries to explain away his meaning (pp. 215-220) by showing how the words of St. Thomas may be interpreted in a narrower sense. This, we take it, is a makeshift. The question in debate is not how the doctrine of St. Thomas may be reconciled with the author's point of view, but what the Angelic Doctor really held on the point at issue. The history of this much mooted question is proof sufficient that he stood for the real distinction. His most ardent disciples conceded it when they argued in favor of his view against those who held the contrary, and De Maria has well summed up the entire controversy in his "*Philosophia Scholastica*." Whatever the merits of these opposing tenets, the question as to what St. Thomas held should not be made one of possible interpretation, but of consistent exegesis and historic fact.

The author's divisions are clear, and though there is nothing new in his exposition, we feel that professors and students will find here, solidly compacted together, the fruit of years of teaching.

History.

Die Thaetigkeit und Stellung der Cardinaele bis Papst Bonifaz VIII., historisch canonistisch untersucht und dargestellt von Dr. J. B. Saegmueller, professor an der Universitaet Tuebingen. Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau; B. Herder, St. Louis, 8°, pp. 262. \$1.80.

For the first time we possess a scientific study on the evolution of the cardinalitial office. Countless volumes have been written on it from many viewpoints, but none has so happily pictured the genetic process by which was formed the powerful senate of the Roman Church. It is a theme that might tempt any historian, whether we consider the multitude of the materials, the greatness of the interests, situations and passions involved, the deep institutional questions that present themselves, or the dramatic splendor of the long genesis affected at every great turn in the world's history by new and unknown influences, that now hem in, now mightily develop the activities of this extraordinary council of men. No story of the Amphictyons or the Areopagus, not even the magnificent panorama of the Senate of the Roman Republic, can so fascinate the student, for it gathers in its wide sweep all interests,—spiritual, temporal and mixed,—all lands, cultured or barbarian, the Old World and the New, and it covers as long a time as the story of the Papacy itself.

The unbroken self-consciousness of the latter institution finds nowhere so vivid and tangible an expression as in the history of the College of Cardinals, at once its official counsellor and its executive arm, the protector of its permanent interests—its eye, hand, and brain. We recommend this admirable study to our readers. It is based on the Papal registers, not only of Jaffé and his later editors, and of Potthast, but also on those of the thirteenth century published by the French School at Rome and by others. The labors of Phillips, Hinschius, Hefele-Knoepfler, Thiel, Duchesne, Gregorovius, Denifle, Fabre, various writers in the second edition of Wetzer and Welte's *Kirchenlexikon*, and the results of a number of special studies on matters relative to the main issue, have been incorporated into this work with a patience and a sagacity that deserve all credit. The study is divided into two parts—the range of the cardinalitial activity in history, and the relative office or position of the Cardinals. The first part is again

subdivided into two sections, the first of which treats in detail of the development of the Cardinalate, *sede plena*, to the death of Boniface VIII. (1303); the second treats of their administration of the Church, *sede vacante*, within the same limits. The small volume of the study ought not to deceive the reader, for it leaves untouched scarcely any of the many questions, constitutional or otherwise, that come up for treatment, and it may be read with profit as an extension of the History of the Councils by Hefele, as a preparation to Pastor's History of the Popes, or as a historical commentary to certain portions of the "*Corpus Juris Canonici*."

Jahrbuecher der Christlichen Kirche unter dem Kaiser Theodosius dem Grossen.
 Versuch einer Erneuerung der *Annales Ecclesiastici* des Baronius fuer die Jahre 378-395, von Gerhard Rauschen, Doctor der Theologie und Philosophie, Ober und Religionslehrer am Kgl. Gynnasium zu Bonn. Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897. Pages xvii-609; \$4.00.

There is something so natural and satisfactory in the annalistic form of history that men return to it with pleasure, even after all the success and prestige of philosophical and institutional history. Take, for instance, the scholarly "*Annals of the German Empire*," now in progress of execution, and in which the results of a century of criticism are finally embodied. Dr. Rauschen has undertaken a revision of the "*Annals of Baronius for the years 378-395, or the period of the reign of Theodosius the Great*." To begin with, the events of each year are narrated with more order than in Baronius, being arranged under eight rubrics: emperors, imperial magistrates, religious and profane legislation, councils, fathers of the church, prominent bishops and heretics. Thus, all that is pertinent, in any year, to any of these rubrics, may be found at a glance. The period is one of the most important in church history. The relations of the Church and State, the codification and modification of the Roman law, the gradual suppression of paganism, the details of the civil service of the empire, the chronology of the councils and of the literary history of the Christian Church, are very grave items of historical study, and furnish the staple subjects of this important volume. Besides the corrections and additions of Pagi, Tillemont, Hefele, and other critics of Baronius, Dr. Rauschen has worked into this volume the best

results of the general works on the last days of the Western Empire, like Richter, Gueldenpfennig, and Ilfland, and of special studies on the Christian fathers such as have appeared from Foerster and Ihm on St. Ambrose, Zoeckler on St. Jerome, Ullmann and Draeseke on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Rade on St. Damasus, Ribbeck on St. Augustine, and several others.

The criticism of Baronius bears really on the sources or authorities used by the great annalist, and in his introduction Dr. Rauschen has some well-weighed pages on these authorities, notably on Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret, to which must be added his remarks on the heathen writers Zosimus and Eunapius, and on the difficult but indispensable *Chronica Minora* (*Fasti Idatiani*, *Anonymus Cuspiniani*, *Chronicon Paschale*, etc.) into which, during the fifth century, there passed no small share of the Imperial Annals of Ravenna now lost to us.

Occasionally the annalistic style is capable of much warmth and coloring by the skilful juxtaposition of facts and statements. The revolt of Antioch (pp. 255-266), the destruction of the Serapeum at Alexandria (pp. 301-303), the massacre of Thessalonica (pp. 317-322), are examples of the nervous eloquence to which the annalist may at times arise.

Within this brief period our author has found a multitude of nice questions of chronology, on which he has exercised his critical skill, very often with praiseworthy success, *e. g.*, the date of the Council of Rome in 378, the date of the *Peregrinatio Sylviæ*, of the death of St. Basil the Great. From the Code of Justinian (xi. 7, 4) he draws a conclusive proof that Illyricum was not divided into East and West in 379, since as late as 386 it was all under one jurisdiction. Of great importance to all scientific theologians and ecclesiastical historians are his excursus on the Creed of the Mass, which he does not admit to be identical with the Creed of Constantinople of 381, on the date of the origin of the papal vicariate of Thessalonica, on the possible Christianity of the court poet Claudian, and on the abolition of the office of public *poenitentiarius* at Constantinople by the patriarch Nectarius (Socrates, v. 19 ; Sozomen, vii., 16).

No teacher of early Church history can afford to be with-

out this valuable contribution to the history of the first century of triumphant Christianity, and no student of the Fathers can fail to take a deep interest in the critical treatment of the writings of St. Ambrose and St. Chrysostom, and in the lengthy study of the latter as a popular preacher (pp. 495-429, 565-574). The book, with its future continuations, deserves place in every public or private library that finds use for the "Annals of Baronius."

Sainte Clotilde. Par G. Kurth, Professeur à l'Université de Liège. Victor Lecoffre, Paris, 1897. 8°, pp. 180.

Professor Kurth has given us in this charming little volume a resumé of what can be known with moral certainty or probability concerning the life of Saint Clotilde, the wife of the great Clovis whose conversion in 496 brought to the support of orthodox Western Christianity the prestige of the victorious nation of the Franks, and ended the supremacy of Gothic and Burgundian Arianism. The style of the narrative is at once picturesque and clear, and the author has understood how to fill in with contemporary portraits and sketches the numerous *hiatus* that the life of this interesting saint offers us. Surely no one was better able to undertake the life of Saint Clotilde than the gifted author of the "Histoire Poétique des Mérovingiens. St. Gregory of Tours, and such continuators of his "History of the Franks" as Fredegarius, have left us pictures of Saint Clotilde that were only too evidently based on legends of pagan barbarian origin. These non-Christian elements in her life have been eliminated by the sure criticism of M. Kurth, and we have to thank him for a task not unlike the cleaning of a palimpsest, or that process which restores to us on one day the portrait of Dante on the walls of the Bargello, and on another the outline of some noble fresco of Giotto.

The book is the first in a series of "Les Saints," brought out by Lecoffre, at Paris, under the direction of M. Henry Joly, who is himself to write for the series a volume on "The Psychology of the Saints." The collaborateurs are selected from among the best known Catholic savants of France, both lay and clerical, and the program of the enterprise sets forth with reason that "it is time to write the lives of the saints in a

spirit at once more critical, literary, historical, and social than has hitherto been obtained. Hence, it is intended to present to the reader saints who have not only edified the faithful, but have also exercised a visible influence on civilization, manners, ideas, philosophy, literature, and the arts. The mere grouping of these narratives would tend to destroy the senseless prejudices that would separate the best things in humanity—religion and the normal evolution of our nature—hold useful activity as incompatible with the profound development of the spiritual life, and exaggerate the differences (too often real, but nowise necessary), that distinguish the great man properly so-called from the saint."

These are the ideas of the Bollandists, and even before their time were forcibly expressed by the great theologian Melchior Canus, and by the humanist and educator Ludovicus Vivès.

Saint Augustin. Par Ad. Hatzfeld. Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1897.

It is always a pleasure to take up a book which is charmingly written and free from the least approach to exaggeration or extravagance. We are made to feel that the author is not a hero-worshipper but a scholar who knows the value of facts and desires to set them before us in a style which is critical without being heavy, pleasing without being overdrawn or fanciful. The life of St. Augustine is one that the Christian soul shall never tire of knowing. In it we may see the various phases of belief realized one after the other until the fulness of Christian truth rounds out a character that was as restless as a bird of passage. The brilliancy of mind which marked off the young African from his compeers; the struggles of head and heart to find satisfactory solutions for the problem of existence in Manicheanism and Neo-Platonism; the dawning of a better day when the first light of Christian truth was seen to break through Paul's epistles; and finally, the abandonment of the rubbish of pagan notions and a career of evil for the yoke that is sweet and the burden that is light, endear the name of Augustine to the Christian, who sees in him a striking illustration of what the truth of God accomplishes in a noble soul. The author bears us on from point to point with unflagging interest and guarantees every statement which he

makes by constant reference to Augustine himself in those many writings which he has left us as an enduring picture of his soul's impressions. The first ninety pages portray the life and experiences of Augustine: the last ninety are concerned with his theology and philosophy. An extensive bibliography closes the author's work on his illustrious subject and acquaints the reader with many standard writings in which, if he be so inclined, he may learn more of the philosopher, theologian, bishop and Father of the Church.

We heartily recommend this volume. Our reasons for so doing may be expressed in the words of Fénelon: "The true means of making a portrait which shall be really a likeness is to depict the complete man: to put him before the eyes of the hearers, as he spoke and as he labored. In recounting the course of his life, it is quite right to bring into the foreground those parts of it in which his natural virtues, as the graces bestowed upon him, more manifestly appear; yet something must be left for the mind and imagination of the hearer to fix upon. The best means of praising a saint is to relate his praiseworthy actions. It is this which bestows solidity and strength to a eulogy; which instructs and impresses the hearer." We might add to this: avoid extravagance and keep within the bounds of historical sources. All this the author has done, most creditably producing a work which may be read with pleasure and profit. While recommending this life of Augustine, we wish also to recall to mind the honored publishing-house of Lecoffre, which has accomplished so much for the spread of Catholic literature and which is continuing its excellent work in a series entitled "*Les Saints*," of which this life of Saint Augustine is a most praiseworthy beginning.

The Life of Father Charles Perraud. By Augustin Largent, Priest of the Oratory, Professor of Apologetics at Paris. New York: The Cathedral Library Association, 1896. 8°, pp. 97.

The introduction to this work, written by Cardinal Gibbons, tells us that it relates the "life of one who may well serve as a model to the parish priest, the pulpit orator, the director of souls, the leader of men." Father Charles Perraud (1831-1892), the disciple of Père Gaty and Lacordaire, and the friend of

Henry Perreyve, was one of the most striking figures in the Catholic France of the second half of our century. As preacher and apologist his sermons and conferences won him wide renown. His zeal and eloquence made him favorably known to a multitude of souls outside of France but who were deeply affected by the great religious currents in Catholicism that so habitually rise in France, to spread thence over the whole world. It was a happy thought to provide by an English translation a wider public for these instructive pages. One excellent paragraph we copy from page 50: "Charles Perraud loved men. He loved by preference the lowly, the poor, those whom the juridical language of Rome called disdainfully '*humiliores*.' He wished to make it evident to all that Christianity, full and entire, that Catholicism, which has the promises of the life to come, has also those of the life that is; that Catholicism is the essential and solid foundation of individual happiness and social prosperity; that it answers to all legitimate aspirations of the reason and heart of men; and that far from impeding progress, it helps it on in every direction."

English Literature.

Dumb in June. By Richard Burton; Boston: Copeland & Day, 1896.

A confirmed habit with the modern critic is to speak of a "poet's place." Now, no poet has any place outside the hearts he has taught to love him until he dies. There are many hearts that love Richard Burton's poetry, and his little book will be welcomed by them. Whatever Mr. Burton's place may eventually be, he has the singing gift, the quality of taste, and, above all, insight into the moods of the mind and the tenderest sympathy with men and nature. "Dumb in June"—a title which is inappropriate in the mouth of a poet who is so delightfully articulate in all seasons—names the book. In it Mr. Burton shows how musically the varied ode movement may be used. He spoils some fine lines by "archaisms" similar to those for which William Morris's, "The Earthly Paradise," set the fashion. "Across the Fields to Anne" will always give genuine pleasure to those who have trodden the footpaths to Shottery with the Shakespearean glamour upon them. "Of One

Afflicted with Deafness," is the sweetest and most touching poem in the volume.

"Realists" and "Masks," fine sonnets, are of the mind and heart; he reaches the fundamentals in life, which is much at a time when the poet is tempted in his search after the original, to achieve only the audacious. "Dumb in June" is a vital book. Whether Mr. Burton writes another or not, one is enough to stamp him as a poet of high talent.

English Prose. Selections with Critical Introductions by various writers, and General Introductions to every Period. Edited by Henry Craik. New York: The Macmillan, 1897.

It is natural enough for men who have attained a mastery of books to look down upon the compilers of "selections." And it is natural enough for compilers to take their work less seriously because they are "only" compilers. Neither of these positions will stand the test of reason or experience. Thomas Humphrey Ward's "English Poets" is of unique value; it is a work of erudition, taste, and intelligence, and Henry Craik's "English Prose" is the only existing companion to it.

"English Prose" is divided into five volumes. It includes the men who began to develop our language and the men who have brought it near to perfection. The last selection is from Robert Louis Stevenson's "Travels with a Donkey," and the pieces, next to this last, are from that over-wrought stylist, Walter Pater. The editor shows his catholicity by his choice of specimens. We are accustomed to have the editors of similar books apologize for Sir Walter Scott, because Sir Walter was never almost pedantic, like De Quincey, nor exceedingly mannered, like Pater, nor somewhat artificial, like Stevenson. It is common to sum up Sir Walter's defects of his qualities by saying that he is "no stylist." But Mr. Henry Craik is at once too philosophical and too broad-minded to confound style with the scrupulous care for style merely as style. The true test of style is not a philological test; it is a test of effectiveness. The main question is, has the author produced the effect he intended to produce? It is not a scientific, but an artistic question. In his preface to the fifth volume, the editor gives an illustration of this. Speaking of Scott, he says:

"It is rather in the lighter treatises on every variety of subject, which he contributed anonymously to reviews, that we look for his best writing, and they leave upon us a far higher impression of Scott's power as a writer of prose than do his novels. In the novels our interest is absorbed by qualities that leave us little attention to spare for style, but these articles, poured forth so easily, owing nothing to the commanding interest of drama and of story, without the variety supplied by dialect, or the play of character in dialogue—show how light and easy was Scott's touch, how quickly he could command interest, and they explain how his prose writing was prized and sought for, even when it was in no way associated either with his name or with the half-shadowed personality which he chose to assume in connection with the novels." Style merely as style, words and groups of words were not used by him, as Leonardo da Vinci probably used his fragments after careful analysis. Style to him had not the same meaning as it had to Flaubert and Pater and Stevenson, yet to him, as the editor says, "we can scarcely deny a mastery of words." Mr. Craik's assistants in this work have been admirably chosen, and, what is more, they all write with evident understanding of the very definite plan of the editor. Saintsbury treats "Sir John Mandeville;" Martin Dobson, "Goldsmith;" Gosse, "William Camden;" Minto, "Lord Bacon;" and W. J. Courthope, "Pope." "English Prose" leaves no room for another volume on a similar plan. We trust that the extracts from Landor may revive interest in his "Imaginary Conversations," not at present appreciated at their full value, and we have only one regret—that no piece of Congreve's excellent prose has been given.

The Philosophy of Literature. By Condé B. Pallen, Ph. D., LL. D.

Dr. Pallen, in his preface to the series of lectures arranged under this title, says "no man has a right to publish unless he has a reason for it," and he proves his belief in this by uttering with all his force old truths which he believes need re-statement in a new way. "Literature is the written expression of man's various relations to the universe and the Creator," Dr. Pallen says, and on this definition he founds the main part

of his thesis. He points out that the literature of decadence, reflecting life imperfectly, must be null since it does not accept this definition. "The primal relation to God is the basis of literature, and even when men seem furthest from God, none the less distinctly, but more darkly and awfully does the shadow of their dependence grow." An examination of the literature of naturalism—the attempt to subordinate even art to the methods of Claude Bernard—shows how true Dr. Pallen's statement is and how great is the need for constant emphasis upon it. It is stimulating and refreshing to hear the voice of a poet raised with such a firm, sure sound at a time when, especially among the most acclaimed of the moderns, such as Carducci and Swinburne, Shelley and Byron—whose renaissance is at hand—poetry is of the mood rather than the intellect. Dr. Pallen founds his utterances, when he seeks to express clearly the essence of things, upon Donoso Cortes and M. Ernest Hello, with whom he is evidently much in sympathy. He leaves no room for the doubt that permeates so many works of the poets, from "Hamlet" to "Le Centaure." "Cherchez-vous les dieux, ô Macaire! et d'où sont issus les hommes, les animaux et les principes du feu universel?" cries Maurice de Guérin. Dr. Pallen answers "from Christ," to whom all things looked forward from the beginning and to whom all things will look backward until the end. But he speaks to a world which is in doubt because it loves the sensations and effects of doubt—doubt which is as prismatic as the tint of a stagnant pool. Dr. Pallen's prose expression is very unlike his poetical. It is hard to believe that the somewhat hard and unplastic style of this book comes from the author of certain lovely sonnets which had vogue not so long ago in this country and in England. It is true that the words printed here were written to be spoken rather than read, and that the lecturer addressed himself to an audience that could supply much that was unexpressed.

Dr. Pallen traces all that is high and beautiful back to Divine Love—Love in life that, as he has said, in one of his sonnets,—

" Gives all his strength,

And stronger grows the longer he may live,
Nor can he weary through eternal length
Of years while Love to Love himself may give;
For Love does make of Love immortal life,
And weds unto himself Eternity for wife,"

Natural Sciences.

An Introductory Course of Quantitative Chemical Analysis, with explanatory notes and Stoichiometrical Problems. By Henry P. Talbot, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Analytical Chemistry in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. New York: Macmillan, 1897.

It seems to be a tendency of our modern text-books to present to the student an ever increasing quantity of matter, far beyond his powers of healthy assimilation in the time at his disposal. This defect has been recognized by a few authors in recent years, and several text-books have been produced which deal with a small number of subjects in so thorough a manner that the student acquires a method and habit of study which will endure and enable him thereafter to be his own guide in kindred lines of thought and work.

Talbot's Quantitative Chemical Analysis is just such a book. *Non multa sed multum* is its motto. The subjects for analysis, though few, are so selected as to illustrate the best methods of gravimetric and volumetric determinations, and the working directions and explanations are so complete and concise that careful attention to them cannot fail to inculcate that accuracy of work so essential to scientific habits. Professor Talbot's Quantitative Analysis is an excellent preparation for advanced work in analysis.

A Detailed Course of Qualitative Chemical Analysis of Inorganic Substances. By Alfred A. Noyes, Ph. D., Assistant Professor in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Third revised and enlarged edition. New York: Macmillan, 1897.

This book, like so many other manuals of analytical chemistry, is based on the classic work of Fresenius, but with such modifications as long experience in one of the best of our American laboratories have suggested. One of two defects common to a great number of text-books of quantitative analysis is the tabulating of "schemes." These, though they give the student a certain amount of "analysis made easy", still, in detecting the common elements by a comparison of the physical properties of solution or precipitates obtained, with those indicated in the tables, are of very doubtful value, if not positively injurious as a factor in the student's education, for they confine the exercise of his faculties of observation within very narrow

limits, and form an imperfect and erroneous notion of the science. In this book we will meet with a number of tables, but here they are not given as a working basis, but as outlines to the work, as introductions to a carefully worked out and fully detailed method of procedure, accompanied by copious notes, critical and explanatory, so that the student is not only taught what to do, or what modifications varying conditions necessitate, but—what is of a greater importance—he learns *why* he does so. A very good example of this valuable feature of a text-book is found in the notes on oxidation and reduction—reaction of very great importance in analytical chemistry—which precede the methods for the separation of the metals of the aluminum and iron groups.

The changes introduced in this edition under notice are such as have been suggested by recent researches, and strengthen the book in its position as one of our most excellent manuals of qualitative analysis.

Miscellaneous.

Manual of Hebrew Syntax. By Rev. J. D. Wijnkoop. Translated from the Dutch by Rev. C. Van Den Bissen. London: Luzac & Co., 1897.

Within the compass of 152 octavo pages, the author of this work has presented a fair treatment of Hebrew syntax. The work is not intended to be an original or an exhaustive treatise on this complex subject. The author acknowledges that he has utilized what others have written on the subject; and those who are already familiar with Hebrew syntax will find little in the present work that they have not read elsewhere. The arrangement of the book is thoughtful and systematic; he treats successively the noun, the pronoun, the verb, the particles, and the construction of sentences. The rabbinical bias of the author seems to have induced him to set aside all the results of Textual Criticism, and to adhere steadfastly to the reading of the Hebrew text as determined by the Massorah. The critical study of this text has made much progress in late years. While no one is expected to accept every clever and ingenious emendation that a commentator may see fit to suggest, yet all Hebrew scholars of merit admit that certain passages of the Massoretic text are corrupt, and in consequence

they sanction some correction. Heretofore the attempt was made to explain the faulty construction of these passages by formulating special rules of syntax. But now, with the corrected readings, Hebrew syntax has been simplified in a large measure. The author of the present manual, holding to the traditional reading of the text, has, as a consequence, interspersed his book with many useless rules. To select an instance of this, see on pages 11 and 12 of his book, the explanation given for the Massoretic reading of I. Samuel 9, 24.

The chief merits of the work are its clearness and conciseness. The rules and explanations are intelligible at first reading. He displays rare judgment in the choice of his quotations from the Hebrew text. The English reads so smoothly that one would not suspect that it was a translation. The manual is fitted to give the beginner a comprehensive knowledge of the structural genius of the Hebrew language, and will serve as a good introduction to more exhaustive and more critical treatises.

Leprosy and the Charity of the Church. By Rev. L. W. Mulhane. Chicago: D. H. McBride & Co., 1896. 8°, pp. 155.

This is a popular but very touching historical account of the dread scourge of leprosy in ancient times, the middle ages, and in our own day. The origin and medical treatment are briefly touched on, while the care of lepers, notably by Catholic religious, men and women, is dwelt on in detail. And rightly, for this supreme self-sacrifice is one of the most striking characteristics of the true Church, which has not waited on the slow progress of medical science or philanthropy to pity or care for the most abandoned and repulsive of mankind.

What Christ Revealed. By Rev. L. Jouin, S. J., St. John's College, Fordham, N. Y.

The object of this little brochure of about 100 small octavo pages is accurately set forth in the preface as "a brief but reasoned exposition of the principal doctrines which constitute the faith of a Catholic. It will be of use in the instructions that are given at missions, and will serve as a text-book for colleges and academies." It contains an outline of the teaching of the Church concerning herself, the articles of the Creed and the Sacraments.

Le Travail des Couturières en Chambre et sa réglementation par Hector Lambrechts. Bruxelles : Société Belge de Librairie, 1897, brochure, pp. 110.

M. Lambrechts bases his very instructive study on the "sweating system" on the article of M. Levasseur, "Le Sweating System aux États Unis (*Revue d'Économie Politique*, September-October, 1896). In three chapters he examines the abuses and dangers of this system, chiefly in the case of female workers, the remedies, general and special reforms, and the proper sanctions of any effective legislation. The author is clearly *au courant* of all the latest and best literature of the question, and we commend this comparative study of the cruel sweating system of to-day to the attention of those of our readers who are interested in questions of sociology.

Three Dialogues on Pulpit Eloquence. By Fénelon, translated and illustrated by quotations from modern writers, with an introductory essay, by Samuel J. Eales, M. A., D. C. L., Vicar of Hanfield, Kent. London : Thomas Baker ; Philadelphia : John J. McVey, 1897. 8°, pp. 174.

The Three Dialogues of Fénelon on Pulpit Eloquence remain forever a classic of unapproachable merit. They were written for the instruction of his own priests and seminarians of Cambrai, and so wear a unique air of paternal earnestness, shrewd and accurate observation of clerical manners and foibles, and abundant learning applied to the specific task of perfecting the mind, the heart, and the delivery of the preacher. They deal with false art and brilliancy in the pulpit ; with the object and nature of eloquence in general ; the necessity of proving, portraying and interesting ; with the principles of oratory, the method of learning and the manners of constructing sermons ; with the use of Scripture and the right method of explaining it ; with the substance of preaching, the proper use of the Fathers, the lives of the Saints, history, and the like. Scattered throughout the little volume are admirable pen-pictures of the ancient orators, their strength and their weaknesses, gem-like character-sketches of the great Christian preachers, and profound observations on ecclesiastical life and habits that possess the double charm of truth and piquancy. The translator has done his task well, save for a slipshod sentence here and there, and in the foot-notes he has added many pertinent illustrations from ancient and modern writers on the

pulpit, for which every reader will be thankful to him. Would that we could put into the hands of every aspirant to the priesthood this golden booklet, in which there are mirrored the tender mystic spirit of the great theologian, the fatherly love of the zealous archbishop, the veneration for and intelligence of the ancient classics that make the author of *Telemachus* so unique and influential an educator!

Immortelles of Catholic Columbian Literature. Compiled from the works of American Catholic Women Writers by the Ursulines of New York (illustrated). Chicago : D. H. McBride, 1897. 8°, pp. 625.

A very useful compilation from the writings of some sixty American Catholic women. It brings before us new and old, familiar and unfamiliar pages of a literary character, and makes a large volume of useful selections from modern English prose and poetry. We commend to imitation the industry and the taste of the ladies of the Ursuline community, and bespeak a large sale for the book, which is well printed and artistically bound.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Acknowledgment under this rubric does not preclude further notice.

Style in Composition, Advice to Young Writers, by William Poland, S. J., St. Louis University. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1896 ; 8°, pp. 25. 15 cents.

Formules Utiles d'Arpentage et de Mesurage des Corps, par le R. P. Laurent McCarthy. Bruxelles, Société Belge de Librairie, 1897 ; 8°, pp. 21.

The Catholic Library, New York, Charles Wildermann, 1897; ten volumes (16mo.) of short stories.

La Primauté de St. Joseph d'après l'épiscopat Catholique et la théologie, par C. M. professeur de théologie, Victor Lecoffre, Paris, 1896 ; pp. 513.

Die Chorgesänge im Buche der Psalmen. Ihre Existenz und ihre form nachgewiesen von J. K. Zenner, S. J., in Zwei Theilen. Erster Theil. Prolegomena, Uebersetzung, und Erläuterungen, mit einem Titelbild : Die Sängerkriegen des ersten Tempels nach Kosmas Indicopleustes. Zweiter

Theil., Texte, Freiburg im Brisgau, Herder; B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.

La Prédication, Grands Maîtres et Grandes Lois, par le R. P. G. Longhaye, de la compagnie de Jésus, 2^{ème} édition. Paris: Victor Retaux, 1897; 8°, pp. 553.

The Sacred Heart of Jesus; What it is; What it demands; What it gives. By Rev. Pierre Suau, S. J. Translated from the French by Marie Clotilde Redfern. Philadelphia. H. L. Kilner & Co., 1897; 12mo., pp. 131.

SCIENTIFIC CHRONICLE.

A Recalculation of the Atomic Weights, by Frank Wigglesworth Clarke, Chief Chemist U. S. Geological Survey; Part V., Constants of Nature, from Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collection.—Professor Clarke has given us a remarkable compendium of all the atomic weight work hitherto accomplished, with a most painstaking and careful criticism. Many chemists will, undoubtedly, take exception to some details. To quote from the introduction: "In fact, it is doubtful whether any two chemists, working independently, would handle all the data in precisely the same way, or combine them so as to produce the same final results." But this by no means detracts from the great value of the book, which is very far ahead of anything of the kind, so far attempted, displaying, as it does, very great skill in the treatment and arrangement of the matter. The utmost care has been bestowed upon every detail, and an unusual degree of confidence may be felt in using its statements. The amount of labor required in making and verifying the calculations has been very great, and might well appall any author, but Professor Clarke does not recognize such difficulties in his chosen field. Of course, the work has the inestimable advantage of being up to date, and will at once take its place as the standard reference in this field. The author himself sees most clearly its greatest value, as evidenced in another quotation from the introduction: "The data have been brought together and reduced to common standards, and for each series of figures the probable error has been determined. Therefore, however much my methods of combination may be criticised, I feel that my labors will have been useful. The ground is cleared, in a measure, for future experiments; it is possible to see more distinctly what remains to be done; some clues are furnished as to the relative merits of different series of results." In spite of the unusually increased activity in this field, within the last decade, the present work but more clearly emphasizes the immense amount yet to be done.

A Novel Method of Quarrying is reported to have been introduced in England. Instead of using high-power explosives for the separation of the material, the expansive force developed, when lime is converted into calcium hydrate, is made available for the purpose. The lime is formed into bars of convenient length, with a diameter of about 70 m. m., about an iron core and under a pressure of about 40,000 K. G. The iron core consists of a tube with a longitudinal slit and a number of perforations. The whole is inclosed in a suitable cartridge bag of canvas. The method of using the apparatus is quite as simple. The cartridge is introduced into the hole drilled to receive it, and is closely packed in with clay. Water is then pumped into the core. The lime expands with great force, pressures of 250 atmospheres being reported. The method is said to be cheap, and has a great advantage in being safe.

Injuries from the Use of X-Rays have been reported in a number of cases, and one of especial interest is described by Dr. J. C. Gilchrist in a recent number of the Johns Hopkins Hospital *Bulletin*. The patient was an exhibitor of apparatus for photographing by means of cathode rays, and frequently exposed his own hand. In about three weeks the skin began to redden and puff up, resembling sun-burn, as in the other cases hitherto reported. Soon the inflammation became much augmented, accompanied by severe throbbing and aching. The skin darkened, dried, cracked, and gradually peeled off, making way for new skin. A feature of this case not noted in the ones hitherto reported was a remarkable swelling of the bones, especially at the joints. They were very painful and sore to the touch. The sense of touch was seriously impaired and voluntary motion was lost for some weeks. Objects could not be picked up by the injured hand, unaided, and could be held with but slight force. The nails gradually fell out, making way for new ones. The inflammation disappeared gradually and the injured member is approaching a normal condition. It would seem that some caution is to be observed in working with these rays, especially after a prolonged exposure. The value of the method in making a diagnosis, etc., seems hardly to be affected, to quote from Dr. Gilchrist: "I do not think

that the possibility of injury ought to deter one from using these wonderful rays in surgical work, because only a few have been affected out of thousands who have been exposed to them. By keeping some distance away from the rays, injurious effects will hardly follow their use."

Immunity from Stings.—In a recent communication to *Nature*, Dawson Williams calls attention to some curious phenomena attending insect stings. As has been previously noted, after a certain number of stings from bees have been suffered, comparative immunity is attained. This appears to be the case, also, with an insect known as the myg, in Norway, and called a gnat in England, which resemble much the mosquito. The sensibility of different persons to the attacks of this insect vary much with the individual, yet the fact of gradual immunity seems to be well established. Old residents suffer less than strangers. A curious periodicity in the symptoms which attend the sting is noticed, and the symptoms themselves carefully described. There is a small pimple-like mark, which itches intensely and is very sensitive to heat, and painful sensations, although dulled to the ordinary sensations of touch. These symptoms disappear in a few hours, but reappear again in about twenty-four hours, the recurrence and disappearance being repeated four or five times. Mr. Williams suggests an investigation to determine the cause of this sting, whether toxic or due to a microbe.

Photography in Colors is a problem which has commanded much research since the invention of the art, but with varying success. Since 1860 several processes have been announced, the success of which have been vouched for by competent authorities, but as yet none of them have become so prominent as to make colored photographs common property. In the year just mentioned, E. Becquerel prepared daguerreotype plates by coating them with subchloride of silver, which yielded good colored impressions. Poiteven modified the method by substituting paper for the silver plate used by Becquerel. Unfortunately, in spite of the investigations of Becquerel, Poiteven, Zenker, and many others, no means of fixing these images has been discovered. While they will persist indefinitely in the dark,

exposure to the light, by its continued action on the silver salt, utterly destroys it.

In 1869, Ch. Cros and Ducos du Huron, independently, in France, and Baron Bonstettin in Germany, devised a process which may be briefly described thus: Three separate colorless negatives of the object are prepared in the usual way, but letting the light come through colored screens. From these negatives three positives are prepared which are colored with appropriate dyes, and then by superposition give the desired colored image. Professor Joly has improved the method so as to obtain all three of the images on the same plate. These colors are not, however, truly photographed, and a large degree of arbitrariness enters into the selection of the dyes.

Professor G. Lippmann, in recent numbers of the *Chemical News*, has been describing the method devised by himself and first announced in 1891. It is based upon the well-known phenomena of the interference of waves of light meeting in opposite phases, the results of which are well illustrated in the colored images on soap-bubbles, Newton's rings, etc. A transparent film of any kind made from chloride, bromide, or iodide of silver, contained in a substratum of albumen, collodion, or gelatine, is placed in the camera slide, and a mirror is formed behind it and in contact with the film by allowing mercury to run in from a small reservoir connected with the slide by a rubber tube. After the exposure the mercury is withdrawn by lowering the reservoir, the plate removed and developed and fixed with cyanide or bromide of potassium. Nothing of the usual technique of photography is changed excepting the introduction of the mirror, which reflecting back the light forming through the film, produces interference, and the elimination of certain wave lengths, resulting in the deposition of the silver in a stratified form. The appearance of color is due to this definite stratification, but a detailed technical explanation cannot appropriately be undertaken here.

Within the last few weeks have been announced two more methods. M. Villandieu-Chassagne is the inventor of a process which bears some resemblance to that of Cros, du Huron, and Bonstettin as modified by Joly. Therefore, our caption may be misleading in this sense, that the colors can not ~~

said to be photographed themselves, at least directly, for they are obtained by treating a properly prepared plate with certain solutions of a secret composition, when the colors are brought out.

A negative is produced in the usual manner upon a plate specially prepared by M. Chassagne. A print is then obtained, either on glass or on paper prepared in the same way. This print, which so far exhibits no trace of color, is then treated successively in baths of blue, green, and red solutions, when the various gradations of color and hue are imparted to the print, by what is described as elective absorption. The composition of the four solutions, wherein the success of the process lies, is still withheld by the inventor. Sir H. Trueman Wood, of King's College, England, in the laboratory of that institution, not only witnessed several trials of the method by M. Chassagne, but actually carried out the entire operation himself, excepting the preparation of the solutions, and vouches for its success and reliability, as have other witnesses. It is to be hoped that the process may be speedily patented and the details given to the scientific world.

But even more wonderful, if the accounts are to be credited, is the work of Mr. Bennetto in England. His method is also, as yet, a secret. It is claimed for it that photographs can be taken, with an exposure of sixteen seconds, of any or all combinations of colors, and printed directly upon paper or plate without washing with colored solutions or the use of any auxiliary apparatus. As an illustration of the possibilities of the method, we quote from a notice in a recent issue of *Nature*: "Perhaps the picture which best illustrated the capabilities of the process was one of a champagne bottle standing on a white table cloth, and surrounded with various fruits. Here there were three or four whites, which were all distinguishable, but which it would have taxed the powers of any artist to represent by painting. The gold foil on the bottle was exactly rendered, and it was possible to tell that it was full by the gleam of the liquid."

Here again it is to be regretted that from the apparent necessity for secrecy, to procure patent rights to the discoverer, the world cannot be put in possession of the details by which

these wonderful results are produced, details which, in themselves, must rival in interest the effects through them obtained.

Earliest Record of Arctic Plants.—The only original contribution to the history of botanical research which, during the last year, having been published in an American journal, was at once reprinted in Europe, was Mr. Theodore Holm's "Earliest Record of Arctic Plants." Mr. Holm introduces his paper by the following graceful tribute to the Department of Botany of the Catholic University, showing that it was here that he was put in possession of the facts so long unknown, and enabled to complete so valuable a contribution :

"Through the courtesy of Dr. Edward L. Greene, my attention has been called to the fact that our earliest knowledge of the arctic flora is not of recent date. The invaluable botanical library which Dr. Greene has accumulated, and which is now located in the Catholic University at Washington, D. C., contains a vast number of rare sixteenth and seventeenth century books, which are truly a great boon to the working botanist. It was in this library that Dr. Greene showed me a short chapter in Ray's *Historia Plantarum Generalis*, wherein are enumerated and described some plants collected in Spitzbergen more than two hundred years ago."

Mr. Holm, one of the botanists of the Department of Agriculture, is a specialist in Arctic European botany, and a frequent student-visitor at the University. His new-old first chapter in the history of Arctic botany appears to have come as a surprise to specialists in that line abroad. The paper was issued in the first place by the Biological Society of Washington, in June last, but was at once copied, with a most complimentary editorial preface, in the *London Journal of Botany*.

A library which furnishes material for such contributions to knowledge is, in itself, doing university work of the first order.

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Vol. III.

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No. 3.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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No. 3.

THE AVESTA AND THE BIBLE.

LITERATURE.*

1. SOURCES (translations).

A. *Avesta.*

JAMES DARMESTETER—The Zend-Avesta :

Part I. The Vendidad. Oxford, 1880.

Part II. The Sirozahs, Yashts, and Nyayish. Oxford, 1883.

LAWRENCE H. MILLS—The Zend-Avesta :

Part III. Yasna, Visparad, Afringans, Gahs, and Miscellaneous Fragments. Oxford, 1887.

These three parts form volumes IV, XXIII, and XXXI of the Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Müller.

CHARLES DE HARLEZ—Avesta, livre sacré du Zoroastrisme, traduit du texte Zend. Paris, 1881.

JAMES DARMESTETER—Le Zend-Avesta, traduction nouvelle, avec commentaire historique et philologique :

Vol. I. La liturgie (Yasna et Vispéred). Paris, 1892.

Vol. II. La loi (Vendidad), l'épopée (Yashts), le livre de prière (Khorda Avesta). Paris, 1892.

Vol. III. Origines de la littérature et de la religion Zoroastriennes. Appendice à la traduction de l'Avesta (fragments des nasks perdus et index). Paris, 1883.

L. H. MILLS—A Study of the Five Zarathushtrian Gathas with Texts and Translations. Leipzig-Oxford, 1892-4.

B. *Pahlavi Literature.*

Pahlavi Texts, translated by E. W. West :

Part I. Bundahish, Bahman Yasht, and Shayast-la-Shayast. Oxford, 1880.

*This list does not aim at being exhaustive.

Part II. *Dadistan-i Dinik*, and the Epistles of *Manushkhihar*. Oxford, 1882.

Part III. *Dina-i Mainog-i Khirad*, *Sikand-Gumanik Vigar*, and *Saddar*. Oxford, 1885.

Part IV. Contents of the Nasks. Oxford, 1892.

These four parts form volumes V, XVIII, XXIV, and XXXVII of the Sacred Books of the East.

2. WORKS FOR GENERAL REFERENCE.

Introductions to the versions just cited.

MARTIN HAUG—*Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees*. 2d Ed., London, 1878.

WILLIAM GEIGER—*The Civilization of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times* (Trans.), 2 vols. Oxford, 1885-'87.

W. D. WHITNEY—*Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, Series I. New York, 1873. Ch. VI.

GEORGE RAWLINSON—*The Five Great Monarchies*. London, 1878. (Media, ch. IV).

Z. A. RAGOZIN—*The Story of the Nations*. Media. New York, 1891.

CHARLES DE HARLEZ—*Etudes Avestiques*. Paris, 1887.

Les Origines du Zoroastrisme, 2 vols. Paris, 1879-80.

JAMES DARMESTETER—*Ormazd et Ahriman*. Paris, 1877.

Etudes Iraniennes, 2 vols. Paris, 1883.

FRANÇOIS LENORMANT—*Histoire ancienne de l'Orient*. Paris, 1887. Vol. V, livre VII, ch. I.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGEL—*Eranische Alterthumskunde*, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1873.

C. DE LA SAUSSAYE—*Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, 1889. Vol. II.

C. P. TIELE—*Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte*. Prenzlau, 1887.

3. AUTHORS TREATING OF THE RELATIONS OF JUDAISM TO ZOROASTRIANISM :

MAX MÜLLER—*Chips from a German Workshop*. N. Y., 1887. Vol. I, ch. VII.

MAX MÜLLER—*Theosophy, or Psychological Religion* (Gifford Lectures for 1892). London and N. Y., 1893. Ch. II.

T. K. CHEYNE—*The Bampton Lectures for 1889*. London, 1891. Lect. VI and VIII.

T. K. CHEYNE—"On the Possible Zoroastrian Influences on the Religion of Israel." *Expository Times*, June-August, 1891.

H. EWALD—*The Old and New Testament* (Trans.). Edinburg, 1888. p. 72-8.

A. KUENEN—*The Religion of Israel* (Trans.). London, 1875. Vol. III, ch. IX.

A. KOHUT—"The Zend-Avesta and Genesis I-XI." *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April, 1890.

C. DE HARLEZ—Avesta, p. ccv seq.

C. DE HARLEZ—"La Bible et l'Avesta." *Revue Biblique*, April, 1896.

J. VAN DEN GHEYN, S. J.—"L'Avestisme et le Judaïsme." *Revue des Religions*, 1889, p. 193 seq.

J. DARMESTETER—*Zend-Avesta*. Vol. III, p. LVII seq.

M. BRÉAL—*Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique*. Paris, 1877, p. 123 seq.

FR. SPIEGEL—Vol. I, p. 446 seq. of work cited above.

A. KOHUT—*Über die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus*. Leipzig, 1866.

The translation of the Avesta which appeared in the years 1852-63 from the pen of the great Iranian scholar, Friedrich Spiegel, awakened on all sides a keen interest in the ancient religion of Zoroaster.¹ Scholars engaged in the comparative study of religions turned their eyes eagerly to this new field of investigation and sought out diligently the development of ancient myths and the parallel forms of religious belief and practice. From the very first they did not fail to remark the many striking points of resemblance between the religious system of the Avesta and that of the Bible. The doctrines touching belief in angels, demons, and the future life offered the closest analogy. And as these elements seemed to have the merit of priority in the Avesta, and only in the later parts of the Bible to receive explicit recognition, it was generally concluded by non-Catholic scholars that their presence in the Old Testament was due to the influence of Zoroastrianism.

One of the first to give expression to this conclusion was a scholar of Jewish descent, Alexander Kohut, who published at Leipsic, in 1866, a small pamphlet² in which he sought to trace the origin of the Jewish belief in angels and demons to the religion of Zoroaster. Similar views were expressed by Bréal³ and many others, and soon became part of the accepted opinions of less conservative scholars.

¹The more correct, but less popular, name is Zarathushtra.

²"Über die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus."

³"*Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique*." Paris, 1877, pp. 123-126.

The notion that the Jewish religion (and consequently the Christian) is indebted to the religion of the Avesta for its doctrines on angels, demons, and the future life has held its own down to the present day. While some scholars like Ewald¹ and Cheyne² hold that the development, but not the origin of these doctrines, was dependent on Zoroastrian influences, a far greater number speak of their derivation from Zoroastrianism as of an established truth.³

The "New World" of March, 1895, contains two independent expressions of this latter view. In his article entitled "The Devil," Dr. Charles C. Everett says: "It is now generally admitted that the Jews received from the Parsees during the Captivity in Babylon the questionable gift of the devil."⁴ And a few pages further on, Dr. L. H. Mills, the eminent Iranian scholar, says: "The entire mass of hagiology, demonology and perhaps of minute ceremonial distinction between clean and unclean, came in upon the Jews from the Persian theology, and with them came a strong assertion of those doctrines of resurrection, immortality and Paradise on the one side, and of Satan, judgment and Hell on the other, which slowly drove the old Sadducean simplicity to its extinction."⁵

In a previous article, "Zoroaster and the Bible," published in the "Nineteenth Century" for January, 1894, he drew out a detailed comparison between the Avesta and the Bible, and concluded that while the Scriptures far surpass the Avesta in grandeur and religious fervor, still the "religion of the Mazda-worshippers was useful in giving point and body to many loose conceptions among the Jewish religious teachers, and in introducing many ideas which were entirely new, while as to the doctrines of immortality and resurrection, the most important of all, it positively determined belief."⁶

¹"Old and New Testament Theology," Edinburgh, 1838, pp. 72-78.

²Bampton Lectures, 1889, London, 1891, pp. 269-272 and 390-402. Cf. Kuenen, "Religion of Israel," London, 1875, II, 156.

³Compare the more guarded statement of de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte* II, p. 2, with the words of Tiele, *Komp. der Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 100 and 197. Cf. also Bellangé, "Le judaïsme et l'histoire du peuple juif," pp. 281-282. The Jewish religion, he says, is "constamment imitatrice de la persane."

⁴p. 11.

⁵"The God of Zoroaster," *New World*, '95, p. 51. Cf. his *Introd. to the Gathas*, p. xlvii, in *S. B. E. XXXI*.

⁶p. 57.

Those who accept conclusions like these and still cling to some form of Christianity, have been led to adopt a new view of the origin of the Jewish religion. They can no longer hold with consistency that the religion of Israel came wholly from the revelations of God to his chosen prophets. They are obliged to assume that in some respects the religion of Iran surpassed in clearness of vision that of Israel itself, and thus became in Divine Providence the medium whereby new fundamental truths of religion became known and embraced by God's chosen people. This is the stand that Dr. Mills has taken. In the article just referred to, he seeks to justify his position in the following words: "To state what is intended to be the keynote of the present communication, I would say that any, or all, of the historical, doctrinal, or hortative statements recorded in the Old or New Testament might, while fervently believed to be inspired by the Divine Power, be yet traced, if the facts would allow of it, to other religious systems for their mental initiative; that the historical origin of particular doctrines or ideas which are expressed in the Old or New Testament does not touch the question of their inspiration, plenary, or otherwise."¹

This language is startling to the Catholic ear. The question naturally presents itself, Do the ascertained facts of the early Jewish and Zoroastrian religions necessitate so radical a position? Can it be demonstrated with certainty that the religion of the Avesta has contributed any of its doctrines to the theology of the Bible? It is the attempt to solve this interesting and important problem that has given rise to the present essay.

In order to carry out this purpose systematically, we shall 1) take note of the translations that have been made of the various parts of the Avesta; 2) study the nature of their contents; and 3) examine at length whether the analogies existing in the Bible can be reasonably derived from the Avesta.

I.—THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE AVESTA.

It is from the Zoroastrians of India that the European world obtained its first knowledge of the sacred literature composing the Avesta. They were the chief surviving remnant of

¹p. 45.

the Persian people that remained true to the religion of their fathers. To escape the religious persecution of their Arab conquerors, they migrated into India in the tenth and following centuries, and formed settlements on the northwest coast, from the Gujerat peninsula to the neighborhood of Bombay. They were known as the Parsees, i. e., Persians, or Guebers, the name given to the conquered Persians by the Arabs. Here, under the sky of religious toleration, they soon developed into a prosperous people, and by the exclusiveness of their religious life kept intact their blood, social customs and religious practices. They have preserved their identity to the present, being now about ninety thousand in number.

The opening of India to European commerce brought the Parsees in contact with British merchants, one of whom secured a manuscript of their sacred books liturgically arranged¹ and sent it to England in 1723. It was chained to the wall of the Bodleian library and remained for years an object of idle curiosity.

The honor of making its precious contents known to European scholars belongs to the French savant, Anquetil Duperron. When a young student at the University of Paris, passionately devoted to Oriental studies, he was shown a short extract, copied from the Bodleian manuscript, which no one could yet decipher. His interest was aroused at the sight of a script so mysterious and at the same time so venerable from its association with the name of Zoroaster, and he made up his mind at any cost to bring to France the glory of producing the first translation of this precious relic of antiquity. The story of his romantic departure for India, of his six years of unremitting struggle against hardships and difficulties, crowned at last with the acquisition of the sacred traditions of the Parsees, is told in interesting and circumstantial style in the first volume of his translation. In 1762 he returned to Paris with one hundred and eighty precious manuscripts in his possession. After nine years more of close application to the study so courageously begun, he gave to the world the fruit of his long labors. The work, consisting of three quarto volumes, bore the title: "*Zend-Avesta, ouvrage de Zoroastre, contenant*

¹ Vendidad Sadah.

les idées théologiques, physiques, et morales de ce législateur, les cérémonies du culte religieux qu'il a établi et plusieurs traits importants relatifs à l'ancienne histoire des Perses."

At its first appearance it was bitterly attacked by Sir William Jones, then a young student at Oxford. He declared the Zend-Avesta a forgery and accused Anquetil of being either a fraud or a dupe. But sound criticism soon rallied to the defense of Anquetil's cause and secured it a complete triumph. His work became authoritative in matters pertaining to Zoroastrianism; for the authenticity of the Avesta having been made good, no one presumed to question the accuracy of his translation.

But it was just here that Anquetil's work was defective. The Parsee priests were almost entirely ignorant of the original language, commonly called the Zend, in which the Avesta was composed, and their knowledge of the Pahlavi tongue, the parent language of modern Persian, into which the Avesta had been translated and paraphrased in the period preceding the Arab conquest, was lamentably defective. Sanskrit was not yet known to European scholars, and thus Anquetil was committed to the faulty teachings of his masters without any means of verification.

The scholar who opened the way to the scientific knowledge of the language and contents of the Avesta was the great orientalist, Eugène Burnouf. With his remarkable genius for grammatical analysis, quickened by a profound knowledge of Sanskrit, he detected that Anquetil's interpretation of the Zend text was at best but a paraphrase marred by many inaccuracies. Luckily there existed among the manuscripts brought from India by Anquetil a Sanskrit version made by an Indian dastur¹ of the thirteenth or fourteenth century on the Pahlavi translation of the Yasna, the sacrificial book of the Avesta. It was thus only a version of a version, but it carried one back to the time when the knowledge of the Avesta was based on a fairly trustworthy interpretation, the ancient Pahlavi versions and commentaries. With the aid of this version Burnouf was able to penetrate into the grammatical construction of the Zend, analyze more than one thousand of its words

¹ Neryosangh. A dastur is a Parsee priest versed in Avestan studies.

and give an intelligent and truly scientific translation of the first nine chapters of the Yasna.¹

The work so magnificently begun by Burnouf was carried on by a worthy successor, Friedrich Spiegel,² who, after profound studies in Pahlavi, Zend and Sanskrit, brought out his German version of the Vendidad in 1852. Seven years later appeared the translation of the Visparad and the Yasna, followed in 1863 by that of the Khorda Avesta. Spiegel's translation was a vast improvement over that of Anquetil, and gave in the main a faithful interpretation of the Avesta. But owing to the rudimentary condition in which he found the science of Zend and Pahlavi, his work was to a large degree tentative and marred by vague and inaccurate expressions.

The method followed by Burnouf and Spiegel did not hold undisputed sway. It was sharply opposed by the so-called Vedic school, which numbered among its members brilliant scholars like Kuhn, Roth, and Haug. Following in the steps of the eminent linguist, Franz Bopp, they took the close resemblance of Zend to Sanskrit to be a mark of dependence, and looked upon the Avestan religion as a schism from the Vedic. They protested against the Parsee tradition as utterly untrustworthy, and insisted on the method of comparison and inference based on data supplied by the Vedas. The traditional school, however, did not reject the aid of Sanskrit philology and of Vedic mythology and ritual; but they rightly refused to commit themselves exclusively to a method so subjective, involving, as it did, the practical denial of an independent historical development in the Avestan language and religion.

The Vedic school did not produce a complete translation of the Avesta. The one who accomplished the most in this respect was Martin Haug, of the University of Munich. Haug brought out a translation of the Gathas, the most ancient portion of the Avesta, in the years 1858-1860.³ His preconceived notions as to the intimate dependence of the Avesta on the Vedas led him into many errors of judgment, so that his version

¹ Eugène Burnouf, "Commentaire sur le Yaçna." Paris, 1833.

² "Avesta aus dem Grund texte übersetzt, mit steter Rücksicht auf die Tradition." 3 Bde. Leipzig, 1852-1863.

³ "Die fünf Gatha des Zarathustra." 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1858-1860.

is, in not a few instances, inaccurate and misleading. The voyage he made to Bombay, soon after the publication of this work, was the means of converting him to a more reasonable appreciation of Parsee tradition.

Until the year 1876, Spiegel's translation held its own as the only complete version of the Avesta worthy of consideration.¹ But in that year appeared the French translation of the Belgian priest and scholar, Mgr. Charles de Harlez. It was entitled "Avesta, livre sacré du zoroastrisme, traduit du text zend." It was published in three successive detachments, and so great was the appreciation of its merit that the second volume was exhausted before the third appeared. This led to a second edition in 1881, carefully revised and amplified with notes, indexes, and a masterly introduction to the study of the books and of the religion of the Avesta. The learned author followed the method adopted by Spiegel, but by a skillful use of the advances made in Avestan studies, to which he contributed not a little himself, he produced a work that stands far above that of his illustrious predecessor.

While de Harlez was busy with his translation, two other scholars were at work on a rendering that would afford English readers a reliable means of access to the thought of the Avesta. Thus far the only available work in English was Bleek's translation of Spiegel, published in 1864. With the advance in Iranian scholarship, the need of a new and independent version was felt. The University of Oxford had already matured its plan of bringing out, under the judicious direction of Max Müller, uniform and trustworthy versions of the sacred books of the East. In 1877 the great Zend scholar, James Darmesteter, was commissioned to make the translation of the Avesta. Three years later appeared his translation of the Vendidad, with an excellent introduction,² followed in 1883 by that of the Sirozahs, Yashts and Nyayish.³ This part of the work was excellently done and met with general approbation. But when requested to finish the work by bringing out the Yasna and Visparad, he declined on the ground that he was not yet

¹In the years 1858-62 there appeared in Berlin a translation in Polish and French on a new plan of the Zend-Avesta, corrected into the name *Zenddaschta*. The author, M. Pietraszewski, failed to shed honor on his name.

²S. B. E. IV.

³S. B. E. XXIII.

sufficiently prepared. These two books, he maintained, being liturgical, could not be properly interpreted till one was thoroughly acquainted with the religious rites they presupposed. Again the Yasna presented unusual difficulties on account of the archaic and abstruse hymns it contained.

The task refused by Darmesteter was accepted by Dr. L. H. Mills, now of Oxford. His translation of the Yasna, Afringans, Gahs, and various Fragments¹ which appeared in 1887, was the fruit of ten years' diligent study of the Avesta in the Pahlavi and Sanskrit versions, no less than in the original. But his work, valuable as it is, cannot be pronounced a masterpiece. Not to speak of his tendency to read his own ideas of spirituality into the obscure Gathic text,² his style of translation is anything but happy, being heavy, unnatural, and saturated with antiquated words such as yea, aye, ye, verily, and the like. This, together with the excessive use of parentheses, tends to weary rather than interest the reader.

In declining the invitation to translate the Yasna, Darmesteter did not renounce the laudable ambition to give to the world a complete translation of the Avesta. After his fruitful studies in Bombay in the years 1886-'87, armed with the precious results of West's studies in the Pahlavi literature, he set himself to the task of translating the entire Avesta into French. In 1892 he brought out the first two volumes under the title, "*Le Zend Avesta, traduction nouvelle avec commentaire historique et philologique par James Darmesteter.*" These beautiful quarto volumes, forming the twenty-first and twenty-second volumes of the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, and containing the Liturgy (Yasna and Visparad)³ and the Law (Vendidad), the Epic hymns (Yashts), and the Book of Prayer (Khorda Avesta)⁴ were followed next year by the third volume,⁵ containing a learned discussion on the formation of the Avestan literature and religion, translated fragments of lost books of the Avesta, some prayers of the modern Parsees, and two comprehensive indexes.

This work is a masterpiece of scholarship and literary

¹S. B. E. XXXI.

²Cf. Y. 30; also introd. to Y. 28. S. B. E. XXXI.

³Vol. I.

⁴Vol. II.

⁵Vol. 24 of the *Annales du Musée Guimet*.

style. The smoothness and elegance of its diction, not absent even in the obscure Gathas, would never lead the casual reader to suspect the many difficulties that hampered the progress of translation. Iranian scholars have lavished praise on its accuracy and on the fullness of information scattered through the work in copious notes and special dissertations. It stands at the head of the translations of the Avesta, and though doubtless destined to many minor corrections with the advance of Iranian studies, will rank as a classic in the literature of oriental philology.

It is thus chiefly through the versions of Darmesteter, Mills and de Harlez, that scholars unacquainted with Zend have access to the ideas contained in the Avesta. In the main outlines they are at one, but they do not agree in many points of detail, some of which, if placed beyond doubt, would be of great importance for doctrinal study. This disagreement is most prominent in the Gathic hymns.

As an illustration of the uncertainty of meaning that prevails in this portion of the Avesta, it is worth while to compare the series of versions which Mills, de Harlez, and Darmesteter give of Yasna 30:4. In his article on "Zoroaster and the Bible" Mills bases his assertion that heaven and hell are, according to Gathas, little more than mental states on the following version: "The two spirits came together at the first, and determined how life at the last shall be ordered, for the wicked (Hell), the worst life; for the holy the best mind (Heaven)."¹

Compare this with de Harlez' version; "(Let me say) this, too, that these two spirits met at the first to create life and death and the final lot of the creature; (these two spirits who are) the bad spirit of the wicked, and the good spirit of the just."²

Darmesteter gives another variation: "And these two spirits met at the creation of the first individual, (bringing) life and death; and so will it be till the end of the world, the wicked belonging to the Bad Spirit, pious thought to the Good."³

¹"Nineteenth Century," 1894, p. 54. Cf. S. B. E. XXXI p. 25. In his Bampton Lectures, p. 398, Professor Cheyne gives expression to this view of Mills as if it were an unquestioned feature of Zoroastrian theology.

²Trans. from Avesta, p. 221.

³Trans. from Zend-Avesta, I, p. 221.

Divergencies like these are unfortunately but too common. Let the curious reader take any one of the Gathic hymns and compare the versions of Mills, de Harlez and Darmesteter, and he will be struck by the varieties of meaning that present themselves on every page. In other portions of the Avesta the uniformity is greater, but by no means perfect.

The conclusion that forces itself on every thoughtful mind is, that in the reconstruction of the early Avestan religion those renderings alone offer a trustworthy basis which are common to the three translators. A fair amount of probability may be assigned to meanings supported by two of them, especially if one of these two be Darmesteter. But it would be rash to attach to the text a reliable meaning where the three translators are at odds with one another.¹

II.—THE AVESTA AND ITS CONTENTS.

The Avesta of to-day, which is but a remnant of the twenty-one sacred nasks or books that existed during the Sassanian dynasty (226-652 A. D.), comprises the following parts:

1. The Yasna and Visparad, two books making practically one and constituting the liturgy of the public sacrifice.

2. The Vendidad, the book of the laws of purification and exorcism.

3. The Yashts, prayers of praise in honor of the supreme God Ormazd and his created deities.

4. Four small collections of prayers for minor devotions. They are the Gahs, prayers for different parts of the day and night; the Sirozahs, prayers for the days of the month; Afringans, prayers for certain festivals of the year; and the Nyayish, devotions to certain deities of nature. These four collections, together with the preserved fragments in Zend of the lost nasks, are often grouped together under the title Khorda Avesta, or Little Avesta. The exact application of this term is not fixed, for it sometimes excludes the Sirozahs, sometimes the Yashts, as well as a number of short prayers, which are nothing more than extracts from different parts of the Avesta.²

¹ For this reason Max Müller is at fault in concluding from his (and Haug's) doubtful version of Yasht 1: 8 (accepted neither by de Harlez, Darmesteter nor West), that Ex. III, 14, "I am that I am," is probably an interpolation of Avestan origin. Cf. Gifford Lectures, 1892, p. 65.

² Darm. "Zend-Avesta," III, p. xxxiii. and xxxiv.

THE YASNA.¹

The most important part of the modern Avesta is the Yasna, the Sacrifice. It is a book of liturgical prayers and invocations to accompany the supreme act of worship in honor of Ormazd and his creation. This ceremony is still performed by the Parsees. It is not a bloody sacrifice. The principal offering consists of the sacred drink Haoma, a slightly inebriating juice crushed out of the stems of the Haoma plant, and like its Vedic equivalent Soma, supposed to give both physical and spiritual strength to him who drinks of it. It is not consumed clear. In the mortar with the Haoma sprigs are also crushed some twigs of pomegranate, and to this mixture are added a few drops of milk and of water, both being duly blessed with sacred rites. This consecrated mixture, known as Parahaoma, is supposed to contain the concentrated virtue of the water, plant, and animal creation. It is consumed by the celebrating priest with great reverence.

This sacred liquid of the sacrifice offers a certain, though very distant analogy, with the consecrated wine in the sacrifice of the Mass. In like manner, reminding one of the consecrated bread of the Mass, are the so-called Draona, small round wafers of bread, which, with butter or fat, are solemnly offered to Ormazd and his Yazads,² and then consumed by the priest and faithful after the manner of a communion service. The butter or fat doubtless stands as the survival and substitute of the ancient annual victims.³

There are offerings, besides, of choice wood and incense for the sacred fire, whose flame, personified as Atar, the son of Ormazd, is symbolic of the Creator; and, lastly, there are libations of consecrated water mingled with a few drops of Parahaoma and poured in part on the so-called Baresma, the bundle of blessed twigs representing the vegetable creation, and in part into the well adjoining the place of sacrifice as an offering to the waters.

It is the prayers that accompany the preparation and con-

¹ The references to the texts are according to Darmesteter's French translation, which alone will be designated by the name *Zend-Avesta*.

² *i. e.*, inferior deities worthy of veneration.

³ *Zend-Avesta I*, pp. lxx-lxvi.

summation of these various offerings that make up the book Yasna.

Of the seventy-two chapters composing this book, a large number are lacking in originality. They consist to a great extent of monotonous litanies, in which the various elements of the sacrifice are announced, consecrated, and offered up to Ormazd and his many Yazads, and abound in quotations and imitations. By far the most interesting portion is the middle part, comprising chapters 11-58. The bulk of these chapters is written in an archaic form of Zend that is found nowhere else in the Avesta. These are the so-called Gathas, or songs, the most ancient portion of the Avesta.

The Gathas, in the strict sense of the term, consist of but seventeen hymns, arranged in five groups by reason of their different kinds of meter.

Besides these, which for convenience sake may be designated as the lyric Gathas, there are a number of prayers composed in the same archaic dialect and likewise known as Gathas¹ in the later parts of the Avesta. They are four short metrical formulas which play an important rôle in the Avestan rites, and a series of seven prayers in prose, called the Gatha of the Seven Chapters. This prose Gatha is of more recent origin than the lyric Gathas themselves.²

The fact that the lyric Gathas are the most ancient records of the Zoroastrian religion, gives them an importance that the other parts of the Avesta cannot claim. Let us then examine their contents first and see what they set forth.

The first thing that strikes us is the profoundly spiritual conception of the supreme deity. This deity, sometimes called Ahura,³ Lord, sometimes, Mazda,⁴ Knowing One, more commonly, Ahura Mazda,⁵ (Ormazd), Omniscient Lord, is the one supreme God,⁶ creator and lord of the world,⁷ having called it into being by his thought.⁸ As his name Mazda implies, he knows all things, he cannot be deceived; he sees the hidden thoughts of men, and takes account of all they do.⁹ He is the Spenta Mainyu, the bountiful spirit, who has provided pastures

¹Cf. Vend. 10:4, 10, 12.

²Cf. S. B. E. XXXI, 281.

³Y. 28: 6, 8.

⁴Y. 28: 1, 2.

⁵Y. 28: 3, 4.

⁶Y. 34: 7.

⁷Y. 31: 7, 8; 44: 7.

⁸Y. 31: 11.

⁹Y. 43: 6; 45: 4, 10; 31:13. Cf. 29: 4.

and cattle for the good of man.¹ He is the source of prosperity, happiness and immortality.² He is the friend of the good,³ the judge and rewarder of good and evil.⁴ He is holy in thought, word and action.⁵

Ormazd is not alone in his work of sustaining and directing the world. Associated with him, but depending upon him, are six spirits known in the prose Gatha⁶ and the later Avesta as the Amesha Spenta (Amshaspands), the Undying Beautiful Ones. These spirits, which seem at times to be mere abstractions, but which are also addressed as distinct personalities,⁷ are constantly invoked together with Ormazd, their lord and creator. They are: Vohu Mano, the Good Mind; Asha Vahista, Excellent Virtue; Khshathra Vairya, Desirable Sovereignty; Spenta Armaiti, Bountiful Piety; Haurvetat, Health, and Ameretat, Immortality. At times they seem to be poetic personifications of graces bestowed by Ormazd on the faithful, for they are given to men and dwell in their hearts.⁸ The Amshaspands are sometimes spoken of as if they were on a level with Ormazd himself, appearing more as emanations of his own spirit than as separate personalities.⁹ At other times they seem to fulfil the office of archangels, bringing the souls of the deceased faithful to heaven,¹⁰ rewarding their good actions,¹¹ overcoming the evil spirit,¹² watching over the herds,¹³ and giving increase to the earth.¹⁴

Quite like these Amshaspands, though by no means so frequently mentioned, is the personified abstraction, Sraosha, Obedience or Faith. In Y. 44:16 he is invoked, together with Vohu Mano. Like the Amshaspands, he watches over the faithful and provides for their spiritual and temporal welfare.¹⁵

Of a wholly different character is the mythical genius that is mentioned in the beginning of the twenty-eighth chapter and assumes a conspicuous rôle in chapter twenty-nine. This is Gaush Urvan, the divinized soul of the primitive ox. It was the first of the animals to be created, but having been slain by the evil spirit, its soul became the tutelary genius of cattle. In the twenty-ninth chapter it lifts its voice in complaint to

¹Y. 47: 3. ²Y. 34: 1. ³Y. 45: 11; 46: 2. ⁴Y. 43: 5. Cf. 30: 8, 10. ⁵Y. 45: 8.

⁶Y. 35: 1; 39: 3. ⁷Y. 28: 1, 3, 4; 47: 1-3. ⁸Y. 30: 7, 8; 31: 21; 32: 2; 34: 1. ⁹Y. 33: 11; 28: 5, 9; 29: 10. ¹⁰Y. 32: 15. ¹¹Y. 28: 8; 46: 18. ¹²Y. 44: 14; 48: 1. ¹³Y. 28: 1; 48: 6. ¹⁴Y. 38: 11.

¹⁵Y. 33: 5; 43: 12.

Ormazd, in behalf of the herds maltreated by wicked plunderers, and hearing that Zoroaster has been appointed protector, laments that one so powerless should have been chosen.

The beneficent reign of Ormazd is not universal. It is prevented from exercising full sway by the powers of evil. Here we are brought face to face with, perhaps, the most striking and distinctive feature of the religion of the Avesta, its dualism. Whether this dualism was the result of Chaldean influence,¹ or was simply the development of a tendency discernible in the primitive Aryan religion,² one thing is certain, namely, that special stress was laid upon it in early Zoroastrianism. The opening stanzas of chapter thirty, which is devoted to the exposition of dualism, might well have been applied to the introduction of a new and important teaching.³

The doctrine of dualism in the Gathas is as follows. Equally eternal with the good spirit is the spirit of evil. From the beginning these two spirits have been absolutely opposed to each other in thought, word and deed.⁴ The one is the giver of life and immortality, the other is the author of death. The one is the promoter of peace and prosperity, the other of strife and rapine. The one brings truth and virtue to men, the other falsehood and wickedness.⁵ Hence the good spirit is said to have declared to the evil spirit, "Neither our thoughts nor our teachings, nor our minds, nor our desires, nor our words, nor our deeds, nor our consciences, nor our souls are at one."⁶ The very names of these two spirits designate their absolute opposition in character. The one is called the beneficent spirit, the good (principle); the other is called the bad (principle), in the later Avesta, Angro Mainyu (Ahriman), the destroying spirit.⁷

Just as Ormazd is assisted in his work of beneficence by the Amshaspands and Sraosha, so Ahriman has at his command evil spirits called Daevas.⁸ Of these three are mentioned by name in the Gathas. They are 1°) the Druj, Deceit, the demon especially opposed to Asha;⁹ 2°) Akem Mano,

¹ For dualism in Chaldea see Lenormant, *Histoire ancienne de l'Orient*, V, 194.

² Cf. Darmesteter *S. B. E.* IV., p. lvii. and lxxx. Cf. Ormazd et Ahriman, p. 337.

³ The same remark applies to beginning of ch. 45, which treats also of dualism.

⁴ Y. 30:3. ⁵ Y. 30:4, 6, 11, cf. 45:1, 7, 8, 9. ⁶ Y. 45:2. ⁷ Y. 30:3; 32:5; 45:2.

⁸ Y. 30:6; 32:3. ⁹ Y. 30:8 44:14; 48:1.

Bad mind, the antithesis of Vohu Mano, Good Mind;¹ and 3°) Aeshma, Fury, whose personality, however, is not so strongly marked in the Gathas as in the later Avesta.² Such then are the spiritual forces ranged against each other, Sraosha and the Amshaspands under Ormazd on the one side in increasing conflict with Ahriman and his Daevas. This great struggle is particularly centered about man.

In the Gathas, man is not a creature of fate, led by force of events to be a follower of Ormazd or of Ahriman. There is no predestination to good or evil. The wicked spirits try to seduce every individual and make him an abettor of evil like themselves. But Ormazd counteracts their evil designs through his revealed law of truth and justice. This law is not meant exclusively for a specially favored nation. It is Ormazd's will to bring all men to the knowledge of his revealed truth.³ Even the Turanian, the deadly enemy of the followers of Zoroaster, is not absolutely excluded.⁴ In short, it rests with the free choice of every man to which side he shall belong.⁵ Those who choose the right path of holy thoughts, holy words, and holy actions are not left to themselves in the struggle with the powers of evil. Mazda sends them his Good Mind and Excellent Virtue, and Power and Wisdom,⁶ so that they may know what is right and have the strength to accomplish it.⁷ On the other hand, those who give way to wicked actions, to the delight of the Daevas, are cut off at once from the friendship of Ahura Mazda. "They become estranged from the Good Mind and fall away from the understanding of Ahura Mazda and of holiness."⁸

There is thus no middle way of compromise. Man cannot serve two masters so opposite in character and aims. He must belong wholly to Mazda or to Ahriman. "They who know, O Mazda, that Holy Wisdom is thy love, and for lack of possessing the Good Mind give themselves up to sin, are as far removed from Virtue (Asha) as are the wild beasts."⁹ Nor is it a question of external conduct alone. Just as Ormazd is opposed to Ahriman in thought as well as in word and deed, so the man who would claim Ormazd's friendship must be

¹Y. 32:3; 47:5.²Y. 30:6; 48:7; 49:4.³Y. 31:3.⁴Y. 46:12.⁵Y. 30:2.⁶The first four Amshaspands.⁷Y. 31:21; 32:2; 33:10; 34:1; 43:4, 10.⁸Y. 32:4.⁹Y. 34:9.

faithful to him in spirit no less than in action.¹ The importance of interior piety is implied in the name borne by one of the Amshaspands, Vohu Mano, Good Mind, in opposition to Akem Mano, Bad Mind. Evil thoughts are frequently mentioned in the Gathas as one of the elements of wickedness.²

One of the most striking features of the theology of the Gathas is its eschatology. Here the joyous, optimistic character of Zoroastrianism comes clearly into view. The ray of religious hope shines upon the sharp conflict with the powers of evil. Falsehood and oppression may win present success, but final victory is on the side of religious truth. Time will come when the Druj and the Daevas shall be brought to naught and justice shall reign over the renewed earth.³ Meanwhile virtue and vice will not go unrewarded. Even in this life piety is rewarded with happiness and prosperity.⁴ But it is especially after death that the full demands of justice will be satisfied. Then every soul will be requited according to its earthly deeds. Those who have lived in fidelity to Ormazd's holy law will pass in safety over the Kinvat bridge and enter into the house of Ormazd to receive the rewards in the gift of Vohu Mano and to enjoy a blessed immortality.⁵

Not so the wicked, the followers of the daevas. They shall be seized with terror as they behold the Kinvat bridge, over which no guilty soul can pass in safety.⁶ They shall go down instead, into the abode of the Druj, where darkness and wailing and noisome food shall be their portion.⁷

We have already alluded to the Gathic doctrine of the coming renovation of the world, when the powers of the evil will be destroyed and justice will reign supreme over the whole earth. This renovation of the world, the Frasho-kereti, includes in latter parts of the Avesta the idea of the resurrection.⁸ But whether this extension of meaning also attaches to the term as employed in the ancient Gathas⁹ is far from decided. Darmesteter, following the opinion of Haug,¹⁰ attributes to the word the meaning of the resurrection. In accordance, also, with the traditional interpretation of the Parsees,

¹Y. 31:21. ²Y. 49:11; 32:5; 45:2; 30:3. ³Y. 30:8-10; 31:4; 34:15; 48:1-2 (de Harlez and Darmesteter). ⁴Y. 43:2; 51:8. ⁵Y. 46:10; 30:10, 11. ⁶Y. 46:11. ⁷Y. 49:11; 31:20. ⁸Yasht 19:89-90; Vend. 13:51. ⁹Y. 30:9; 34:15. ¹⁰Haug, *Essays*, p. 312-13. *Zend-Avesta*, I, p. 256.

he sees allusions to the doctrine of the resurrection in the vague expressions, "the day of the grand affair,"¹ "the hour of the great trial."² But both de Harlez and Mills understand these latter texts as referring to the preaching of the law. Mills attributes to the expression *Frasho-kereti* the meaning "millennial perfection,"³ and de Harlez, while giving it a similar meaning, "renovation of the world," expresses his conviction that it is a mistake to conclude from these texts that the Gathas teach the resurrection.⁴

When we pass from the lyric Gathas to the prose Gatha, and to the rest of the Yasna, we find ourselves in a different atmosphere. The lyric Gathas, while partly didactic, are in great measure religious outpourings of the soul to Mazda and his Amshaspands, in acts of faith, of trust, of thanksgiving, of petition, of benediction for the faithful, and of imprecation on the wicked. There is no reference to liturgical rites, nothing to indicate that these prayers were originally meant to be the accompaniment of a sacrifice. In the rest of the Yasna the prayers, with a few exceptions, have a liturgical form, with direct reference to the sacrifice.

But even greater than the change of form is the difference in the subject-matter. The religious system of the lyric Gathas becomes greatly complicated by the intrusion of a host of divinized virtues, prayers, and elements of nature which claim a part, as Yazads of Ormazd, in the prayers and sacrifices of the faithful. Still this difference may be more apparent than real. It may be, indeed, that the religious system that gave birth to the Gathas was not so free from these inferior elements as would appear from the Gathas themselves. These prayers are too short and too few, too limited in their purpose and scope, to give a complete picture of the religion to which they belonged. Had they been less personal and more liturgical, they would doubtless have revealed some at least of the inferior elements that we find in the rest of Yasna. The religious conceptions of the Gathas undergo scarcely any change in the remaining parts of the Avesta.⁵ The dualism and the personality of the Amshaspands become more strongly emphasized, but that is all. Ormazd remains the supreme

¹Y. 30:2. ²Y. 36:2. Y. 33:5. ³S. B. E. xxxi, p. 90, note 6. ⁴Avesta, p. clxxxv.

⁵There are poetical exaggerations in Vend. 22:2 seq.; also Yasht 5:17; 15:2.

Lord and Creator in the midst of the multitude of Yazads that share in his worship. Then, again, it is to be noted that the lofty spirituality of the Gathas is not without a flaw. It is marred by the presence of the Gaush Urvan, the soul of the mythical ox who pleads for the maltreated cattle. This example, together with the reference to the mythical hero, Yima,¹ and to the fabulous Kinvat bridge ought to make us guarded in our estimate of the superiority of the Gathic religion over that of the rest of the Avesta.

In the prose Gatha, the three elements, earth, fire, and water are the objects of religious veneration.² The fire is personified as Atar, the son of Ahura Mazda, and is addressed in petition like a real personality.³ The fact that retribution is pronounced on those who treat it ill shows that the obligation of not soiling the fire, as laid down in the Vendidad,⁴ was already recognized. It is probable, but not open to proof, that similar obligations existed towards the other two elements, the earth and the water.

Another striking feature of the prose Gatha is the worship of the souls of the just, whether dead or alive or not yet in existence, and of animal souls as well.⁵ By these are probably meant the Fravashis, mentioned for the first time in the third prayer of the prose Gatha,⁶ and often identified with the souls of men.

In the other parts of Yasna, the nature of the Fravashis comes more prominently into view. It is generally argued that the Fravashi-cult had its origin in the remote ancestral worship of the Aryans.⁷ In Yasna 16:7 and many other places⁸ the word is used of the souls of the dead. But by a change, due perhaps to Babylonian influence,⁹ the idea of Fravashis outgrew the narrow limits of the Pitris of the Indian Aryans and of the Manes of the Latins, and embraced the notion of genii or angels, whose object it was to watch over their respective charges. In this sense every man and animal has its Fravashi, and in the thirteenth Yasht, devoted to the praise of these genii, even the sky, waters, earth, plants and fire are similarly provided for. And by a further exten-

¹Y. 32:8.²Y. 36 and 38.³Y. 36:3.⁴Vend 7:25-27; 8:73-74.⁵Y. 39:1-2.⁶Y. 37:3.⁷Zend-Avesta, II, p. 502-3; Avesta, p. CXIX.⁸Cf. Y. 26:7.⁹Avesta, pp. CXIX, CXXV.

sion, in which the protective character of the Fravashi has doubtless disappeared, Ormazd and the Amshaspands have their Fravashis as well.¹

The beneficial character of the Fravashis is abundantly shown in the Yasna. They were the dreaded enemies of the Daevas and were invoked as the "invincible, victorious Fravashis of the just."² They kept the laws of nature in orderly working. They brought the waters to the fertile meadows.³ They looked after the heavens and the earth, the rivers and the herds, and promoted the growth of the infant yet unborn.⁴ Hence, we find them invoked as "the good, the powerful, the beneficent Fravashis of the just."⁵ The thirteenth Yasht describes these offices much more completely than the Yasna, and tells of their readiness to rush in crowds to the assistance of the good man who invokes their aid.

Among the few Yazads mentioned in the lyric Gathas we find Sraosha, Obedience. His personality is much more strongly defined in the fifty-seventh chapter of the Yasna. Here he appears as the heavenly priest and warrior. He is worshipped as the first to offer the Haoma sacrifice to Ormazd and to sing the Gathas,⁶ as the protector of the weak against Aeshma and the Daevas, whom he puts to flight, smiting them with his weapons.⁷ His eternal watchfulness over the good creation is praised, and prayer is addressed to him to shield the faithful from the assaults of the Daevas and to give increase of prosperity.⁸

Scarcely less prominent than Sraosha is the river goddess Ardvi Sura Anahita, the High, Powerful, Undeiled One. Whether she is the personification of a mythical or of a real stream is not certain. It is not unlikely that some river of Iran may have given a basis for the personification which religious fancy converted in the course of time into something totally independent of its origin. Be that as it may, de Harlez sees in the offices of the goddess traces of Assyrian influence. In his view, Ardvi Sura, originally an Iranian water goddess, assimilated the characteristics of Mylitta, the Assyrian goddess of moisture and generation. This change he ascribes to

¹Y. 26:2; 67:2. ²Y. 1:18; 4:6. ³Y. 65:6. ⁴Y. 67:1. ⁵Y. 26:1 cf. 60:4. ⁶Yv. 1-7, and 20. ⁷Yv. 6-14. ⁸Yv. 25 ff.

Artaxerxes, who introduced statues of this goddess.¹ If such be the case, the sensual features of the Assyrian cult were carefully suppressed. Ardvi Sura Anahita is the goddess of chaste fecundity. She purifies the elements of human generation, provides for a happy childbirth, and gives milk to the mothers' breasts. She likewise brings fertility to the fields and causes the herds to increase.² The fifth Yasht, which glorifies this goddess, tells also of her great power to confound the Daevas.

There is another Yazad to which considerable prominence is given in the Yasna. It is Haoma, the personification of the sacred liquid offered in sacrifice. The so-called Hom-Yasht, comprising chapters 9-11:15, is devoted to his honor. His favorite epithet is "death-removing."³ In chapter 9, he appears to Zoroaster in the form of a beautiful youth, and in answer to the questions of the prophet, tells who were the first to worship him and what were their rewards.⁴ Vivanghant was the first, and in reward was born to him Yima, the illustrious shepherd, under whose reign there was neither heat nor cold nor old age nor death nor envy.⁵ The second was Athwya, who was recompensed by the birth of his son Thraetona. He slew the most powerful of Ahriman's creatures, Azhi Dahaka, the dragon with three throats, three heads, six eyes and a thousand powers.⁶ The third worshipper was Thrита, to whom was born Keresaspa, the slayer of the horned dragon, Azhi Svara, streaming with poison, which devoured horses and men.⁷ The fourth worshipper was Pourushaspa, whose son, Zoroaster, vanquished the demons with the Ahuna Vairya prayer.⁸ Haoma is then besought in a long series of prayers to bring manifold blessings to the faithful and to paralyze the wicked efforts of Daevas and of hostile men.

Along with these Yazads are worshipped many others in the Yasna, though they do not figure so prominently. Many of them are personified abstractions, as Rashnu and Arshtat, Truth and Loyalty, Verethraghna, Victory, Daena, Religion and others. Other Yazads are Mithra, the Friend, as his name implies, one of the ancient Aryan light-gods, invoked

¹ Avesta, p. cvi.² Y. 65:1-2.³ Y. 9:2; 10:21; 42:5.⁴ Y. 9:1-2.⁵ vv. 4-5.⁶ vv. 6-8.⁷ vv. 9-11. ⁸ vv. 12-15.

as the "lord of wide fields, with a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes,"¹ the dreaded enemy of the Daevas, the great judge and avenger of wrong, especially of violated contracts;² then objects of nature, as the Sun, the "swift-horsed, the eye of Ormazd;"³ the Moon, the Stars, and in particular the brilliant and glorious star Tishtrya.⁴ All of these Yazads, excepting the Stars taken collectively, are honored by special Yashts.

To the names of the demons mentioned in the Gathas very little addition is made in the rest of the Yasna. Besides the mythical dragons mentioned in the Hom-Yasht, Vidhotu is named the demon of death, who is said in Vendidad 5:8, 9 to kill those who perish in water or fire.⁵ The personality of Aeshma is strongly emphasized. He is called "Aeshma with the deadly weapon."⁶ Shaosha, the defender of the faithful, deals him a murderous blow on the head with his weapon, assailing him as he would a robber.⁷

The Visparad is little more than a supplement of the Yasna. Its twenty-four Kardas or chapters are unimportant for doctrinal study, being composed entirely of monotonous litanies of liturgical invocations, in which all the Yazads, without exception, are duly commemorated. Hence the name Visparad, All the Lords. This book does not represent an independent liturgy. Its prayers are never said alone, but serve as an adjunct to the prayers of the Yasna to give greater solemnity to the sacrifice. At such times its Kardas are interspersed through the Yasna, some chapters of which are then omitted to give place to the more elaborate elements of the Visparad.

THE VENDIDAD.

Almost equal in importance to the Yasna, and surpassing it in interest, is the book of the law, the Vendidad. As its name implies, (vi-daevo-datem, the law against the Daevas), it warns the faithful of the ways in which one falls under the power of the Daevas, and teaches the corresponding means of removing their baneful presence. In other words, it treats of the causes of contamination and the laws of purification.

¹Y. 1:3.²Cf. Yasht 10.³Y. 1:11.⁴Y. 1:11. Tishtrya is the star Sirius.⁵Y. 57:26.⁶Y. 10:8; 27; 57:31.⁷Y. 57:10 and 31.

Written in the form of a dialogue, it sets forth its various teachings as if they were the direct answers of Ormazd to the questions put by Zoroaster. These teachings, which are embodied in twenty-two Fargards or chapters, are not arranged in systematic form, nor do they all belong strictly to the subject-matter that is the object of the book to discuss. A few of them are altogether of a mythical character. Thus, chapter one tells how the sixteen lands created by Ormazd were successively blighted by the evil spirit Ahriman. In chapter two we read of the wonderful enlargement of the earth by Yima, and of the way in which he saved specimens of every kind of life from the killing snow and cold that laid waste the fair face of the earth. How Zoroaster resisted the seductions and assaults of the Daevas and learned of Ormazd the rite of purification, as well as the fate of the soul after death, as told in the nineteenth chapter, while the twentieth and twenty-second give account of the divine origin of medicine and of the deliverance of Ormazd by the heavenly prayer Airyaman from the 99,999 diseases created by Ahriman.

The remaining chapters are mostly devoted to practical rules of conduct. Their lack of systematic arrangement and their many repetitions and variations of the same topics give them the appearance of a patchwork composed by different hands. The contents may best be summarized by ignoring the order of chapters and by making a logical classification.

By far the most prominent subject in the legislation of the Vendidad is the proper treatment and disposal of the dead. This subject occupies most of chapters five to twelve, inclusive, as well as part of chapter three, and embraces the treatment of the corpse from the time of death to its exposure to the birds of prey,¹ the different lengths of mourning for the relatives,² the defilements from various kinds of contact with the dead and the modes of purification for persons and objects defiled,³ the prayers and spells necessary for their purifications,⁴ the crimes attaching to unauthorized attempts to purify,⁵ and to forbidden ways of dealing with corpses of men and dogs.⁶

¹Vend. 5:10-14; 6:44-51; 7:50-59; 8:4-13, 23-25.
28-35, 45-49, 73-77; 8:1-3, 14-22, 35-107; 9:1-122,
6:10-25; 7:20-27; 5:60-62; 8:23-25, 73,

²Ch. 12.

⁴Ch. 10-11.

⁵5:1-7, 27-38; 6:1-9, 26-43; 7:1-22

⁶9:47, 57, ³8:8, 14-21, 36-42;

The proper isolation and purification of mothers of still-born babes and of women in their monthly sickness are also set forth, the former in chapters 5 and 7,¹ the latter in chapter 16.² Sexual intercourse at such times is branded as criminal.³

The proper way to dispose of the detached portions of the hair and nails occupies a whole chapter;⁴ so also special prayers against demons of sickness for women in labor.⁵

A number of chapters in whole or in part are devoted to teaching the sacred character of the animals especially effective against demons, namely, dogs, the hedgehog, the beaver, and the cock. Instructions are given on the care due these animals, and the penalties are laid down for the crime of killing or maltreating them.⁶

Lastly, scattered through many chapters are condemnations of different sins against chastity,⁷ religion,⁸ and justice,⁹ as well as a number of topics having a less direct bearing on the main purpose of the Vendidad. Among these may be mentioned the enumeration of certain kinds of contracts,¹⁰ rules for the probation and recompense of physicians¹¹ and for the recompense of the cleansing priest,¹² the praise of agriculture and cattle breeding,¹³ of prolific marriage, and the condemnation of asceticism.¹⁴

To appreciate properly the legislation of the Vendidad we must understand the religious mind in which it was conceived. It was a mind deeply influenced by the idea of dualism. To the Zoroastrian, creation was not all the work of Ormazd. Only what is good came from his hands. Evil, both physical and moral, was the counter-creation of the malignant Ahri-man, who from the very beginning was led by his wicked nature to oppose every good work of Ormazd. Thus the universe was divided into two great armies at continual war with each other. Ranged on the side of Ahri-man were the Daevas in the invisible order, and in the visible, winter, drought, disease and death, noxious plants and animals. Among the latter were serpents, lizards, toads and frogs, ants and flies, spiders and locusts.¹⁵ Hence to destroy them as far as possible was a

¹5:45-62; 7:60-72; ²16:1-11. ³15:7-9; 16:13-18; 18:37-76. ⁴Ch. 17. ⁵Ch. 21. ⁶Ch. 13, 14, 15, 3-6 and 19-51; 18:13-20. ⁷8:26-32; 18:60-65. ⁸4:46, 49-55; 15:2; 18:1-17, 30-59. ⁹4:1-43; 15:9-19. ¹⁰4:2-4, 44-45. ¹¹7:36-44. ¹²9:37-44. ¹³3:2-6 and 23-33. ¹⁴3:33; 4:47-49. ¹⁵1:3, 5, 7, 14:5-6 and 18:73.

work beneficial to the good creation, a work pleasing to Mazda.¹ Penances for sins committed often included the destruction of a certain number of these khrafstras, as they were called.

It was against man, the noblest part of Ormazd's visible creation, that the powers of evil were especially directed. Ahriman could not create bad men as he created noxious animals and plants; but he could turn men into his agents and make them demons incarnate by persuading them to forsake the paths of truth and virtue. By deeds of wickedness men not only become demons; they cause other demons to multiply. Their very presence helped to stunt the growth of good animals and plants.² Hence the Daevas were ever trying to seduce the faithful into sin.

But even those who withstood the evil suggestions of Ahriman were not secure against his malignant influence. If he could not destroy their souls he could at least injure their bodies by inflicting them with different forms of disease, often resulting in death. He could do even worse than this. He could so defile the faithful worshipper of Mazda with the spirit of uncleanness and corruption as to blot out in him the glory of the good creation and cause him to blight every good thing with which he came in contact.

This contamination of the faithful was effected in several ways. One of the most common was the uncleanness produced in every woman by the monthly sickness, which was a creation of Ahriman's, and one of the most powerful sources of defilement.³ A menstruous woman, being possessed by an unclean spirit, was unfit to come near any clean object until the demon was driven forth by special purifications. Hence the heinousness of sexual intercourse at such times.

Another form of this uncleanness, even more to be dreaded, was that arising from contact with the dead. Not all corpses were the sources of this kind of demoniacal possession, but only those of Mazda-worshippers and of dogs. The wicked followers of the Daevas were possessed in life by the unclean spirits, so that at death their corpses had no further attrac-

¹Priests always went about armed with the khrafstraghna, an instrument for killing such animals. Cf. Vend. 18:2; 14:8, also Herodotus 1:140.

²14:5-6; 18:13. ³7: 26-27; 8: 31-32; 18: 62-64. ⁴1: 18, 19; 16: 11.

tions for them. But not having full power over the faithful, nor over the dogs, whose very look was more than the strongest fiend could bear, they seized the opportunity at death to enter into their corpses and contaminate them. There was one demon whose special office it was to take possession of all such corpses. It was Nasu, Corruption. On the death of every faithful Mazdean this demon lodged itself in the remains. The way to expel the fiend was to bring a dog close to the corpse and let it fix its gaze intently upon it. Before this ceremony, called by modern Parsus the Sag-did (Dog-gaze), it was dangerous to be near the corpse, for at the slightest contact the foul Nasu would rush out from its lurking place into the body of the person and pollute him from head to foot.

A similar form of uncleanness, but of a degree even more dreadful, was that contracted by a woman bringing forth a still-born babe, for her contact with the Nasu-stricken corpse was more prolonged and more intimate.

Such persons, defiled with Nasu, like the woman defiled with the demon of menstrual uncleanness, being sources of contamination, had to be isolated till they were exorcised and purified. This rite of purification, which lasted nine nights, was rendered effective by spells and exorcisms, accompanied by the Sag-did, and by sprinklings of gomez¹ and of water. These sprinklings were made systematically on all parts of the body, from front to back, from right to left, beginning at the head and moving gradually downwards, till at last the Nasu was expelled from the left toe. It was supposed to depart toward the north in the form of a raging fly.²

A less degree of uncleanness was that contracted by touching a corpse already submitted to the Sag-did. This kind of uncleanness, which was always communicated to the carriers of the corpse, could be removed by a simple washing with gomez and water. The purification of vessels, clothing, and other articles contaminated was effected in the same manner.

Corpses of men and of dogs remained unclean till they were reduced to dry bones. And as the three elements (earth,

¹Ox's urine.

²835-72; 9:1-36. The North, the region of cold and darkness, was the home of the evil spirits. Cf. Vend. 8:16, 21, 71; 7:2; 19:1.

water, and fire) were sacred parts of Ormazd's creation, it was a great crime to pollute these elements by burning or burying corpses or throwing them in water. The only proper way to dispose of the dead was to allow them to be devoured by beasts or birds on the top of hills, or, better still, within open towers called Dakhmas, built especially for this purpose. Some of the greatest crimes in the Zoroastrian code were offenses against this law of disposing of the dead. To carry a corpse alone was equally criminal, for in such instances the spirit of uncleanness took such forcible possession of the person that exorcism was utterly impossible. Death was the penalty for all such offenses.

As it was a good religious work to destroy as many Khrafstras as possible, so was it wrong to do anything that would lead even indirectly to their increase. Now it was thought that nail-parings and detached hairs when lodged in cracks in the floor and other lurking places bred various insects that ate up the corn in the fields and clothes in the wardrobe.¹ And so it was a religious duty not to throw them carelessly on the ground, but to bury them carefully in little holes, reciting over them certain formulas to keep off the daevas.

The multiplication of the Khrafstras could also be favored by maltreating the creatures of Ormazd that were thought to be especially adapted to their destruction. Foremost among these were the hedgehog, the beaver, and dogs of all kinds. To kill them or withhold them help and shelter when in distress was accounted a great crime. A preternatural power over demons was also ascribed to them. A good instance of this is the use they made of the dog to drive the Nasu from corpses and from persons affected with certain kinds of uncleanness. A similar power made the cock an object of religious reverence, for by his crowing he awakened the faithful at daybreak to their religious tasks and drove away Bushyasta, the long-fingered demon of sloth, who strove to keep the living world asleep and prevent the performance of good works.

From this summary it is plain that the religious code of the Vendidad was a logical outgrowth of the principle of dualism. While marred with superstitious exaggerations, it

taught a standard of moral conduct that justly excites admiration both for its completeness and its depth. It did not rest satisfied with external conduct; it insisted on the conformity of the will to the right order established by Ormazd.¹ The vices to which the people of the Orient were so prone, prostitution, abortion, unnatural lusts, were forbidden under the severest penalties. Fidelity to contracts, chastity, kindness to the poor, and industry were especially inculcated. It is the noblest code of morality to be found outside of the Bible.

THE YASHTS.

The word Yasht, like Yasna, means worship, sacrifice. It is applied to the collection of poetic and imaginative prayers, abounding in legendary lore, that were composed at a comparatively late period, in praise and adoration of Ormazd and his chief Yazads. Strictly speaking, they are but twenty in number. But in the same collection are included four other chapters of a didactic character.

The Yashts extol the power of their appropriate Yazads to bring blessings to the faithful and to smite Ahriman and his agents of wickedness. The advantage as well as the duty of offering them sacrifice is indirectly set forth by the enumeration of the legendary heroes who sacrificed to them in petition for certain boons and who received their request.² This lesson of religious worship is given even greater force by the example of Ormazd himself, who did not disdain to offer sacrifice to some of these deities,³ though they all owe their existence to his own creative power.

Of these Yashts the most poetic and interesting are the fifth, the eighth and the nineteenth. The fifth Yasht, in honor of the water-goddess Ardivi Sura Anahita, has the most complete account of the legendary heroes who offered sacrifice. It may have served as the model for the others. Another interesting feature of this Yasht is the detailed description of the dress and ornaments of the goddess.⁴ The character of this description led de Harlez to the surmise that it was no mere creation of the author's fancy, but a description of a

¹Cf. Vend. 18:17.

²Cf. Yasht 5:16-118; 9:32; 10:124; 15:41; 16:6-15; 17:24-52.

³Yasht 5:16-19;

8:25; 10:124; 15:2-4. ⁴vv. 126-129.

statue.¹ And as statues of Anahita were first introduced into Persia and Media by Artaxerxes Mnemon (404-361 B. C.), he concluded with a fair amount of likelihood that this Yasht was not composed before the fourth century B. C.

The eighth Yasht is the most poetic of all. It describes how the star-god Tishtrya manifests himself in the forms of a lovely youth, of a golden-horned bull, and of a beautiful white horse, promising an abundance of children, herds, and horses to those who gave him sacrifice. Then follows the description of the fierce battle which, as a white horse, he fights with the black horse-demon of drought, Apaosha. At first he is worsted after a three days' conflict, but strengthened by a sacrifice offered him by Mazda, he overcomes the demon, and plunging into the sea, churns the waters into a seething mass till the rain-clouds rise and bring refreshing moisture to the parched lands.

The nineteenth Yasht is chiefly occupied with the history of the kingly glory, a sort of brilliant nimbus created by Ormazd. A source of wisdom and a badge of authority as well, it abided with those destined to rule and teach the people. It was beyond reach of the unworthy, and passed from king to king when death or evil deed gave occasion for the change. The history of the transition of the kingly glory from Haoshyangha, the first king, through his long line of successors to Zoroaster and his royal protector Vishtaspa, embraces a number of interesting legends.

The last four chapters of the book of Yashts are quite different from the rest in character and contents. Of these, by far the most striking is the one which describes the different fates of the good and the bad soul after death. For three nights the departed soul hovers about its lifeless body, enjoying unspeakable pleasure or suffering the utmost misery, according as its earthly life was good or wicked. At the dawn of the fourth day the faithful soul is met by his conscience in the form of a beautiful young maiden, who praises him for his good deeds on earth. Passing in three steps through the regions of good thought, good word and good action, he enters into the paradise of boundless light, the home of Ormazd, and

¹Avesta, p. cxciii. Darmesteter is of the same opinion. *Zend-Avesta* II, 364.

feasts on the heavenly food prepared for the blessed. On the other hand, the wicked soul is conducted through the three regions of bad thought, bad word and bad action into the hell of boundless darkness, where Ahriman bids him eat of the noxious, foul-smelling food set apart for the wicked.

This same doctrine finds summary expression in the nineteenth chapter of the Vendidad.¹

There is another side of Avestan eschatology, which, as belonging to the later portions of the Avesta, and more particularly to the Yashts, may be fittingly considered here. It is the developed notion of the renovation of the world.

The Gathas themselves, as we have seen, speak of the day when the powers of evil shall be destroyed and the earth shall be renewed. But there is nothing positive in these passages to show that the idea of the resurrection was in the mind of the author. It is not till we come to the later parts of the Avesta that we find the notion of the resurrection plainly connected with that of the final renovation. Even then there are but three independent passages that refer to the resurrection in unmistakable terms.²

In the first of these, Vend. 18, 51, the idea of the resurrection is only indirectly expressed: "O Spenta Armaiti,³ I give this man to thy keeping. Restore him on the day when the world shall be happily renewed."

The other two passages are direct and explicit. The one is Yasht 19:88-89 and runs as follows: "We sacrifice to the awful Kingly Glory, created by Mazda, which will abide with the victorious Saoshyant and his friends, when he will make a new world, above the reach of sickness and death, decay and corruption . . . when the dead shall arise, when immortality shall come to the living, when the world shall be fittingly renewed."⁴

The other passage is found at the end of the short fragment numbered four in the Westergaard collection. It is a fragment of one of the lost nasks.⁵ Praising the power of one of the Gathic formulas, it declares, "Angro Mainyu⁶ will

¹vv. 27-34.

²Yasht 13: 129, according to Darmesteter, but not to de Harlez, alludes to the resurrection.

³Bountiful Wisdom, one of the Amshaspands and genius of the earth.

⁴This text is repeated in verses 11-12, 19-20, and 23-24 of the same Yasht.

⁵Zend Avesta, III, 5. ⁶Ahriman.

hide himself beneath the earth ; beneath the earth will the Daevas hide themselves. The dead will arise, life will return to the bodies, and they will be endowed with breath."

Closely associated with the resurrection is the notion of the Saoshyant or Savior. It is he who will break the power of Ahriman and the Daevas and will lead in the universal reign of happiness and peace. He is destined to be the direct son of Zoroaster, whose seed, miraculously preserved in the Lake Kasava and guarded by nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine Fravashis, will cause the Virgin Eretat-fedhri to conceive while bathing in its waters. It is only in the Pahlavi literature that a full and connected account of the Saoshyant is given, but the chief elements are to be found here and there in the later portions of the Avesta.¹

THE KHORDA AVESTA.

The Khorda Avesta, a sort of Book of Common Prayer, is the least important and the least original part of the Avesta. The prayers, with but few exceptions, are made up of extracts from other books, especially from the Yasna and the Yashts, and thus betray their comparatively late origin. While omitting, then, a detailed examination of these prayers as unnecessary for our purpose, we may note, in passing, the liturgical object of the prayer called the Afringan Gahanbar, the Gahanbar Benediction. This rite was performed on each of the six Gahanbars, religious feasts of five days' length that were celebrated at different intervals in the year to commemorate the six great acts of creation. The order of these commemorations recalls strikingly the process of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, namely, the heavens, the waters, the earth, the plants, the animals, and man.²

III.—RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND THE AVESTA. DISCUSSION OF THEIR ALLEGED AVESTAN ORIGIN.

The points of resemblance between the Avesta and the Bible are numerous and striking.

1. Like Jehovah, Ormazd is the supreme and all-wise spirit, the Creator of the visible and invisible universe, the Sustainer

¹Vend. 19:5. Yasht 13:62, 142; 19:89-92.

²Zend-Avesta, I, p. 37. Harlez, Avesta, CLXV.

of its wonderful order, the source of all holiness and prosperity. This noble conception is marred, however, by the dualistic idea, according to which his supremacy is limited by the evil spirit Ahriman and his hostile creations.

2. Ormazd, like Jehovah, is not alone in the government of the world. He has a host of ministering spirits, the Amshaspands, the Fravashis and the other Yazads, to execute his plans for the maintenance of due order in the physical world and for the preservation of his holy law in the hearts of men.

3. As the perfect order of Jehovah's creation is marred by the evil designs of Satan and his agents, so the creation of Ormazd is subject to the blighting influence of Ahriman and the Daevas. In both religions evil spirits possess human beings and produce different forms of disease.

4. Just as Jehovah sends His prophet Moses to teach His holy law to the chosen people, and thus establish His kingdom on earth, so in like manner Ormazd reveals his holy law to Zoroaster and makes him his divinely authorized prophet to teach that law to men. Both religions thus claim to be divinely revealed. Each has as its founder a great prophet and law-giver, and to make the analogy still more striking, Zoroaster, like Moses, is no mighty warrior or king, but a man of weakness.¹

5. The Old Testament enkindles hope in the Messiah, who is to be born of a virgin, and who will establish the eternal reign of peace. The Avesta teaches that in the fulness of time a virgin will conceive of Zoroaster's seed, miraculously preserved in the waters of Kasava, and will give birth to the Saoshyant, who will destroy the powers of evil and bring about the final renovation of the world.

6. In regard to the state of the soul after death, Mazdeism is even more explicit than early Judaism. One of the most striking things in the earliest books of the Old Testament is the absence of appeal to rewards and punishments after death as a sanction of conduct and as a ground of religious consolation. Throughout the whole Avesta the future life, with its rewards and punishments, is constantly kept in view.

7. Both religions include among their doctrines that of the

¹S. 20: 9.

resurrection. As we have already seen, it is open to question whether the earliest part of the Avesta, the Gathas, contains traces of this belief. It is only in the latest portions of the Avesta that the resurrection is referred to in unmistakable terms.

8. According to Genesis, God created the universe in six days. According to the Avesta, Ormazd created the world in six periods within the space of a year. The order of these creations, commemorated as we have seen by the six Afringan Gahanbars, very nearly coincides with that of Genesis, namely, heaven, waters, earth, plants, animals, man.¹

9. Corresponding with the deluge of Genesis is the winter of snow and cold in Vendidad.² Yima, the Mazdean Noah, saves life on the earth from utter destruction by building an underground garden, in which he puts choice specimens of men and of all kinds of animals and plants.

10. In the moral order the similarities are striking. In the Old Testament there are abundant instances to show that the law of holiness did not simply concern external conduct, but laid hold of the will and the heart.³ But it remained for the teaching of Christ to bring this feature out into striking prominence. Now, it is remarkable that the Avesta, even in its most ancient hymns, lays great stress on the internal element of the religious and moral life, and speaks constantly of good and bad thoughts, words and actions.⁴

The Mazdean, like the Jewish religion, teaches the dignity of labor, kindness to the poor, favors prolific marriage, denounces all forms of unchastity, especially those against nature.⁵

11. In both religions great stress is laid on the distinction between clean and unclean. The division of animal and plant creation into the creatures of Ormazd and those of Ahriman, finds its parallel in the Old Testament division of animals into clean and unclean.⁶ Both religions likewise teach that con-

¹Zend-Avesta, I, 37.

²Ch. 2.

³Cf. Gen. VI, 5. Deut. V, 21; XV, 9. Ezek. XXXVIII, 10. Prov. XII, 5; XV, 26; XXIV, 9.

⁴In Ps. XVI, 3-5, this threefold distinction is recognized.

⁵It is debated whether incestuous marriages of the first degree are favored by the Avesta proper, though it was practised at times in Persia. Cf. Darm. Zend-Avesta I, p. 126 seq.; West S. B. E. XVIII, p. 389 seq.; Contra, de Harlez, Avesta, CLXXI.

⁶Cf. Levit. XI.

tact with the dead, childbirth, the menstrual flow in woman and the seminal flow in man are the sources of uncleanness.¹ The unclean communicates his defilement to whatever person or thing he touches. Especially heinous is sexual union with a woman in her monthly sickness.² In both religions there are laws of purification for persons and things defiled, an especial form of purification being required to remove uncleanness resulting from contact with the dead.³

12. One of the resemblances pointed out between the Avesta and the New Testament is the temptation of Zoroaster compared with that of our Blessed Savior. Ahriman, having tried in vain to kill Zoroaster, offers him the dominion of the earth if he will renounce the law of Mazda, but the saint repels the tempter and declares his readiness to accept death rather than prove false to his Maker.⁴

13. The other is the analogy pointed out by Bréal⁵ and others between the seven-headed dragon⁶ of the Apocalypse and the three-headed dragon of the Avesta, Azhi Dahaka. The identification of the apocalyptic dragon with "that old serpent who is called the devil and satan, who seduceth the whole world,"⁷ has also given rise to the surmise that the serpent of Genesis, too, has something in common with the Avestan dragon.

These are the main points of resemblance between the two religions, but to make the comparison complete we may note a number of analogies found in the Pahlavi literature, but derived doubtless from some of the lost nasks of the Avesta.

14. One of these analogies is the story of Mashya and Mashyoi, the first human pair, from which the human race is descended. Like Adam and Eve they sinned and fell under the power of the evil spirit.⁸

15. The Gaokerena, the White Haoma Tree, whose leaves, eaten by men at the renovation of the world, will give immortality, reminds one of the Tree of Life in Genesis. As the latter was guarded by cherubim, so the Gaokerena, growing in the water, is guarded by ten fish.⁹

16. The apportioning of the earth by the hero Thraetona

¹Cf. Lev. XII and XV.

²Lev. XV, 24; XX, 18.

³Cf. Num. XIX.

⁴Vend. 19:6-7.

⁵Mélanges, p. 126.

⁶Ch. 12.

⁷Apoc. 12:9.

⁸Bundahish, 15; S. B. E., V, 52 seq.

⁹Bund.

18:62; S. B. E., V. 65.

to his three sons, Airya, Sairima, and Tura, recalls the division of the earth by Noah between his three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet.¹

17. Finally, the story of Joshua stopping the sun is paralleled by that of Hushedhar, one of the future sons of Zoroaster. He stops the sun for ten days and nights and thereby wins the nations to the religion of Mazda.²

Having thus reviewed the many points of resemblance between the Avesta and the Bible, it remains for us to examine critically the question whether the latter is under obligation to the former for the possession of any of these common features.

It is well at the very outset to bear in mind a truth that is very often lost sight of in the comparison of different forms of religion. That truth is, that similarities of belief in different religions do not necessarily imply identity of origin, or indebtedness of one of these religions to the other. Where no historical influence can be shown, it is extremely rash to attribute to an earlier religion the credit of originating certain features that it has in common with a later one. By forgetting this principle writers have often been led into egregious blunders. Note, for example, the attempt to derive the teachings of the New Testament in great measure from those of Buddhism on the ground of the striking resemblances existing between them. The attempt is now recognized by the best Oriental scholars as an utter failure. The words of Prof. Rhys Davids on the subject are worthy of citation. He declares: "Very little reliance can be placed without careful investigation on a resemblance, however close at first sight, between a passage in the Pâli Pitakas and a passage in the New Testament. It is true that many passages in these two literatures can be easily shown to have a similar tendency. But when some writers, on the basis of such similarities, proceed to agree that there must have been some historical connexion between the two, and that the New Testament as the latter must be the borrower, I venture to think that they are wrong. There does not seem to me to be the slightest historical connexion-

¹Dinkart VIII; Ch. 13:9; S. B. E. XXXVII, p. 28.

²Bahman Yasht, III, 45-48; S. B. E., V, 231-2.

ion between them. And whenever the resemblance is a real one it is due not to any borrowing on the one side or on the other, but solely to the similarity of the conditions under which the two movements grew."¹

Now it is just such a mistake as this that writers like Dr. Mills and Dr. Everett commit when they conclude, the one that the temptation of Zoroaster furnished the model for the story of Christ's temptation,² the other that the dragon of the Apocalypse is identical with Azhi Dahaka.³ The story of Christ's temptation has no more dependence on the temptation of Zoroaster than on that of Buddha.⁴ In like manner, the Apocalyptic dragon has as little connexion with Azhi Dahaka as with the Babylonian dragon of Tiamat⁵ or the Egyptian serpent Apap.⁶

The great majority of the features that the Old Testament has in common with the Avesta are so plainly mentioned in the oldest parts of Sacred Scripture and are so closely knit with what is distinctive and essential in the Jewish religion as to leave no doubt of their independent origin. Such are the monotheism of the Old Testament, the revelation of the law through Moses, the promise of the Messiah, the moral teachings, the stories of the creation, of Adam and Eve, of the Tree of Life, of the Deluge, of the division of the earth among the three sons of Noah, of Joshua staying the sun.⁷ This much is admitted by all. But, as we have seen, many scholars declare that the Jewish conceptions of angels, demons, immortality, future rewards and punishments, and the resurrection are the result of Persian influence. To them Dr. Mills adds the distinction of clean and unclean. Their argument is as follows:

Before the period of the Captivity there is no evidence that these common doctrines formed part of the Jewish belief.

¹S. B. E., XI, p. 165-6. Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 126, n. 1; Kuenen, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1882, p. 334-7.

²*Nineteenth Century*, 1894, p. 52-53.

³*New World*, 1885, p. 15.

⁴Cf. Oldenberg.

⁵Lenormant, *Hist. Ancienne de l'Orient*, V, p. 243.

⁶Tiele, *Geschichte der Religion im Alterthum*, p. 33; de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, I, p. 283.

⁷See above Nos. 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

But during and after the Captivity they receive recognition in the Sacred Writings. Now, this was the very time when the Jews were brought into close contact with the Persians, whose religion, as set forth in the Avesta, taught these very doctrines in unmistakable terms. And so the only natural inference is that the Jewish religion is indebted for this part of its creed to the Persian.

The argument, at first sight, looks plausible. A close examination, however, shows it to be far from convincing.

In the first place it should be noted that some of these tenets, while presenting points of resemblance, are yet, in other respects, so utterly at variance as to make it doubtful whether the one could have been directly borrowed from the other. Take for instance the notion of unclean animals in Leviticus. How different it is, in spite of striking resemblances, from that of the Vendidad. In Leviticus, the unclean as well as the clean animals are recognized as God's creatures. The distinction of clean and unclean is based largely on physical differences. In the Vendidad, on the other hand, the unclean animals are all those created by the evil spirit. Nor is the application of the notion of clean and unclean the same in both legislations. Thus Leviticus forbids as unclean the eating of the camel¹ and the swine,² but allows the eating of locusts and grasshoppers.³ On the other hand, locusts and grasshoppers were an abomination to the Mazdean,⁴ while camels⁵ and swine⁶ were looked upon as clean.

If we compare the notion of Satan with that of Ahriman we find the one by no means identical with the other. Both agree in that they are hostile to God and bent on seducing man and doing harm to God's creation. But here the parity ends. Satan is a fallen creature of God, destined to live forever, but shorn at last of his power to do evil. Ahriman is a spirit evil by nature, uncreated like Ormazd himself, but destined to final destruction. Satan's power for evil is only what God chooses to allow him. Ahriman's is independent of Ormazd and is more dreadful. Satan can only mar what God has created. Ahriman can do more. He can create demons,

¹XI., 4. ²XI., 7. ³XI., 21, 22.
ast II., 58, in S. B. E., V. 260.

⁴See above.

⁵Vend 22:3.

⁶Shayast la Shay-

noxious animals and plants. So different, in short, is the notion of Satan from that of Ahriman that Ewald, who attributes the development of Jewish doctrine partly to Zoroastrian influence, declares of Satan : "But the whole conception is Hebrew : to trace it to Persian sources is groundless and unhistorical."¹

But the theory under review has far greater difficulties than these to contend with. It is plain that if it is to make good its claims to trustworthiness, it must establish beyond doubt two very important points. It must demonstrate, first, that the Persians, in the period of contact with the Jews, held the religious tenets which they are supposed to have contributed to the theology of the Old Testament; secondly, that no trace of these doctrines can be found in the books of the Old Testament written before this period of contact.

Now, it is significant that neither of these points is capable of rigorous proof; nay, the evidence against the second point is so strong as to render the theory in the highest degree improbable.

First of all, the important question presents itself, when did the Jews, who formed the Old Testament, come into close contact with the Persians? This is a question which is often overlooked, and yet its solution is of the greatest value in the present discussion. Thus it is often taken for granted that the Jews were brought under Persian influence during the Captivity. We have already quoted Dr. Everett, who considers it a generally admitted truth that the Jews of the Captivity received their notion of Satan from the Parsees. But it is plain that during the Captivity the Jews were exposed to Babylonian, not to Persian, influences. During this entire period the relations between these two monarchies were strained. It was not till Cyrus overthrew Babylon in 539 B. C. that intimate relations between the Persians and the Jews of Babylon were possible, and even then we must allow for a certain length of time before the religion of the Persians could begin to exert its influence on that of the Jews. It is thus out of the question to speak of Persian influence before the end of the Captivity, 536 B. C., nor is it at all likely that such

¹Old and New Testament Theology, p. 72.

influence could have made itself felt at so early a date. But for the sake of argument, we may assume that the period of Persian influence began at the close of the Babylonian captivity.

Now, what sort of religious influence could the Persians of that period have exerted on the Jews? Did they themselves include in their religious belief those doctrines which the Jews are declared to have borrowed from them? This capital question does not admit of a positive answer. Those who speak so confidently of the indebtedness of the Old Testament to Persian theology generally take it for granted that from the time of Cyrus onward the religion of Persia was identical with the religion of the Avesta. But this very point has never yet been demonstrated. On the contrary, it has been seriously called in question by scholars of great ability. Professor Sayce¹ and Halévy² have both put forth the thesis that Cyrus was no Mazda-worshipper at all, for Babylonian cylinders have been found in which he is put on record as a worshipper of Babylonian gods.³ To this conclusion Professor Cheyne has also given full assent, and says: "We now know that the Aryan and Zoroastrian element did not obtain supremacy in the Achaemenian empire till the accession of Darius, too late to exercise any marked influence on Jewish modes of thought."⁴

But even if we admit with Kuenen⁵ and others that Cyrus, like Darius, was a Mazda-worshipper, it by no means follows that the Achaemenian kings were Zoroastrians.⁶ The original home of the Avesta is still a matter of dispute among Iranian scholars. Some place it in Media, others in Bactria or some other eastern province of Iran.⁷ But one thing is certain, it did not take form in Persia. Neither the language of the Gathas nor that of the later Avesta can be classed with the Persian dialects.

The religion of the Avesta was thus an importation into Persia, doubtless insignificant at first, but rising gradually in importance till it finally overshadowed the old belief and be-

¹Cf. Academy, Oct. 16, 1880, pp. 276-7.

²Revue des études juives, No. 1, pp. 41-63.

³Cheyne, Prophecies of Isaiah, II, pp. 289-91, also I, pp. 305-306; de Harlez, Avesta CCXIII.

⁴Prophecies of Isaiah, II, p. 294.

⁵Hibbert Lectures, 1882, p. 320.

⁶This is patent in the case of Cyrus. The worship of strange gods was an abomination to the Zoroastrian.

⁷Cf. de la Saussaye, II, pp. 17-18.

came itself the religion of state. When this important movement was accomplished is still a problem for Iranian scholars. But according to many, it did not take place before the time of Artaxerxes. Inscriptions of this king and of his predecessors, Xerxes and Darius, are still extant on the royal tombs at Nackhs-i-Rustem and on the rocks of Alvand, Behistun, and on the ruins of Persepolis, Murghab, Khorkor and Susa.¹ While professing to be faithful followers of Anramazda, they make no mention of the Amshaspands or of Ahriman, and at the same time provide for their burial in tombs, a hideous abomination for the Zoroastrian. In the face of such evidence de Harlez, and even Mills, conclude that the state religion of Persia during this period could not have been that of the Avesta. In his work on the Avesta² he submits this question to a long and detailed examination, and sums up the results of his study as follows: "The conclusion which plainly results from this long investigation is that in all the texts of antiquity touching on the religious belief and practices of the Persians, one may look in vain for a word pointing to the influence of the Avesta within the empire of the Achæmenidæ. On the contrary, everything goes to show that its prescriptions were entirely unknown, that the people were ignorant of its rites and ceremonies. The religion of ancient Persia was Iranian, but not Avestan."³

Dr. Mills, who treats the subject more succinctly in his introduction to the Gathas, ⁴ thinks the religion of the inscriptions may have been a form of Mazda-worship similar to that of the Gathas, "but that it was the later and fully developed Zarathushtrianism, provided with all the regulations of the Vendidad, seems out of the question."⁵ His embarrassment in accounting for the unavestan language and practices of Darius reveals itself, when he says, "He was either a heretical schismatic departing from a sacred precept, or he was following the creed of his fathers, a Mazda-worshipper, but not of Zarathushtra's order, or if a Zarathushtrian, then a partial inheritor of Zarathushtra's religion at an undeveloped stage, when burial was not as yet forbidden by it; and at the same

¹Mills, *New World*, 1895, p. 47; Ragozin, *Media*, pp. 282, 369.

²Pp. ix-xviii, cexi-cexlii.

³p. cexlii.

⁴S. B. E. xxxi, p. xxx-xxxii.

⁵P. xxx.

time he neglected also prominent doctrines of the Gathas."¹ His final conclusion seems to be that Darius and his chieftains adhered to a more ancient and simple form of Mazdaism, while the masses were captivated by the novelties of the later Zoroastrianism.² It is plain to see that his statement in regard to the religion of the masses is a supposition on his part. He does not support it by a single proof. On the other hand, the inscription of Darius on the rock of Behistun bears witness to the fact that before as well as after the short usurpation of the throne by the Magian Gomates, the religion professed by Darius was the widespread religion of state. In this inscription, after narrating how with Anramazda's help he overthrew the Magian Gomates, Darius proceeds: "The empire that had been wrested from our race I recovered, I restored to its place, as in the days of old, so I did. The temples which Gaumata the Magian had destroyed I rebuilt. I restored to the state the sacred chants and worship and entrusted them to the families which had been deprived of them by Gaumata the Magian."³

We see then, how far from the certainty of an established truth is the hypothesis that the religion of the Avesta prevailed in Persia under Cyrus and his immediate successors. It is evident that there is need of a more solid basis before one can proceed with any degree of trustworthiness to point to the teachings of the Avesta as the sources of Jewish theology.

Another important consideration, often overlooked, is this: It is now generally admitted that while the Gathas may date from the eighth century, or, according to some, from a much greater antiquity, the rest of the Avesta is comparatively recent. Even Geldner, who gives a high antiquity to the Gathas, placing them in the fourteenth century B. C., admits that the latest parts of the Avesta may be no earlier than the fourth century, B. C.,⁴ and de Harlez gives reasons to show that much of the later Avesta was written after the fifth or fourth century B. C.⁵ Spiegel held that the whole Avesta was not written before Alexander the Great. And Mills himself says of the Avesta, exclusive of the Gathas: "Placing, then, the

¹P. xxxi. ²P. xxxii.

³Cf. Kuenen, *National and Universal Religion*, p. 320; Ragozin, *Media*, p. 366.

⁴Cf. *Ency. Brit.* 9th ed. vol. XVIII, p. 654. ⁵*Avesta*, p. cxciii.

oldest portions of the later Avesta somewhat earlier than Darius, we are obliged to extend the period during which its several parts were composed, so far as perhaps to the third or fourth century before Christ, the half-spurious matter contained in them being regarded as indefinitely later."³ Now, remembering that the home of the Avesta was not Persia, but some other province of Iran, we have grave reasons to suspect that the writings of the later Avesta could have reached Persia in time to exercise any important influence on the formation of Jewish theology.

This consideration tells with especial force against the assertion that the Jews took their belief in the resurrection from the Avesta. As we have already seen, there are but three reliable testimonies in the Avesta to the belief in the resurrection, and they all belong to the later development of Zoroastrianism. The least explicit of these, Vendidad 18:51, occurs in a section which is unique in character and which, from its total lack of connection with what precedes, may be safely set down as an interpolation. At any rate, the nature of its contents points to an origin, at the very least, as late as that of the first chapter of the Vendidad, which Mills places at about 500 B. C.²

It is to the other two testimonies, Yasht 19: 88, 89, and Fragment IV., that Mills appeals to show that the Bible is indebted to the Avesta for the doctrine of the resurrection. But it is to be observed that the dates he assigns to these two texts, 500 B. C. and 300 B. C. respectively,³ are, like that of Vendidad, 18:51, quite inadequate to prove the point at issue, for long before Avestan texts composed in 500 B. C. could become familiar to the Persians and through them to the Jews, the notion of the resurrection was plainly set forth in the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah.

Having thus seen that solid evidence is lacking to show that the Jews under Cyrus and his immediate successors were brought into acquaintance with the teachings of the Avesta, nay, that the very existence of the doctrine of the resurrection

¹S. B. E., XXI, p. xxxvii.

²"Nineteenth Cent.," 1894, p. 50.

³Ibid., p. 560, de Harlez claims that Yasht 19 belongs to the Avestan literature of most recent date. Avesta, p. cxlviii.

in the Avesta of that period is beyond the reach of demonstration, let us turn to the early writings of the Old Testament and test the truth of the assertion that before contact with the Persians under Cyrus, the Jews were ignorant of the distinction of clean and unclean, of angels, of demons, of the doctrines of immortality, the resurrection and retribution after death.

As has already been pointed out, the time of contact cannot be put earlier than the close of the captivity, 536 B. C. Hence the writers belonging to the period of the captivity may be used as witnesses no less than those of an earlier age. For the sake of argument, we shall confine ourselves to those parts of Scripture which in the eyes of all but the most radical scholars have a solid claim to an antiquity greater than 536 B. C.

First, it is undeniable that the recognition of clean and unclean things existed among the Jews long before their contact with the Persians. For even those who take Leviticus 11-15 to be part of the Priests' Code admit that these chapters embody pre-exilic usage.¹ The distinction of clean and unclean is found in the fourteenth chapter of Deut., a book recognized by radical scholars to be not later than 621 B. C.² Allusion is made to it in the book of Judges,³ when the mother of Samson is warned not to "eat any unclean thing."

If the early distinction of clean and unclean in the Old Testament admits of easy proof, still more patent is the early Jewish belief in angels. Indeed, so abundant are the references to angels in the most ancient parts of the Old Testament, that it is all but incredible that any one should ascribe the Jewish angelology to the Avestas. The very notion of guardian angels, prevalent in the rabbinical age and derived by some with the utmost assurance from the Avestan Fravashis, is implied in the numerous Old Testament accounts of angels providing for the safety and welfare of individuals. It is two angels who protect Lot and his family and save them from the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.⁴ It is an angel of the

¹Driver, *Introd.*, p. 135. In his *Religion of Israel*, Kuenen says: "The precepts concerning clean and unclean which occupy so large a space in it (*i. e.*, the redaction of Esdras) are of Israelitish origin." Vol. III, p. 36, London, 1895.

²Driver, p. 81. ³XIII, 4, 7. ⁴Gen. XVIII.

Lord who comforts Hagar on both occasions of her distress.¹ It is an angel of the Lord who stayed Abraham's hand as it was uplifted to sacrifice his son.² It was an angel of the Lord that appeared to Gideon and promised assistance to smite the Midianites.³ It was an angel that fed Elias in the wilderness.⁴ The 90th Psalm does but sum up the protective ministration of the angels as exemplified in these numerous texts, when it declares: "For he hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways; in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone."

It is plain from this mass of evidence, which is far from exhaustive, that the conception of angels and of guardian-spirits as well was not foreign to the early developments of Hebrew doctrine. To seek the origin of guardian angels in the fantastic Fravashis of the Avesta is utterly uncalled for.

But, it is urged, is not the notion of the "seven spirits" who "stand before the throne"⁵ who are "sent forth into all the earth"⁶ taken from that of the "seven Amshaspands" mentioned in the Yasht devoted to the Fravashis? "We sacrifice to the good, powerful, beneficent Fravashis of the just; to those of the Amesha Spentas, the sovereign beings with benign eye—who have, all seven, the same thought, all seven, the same word, all seven, the same action."⁷ As de Harlez has shown,⁸ this analogy is by no means exact. For the Amshaspands, in the ordinary sense, are but six. It is only by reckoning Ormazd himself among them that they can be called seven. If, in like manner, we were to include God among the spirits that stand before the throne we should have eight, not seven. It is out of the question then to see in the notion of the seven spirits a result of Avestan influence. Much more natural would it be to explain this unexpected and awkward combination of Ormazd and his six Amshaspands as an unsuccessful attempt to imitate the Jewish conception of the seven spirits. The fact that it finds expression but twice in the whole Avesta, and that too in the very latest parts, seems to prove this assumption.

¹Gen. XVI, 9; XXI, 17. ²Gen. XXII, 11-15. ³Judge VI, 11-23. ⁴III Kings, XIX, 4-7.

Vv. 11, 12. Driver says this psalm "may be presumed to be pre-exilic (introd., p. 363); though Cheyne on very insufficient grounds thinks it may belong to the time of Esdras (Bampt. Lect., p. 73.)

⁸Tobias XII, 15. ⁶Apoc. V, 6. ⁷Yasht 13:82; 19:15-16. ⁸Rev. Biblique, Apr. 1896, p. 169.

The evidence for early Jewish belief in the evil spirit, in demoniacal possession and demoniacal causes of disease, while not so abundant as the evidence for belief in angels, is still ample enough to show that the Jews were familiar with these notions long before the close of the Captivity, that is, before the time of contact with the Persians.

The story of the temptation in the third chapter of Genesis involves the notion of the evil spirit seducing Eve under the form of a serpent. But since the cogency of this inference is called in question by some, we can appeal to other ancient passages where the belief in evil spirits is brought plainly into view. Thus in the Song of Moses the unfaithful Israelites are said to have sacrificed to devils, and not to God.¹ The first book of Kings relates how Saul was afflicted with an evil spirit.² But most striking of all is the figure of Satan in the book of Job.³ Now, as the book of Job, even in the opinion of radical scholars like Kuenen, Davidson and Cheyne,⁴ belongs to the period of the Captivity, it is itself a sufficient refutation of the assertion that the Jews were ignorant of the devil until they came in contact with the Persians. It does but bear out the statement, already quoted, of the acute scholar Ewald: "The whole conception (of Satan) is Hebrew; to trace it to Persian sources is groundless and unhistorical."⁴

Nor need we look to Persian or Avestan theology for the origin of the Jewish belief in demoniacal disease and possession. The power of the devil to take possession of men and to inflict disease is clearly implied in the story of Saul's affliction by the evil spirit and in that of Job's disease produced by Satan.

The presence of an Avestan demon in the book of Tobias⁵ is often appealed to as proof that the Jewish notion of the devil was borrowed from the Persians. With much better show of reason might one argue that the Babylonian night hag, Lilith,⁶ which figured so prominently in rabbinical

¹Deut. XXXII, 17. Cf. Lev. XVII, 7. ²I. Kings, XVI, 14-23. ³I, 10-12; II, 7. Cf. Driver, pp. 405-8.

⁴Cheyne, Bamp. Lect., p. 271, says: "Nor can it be shown that that poetical masterpiece of the Exile, the Book of Job, presents any undoubtedly Iranian affinities. If anything there has been borrowed, it has been so Hebraized as to be undistinguishable from genuine Hebrew material."

⁵Tobias III, 8. ⁶Cf. Lenormant, *Hist. de l'Orient*, V, p. 276.

demon-law, and which receives mention in Scripture¹ long before the Asmodeus of Tobias, points to the religion of Babylon as the source of Jewish belief in the devil.

The attempt of some Catholic apologists to disprove all connection between Asmodeus and Aeshma Daeva of the Avesta on the ground that the former is a demon of impurity while the latter is a demon of violence, does not commend itself to sound judgment.² For Asmodeus nowhere appears in Tobias as tempting to impurity, but rather as killing the bridegrooms as soon as they have exposed themselves to his power through unrestrained desire. Hence the name Aeshma Daeva, Asmodeus, the Violent Demon, is peculiarly suited to his character. It is easy to suppose that the writer of Tobias, wishing to give a name to the demon he put in his story, took one ready to hand, as supplied by the religion of the Avesta, just as the Jews of a later period called Satan Beelzebub, after the god of Accaron.³ It is plain that such an action does but presuppose the belief of the writer in the devil. To hold that the notion of the devil first came into Jewish theology with the book of Tobias is an anachronism.

We have thus found evidence enough in the early Scriptures to show beyond reasonable doubt that before contact with the Persians the Jews recognized the distinction of clean and unclean, and believed in the existence of good and bad spirits. It remains to be seen if they were likewise acquainted with the doctrines concerning the life after death.

It must be confessed that the early books of the Old Testament are singularly deficient in reference to the future life. One would naturally expect that the chosen people, so weak in faith and so prone to sin, would have had repeatedly and solemnly impressed upon them the powerful sanction of future rewards and punishments. And yet, in the very books which treat of the laws of moral and religious conduct, prosperity and misfortune in the present life are the only motives to which appeal is made. In those early parts of Scripture that deal with the trials of the just and the prosperity of the

¹Isaiah XXXIV, 14. Cf. Cheyne, *Prophecies of Isaiah*, I, 197.

²Cf. *Revue des Religions*, 1889, p. 202. Curious to note, Max Müller, following Bréal (*Mélanges*, pp. 123-4), makes the opposite mistake of taking Aeshma Daeva to be the demon of concupiscence. "Chips From a German Workshop," I, p. 145.

³IV Kings I, 2.

wicked, the promise of the resurrection and of future rewards would have come most suitably as a strength and consolation. The fact, then, that clear and explicit mention of these doctrines is not made in the earlier parts of the Old Testament is taken by many as safe evidence that they did not, from the first, form part of the popular belief. Revealed at first vaguely to the minds of the chosen few, they gradually assumed more definite shape, till, at length, they burst into clear view and became the common possession of the people. They were revealed only in germ; their fulness of import was recognized only after a long period of development.

Still there is evidence in the more ancient parts of the Old Testament to show that the notion of immortality was not altogether absent from the minds of the early Jews. In the first place their belief in the existence of good and bad spirits is scarcely conceivable without a corresponding belief in the persistence of the soul after death. Again, the notion of immortality is implied in the assumption of Enoch¹ and of Elias.² The prohibition against seeking information from the dead,³ as well as the story of Saul consulting the spirit of Samuel,⁴ shows that in the minds of the ancient Israelites all did not end with death. The yearning for the future beatific life finds expression in a number of the Psalms,⁵ and notably in the book of Job,⁶ which, as we have seen, can solidly claim an antiquity as great as the time of the Captivity. And in the remarkable words of Osee,⁷ the prophet of tottering Israel, "For he hath taken us and he will heal us; he will strike and he will cure us. He will revive us after two days. On the third day he will raise us up and we shall live in his sight," as well as in the prophet Ezekiel's⁸ famous vision of the revived bones, we have allegorical language that naturally implies the conscious idea of the resurrection, the idea which culminates in the beautiful promise in the twenty-sixth chapter of Israel: "Thy dead men shall live; my slain shall rise again. Awake and give praise, ye that dwell in the dust."⁹ Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the contention of

¹ Gen. V, 24.² IV Kings, II, 11.³ Deut, XVIII, 10.⁴ I Kings, XXVIII, 7-20.⁵ Ps. 15:10, 11; 16:15; 22:4; 48:16. Cf. Cheyne, Bamp. Lect., p. 389, seq.⁶ XIX, 25-26. Cf. Driver, p. 394.⁷ VI, 2.⁸ XXXVII, 1-10.⁹ Verse 19.

scholars like Delitzsch, Dillmann, Driver and Cheyne, that this prophecy belongs to the early post-exilic period,¹ it surely antedates the earliest positive proof of the resurrection idea in the Avesta.²

The limits of this essay do not allow a discussion of the view supported by eminent scholars, as Spiegel, Justi, de Harlez, Halévy, and others, that the Gathas were composed only in the eighth or seventh century B. C., and that their religious conceptions are in part the product of Semitic influence exercised by the Israelite captives whom Sargon transported into Media after the fall of Samaria."³ Neither is there room to examine the startling theory put forth by Darmesteter that the Gathas can not claim an antiquity greater than the first century of our era, and that the Avestan religion, while remotely ancient in its main features, shows traces of Jewish, no less than Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Greek influences.⁴

Whether such views be accepted or not, they show, at all events, that Iranian scholars are by no means unanimous on the question of the relations of the Old Testament with the Avesta.

The argument of this essay may be summed up as follows : If the Bible is indebted to the Avesta for its teachings concerning ceremonial purity, angels, demons, and the future life, the earliest date to which we can assign such an influence is the period immediately following the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, when for the first time the Jews were brought into close contact with the Persians. But far from being demonstrated, it is still a matter of grave doubt whether the Persians of that period professed the religion of the Avesta. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence in the exilic and pre-exilic Scriptures to show that the doctrines in question, while lacking the fullness of import of later times, were already known to the Jews before Persian, still less, Avestan influences were possible. The natural conclusion is that the attempt to trace these important features of biblical theology to the Avesta as their origin, must be set down as a failure.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

¹Cf. Driver, *Introd.*, p. 210.

²Cheyne says of this text: "The vague and incidental character of the reference in this passage is itself a warrant of its underived origin." *The Prophecies of Isaiah*, I, 157.

³Max Müller makes a partial concession to this theory when he says that the monotheism of the Avesta may have come from Jewish sources. Cf. *Gifford Lectures*, 1889, p. 48-49.

⁴*Zend-Avesta*, III, pp. xx-c.

EMPIRICAL UTILITARIANISM.¹

Principles of Philosophy. Paley's. London, 1785.

Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation ; and Deontology.

Jeremy Bentham. Edited by Sir J. Bowring. Edinburgh, 1843.

Dissertations and Discussions. John Stuart Mill. London, 1859.

Utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill. London, 1863.

Autobiography. John Stuart Mill. London, 1873.

Westminster Review. Passim, 1824-1829.

The Utilitarian principle that pleasure is the object of desire is sustained broadly in:

The Science of Ethics. Leslie Stephen. London.

The Emotions and Will. Chap. XV: The Moral Sense. Alexander Bain. London.

Outlines of Psychology. James Sully. New York, 1891.

Microcosmus. Hermann Lotze. Translation. Edinburgh.

The system is criticised in:

Types of Ethical Theory. James Martineau. London, 1882.

History of European Morals. W. E. H. Leckey. London, 1890.

Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy. John Grote. London, 1870.

The Methods of Ethics. Henry Sidgwick. London, 1890.

Pure Logic and other Minor Works. W. Stanley Jevons, London, 1890.

The Data of Ethics. Herbert Spencer. London, 1879.

L' Idée Moderne du Droit. A. Fouillé. Paris, 1892.

La Morale Utilitaire. Carrau. Paris, 1890.

In the preparation of this essay the writer has derived considerable assistance from Mr. W. S. Lilly's *Right and Wrong*, London, 1893, and from M. l'Abbé Maurice de Baetes' *Les Bases de la Morale et du Droit*, Paris, 1892.

Nearly seventy years ago, shortly after the term Utilitarianism had been accepted to designate a new form of an old theory of ethics, a celebrated writer, who frequently allowed his love of antithesis to carry him beyond the bounds of good taste, wrote that, though quibbling about self-interest and motives and objects of desire, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number is but a poor employment for a grown man, it certainly hurts the health less than hard drinking

¹The principles of modern Utilitarianism and the supporting arguments are best found in the above works.

and the fortune less than high play. It is not much more laughable than phrenology, and is immeasurably more humane than cock fighting. In the interval that has elapsed since these words were written, Utilitarianism, after rising to a commanding eminence in English thought, has been relegated by most ethical teachers to the realms of rejected systems. Its inconsistencies and shortcomings have again and again been laid bare by critics of opposite schools, so that today it has as few patrons as phrenology or that once popular pastime with which Macaulay set it in favorable contrast.

But, though it is long since exploded as a system, much of its once far-reaching influence still endures. No student of present day literature, in which the jargon of altruism so widely abounds, can fail to recognize that in many minds the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is looked upon as an adequate philosophical basis for the loftiest morality. It is not, therefore, superfluous, even to-day, to expose the unreality of Utilitarianism.

The doctrine which makes of utility the supreme criterion of right and wrong is not of recent origin, for we find its characteristic tenet taught in the old Cyrenaic school, which held pleasure to be the end of life, and recognized no distinction of quality between various kinds of pleasure. Epicurus, insisting that a truly happy life must be one guided by reason, taught that, while happiness is the end of life, this happiness is constituted, not by the aggregate of passing moments of gratification, but by that prudent direction of life which so regulates conduct as to obtain from all sources of experience the maximum of agreeable feeling. Modern hedonism, gradually developing through the successive modifications made by Paley, Bentley and John Stuart Mill, differs from the old chiefly because it professes to take for its standpoint, not the individual, but society or mankind. The old hedonism was egoistic, the new altruistic. Paley progressed but little beyond the old hedonistic lines, recognizing no difference in pleasures, except in their continuance and degrees of intensity, and his utilitarianism is still egoistic. Bentham admitted a variable value, but laid down no principle by which to discriminate higher from lower pleasures; and he advanced

towards the altruistic position. John Stuart Mill, rejecting the narrow and obviously false principle that all pleasures are alike in quality, endeavored to give the system a wider basis by distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures, and holding that quality is of more importance than quantity. Besides, he makes the happiness which is the end of conduct, not the individual's, but society's. The introduction into hedonism of these two principles produces and ruins utilitarianism. He fails to reconcile egoism with altruism, or to show any basis for distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures. The entirely empirical value given to morality in Mill's system was observed by Herbert Spencer, who endeavors, by bringing the theory of evolution to bear on conduct, to rehabilitate utilitarianism and give its morality a necessary character by deducing from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness.

These two philosophers have not evolved from their own principles any practical code of morality. They have appropriated the existing one, founded on natural, and developed under the influence of supernatural religion. Ardent advocates of a positivist philosophy, which denies or ignores all religion, they reject those fundamental principles which sustain the moral law. Then, that the entire structure may not tumble into ruin, they set themselves to the task of constructing out of their own creeds a support to fill the vacuum left by the rejected cornerstone. Though Mill taxed Mr. Spencer with being a foe to utilitarianism, and the Spencerian theory of ethics is founded on the doctrine of evolution, with which Mill has no concern, yet their leading principle is the same: happiness constitutes the good, and the right and wrong of conduct are decided by the criterion of pleasure and pain.

The utilitarian theory bears some resemblance to Christian morality. In Christian ethics, too, it is laid down that happiness is the end of life. The happiness to be derived from virtue here, and the greater happiness expected as its future reward, are undoubtedly, with most Christians, a strong determinant towards moral conduct. On the other hand the fear of pain, in the form of punishment, acts as an important

factor in dissuading them from evil. The Catholic moralist refuses to agree with Kant, who teaches that moral good is to be possessed exclusively out of a motive of reverence for it, and that if it is aimed at for any other reason conduct ceases to be righteous. The Catholic theologian condemns the Calvinist, who holds that works performed with a view to eternal reward are bad. Murder, robbery, fraud, promiscuous sexual intercourse, both the utilitarian and the Christian moralist will unite in condemning on the ground that such actions are injurious to others and subversive of society. Does Christian ethics, then, write itself down utilitarianism disguised? It does not; for, whilst they agree on these points, they are profoundly different in their genesis, in the position which they assign to happiness in the order of finality, and in the force with which they address themselves to the individual conscience. "A theory of morals," says Mr. Leckey,¹ "must explain not only what constitutes a duty, but also how we obtain the notion of their being such a thing as duty. It must tell us not merely what is the course of conduct we ought to pursue, but also what is the meaning of the word 'ought' and from what source we derive the idea it expresses."

The object of the present essay is to demonstrate that, while the Christian theory of morality responds adequately to this demand, empirical utilitarianism, based on a wrong hypothesis concerning the end of man, and the connection between happiness and conduct, fails to establish any ultimate standard of right, and can show no basis of moral obligation.

THE ELEMENTS OF MORALITY.

In the common language of mankind there are no words of more frequent occurrence than "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong;" "this thing ought to be done;" "you have no right to that object;" "A behaved nobly; B's conduct was disgraceful." Such phrases as these are constantly in everybody's mouth; and whilst the application of them is one of the most abundant sources of disagreement, nobody fails to recognize, and all are agreed upon, the ideas conveyed. There are men to be found whose moral judgment is so unen-

¹European Morals, chap. I, p. 5.

lightened that they take as good conduct which the common verdict of mankind brands as wicked. This fact proves, not that such men are without the notion of right and wrong, but that they misapply it in their practical judgment of conduct. An enterprising Bedouin will rob, perhaps kill, a defenseless traveller without scruple; yet at the same time he will feel bound to respect the life and property of an enemy who has succeeded in putting himself under the aegis of hospitality. The standard which this man has of right and wrong is perverted; but a standard of some kind he evidently recognizes and applies. A thief will steal your purse without ceasing to believe that it rightly belongs to you, and that he ought not to deprive you of your own. This notion of the difference between right and wrong giving rise to duty and obligation lies at the root of all morality.

Let us examine the elements which go to make it up. Everybody admits that it is wrong to lie, not that it is wrong merely for A to lie or B or C, but that it is wrong, independently of the question of who the liar may be. There is a something in the action which makes it wrong—it is wrong objectively. Similarly I perceive that for anybody to betray the confidence of his friend in order to gain some advantage for himself is wrong, no matter who are the persons concerned. In the investigation of what constitutes morality we must find out in what consists this objective element which makes action right or wrong. Again, if I use my own property for my own needs, everybody says I have a right to do so. On the other hand, if I take without the owner's permission what belongs to somebody else and spend it in amusement, the verdict of reason is that I have acted unjustly in violating rights which I was bound to respect. Here we have a recognition of objective rights and obligations; this is the second element of morality to be accounted for. When a man advertently and willingly commits a wrong action we consider that the malice of the action reflects on him; whilst if he does something that we judge praiseworthy we recognize that he is deserving of praise. In both cases the character of the action reflects upon the agent. Here we have a third element—that of imputability. Furthermore, on imputing a fault to the operator, we

look on him as being bound to answer for the consequences of his act—hence another element, responsibility. Every convention, every law that men have framed for social life, every judgment that we pass upon our own or others' conduct connotes the existence of objective morality, imputability, and responsibility. In all regulations made for the constitution and harmonious development of society there is assumed the objective existence of rights on the one side, and on the other the obligation of respecting them.

Let us first look into the element of the objective morality. Since we can judge an act to be right or wrong, we evidently have some standard whereby we discriminate between one kind of act and another. To judge that a thing is right is nothing else than to declare it conforms to some recognized criterion; to find an action wrong is simply to affirm that it deviates from some standard of right. This harmony with the standard constitutes a character of rectitude in the act. Now, the conduct which enjoys that character has in it something attractive which draws us to it. We perceive in it a potency of adding to our perfection and happiness; and for this reason it is something to be sought after. This power of adding to and perfecting the agent makes the act a good for him; and the characteristic from which it flows is the moral good of the action. Furthermore, we see that this quality of goodness is present in varying degrees, coming home to our reason with a varying momentum. One act may possess the character of goodness in a high degree, yet be such that, though I omit it, my conduct is not out of harmony with the standard of rectitude. The good here is optional; however attractive or ennobling it may be, I am not bound to embrace it. On the other hand, I sometimes have no alternative,—either I must do the good or my conduct fails of righteousness. In this case there is a hypothetical necessity: I must act thus if my conduct is to be righteous. This hypothetical necessity is the necessity of moral obligation. If morality is to have any practical weight in the guidance of conduct, it is evident that its efficiency depends chiefly on the influence that the element of obligation will have when two opposite courses stand before a moral agent, who is to embrace one and reject the other. To leave out or minimize the character of moral obligation is to deprive

morality of all practical weight. A moral standard, unexceptionable in its loftiness, may be set up, but if there is no obligation to conform to it, its influence will be unfelt where it is most needed. And the weight with which obligation will bear in every particular case will depend on the directness and force with which the antecedent of the hypothesis on which obligation rests is proved :

“If I am to conform my conduct to the standard of moral rectitude, I must act thus now. I ought to conform my conduct to that standard. Therefore I must act thus now.”

It is the business of an ethical system to establish the authority of the above minor beyond dispute.

Having disintegrated objective morality into its elements of (1) rectitude, (2) goodness, (3) obligation, let us do the same with rights. There is no end to the literature that has been inflicted on us to explain the origin and scope of the term right. But the attempts have ended more frequently in the production of fog than in the diffusion of light. Though the definition has raised endless controversy, nobody fails to grasp the idea which underlies the term. We observe a man riding a horse; he has physical control of the animal: is it his? The physical power will not be received by anybody as an argument sufficient for an affirmative answer. The point to be considered is, has he any moral claim to it, any tie that binds it to him as belonging to him, so that everybody else is restricted from depriving him of the object. If such a moral power is vested in him, then, though the animal should escape from his control, it remains his property; he has a right to it. This right is made up of two correlative elements, the owner's moral power over the object, and the restriction imposed on everybody else of respecting that power. An ethical system must render a satisfactory account of the origin of this power and its inviolability. The foregoing analysis, though exhibiting only obvious results, is by no means unnecessary. Men of unquestioned mental power and uprightness of character, but holding suicidal philosophic principles, have been driven, in order to maintain consistency with their original position, to propound systems of ethics which utterly lack the first requisites of a moral code. We shall proceed to an examination of Mill's Utilitarianism.

I.—EXPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM.

The Utilitarian theory of morals, as laid down by Mill, is to be found in the essay entitled *Utilitarianism*, among his “*Dissertations and Discussions*.” In order that no statement or position not his own may be attributed to him we shall take his own exposition. Before entering on the subject, he refers to the taunt levelled against his creed, that the doctrine of pleasure being the end of life degrades man to the level of swine. He replies that it is not the Utilitarians, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light, since the accusation implies that men are capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. Pleasure, he remarks, is not confined to sensual satisfaction; there are intellectual pleasures; pleasures of a still higher order, resulting from the exercise of benevolence. All these pleasures are included by Mill in the notion of happiness, which he constitutes the end of conduct. We shall see whether he can offer any consistent basis to distinguish between baser and nobler pleasures, while remaining within the limits of his system. In the following passages he lays down the Utilitarian creed:

a. “The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pleasure and pain, and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the Utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”¹

¹Utilitarianism, c. II.

b. "It is quite compatible with the principles of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while, in estimating all other things, quality is concerned as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked what I mean by difference or quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all, or almost all, who have experience of both, give a decided preference, irrespective of any moral obligation to prefer it, that is the most desirable pleasure."

c. "I must again repeat what the assailants of Utilitarianism have seldom the justice to acknowledge; that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned; as between himself and others Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."

d. "If the end which the Utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory as in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all that it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness a good to the aggregate of persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality."

e. ¹"It has not by this alone proved itself to be the sole criterion. To do that it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now, it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example,

¹Utilitarianism, c. IV.

virtue and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness." "But does the Utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly for itself." "This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate."

This doctrine is reducible to the following propositions:

1. Happiness, that is pleasure, and the absence of pain, constitute the good of man, and the end of human conduct.

2. Consequently actions are good if they tend to increase pleasure or diminish pain, bad if they have a contrary tendency.

3. Pleasure must be estimated according to quality, as well as quantity.

4. By happiness, that is the aggregate of pleasure, is meant, not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

The first of these propositions is evidently the foundation of the system; if it is true, the second follows as a consequence; the third and fourth are but explanations of the term "happiness" in the first. If it is false, the theory is wrong from its base. The charge of selfishness has been brought against the system. Nothing can be more opposed to selfishness than the postulate of Mill, that Utilitarianism requires a man, when weighing the conflicting claims of his own and other's enjoyments, to be strictly impartial and hold the balance with the even hand of a disinterested spectator. "The Utilitarian morality," claims Mill, "does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others." This is a doctrine in which self-sacrifice is carried to the extreme. It seems to justify Mill's assertion that "in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of Utility. To do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself constitutes the ideal perfection of Utilitarian morality."¹

¹ Op. cit. c. III.

On the sources of obligation Mill speaks with an uncertain note. He recognizes that there is a weakness here in his system, but not greater than in any other: "If the view adopted by the Utilitarian philosophy be correct, this difficulty will always present itself until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have of the consequences; until by the improvement of education the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures shall be (what it cannot be denied Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person."¹

The charge of atheism has been pressed, perhaps too far, against Utilitarianism. It is not atheistical if we accept utility as a subordinate standard depending for its validity on an ulterior one. Utility is certainly the characteristic feature which proclaims the goodness of some conduct; and, by its absence, the worthlessness of other. Mill maintains that a utilitarian may accept this criterion as the practical guide of conduct, deriving a sanction from the revealed will of a Supreme Ruler of the universe, if the utilitarian believes in the existence of such a Ruler. "The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals. These sanctions are either external or internal. Of the external it is not necessary to speak at length. They are the hope of favor and fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them; or of love and awe of Him inclining us to do His will independent of all selfish consequences." When we come to examine Mill's account of the nature of moral obligation it will be manifest that this assumption is, for Utilitarianism, a self-contradiction. It must be judged on its pretensions to being an independent system, able to show within itself, without any appeal to another standard, the least radical difference between right and wrong, and to establish from its own principles the obligation binding the will to do good and shun evil. It claims to be, not a

¹ Ibid.

judge dependent on a supreme authority, but the supreme authority itself. The chief sanction in the system is that of conscience.

"The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same; a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense on the violation of duty, which, in properly cultivated moral natures, rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. The feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience, though in the complex phenomenon, as it actually exists, the simple fact is, in general, all incrustated over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling, from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others and occasionally even from self-abasement."¹

The primary thesis to be demonstrated, directly or indirectly, for the establishment of Utilitarianism as a sound system of morality is that happiness in the sense in which Mill understands the word constitutes the good. We shall find that Mill, so far from doing so, tacitly admits that there must be some other criterion of right and wrong more fundamental than the pleasure and pain standard, and some other end of conduct than pleasure and pain. Notwithstanding its loud profession of benevolence, the logical outcome of Utilitarianism is to reduce all benevolence to mere selfishness, to banish the very possibility of self-sacrifice and to confound vice and virtue so completely as to reduce morality to chaos. The sanction of conscience becomes a nullity, and no foundation for moral obligation remains.

II.—IS HAPPINESS THE END OF CONDUCT?

In one sense happiness is undoubtedly the end of conduct. Following Aristotle, the scholastics taught that happiness, *beatitudo*, the possession of the Supreme Good, and ultimate perfection of reason is the end of conduct. But it is not this psychical state of active possession that Mill means by the

¹ *Ib.*, c. III.

term. By it he understands the sum of agreeable feeling, the happiness called by the scholastics *bonum delectabile*. The question, therefore, as far as Utilitarianism is concerned, is confined to the consideration of happiness in this sense understood. The question of ultimate ends, Mill observes, does not admit of proof in the ordinary acceptation of the term; for to be incapable of proof is common to all first principles. He, therefore, proposes to prove his first principle by an appeal to the faculties which judge of fact. As the proof that an object is visible lies in the proof that people actually see it, so the proof that agreeable feeling is desirable lies in the fact that people actually do desire it, and he thus concludes that happiness is desirable. (cf. p. —.) With this conclusion we quite agree. Happiness is a good, therefore desirable. Then he proceeds to the all-important pith of the proof. Having shown that happiness is one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality, he attempts (p. —) to prove that it is the sole criterion, for whatever else is desired is desired only on account of the happiness which it brings. Virtue is desired, first, as a means to happiness, afterwards it becomes an end in itself with those who are virtuous. In proof of this he adduces the example of music and money. Music, he says, is not looked upon as a means to a collective something called happiness, and on that account desirable. It is desirable in and for itself; besides being a means, it is a part of the end. Money, at first desirable only as a means, afterwards is desired for itself, when there is no longer any desire of the ends to which it was, at first, looked on only as a means. The statement that virtue is not only desirable, but that it is desirable in itself, Mill declares to be, in not the slightest degree, a departure from the utilitarian standpoint. To which we reply that the statement is fatal to the system. The issue to be solved is the establishment of the ultimate criterion of right and wrong; to determine what it is, is the last analysis that constitutes conduct virtuous or not virtuous. What is the utilitarian principle? It is that nothing is good except so far forth as it tends to happiness; the happiness giving character constitutes the goodness.

Now, in the above reasoning, there is assumed another standard of good and bad, anterior to and consequently more fundamental than utility; and this assumption is evidently incompatible with the principle that utility is the supreme criterion of right and wrong. Virtuous conduct carries with it its own desirability, or, in other words, virtue is desirable for itself; that means it has a character of goodness in itself—it is to be desired not as a means, but for itself. Now, this is directly opposed to the doctrine that nothing is good except because it is useful, that is, capable of serving as a means to the end, happiness. “There is no contradiction whatever,” replies the utilitarian; “We hold that virtue, or moral goodness, is itself a part of happiness; the part is embraced in the whole. Therefore, it is no contradiction to say that happiness is the end, and virtue is an end.” The fallacy is concealed, but it is present. Why, we ask the utilitarian, is an act of virtue, or moral goodness, desirable? “Because,” he replies, “it brings me happiness. I aim at it because I perceive an element or character in it that will confer happiness.” Very good. There is, then, a character in the good action, or in virtue, which appeals to you as something that will bring happiness. Now another question: What constitutes, in the good action, that happiness-producing character which is present in one, absent from other actions? You cannot answer, utility, or the happiness produced, because the utility follows from the presence of this undefined something; so it evidently cannot be the cause of it. The happiness follows for you because the act is good. What constitutes that good which is productive of the happiness? You admit that in some conduct there exists this quality, and that in others it is absent,—the result of its presence being the causation of happiness. This result, happiness, is an extrinsic sign that it is present. What is the intrinsic constituent? What is the criterion by which you judge of its presence or its absence? When you have found what constitutes that good whose presence or absence divides conduct into right and wrong, rendering one attractive as happiness-giving, you have reached a standard deeper down, in the nature of things, than the question of

utility; you have reached the fundamental criterion of morality.

The admission that virtue is good and desirable for its own sake is fatal to Utilitarianism, for it implies a distinction between right and wrong antecedent to all considerations of utility. Mill's entire argument involves a confusion between two closely associated but distinct ideas, goodness and happiness. In one passage he argues that having proved happiness to be a good, he has proved it something desirable. The postulate in this contention is that the good is the object of desire, which is true, else where his doctrine is that happiness is the object of desire. It never seems to have occurred to him that happiness, pleasure, or agreeable feeling, is not something objective, but subjective, a result in the agent of some functional play. Good obtained is the cause, happiness the result. Instead of taking as his primary principle, "nothing is desirable but happiness," he should have started from the undoubted truth, "nothing is desirable but the good." By good is meant not merely moral good, but whatever has in it the potency to satisfy any of our expansive faculties; but nothing is true good unless it has the note of moral goodness, when considered as the object of human action.

The illustration which Mill draws from our love of music lends no aid to the utility theory. Music, as he admits, is a good in itself. In other words, it is desirable. It is of a nature to satisfy and complete one of our faculties. In music there are two elements which are apprehended by two different faculties. There is the material sound caused by the vibratory waves with a rythmical movement, naturally adapted to gratify the sense of hearing. Besides this there is the æsthetic element of the harmony perceived by the intelligence to which it affords gratification. These two elements make music a good of these faculties; happiness, agreeable feeling, is the result to these faculties when they attain this good. This is a parallel to the case of virtuous conduct; from the good flows the happiness. For the same reason money, too, can be pursued for itself, independent of all consideration of it as a means. The diseased judgment of the miser may esteem money as a good in itself, whilst a sane man will value it only

as a means to an end. The miser sees in it a potency that draws his desire. In the money as in virtue and music there is an intrinsic characteristic which when recognized by the reason draws the will into pursuit.

But a utilitarian may object that we can pursue anything for the happiness derivable from it. Music is sought solely for the pleasure resulting from it. This is true. Among the endless varieties of things, acts, conditions, experiences, which are apprehended by the reason as goods, happiness or agreeable feeling is one, and as such it may become the object of our desire and the aim of our action. But the fact that we can make the pleasure derived from various sources (music, amusement, food, etc.) the object for which we pursue such good and succeed in obtaining pleasure, is not a fact that universally obtains. In the matter of morals it has no existence. We may go to hear an opera, exclusively for the pleasure we derive from it, and if the prima donna's throat is in good condition, the orchestra efficient, and all circumstances favorable to comfort we shall not be disappointed. But if we practise virtue merely to experience the satisfaction that is to result from a consciousness of our own benevolence we are sure to be disappointed. If the pleasure of virtue is to be attained virtue must be practised for itself, not for the pleasure. Virtue is no longer virtue if not practised for its own sake. Dives, let us suppose, alleviates the pressing wants of Lazarus, not that he desires the well-being of Lazarus, but that he may enjoy the agreeable consciousness resulting to himself, from the knowledge that he has increased the sum of human well-being by the amount represented by the conversion flavor of Lazarus from a minus to a plus quantity. He desires that the flavor of his viands may be heightened by the accompanying glow which comes from the still small voice's verdict of *well done*. Has Dives any reason to expect that the self-approbation of virtue will attend his act? There is no doubt of the result—the satisfaction of virtue attends only on virtue practised for virtue's sake. Nobody bears stronger testimony to this truth than Mill himself. In his *Autobiography* he describes how the truth dawned upon him that to pursue happiness for its own sake was a course sure to defeat its object,

After passing through a protracted slough of despond, he finally realized that personal happiness is to be attained by not making it the end. "These only are happy, I thought, who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way." Thus, his own experience taught him the error of the happiness theory. When he reached the conclusion that happiness is to be found, even in any art or pursuit followed as an ideal end, but not to be reached when sought directly as an end, the truth stood palpably before him: the good is the object of human desire. Yet even then, so hopelessly was he enthralled by his empirical philosophy, that he did not perceive the meaning of his conclusion. Like another Cato, he still prefers the lost cause. Utilitarianism must be maintained; so he shifts his ground; happiness is still the end of life, not the agent's own happiness, but the happiness of others. Let us follow the system into its last refuge.

It may be remarked that if Mill on his new platform maintains that the happiness of others is the universal end (some of his followers certainly do) the assertion which is quoted above is contradictory, for he puts the happiness of others, as an end, on the same level as "art or any other pursuit" followed for itself. Passing over this contradiction we come to the question: What is the end for which a utilitarian is to pursue the happiness of others, an art, or any other pursuit? Besides the end of his action externally he must have an intention of his will to some purpose. If the utilitarian answers his own happiness he falls back on Mill's original and abandoned position. If he replies that the end is to be pursued for itself he admits that it is the objective goodness, of the object of pursuit, which is the end of conduct, a conclusion directly opposed to the fundamental principles of Utilitarianism.

Again, the much-extolled principle of altruism, that the happiness of others is the end of conduct which when pursued is to assure the individual's own happiness, involves a

sophism of the most glaring character. My happiness, I am told, is to consist in increasing as much as possible the happiness of others. If such is the case, the rule must hold good all round, and the happiness of everybody is to be in promoting somebody else's happiness. The happiness of society is only the aggregate of individual happiness. But if my happiness consists in promoting yours, which in its turn lies chiefly in extending mine, then I am to be happy because you are happy that I am happy, because you are happy, without Utilitarianism pointing out any good whence all this endless action and reaction is to take rise. When Utilitarianism endeavors to make out its case by substituting the general for individual happiness as the end of conduct, confusion is but worse confounded. Mill failed to prove the assumption on which his system rests; on the end depends the criterion; the standard, therefore, of morality is not pleasure and pain. To anyone sifting the contradictory notions and illogical arguments advanced to substantiate the doctrine, it becomes plain that Utilitarianism has lied unto itself.

III.—OBLIGATION.

It is, says Mill, a necessary part of moral philosophy to show the origin of obligation. After observing that the customary morality is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory, he holds that when another system (Utilitarianism) would maintain that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle (the happiness principle) the corollaries (the particular dictates of morality) seem to have a more binding force than the original principle. The reasoning of a man is, as he puts it, "I feel that I am bound, not to murder, rob, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give it the preference? It is only justice to Mill to acknowledge that he always put the case against himself straightforwardly. Utilitarianism can give no satisfactory answer to the query. If my own happiness lies in something else, that will not tend to the general good, that may even be subversive of it, what binds me, if I accept the utilitarian creed, to avoid

what will be conducive to my own happiness? If morality cannot show the existence of a binding obligation, with a solid basis, giving it an indisputable claim to check the tendencies of our nature to embrace the immediate enjoyment, then any excess of human passion is quite lawful, since nothing exists to forbid it. I may rob, murder, betray and deceive if there exists no obligation to avoid murder, robbery, treachery and deceit. This difficulty, we are told, must always remain until the influences which form moral character have rendered everybody eminently virtuous. (Cf. p.—.) Let us illustrate the gist of this answer. A gentleman, who finds much charm in the theory that the attainment of the highest possible measure of pleasure is the end of life, consults a utilitarian guide, philosopher and friend to have a practical question of conscience settled. He states his case. "Happiness, I understand, is the end of life, and we are constrained always to act for happiness. Now, the possession of a certain diamond ring, belonging to a friend of mine, would naturally increase my happiness. I propose to obtain it as soon as I have the good fortune to meet its present owner in a lonely spot on a dark night, when I shall probably have to use some physical force detrimental to his well-being before I obtain the article. This conduct of mine will not be for the general happiness, but it will be for my own. Now, is there any obligation binding me to prefer the general happiness? I see none." The philosopher consults his Mill (*Utilitarianism*, Chap. III) and finds the solution. "Well, there is a difficulty at present about making evident to you the binding force of our fundamental principle, and that difficulty will continue until, by the improvement of your education, the feeling of unity with your fellow-creatures, shall be as deeply rooted in your character and to your consciousness as completely a part of your nature as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person." "I thank you," replies the other. "The feeling of unity with my fellow-creatures is but slightly developed in me at present, so I shall take the ring. Doubtless my mode of life will tend to bring out in my nature that feeling of unity which I lack. If it should not reach perfection in me, it may in my son or my grandson, who, owing to the

spread of education, will perceive that all his acquaintances are seeking his welfare, and he, not his own, but theirs." The utilitarian foundation, therefore, of obligation is not yet developed to the point of establishing an obligation over an unwilling mind, but it will when the improvement of education will have made this feeling of unity so strong that we must see the general happiness to be our necessary end with the same directness that we now see it is wrong to lie. Now, we have no basis of obligation; then, none will be needed.

The external sanctions available for utilitarianism are two, one derived from God, if the utilitarian believes in God—the other from our fellow creatures. Can the sanction depending on our relation to God be consistently invoked by utilitarianism? It cannot. This sanction rests upon an obligation of conforming our conduct to the Divine will. How can I perceive this sanction to bear on my conduct? By assuming that a conduct of utility is consistent with, and an opposite conduct repugnant to, that will. How am I to judge whether such or such act of mine will be agreeable to the Supreme Ruler or not? I have no means of arriving at a knowledge of this question (revelation is not to be invoked in the construction of natural ethics) except by my reason's accepting the universal order established in creation as the expression of His Will. Then, I will judge useful conduct to have Divine Sanction, because useful conduct is consistent with the universal order established in creation. That is to say, to reach the Divine Sanction I must go below the question of utility and reach a criterion more fundamental—the agreement of conduct with the required order of things as perceived by reason. This is a question more profound than all considerations of pleasure or pain, and the standard to which recourse is had lies below—that of utility. It is again evident that Mill confuses the relationship between the agreeable and the good. He sets up the experience of agreeable feeling as the end, and when seeking for sources of obligation binding us to pursue that end he invokes the obligation which we are under of pursuing the good. Utilitarianism denies the existence of the good independent of any consideration of utility and agreeable feeling. Make this postulate the basis of an ethical system,

and such system is shorn of all source of obligation. Mill has affirmed that in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read all the philosophy of utilitarian ethics,—to do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself. He forgot that this rule does not contain all the ethical philosophy of Jesus of Nazareth, who did not make the mistake of laying down a code of benevolence without any grounds on which the obligation may stand. The law of universal benevolence is a secondary and derivative one, coming from the first and greatest: "Thou shall love the Lord thy God," which confers on the subordinate law a binding force. The essential vice and weakness of Utilitarianism lies, precisely, in the attempt to set up the second table of the decalogue as independent and self-sustaining, whereas all the validity of the laws governing our conduct towards our fellow-men depends upon the law which regulates our duty to the Creator.

The external sanction consisting of the rewards and punishments that we have to expect from our fellow-men, Mill, rightly, does not much insist on. It chiefly depends on the efficiency of law and police, and on the views prevalent in any society concerning morality. Some years ago to kill a man in a duel, far from receiving the condemnation of society, was considered an honorable distinction, whilst to decline a challenge to the attempt was an indelible shame. The obligations arising from the sanction of society may enforce vice instead of virtue. If, then, Utilitarianism has any real sanction, this must come from the internal source,—conscience; and that sanction we shall next examine.

IV.—CONSCIENCE.

Conscience, according to Mill, is essentially a feeling in our own mind consequent on the violation of duty. If this be conscience, then the utilitarian may say with Launcelot Gobbo: "By my conscience, my conscience is but a hard sort of conscience," since it is heard from only to reprimand, and extends no meed of approbation for virtue exercised. The feeling of conscience, then, arises in our own mind consequent on a perception of duty violated. Before, therefore, that conscience can make itself felt, the duty must be recognized as such—with an obligation, an "ought" of binding force.

If there is no "ought" there is no duty shown by reason ; if there is no duty recognized there is no violation, and no subsequent condemnation, and no feeling of pain. "It would pain me to do this act." Why would it pain you? "Because it would be a violation of duty." Whence comes the "ought" that creates the duty? If you cannot show the origin of the duty you cannot show any cause for the pain in which consists the utilitarian conscience. This sanction, then, presupposes an obligation ; yet it is advanced by Mill as the chief origin of obligation. That one course of conduct brings remorse, while another is followed by no such result, implies that there is an essential character absent in one, present in the other. One is such that I ought to embrace it—the other I ought not to do ; but of this essential character Utilitarianism gives no account. A utilitarian, acting strictly within the limits of his creed, contemplates an act agreeable to himself but injurious to others. Since injury to others is an injury to society, he as a member of society may indeed reap a slight measure of the evil consequences. However, on weighing both sides, his own pleasure on the one side, the evil to society, including his own problematical dividend out of the whole, on the other, he concludes that the balance of happiness declares in favor of the action. Happiness is the necessary, the only end of conduct. There is no duty binding him to an opposite course. Therefore, he will violate no duty and suffer no consequent pain—and this is the be-all and end-all of the utilitarian conscience.

Mill saw the lame and impotent character of the conscience sanction in his scheme, and he sought to palliate the absurdity by a *Tu quoque* argument. "This sanction, so far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself ; and the notion, therefore, of the transcendental moralists must be that the sanction will not exist in the mind, unless it is believed to have its origin out of the mind, and that of a person able to say to himself, 'This feeling which is restraining me, and is called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind,' he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases ; and that if he find the feeling inconvenient he may disregard it, and try to get rid of it. But is this dan-

ger confined to the utilitarian morality? The fact is so far otherwise that all moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in the generality of minds, conscience can be silenced or stifled. The question, need I obey my conscience? is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the principle of utility as by its adherents."¹ Very different, indeed, is the force with which this difficulty bears on the utilitarian theory and on a true system of morals. For a man who sticks consistently and exclusively to utilitarian principles, the introspection which detects the entirely subjective character assigned to moral obligation, dissolves all grounds of duty. The conduct injurious to others, if sufficiently pleasant for oneself, is not recognized as any violation of duty. Conscience is not silenced or stifled, but allowed full play, with the result that reason can perceive no duty violated, and conscience has nothing to condemn. A utilitarian may say:—"But I, in my own conduct, do recognize that, for instance, it is my duty not to rob my neighbor, and if I do so my conscience will condemn me." True; if "collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear, from all the forms of religious feelings, from the recollections of childhood, from the recollections of past life," lead you to judge that your neighbor's well-being is to be considered before your own immediate pleasure, you embrace the right path. But it still remains true that the man who prefers his own pleasure can take the injurious course, without finding any utilitarian principle to convict him of wrong-doing. And in the determination of your will the scale has been turned by something else than the happiness principle; some form of religious feeling, most probably, has had a large share in the formation of your conscience, so that, fortunately for yourself, your practical morality is at variance with your theoretical Utilitarianism. When treating of the true system of ethics it will be made apparent that, though the reproving voice of conscience is neglected, there is another office of the internal monitor which is always fulfilled.

Mill makes another attempt to get rid of his embarrassment. Taking a simple thread of fact and weaving it through a wide

¹Utilitarianism, c. III.

warp and woof of gratuitous assumption, he produces a utilitarian conscience, warranted proof. The fact, which is fully conceded, is that there exists among men a powerful and widely diffused natural sentiment of benevolence. The theory which he spins, belonging to the realms of prophecy rather than moral philosophy, is that when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, this powerful natural sentiment will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. When once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard ! If Utilitarianism is good for anything it ought to be good and valid now. If it is valid now, it must contain a force binding on conscience in the man who is inclined to be vicious, as well as in his virtuous brother. Instead of giving us a present sanction, Mill treats us to the version of the dreamer in *Locksley Hall*. There is a good time coming, if we but wait a little longer, when the natural bent of everybody will be, not his own, but society's welfare. When universal benevolence will have displaced every instinct of selfishness ; when Utilitarianism will have taken hold of human life and "colored all thought, feeling and action in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste." In short, when human nature shall be no longer what it is to-day, a mixture of good and evil propensities, with the evil, in many cases, largely predominant, then will come into play the sanction of the Greatest Happiness morality. This is an entrancing prospect.

" Forward, forward let us range ;

Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change."

But let us also ask, however timidly, what are we to do in the meantime ? It seems a pity that this efficient sanction, so badly needed now, will be available only when no longer required in that glad age when all men are to be virtuous, as Falstaff was a coward, upon instinct. How is Utilitarianism, to-day with no sanction or basis of duty, no "ought," going to raise man to that delightful condition ? The progress of society, under the influence of a morality enforced by the internal sanction of conscience, resting upon the most awful ex-

ternal sanctions, has been slow, laborious and fluctuating. Utilitarianism, without lever or fulcrum, proposes to raise mankind to a level which has been the ideal of Christian virtue, an ideal which has been but seldom reached and never permanently maintained by any social organization. The task recalls the fact of Baron Munchausen, who tells how he lifted himself into Gibraltar by his boot straps. The progress in morality which has been made, from the condition that prevailed in Europe at the period of the barbarian invasion, has been the result of an ethical doctrine, widely different from the utilitarian principle. The morality which effected this change took for its starting point the ground that between right and wrong exists a distinction independent of all likes or dislikes, absolute and unchanging, based upon the eternal opposition between truth and falsehood. It brought that distinction to bear on conduct by the help of a sanction coming from conscience, derived from the will of a Supreme Legislator, whose decrees are to be obeyed. Instead of eliminating from human life the beauty of self-sacrifice, it followed the natural judgment of reason, which proclaims that self-sacrifice, distinct from and usually opposed to self-interest, is one of the chief elements of virtue. This feature of the old morality is well expressed by Carlyle: "It is a calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense, sugar plums of any kind in this world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor, swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his honor of a soldier, different from drill regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things and vindicate himself under God's heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong man greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man. Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns up all lower considerations." (Hero Worship.)

What would have been the result if Utilitarianism had been the only guide of morals when the bulwarks of the Roman

empire went down before the barbarians? The morality which, as a whole, is received by civilized nations to-day is the outcome of what Mill and his school call the transcendental view. Finding this code in possession they try to explain it on utilitarian principles. These fail to explain; they certainly never could have produced. A code of morality is wanted, not so much to encourage those who, of their own accord, are walking in the right path, as to restrain others who prefer to follow the wrong one. Utilitarianism, if it were all it professes to be, could, at best, but say to the virtuous man: *maecte virtute*; for the man who does not aim at virtue it has no message whatever.

V.—RIGHTS.

The origin of right is an important part of ethical inquiry. The idea must be thoroughly investigated in order to have a clear understanding of the measure of our duties towards others and of our claims upon them. In the chapter entitled "How Utilitarianism is Connected with Justice" Mill gives us his views on the subject. After an analysis of the various relations in which the notion of justice is found he summarizes his doctrine:

"The idea of justice supposes two things—a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good; the other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by all those who infringe that rule. There is involved in addition the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement, whose rights (to use the expression appropriate to the case) are violated by it." "I have throughout treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person and violated by the injury, not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in which the two other ideas clothe themselves. These elements are a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand and a demand for punishment on the other. An examination of our own minds will, I think, show all that these two things include, all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right

we mean that he has a valid claim upon society to protect them in the possession of it. If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we say he has a right to it. If we have a desire to prove that anything does not belong to him, as a right, we think this is done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to chance or his own exertions." "To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility."¹

Let us now examine the number of elements comprised in this idea of right.

1. Right is a form in which clothe themselves these two elements—a hurt to some person or persons and a desire for punishment.

2. These two elements include all that we mean when we speak of the violation of a right.

3. When we call anything a person's right we mean that he has a valid claim upon society to protect him in the possession of it.

4. Society ought to protect him in the possession of it, for the reason of general utility.

A concrete example will expose the character of this explanation of rights: John Doe steals Richard Roe's horse; Richard has a right to the horse. How is this right constituted? First, we have a definite person injured—the owner of the horse. Second, there is a demand for punishment. These are what we mean. Mill tells us, when we speak of the violation of a right. When we speak of Roe's right to the horse we mean, too, that he has a valid claim upon society to be protected in the possession of it. Now it is clear that the two first mentioned elements suppose the existence of the valid claim in Richard Roe. If this valid claim were not vested in him the horse would not be his and there would be no injury inflicted, and consequently no demand for punishment if it were taken from him. If he has the claim society ought to

¹Chap. V.

protect him in the possession of it. Mr. Doe has no such valid claim to the horse. Consequently, when society, represented by the judge, will come to look into the transaction it will find that Mr. Roe, who will prove his valid claim, has been injured ; that there is a demand for punishment of the enterprising utilitarian, Mr. Doe, who, unfortunately for himself, allowed his judgment to unduly magnify the amount of happiness represented by the horse. The judge will insist that the horse be restored to the person to whom it belonged—that is, to him who had the valid claim. Ultimate proceedings will probably result in Mr. Doe's going to prison, where, if his mind is of an ethical turn, he may employ his leisure to investigate a point which Mill has left entirely in the dark : Whence did it arise that the other man had the valid claim, and what is the nature of the valid claim ? Everything else follows from the existence of this element—the injury inflicted, the demand for punishment, the necessity that society should see that the injury be repaired, and that the thief be punished. In other words, the valid claim is the right itself, and Mill has made no attempt to explain its origin or nature. He merely shows certain consequences which flow from its existence, and that is all that he can do, for his system affords no basis of right. Start from the principle that the necessary end of conduct is agreeable feeling, with pleasure and pain as the criterion of right and wrong ; then, as you will have rejected all moral obligation, so you will have left no foundation for human rights.

VI.—CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM.

The world at large has always looked upon self-sacrifice as an essential part of virtuous conduct. The goodness of a beneficent action is not measured without reference to the self-sacrifice which it implies. A physician who loses his life in a vain attempt to stop the spread of cholera is none the less a hero because his efforts have been unsuccessful. Let us suppose a child's life is in danger, in a burning house, without any bystander showing an inclination to attempt a rescue. Somebody offers a reward of a thousand dollars to anybody who will save the child. This proposal brings out a volunteer,

who first insists upon a guarantee that on the performance of the service his reward will be paid. Now, we should not consider his conduct by any means on a level with that of a man who would, without any prospect of reward, rush into the danger to rescue the child. Yet the material act in both cases is the same. If utility is the sole test of goodness, the conduct of each should be equally noble and virtuous. It is the element of disinterestedness which constitutes the special goodness of the one act over the other—an element which has no place in the utilitarian scheme. Utilitarianism eliminates from conduct every vestige of self-sacrifice. If I seek the happiness of others I must seek it for some motive of my own, and there can be no other motive for a utilitarian than happiness or agreeable feeling. "Each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, seeks his own happiness," is Mill's dictum. In every action, then, whatever the outward or objective end may be, the agent's own interest is the end to which that other is a means. He may exchange one kind of happiness, such as safety, comfort, property for some other, just as the man in the above illustration exchanges his safety for the prospect of a thousand dollars. This may be prudence, enlightened self-interest, but it is not self-sacrifice.

The devotedness and disinterestedness with which an action useful to others is done is always taken into account in the moral judgment of the act. But utilitarianism would change all that. The heroic examples of men who have sacrificed possessions, peace, life itself in devotion to a principle challenges the respect of men divided from them by centuries, by racial and religious differences. Such an estimate of conduct, however, we are asked to believe, is grounded on a mistake. There is no such thing as self-sacrifice. Prudence and sagacity there are in abundance, occupied in the calculation of which conduct is the most beneficial to the actor himself. The Three Hundred die at Thermopylae, Regulus returns to his Carthaginian dungeon, a Sister of Charity catches the fatal plague from a patient—glorious heroes of self-sacrifice, is the verdict of men. "Soft," says Utilitarianism, "no enthusiasm; you have here but examples of enlightened self-interest." However loudly this creed may boast that it gives an honored place

to benevolence, yet by the necessity of logic, utility, as the constituent of good, comes inevitably down to a level of selfishness from which the moral judgment of mankind turns in disgust. Deny that—

Because right is right, to follow right,
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence,

and our admiration of the nobility and heroism of self-sacrifice is but a mental aberration. While Utilitarianism will destroy virtue, it will, by way of compensation, elevate to the rank of virtues actions which few utilitarians would call by that name. If utility constitutes moral good, then, no matter how unworthy an act may seem to be, that act is virtuous and good, if it is useful. Utility is the constituent of the good—when the cause is present the effect must follow. A railroad promoter, by swindling some of his business associates, accumulates enough capital to build a railroad through an undeveloped district. The new road proved an inestimable benefit to a large population and materially helps the general well being,—an object which the speculator had in view, even during the operations by which he obtained his money. The amount of happiness that the successful rogue has given rise to far outweighs the disadvantage caused to his few dupes. His conduct is useful, therefore it must be virtuous. Utilitarianism, indeed, seems to be accepted by society when taking a practical view of such cases, for—

In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice,
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law;

but, withal, the prize is none the less wicked, and the rascal none the less a rascal for being a successful one.

Again, if resultant happiness is the measure of virtue, the wealthy man who gives a thousand dollars to some deserving public charity exercises a thousand times more virtue than a poor washerwoman who, out of her hardly-earned wages, badly needed by herself, gives a dollar. The utilitarian principle is not in harmony with the ethical view taught in the parable of the widow's mite. The measure of evil in conduct is no longer to be measured by any intrinsic essential wrongness, but entirely by the extent of the disadvantages that will result from

it. An adulterer sins with a willing accomplice ; he takes such precautions in every respect that his wrongdoing remains entirely secret. There is no injury to the community from bad example, no pain of mind to the injured husband, for he knows nothing of the fact ; so the diminution of happiness is reduced to a minimum. Now, if the evil of conduct is in direct ratio to the production of pain, the wrong of adultery in this case is infinitesimally small. On the other hand, many a husband and father who is faithful to his wife and provides as best he can for the wants of his family, may yet, by his bad temper, cause daily unhappiness which amounts to a total far greater than what is caused by the adulterer ; his conduct must, therefore, be more immoral than adultery. Or, a man may lose his fortune through an indiscretion and thus bring upon his family permanent distress ; his conduct makes strongly for discomfort and suffering, consequently it is vicious. Tried by the utilitarian code, Lord Steyne is dismissed with a caution to be more circumspect in future, while poor old Joe Sedley is branded as a villain of the deepest dye. In short, the classification which Utilitarianism would make of virtues, vices, characters, dispositions, motives upsets all recognized notions of morality. Dispensing with the first table it would cling to the second ; but they refuse to be divorced. Morality can be safeguarded only by recognizing the good, independent of questions of pleasure and pain, as the end of human conduct ; and the ethical system, which ignores this fact, leads not to morality, but to its negative ;—

“Hold thou thy good ; define it well ;
For fear divine Philosophy
Should pass beyond her mark, and be
Procureess to the Lords of Hell.”

Some of Mill's followers have sought to evade these consequences by two different arguments. One is that an action injurious in its nature, but not actually injurious in the particular circumstances under which some one perpetrates its contemplation, is to be avoided, because, says Austin, “the question is, if acts of this class were generally done, or generally forborne or omitted, what would be the result to the general happiness or good ?” It is not so nominated in the bond. Utility alone is set up as the test of right and wrong.

I have to consider the results of this, my own individual act, with all its consequences to myself and others. If things were so that one of its consequences would be that everybody else would forthwith do likewise, then I should have to consider the result of this universal conduct upon the general good. But my act is going to have no such effect, so I need not trouble myself with making absurd suppositions. The end is small, if any; my prospective happiness is great; society is not concerned in the question; I am a utilitarian, and for me the act is moral and admissible. The other is that an act, even though in certain circumstances no evil may arise from it, may be forbidden by the fact that its perpetration tends to engender a habit of committing such acts. What is the grand aim of Utilitarianism? To draw men into the habit of regulating their conduct by the utility standard. Now, in an action of this kind, I may apply that standard with the nicest discrimination, and, if one act creates a habit, then I may expect as a result of this one, a more pronounced tendency to employ, in the future, this same convenient standard. If the utilitarian could urge that the morality of conduct may be measured by the agent's motive there might be some help to assist him out of the difficulty. But this view he himself has ruled out of court. He holds that there is but one motive of conduct—happiness. "The motive," says Mill, "has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. The motive makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or bad disposition, from which useful or hurtful actions are likely to arise." How far can the motive, then, make a difference in our appreciation of the agent? Chiefly as far as it indicates to what extent we may look for similar acts in the future. That means, if it means anything, that the motive may be considered, not to test whether the agent is acting virtuously or not in the present instance—that is, settled independently of the motive, but to judge whether one may look to him for a continuation of such useful acts in the future.

We have brought to a close the examination of Utilitarianism, with the result that its failure to take the place of religion as a foundation for morality is shown to be evident, complete and disastrous.

JAMES J. FOX.

NEW HANDBOOKS OF PHILOSOPHY.

This is an age of the revival of philosophies, and these philosophies are expressed through literature. The form of literature which at present dominates the greater part of the reading world is the novel. It has become a handbook of philosophy, and nearly every novelist feels that he is unworthy of his avocation if he cannot find a philosophical theory for his practice. In a word he philosophizes his philosophy.

The French critics, who have exquisitely refined the tools *tière*, who is a Darwinian, but not a "naturalist," is using of their trade, are largely responsible for this; and M. Brunet the material offered by the novel as a great part in his work of showing that literature is both a theory and an art. He is fond of the word "evolution," but he is keen and broad-minded enough to see that literature is not science, though the causes which lead to its creation may be treated in a philosophical manner. In spite of the passion of his nation for analysis, his methods are synthetical. As M. Jules Lemaitre says:¹ "M. Brunetière est incapable, ce semble, de considérer une œuvre, quelle qu'elle soit, grande ou petite, sinon dans ses rapports avec un groupe d'autres œuvres, dont la relation avec d'autres groupes, à travers le temps et l'espace, lui apparaît immédiatement, et aussi de suite."

The power of doing this,—and nobody who knows M. Brunetière's work can deny that he does it admirably,—implies the possession of an enormous amount of territory, from whose fastnesses he can draw at will. This territory he has conquered thoroughly; he has examined every acre and even yard of it most minutely; and in the splendor of his conquest and his use of it, he is superior to those great critics that preceded him,—Sainte Beuve and Edmond Scherer. If one, however, applies his synthetical method to his position as a critic, one at first thought groups with him two authors who, at a second

¹ Les Contemporains (sixième série.)

glance, seem to have little resemblance to him. And these are Louis Veuillot and W. H. Mallock. And, applying to him, too, his theory of evolution, we discover, with hope, that the result of Sainte Beuve and Scherer and a great group of lesser critics is a man who, in his desire for "a principle of authority has been led on various occasions to make concessions to Catholicity, which may very well seem excessive."¹ Brunetière is hardly a Neo-Catholic, he is not less of a Pessimist than he was, and it is a question whether he does not hold Buddhism² as of at least equal value with Christianity, yet it is consoling to know that, while the apostles of science and work and the preachers of aestheticism and idleness place annihilation as their conclusion, a logical and great critic looks with longing, but as yet perhaps without solace, to the one religion of infallible authority. M. Anatole France, who is M. Renan bathed in extract of violets, would prefer the Paradise of Mohammed; M. Brunetière looks forward to a Nirvâna, but he cannot accept the quiescent state and the absence of the karma,—for him soul-activity will never cease; he is too practical for mysticism, too scholastic for impressionism. As a logician who halts, he is like Mallock; as a dogmatist who will not tolerate unreason, he is like Veuillot; hence his "concessions," hence his problems. The sarcasm and invective of Louis Veuillot against the schools of philosophy in letters that he detested were not much more fierce than are the attacks of Brunetière on the "scientific naturalistic" school. His evolution is in progress, and it is evident that the Darwinian who finds, the older he grows, the need for a solid philosophical and moral background for his science and art, is gradually losing his respect for Schopenhauer and his tendency to regard Christianity and Buddhism with equal sympathy. The man who refused to calumniate the Middle Ages and accused the writers of the eighteenth century of having invented their darkness has not been slow to discover that the abuse of Darwinism and the teaching of Schopenhauer have helped to produce the manifestations he most abhors in literature.

¹Irving Babbett: *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1897.

²*La Philosophie de Schopenhauer : Questions de Critique : 1886.*

It is remarkable that England and America, while they show us the results of the philosophical tendencies in literature, offer such a small amount of serious criticism. The seeker who would analyze the influences that make partisans of thought must turn to the French, who have a way of settling questions without circumlocution. Besides, in France art is a religion, and while the artist there takes himself seriously, the artist in other countries—always excepting the German musician,—wastes a good deal of his mental force in trying to believe that he is serious. Consequently, French literary art dominates the form of expression which, for want of a better name, we call the novel. The march of events and the complexity of modern life have become so sublime and amazing, that Melchior de Vogüé expresses a truth we all know when he says of the progress of Germany: "It would require a Shakespere, doubled by a Montesquieu to describe the life of this country during the last three years." Similarly the life of all civilized countries, as depicted in history—which, when not a mere collection of annals, is as personal as fiction—requires that the author should be something more than a lyrical romancer. There must be in him a stronger element than the mere desire to chaunt or to recite great events. As depicted in the novel, which is not only the history of the mind, but the essentials from which the historian must, in the future, draw much of his material, life is no longer a mere spectacle, with red fire flaming here and there and the torch-bearing Hymen at the end. Whether it is well that a form of expression, which was gay at times, more often at least cheerful and always exciting, should have become a vehicle for the consideration of all sorts of problems, is not the question at present. But in no age has the art of fiction received such careful attention and analysis. Even in England where, in Miss Austin's time, the novel was dropped behind the sofa or the sideboard when visitors came and a compilation of sermons immediately taken up, it has been, for at least fifty years, the favorite tool of men who wished either to construct or destroy. Newman, Wiseman, Lord Beaconsfield, Charles Kingsley, Carlyle—all resorted to fiction; and no doubt a posthumous novel by Mr. Gladstone will be discovered, since

this is the only form of thought expression he seems so far to have neglected.

M. Brunetière, while crediting Protestantism with the morality of the English novel,¹ declares that in France the novel serves as a destructive force to batter uncomfortable institutions or to attack unpleasant persons, but that he doubts whether it will ever become, as in the hands of Dickens, Thackeray, and George Eliot, an instrument for higher things. He notes the distinction between the moral teaching of George Eliot—"the moral of the good bad books"—and the morality of Thackeray, which is "insupportably preachy, narrow and prudhommesque." She teaches the morality of Herbert Spencer; "there is no higher morality," Brunetière says, "none more Utopian;" and he compares it, with gentle scorn, to the morality of Madame Craven and Miss Yonge.

For serious criticism of literature one must go to France, where literary manifestations are not only considered from the point of view of art, but from the point of view of philosophy; but even M. Brunetière, whom some of us Catholics have adopted with enthusiasm, perhaps a little too ardent, does not, as a rule, take that view of morality of which we approve. We love him most reasonably for his hatreds;—we find at the end of the century a critic making the same fight against false philosophy in literature that Veuillot and Brownson made, with a much greater power of having himself heard. We cannot help seeing, from the example of M. Brunetière, that a serious student of literature must devote great attention to the development and scientific causes of the novel, but that, in so doing, he finds himself helpless unless he can find some fixed standard of philosophy, morality, and art to which to appeal. The present intellectual position of M. Brunetière is due to this fact: he must accept the theories of the "impressionists," like MM. Anatole France and Jules Lemaître, grope along until he finds a basis which will be popular and still have a "scientific" appearance or admit that the absolute exists, and that the absolute, the ultimate tribunal, is God. M. Brunetière and the schools of critics about him are living proofs that art

¹"C'est ainsi qu'il manquera probablement toujours au naturalisme français ce que trois siècles de forte éducation protestante ont infusé de valeur morale au naturalisme anglais."—*Le Roman Naturaliste*, p. 241.

cannot live for art alone, nor science for science alone, and that the very denial of God and dogma is essentially an affirmation.

Psychology will some day or other give us the key to what we call temperament. Until then we shall be forced to listen to endless theories on the consciousness and intentions of Shakespere and to hear the modern doers of various kinds of work wasting many words in striving to justify the result of natural bent, early training, and the demands of their time upon them, by formulating philosophies for it all. M. Zola, not admitting the manifest truth that he took advantage of the popularization of science in order to make an effect which accorded with his natural tendency, invents a philosophy of "scientific naturalism." Carlyle, who invented a style for the purpose of effect, too, and took advantage of dyspepsia in order to accent it, might, had the process been in fashion in his time, have made a scientific apology for himself in much the same way. But he was of his years. M. Zola, in attempting to be effective, was, he thought, obliged to be coarse and incorrect in his style; to be heard, too, he must make a sensation, and grovel in the filth at the feet of the people. Unconsciously, he was following a tendency which forced Hugo to be violent and truculent in his protest against aristocratic classicism, to commit brutal acts in his dramas; for it is certain that when literary art in France "appeals directly to the people—being innately cultivated, chiselled, exquisite, in a word, aristocratic,—it becomes exceedingly coarse, declamatory and incorrect."¹

M. Zola will admit no force unknown to him in his method, though we know he finds room somewhere for his guess at heredity. Yet, if he were a true analyst, he would see that the reaction from classicism in his own case is only romantic after all. While M. Zola shrieks, like Caliban, at scholasticism, he is forced to give a metaphysical reason for his nastiness, just as modern poets often feel themselves obliged, out of consideration for science, to explain their involuntary rhythms by an elaborate appeal to physics. In fact, he is forced by the demand that everything shall be re-

¹"Le Roman Naturaliste," p. 242. La théorie de l'art pour l'art est essentiellement latine.

ferred to philosophy, whether divine or not, to flee for dignity to the thing he most detests. He is like an actor hating all things classical, who would attempt to increase his height when topped with a tall hat, by shoeing himself with the cothurnus!

Having written a certain number of novels, founded on a hypothesis which attracted him, he now goes forth in search of a philosophy. The syllogism, the soul of scholasticism, haunts him, as it haunts every other man brought up in scholastic methods. He wrote "*Le Rêve*" in order to show that he could be moral and "chaste." It was a conscious effort; he went against his tendencies, and he pointed to it with pride. It was even more difficult to find a philosophy which would explain him, not as a mere writer, an intuitive observer, a magical expressor, but as a scientist. It is necessary to accentuate this here in order to show that the position of the novel and the novelist has entirely changed in the last fifty years. It has become something that must be reckoned with and which deserves as much study as any other great social phenomenon.

Science and work are the key-words of M. Zola's system. From his experimental philosophy he gets these axioms: "Man must be scientific; man must work." Tolstoï, who has also arranged his various philosophies in the form of novels, comments on this, from his point of view, in 1884: "The most part of what is called religion," he says, "is only the superstition of the past; the most part of what is called science is only the superstition of the present." Tolstoï goes on to say that even before he heard Zola's formula given to the youth of France, he was surprised at the fixed impression, above all in Europe, that work is a species of virtue. "I had always believed it was pardonable only in a being deprived of reason, as the ant in the fable, to elevate work to the rank of a virtue and to glory in it. M. Zola is sure that work makes man good. I have always remarked the contrary." Work, even when it is not entirely selfish,—he continues—"work for work's sake, makes men, as well as ants, hard and cruel. "Even if work be not a vice, it can not, from any point of view, be regarded as a merit."¹

¹Zola, Dumas, Guy de Maupassant; Leo Tolstoï. Translated into French by E. Halperrine Kalminsky.

One observes a great difference between the teachings of Zola and those of Count Tolstoi, both eminent writers of the modern handbooks of philosophy. With one, religion is a superstition and science a living light; with the other both are largely superstitions. Authors like Sir Walter Scott and Manzoni, believed that their work was to illuminate life rather than to explain it.

If M. Zola claimed only to be a teller of tales and said frankly that he "wallowed" because there are many persons who find his wallowing interesting enough to be paid for, we should have no concern with him here. If M. Brunetière treated literature,—and the literature of the novel particularly,—only as a means of producing effects, his critical studies would have no claim on attention in this paper. But both these gentlemen turn irresistibly from the modus of their work to its philosophy, and draw from it ethical conclusions. M. Brunetière, logically following his method, must come in time to see that a system of ethics which can be preached with confidence must have an infallible foundation. M. Zola, following his method as logically as he can, will never end by turning the impossible into the possible. To make processes which go on in the soul as evident as the lungs of a cat are in the hands of an experimenting surgeon the soul must be touched by a steel scalpel.

The chief experimental scientific novelist, who is M. Zola, breathed jubilantly when he discovered Claude Bernard's "Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine." He had at last a standard to which he could mould his own. Bernard holds that the spontaneity of living bodies is not opposed to the employment of experiment.¹ "The end of all experimental method, the boundary of all scientific research, is thus identical for living and for inanimate bodies; it consists in finding the motions which unite a phenomenon of any kind to its nearest cause, or, in other words, in determining the conditions necessary for the manifestation of this phenomenon." He has no hope of ever finding the "why" of things; he can only know the "how." "The experimental novel is a consequence of the scientific evolution of the cen-

¹ Bernard as quoted by Zola, in "The Experimental Novel," translated by Belle M. Sherman.

ture." M. Zola says: "It continues and completes physiology, which itself leans for support on chemistry and medicine; it substitutes for the study of the abstract metaphysical man the study of the natural man, governed by physical and chemical laws, and modified by the influence of his surroundings; it is, in one word, the literature of our scientific age, as the classical and romantic literature corresponded to a scholastic and theological age."

It would be useless to give so much space to M. Zola's "determinism," if he were the only exponent of it. Fallacious as it seems to men of faith, to men who hold firmly to the supernatural, it has a specious quality of insinuation for folk of unfixed principle, whether it be covered by Grant Allen's Hedonism or Hardy's Pessimism; in a phrase, almost any jargon may pass if it be concealed by that blanket word—scientific.

The experimental scientific novelist is a student of diseases. He takes the body in the clinic and cuts into the ulcer; he will not permit his disciples to smoke a cigar in his dissecting room,—it might create an illusion, and all palliative illusions are idealistic! Idealism is the enemy. "Let us compare, for one instant, the work of the idealistic novelists to ours," M. Zola says, "and here this word idealistic refers to writers who cast aside observation and experiment and base their works on the supernatural and irrational, who admit, in a word, the power of mysterious forces outside of the determinism of the phenomenon."

The author who admits the supernatural is as odious to the "scientific experimentalists" as is the vivisector who believes in a soul which he cannot see or touch. The "scientific experimentalist" is a doctor of letters, whose occupation is gone when health reigns. Nevertheless, the novelist who places himself before his subject on the table of the clinic must have an idea. Readers of M. Zola will naturally wonder in what way this personal idea or hypothesis differs from the "theory" of the idealistic novelist; he does not answer this question. Jules Verne, whom the superior "scientific experimentalist" doubtless holds to be rather frivolous, occurs to one's mind in glancing at this elaborate exposition; he has

ideas; he uses them as search lights to find strange combinations of facts in his imagination, and no doubt he will be quite willing to accept these combinations as truths if they are ever proved. The naturalistic experimental novelist would treat the story of Lancelot and Guinevere in this way: First, there is the idea, which is, that in an effete state of society, where idealism is rampant, sin is supposed to exist. King Arthur, Guinevere, Lancelot, are combinations of phosphorus, oxygen, nitrogen and whatever else chemistry finds them to be. Arthur does not count; the experimental scientific novelist could hardly deal with him; Lancelot and Guinevere follow certain inevitable physiological laws. Tainted with idealism, they fancy that they sin, not knowing that the experimental novelist has effaced sin. The consequence is that the consciousness of sin, which is "scientifically" impossible, produces a false and morbid condition in the whole Round Table, and the poor creatures, who had not even read Paul Bert's nice little scientific primer, die miserable deaths in convent cells, sacrificed to idealism. Hamlet might be treated in a similar manner,—the hallucination of the old-fashioned ghost on the subject of the "sins done in his days of nature" being the disease for the experimental treatment of the scientist.

But may any process be scientific, the results of which can not be verified? May any method be scientific which can be applied only by one man? The Keely Motor may be to us magic or charlatanism; if it be clearly explained, so that its processes can be squared with natural laws; if experts can repeat its processes, it becomes scientific, and ceases to be "magical."

It is plain that the creation of a novelist or a poet can never belong to science. Let us presume that you find your Becky Sharp,—exactly like *your* conception of Thackeray's intriguer,—are you sure that she is really *his* Becky Sharp? *You* may think she is. In the processes of physics, chemistry and physiology, experimentalism is not founded on your thought or mine. Literature is compact of imagination. Imagination may be the prophet of science, but it is not science; it can never be science; it soars beyond what the experimentalist calls the rational. Mr. Coventry Patmore puts it,—“The more lofty,

living and spiritual the intellect and character become, the more is need perceived for the sap of life which can only be sucked from the inscrutable and, to the wholly rational mind, repulsive ultimates of nature and instinct."¹ The experimental scientific novelist either ignores this truth or treats it as an aberration. Some men—a few—are born with their hearts on the right side. They are abnormal; they answer, in the opinion of the gentlemen of this school, to the idealist in life and letters. The idealist has lived for many centuries; the scientific novelist's mission is to exterminate him, and the scientific experimentalist "is always a little Atlas who goes² stumbling along with his eyeballs bursting from his head under his self-imposed burden." It is a merciful thing that he does not discover that the world he thinks he holds has become only a goitre under his chin, which, unhappily, does not stop the action of his jaws.

That M. Zola's philosophy is taken seriously in France, M. Brunetière's fulminations show,—and M. Brunetière has kept them up for a long time. That there are many cultivated persons who believe that criticism may exist without canons, the success of M. Anatole France and M. Jules Lemaitre shows,—and M. Anatole France and M. Jules Lemaitre have been writing for a long time. M. Zola is bewildered by Darwin, and he seizes Claude Bernard as the raft to which he clings in a sea of inconsistent romance. When he discovers that the raft is water-logged, he will grasp the later support offered by the dictum of M. Le Dantec,—that beyond the laws of physics and chemistry there is nothing affecting the senses of living, observing beings, transcending the laws governing gross matter, and, he will add, there can be nothing. MM. France and Lemaitre have not even the decency of pretending to reverence science. "I am sure only of my impressions," M. Lemaitre says. M. Gaston Deschamps, who has brilliancy and common sense, laughs a little at them both, while gravely remarking that Guy de Maupassant, though not "a philosopher by profession, was saturated with philosophy and science."³ Always partridges—and philosophy!

¹Religio Poetae, p. 128.

²Ibid.

³La vie et les livres; Gaston Deschamps.

Critics of the type of M. Brunetière are rare in England and our own country. There are Saintsbury and Dowden; there are Stedman, Richard H. Stoddard, Howells, Hazeltine and Irving Babbett. They do not seem to be so serious as their French colleagues, perhaps because their work is not looked upon nationally as great or important. Of these Mr. Howells is most colored, both in his creative and analytical products, by the modern French. He is a naturalist, too,—but he confines himself to the nerves; he is a specialist in slight nervous difficulties. Nobody of taste can deny his charm, which is strongest when he forgets the theory that realism, of a decent sort, is to regenerate the world.

The haste with which books are reviewed prevents grave and careful criticism; and most of our reviewers are, from defects in philosophical training and lack of time, only impressionists of the sketchiest kind. It ought to be remembered that books go on living, for good or ill, years and years after they are forgotten by the critics. They disappear and become white paper again, but their seeds remain and germinate forever and forever.

The English, whose taste in novels largely dominates ours, have borrowed from France the idea of making their works of fiction into tremendously philosophical treatises. In fact, the French schools, to which we owe the later Henry James¹ and the new methods of Harold Frederic,² have permeated Hardy and Meredith, Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mr. Grant Allen, and half a dozen others.

It is difficult to account for Miss Marie Corelli; she was, no doubt, struck out of the brain of a mahatma by a flaming comet.

Pessimism and evolution and experimental naturalism are apparent, more or less, in all. Even Stevenson does not concern himself with God and the supernatural motive. "The naturalistic writer," says M. Zola,³ "believes that there is no necessity to pronounce on the question of God. He is a creative force, and that is all. Without entering into a discussion as to the subject of this force, without wishing still

¹The Experimental Novel, p. 401.

²The Other House.

³The Damnation of Theron Ware.

further to specify it, he takes nature from the beginning and analyzes it. His work is the same as that of our chemists and physicists. He but gathers together and classifies the data, without ever referring them to a common standard, without drawing conclusions about the ideal." It seems like a blunder,—which in literary criticism means a crime against good taste,—to intimate that the adorable Stevenson should be submitted to analysis. There can be no question that Miss Wedgewood is right when she calls him "non-moral";¹ she is just, too, when she points out the fact that between the direct moral tone of George Eliot, for all her Herbert Spencerism, and Stevenson and Meredith, there is a marked difference. Meredith, the chief novelist of our year, is an "experimentalist"; he chooses his subjects and tries to produce re-actions. God may exist "as a creative force," but Meredith has not found it necessary to consider that. Diana of the Causeways, Lord Ormont's Aminta, the persons in "Richard Feveril," are treated as a demonstrator of anatomy handles his bones,—and the experimental lecturer makes epigrams that have light, but no warmth. The philosophy of Meredith is Epicureanism restrained in expression by the reticence of a distinguished patrician of letters. And neither in "Marius the Epicurean" nor in "Gaston de Latour" can Pater conceal in his art the trail of the bad old aestheticism.

The text on which Mr. Hardy seems to have based the philosophy of his latest works is from Schopenhauer: "There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work of an all-wise, all-good and, at the same time, all-powerful Being. First, the misery which abounds in it everywhere; and, second, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, who is a burlesque on all he should be."

If Mr. Hardy were an actual realist, not a mere experimentalist, the world would be only a spring-board from which his creatures ought to plunge into a sea of nothingness. And he, doubtless disagreeing with Schopenhauer in regarding suicide as unjustifiable, should not to be hard-hearted enough to expect them to live under the hopelessness which he has heaped

¹ *Ethics and Literature.* Julia Wedgewood. *Contemporary Review* for January, 1897.

upon them. Life is bad, sad, he teaches us; women are young and we imagine they are beautiful, but the allure is only that a man be snared into marriage and be unhappy ever afterward. Nature is fair and cruel, and everywhere suggestive of the worship of Phallas; and what matters it all?

Hardy and Meredith are consummate artists, and nobody will refuse that adjective to Stevenson's art. But let us remark, in all coldness, without partisanship, if necessary, that in the nineteenth century after the birth of Christ, the false philosophies of the vanished world again appear, and the intellectual and cultivated Christians of our time receive them without much question, with no apologies, with no protest, under the form most insidious, most permeating. With Stevenson life is a problem, for which he has no solution. To live bravely, not thinking of the end, is his motto. The slightest hurt to the smallest creature is, in his code, more terrible than the pride of Lucifer. Men and women are good and bad as they have been made good or bad; their souls may not exist as souls, but their karma—the essence of their acts influenced by the acts of their ancestors—exists, and it determines their earthly fate. Stevenson has more skill than Sir Walter Scott; he, like Hardy and George Meredith, can tell a story better than Cervantes. Le Sage and Fielding and Manzoni are bunglers in their art compared to these new men. But there is nothing predicting that they will live as Hamlet and "Promessi Sposi," "The Bride of Lammermoor" and "The Newcomes" and "Adam Bede" will live. Even the fundamental passions fail of effect if there are no gods to whom to appeal. Persephone in Hades is not a fit subject for poetry, with Jupiter dead and no golden harvest and no blue flowers in the corn above her, bathed in the sunshine, for which she longs. Heine's yearning pine is naught without the splendid vision of the sun-flooded land of the palm. There are no finer artists in words than Flaubert and De Maupassant and Meredith and Hardy and Stevenson; we may admire the carving of the statue of Mercury without burning incense to the cult it represents. But, while the art is fine, there is a lack of depth beyond it; the sea of eternity sends no winds to the land where its creatures live. They pretend not to have heard that Pan is dead or that the Galilean has conquered.

Mrs. Humphrey Ward is a professional philosopher. She teaches consciously ; she analyzes persons in order to construct others. She is a "modern," too, an experimentalist, a scientist ; her human interest saves her in spite of her didacticism. She is pagan rather than positivist ; a rather conventional pagan ; studying, in the breakfast cap of a British matron, the sports of the arena. She could have taught Marcus Aurelius much that would have opened his eyes. One is sure, however, that her head would have been cut off early in the week if she had pre-existed as the story-telling princess of the Arabian Nights. Mr. Henry James is an experimentalist, and he dallies with the scientific method. He has the advantage of a manner of late so impartial that one may begin his novels at the end and not know that one has finished them when the commencement is reached. With him, too, God is an abstraction. Mr. Crawford makes no philosophical claims. He is the manager of "a pocket theatre," yet his grasp on the eternal verities is sure, and he philosophizes didactically on every possible occasion ; a huge book could be made of his *dicta*. He abhors the experimental novelist, and evidently has the old aristocratic prejudice against science as a tool of democracy, a leveller, in fact.

To return to M. Brunetière, it is permissible to point to him as a type—by no means an entirely satisfactory type—of a class of men that we badly need in English-speaking countries. There are many who explain Dante to us, some with insight, more with unction. There is none at present willing and capable of interpreting the meaning of this wonderful literary and social and philosophical phenomenon, the novel, none able to appreciate its value or its strength, or to pluck out the heart of its false philosophies. It is a force, a tyranny, a terror. It may be made to serve as a key to problems that the world faces shivering.

It is not science, but it deserves scientific treatment. The province of the highest art is not to idealize, but to perfect. Science, which deals only with the exact and rational, loses its dignity when used by an artist to conceal the betrayal of his best.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

ERIGENA AND AQUINAS.

It is with a view of suggesting a study in development, and not for the purpose of comparing systems of thought, that the names of Erigena and Aquinas are brought together in the present article. Philosophy, like every other vital product, is subject to certain laws of progress and decay. At decisive moments in its history great minds appear, and though it must be conceded that their appearance is not fully accounted for, yet systems and schools are, to a large extent, the outcome of antecedents which it is in the power of the historian to determine. Every philosophical movement is, in a manner, the product of the past, and becomes in turn the inspiration of subsequent movements. This is admirably illustrated in the history of the philosophy of the Schools. The great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century are not comets wandering aimlessly and appearing unaccountably above the philosophical horizon. No one who has studied the period can fail to recognize in St. Thomas and his contemporaries the continuators of a movement begun in Alexandria and extended in the ninth century to the schools of the West. The thirteenth century, it is true, will always be regarded as the golden age of scholasticism; the ninth, tenth, and eleventh were the period of preparation, the fourteenth and fifteenth the epoch of degeneration and decay. From Hales to Occam scholastic thought reached its highest development and found its most fitting expression. But the importance of the thirteenth century and the success which its writers attained suggest all the more imperatively the necessity of searching the preceding ages for the beginnings of such noteworthy growth. It is only when we compare it with the efforts of the first School philosophers that we are able to see in its true proportions the work accomplished by St. Thomas.

The title "Scholastic Philosophy" is now found at the head of a section or paragraph in every text-book of the history of philosophy, and is understood to designate the epoch which,

roughly speaking, extends from the ninth century to the fifteenth. The writers whom it is made to include seem at first sight to have nothing in common save the name itself. They are School philosophers,—sprung from the race of masters who in the ninth and tenth centuries presided over the schools in court and cloister, and who, as far as the limited curriculum of the schools allowed, affixed to the text of their logical treatises those commentaries which were to form the starting point of mediæval metaphysics. All divisions in history are necessarily arbitrary, and it is not doing violence to facts to group all the Christian philosophers from the days of Charlemagne to the fall of Constantinople under the name “Schoolmen,” a title which points to the institution whence the whole scholastic movement began.

But the name is not the only link which binds together the philosophers of the School. There are bonds more intimate, characteristics of method and doctrine which they possess in common. Of these characteristics, the gradual adaptation of the philosophy of Aristotle as the basis of a rational exposition of Christianity has been suggested as the one that dominates the scholastic period. This trait certainly divides the scholastic era from the patristic; but though Aristotelianism triumphed in the schools it was not always in the ascendant among the School-philosophers; Erigena, Anselm and Henry of Ghent were Platonists, while Abelard and others divided their allegiance between the Lyceum and the Academy. Again, it is suggested that belief in the agreement between philosophy and theology is the characteristic of the scholastic period and the inspiration of the whole movement. This is certainly a trait of the period, a principle which is more deeply rooted in School-philosophers than their leaning towards Aristotle; but it is a trait which is found also in patristic systems.

Before attempting to cite Erigena and Aquinas as two moments in the unfolding of the scholastic idea, we must answer the question which the preceding paragraph suggests. In what does the scholastic idea consist? What is the soul of the scholastic movement? The gradual Christianizing of Aristotle is but a secondary trait. To put reason and revelation in harmony was the aim of the Fathers as well as the School-

men. But the patristic apologetics and patristic philosophy leaned towards authority. The rights of reason were acknowledged, but reason was often transfigured into a faculty of mystic intuition. With the ninth century, however, a new era dawns, and the agreement between reason and revelation assumes a new aspect. Erigena, it is true, lingers round the portals of the Museum; Neo-Platonism dominates his thought and vitiates his method. Yet he is the first in a long line of dialecticians who will give to reason, in the stricter sense of ratiocinative faculty, her full share in the honors which she must divide with revelation. In their broad outlines, therefore, the scholastic idea and the patristic idea are identical; but between them there is one important difference which we cannot overlook, if we would grasp the meaning of the scholastic movement. Logic is the only inheritance that the first Schoolmen received from pagan antiquity, and by applying logic to the mysteries of faith these innovators determine the character of the whole period. Thus while the adjustment of reason and revelation, of science and faith, is the great aim of the scholastic as it was of the patristic period, it is peculiar to the Schoolmen that they regarded dialectic as the sole instrument by which that aim was to be accomplished.

Bearing in mind the aim and the method of scholastic philosophy, it is evident that we must judge the different epochs of scholasticism according to the meaning which each attached to the underlying principle itself and to the perfection with which each worked it out in detail. Erigena and Aquinas, exemplifying as they do the first rude beginnings and the final culmination of the scholastic movement, exhibit the scholastic idea in two very distinct moments of development.

Erigena's starting point is that of his favorite author, the Pseudo-Dionysius: "The Over-Being of God is the Being of all Things." In nature and in grace, in the realm of reason as well as in that of revelation, God is not only the greatest, He is the sole object of knowledge. In the first chapter of the "Liber de Proedestinatione" St. Augustine is quoted, "Sic, enim, creditur—non aliam esse philosophiam, id est Sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem" (De Vera Religione, Cap. 5).

Philosophy, Erigena adds, is true religion, for philosophy aims at expounding the laws of that religion by which God, the supreme cause, is adored in humility and studied by reasonable inquiry. Hence, true religion is true philosophy, and true philosophy is true religion (Col., 358).¹ Thus, at the outset of the scholastic movement the agreement between philosophy and theology is resolved into the identity of the two sciences. And Erigena carried the principle into practice: Scripture and tradition are sources of argument in philosophy, while the mysteries of religion are placed within the reach of human reason. But here we must be careful to grasp the exact thought of the court philosopher. Abelard, in later times, confounded theology and philosophy; he brought the authority of the Fathers and of the Scriptures to bear on philosophical problems, and shocked the pious mystics of his age by his daring application of dialectics to the mysteries of faith. Yet, Abelard's position and Erigena's are antithetical, for, while Abelard was rationalistic in his tendencies, Erigena inclined to mysticism. Confident in the untried power of the human mind, Abelard practically set no limits to the possible conquest of dialectical reasoning. Erigena sees no possibility of attaining truth unless we are enlightened by the Author of all light, Who alone is worthy of our contemplation. For Abelard, all theology is philosophy; for Erigena, all philosophy is theosophy.

In support of this view of Erigena's position regarding the relation of philosophy to theology, it is sufficient to turn to the first book of "*De Divisione Naturae*," where being and not-being are defined in terms of our cognitive powers. Whatever we can comprehend is; whatever we cannot comprehend is not. To the question, What can we comprehend? Erigena replies that we can comprehend merely the qualities and other accidents of things (Col., 443)—the real nature of things being hidden and God alone being able to open up the secrets of the universe. The curtain is drawn and the hidden truth revealed in that Theophania or divine apparition which will constitute the never-ending glory of the blessed, but which is also vouchsafed here below to those who make themselves worthy of it

¹ The references are to Migne's edition, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 122.

(Col., 449). Here we have the central idea of Erigena's theory of knowledge. Its mystic tendency is evident. It answers the question, Why are philosophy and theology one science? They are one because knowledge of the *noumenon* is possible only by a revelation or, at least, by an intuition of the illumined intellect.

Let us now turn to Aquinas, and see how he defines the relations of reason to faith. The opening chapters of the "Summa contra Gentiles" lay down the Thomistic doctrine, which may be reduced to the following three points:

I. There are truths, as for example the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, which transcend human reason. Such truths belong exclusively to theology. This is the first and most tangible indication of the distinction between theology and philosophy.

II. There are truths concerning God which human reason unaided can attain. Such, for example, are the existence and the unity of God. These truths are demonstrable by reason, yet they are revealed. But in theology, we believe on authority: in philosophy, we assent on intrinsic evidence. Even, therefore, on the common ground of truths immediate between philosophy and theology there is no possibility of confounding the two sciences. The light of reason and the light of revelation are distinct, and scientific knowledge, which is illumined by the one, and belief, which is guided by the other, must also remain distinct. (Cf. Summa Theol., I, I, 1 ad 2um.)

III. Finally, truths concerning God, whether they are within the reach of human reason or are purely supernatural, cannot contradict the great body of doctrines which belong to the natural sciences and to philosophy. This was a settled conviction with all the Schoolmen. It was assumed as axiomatic, and under one form or another inspired every contribution to scholastic philosophy. St. Thomas undertakes to prove it. Our natural knowledge has God for its author. The principles of science, the germs of all knowledge, are planted in the mind from the beginning, and thus, when we acquire knowledge, when others teach us or when we imagine that we are teaching ourselves, it is God, who, in a special

sense, is our teacher. When, therefore, God reveals truths which are beyond our natural ken, it were blasphemous to suppose that He should contradict His own teaching.

The relations existing between reason and revelation may, therefore, be summed up in these words: Distinction and Continuity. The domain of theology is distinct from that of philosophy, yet between them there is no break; the one is the continuation of the other. Where reason ends faith begins; beyond the region of systematized knowledge lies the realm of the incomprehensible, where faith rules alone. St. Thomas, however, did not make the limitations of human knowledge the foundation of his system as the modern agnostic does. He did not set those limits so close around us as Mansel and Spencer have striven to set them. But he recognizes the principle that the human mind is limited; that knowledge is not coextensive with truth; though he differs radically from the anti-Christian agnostic when he insists that beyond the region of knowledge is faith, not nescience.

If we now proceed to compare the central idea of scholasticism, as understood by Erigena and by St. Thomas respectively, we perceive at once the immense distance which separates the two philosophers. The thought is, in substance, the same, yet it is strangely different in its two aspects. It has undergone an evolution. The concept of theology and philosophy as homogeneous has yielded to the concept of the heterogeneity of the two sciences, and while a violent severance of reason from faith, such as the sixteenth century witnessed, must be judged a lamentable deterioration, the passing from uncritical oneness to harmonious heterogeneity, the change which the scholastic idea underwent in the progress from the ninth century to the thirteenth, must be regarded as a true evolution. The factors in this change have been many and complicated. The rationalizing spirit of Roscelin and Abelard has been offset by the mysticism of St. Bernard and the Victorines. Every system has directed its efforts towards harmonizing faith and science. The thought that revelation is reasonable and that reason is divine, has wandered through the ages seeking an appropriate expression, until Aquinas voiced it in a system of formulas simple in expression, yet rich in contents and easily

applicable to the great problems of the mind. It took three centuries to show that rationalism and mysticism destroy one of the two terms to be reconciled, and that the formula which preserves both yet holds that both are harmonious parts of a yet greater system, has solved the problem.

In order to appreciate the superiority of the stand which St. Thomas has taken, let us see how Erigena applies his principle to the most characteristic of all the contents of his philosophical system. At the outset of his treatise, "*De Divisione Naturae*," he cites St. Gregory in support of the proposition that "the being of all things is the over-being of God" ("*Esse omnium est superesse Divinitatis*"). He distinguishes, it is true, the fourfold function of philosophy to divide, to define, to demonstrate, and to analyze; but in practice he neglects the latter two. He divides nature, he defines with infinite pains the different meanings of being and not-being; but when he comes to speak of God in nature he does not prove his position, nor does he analyze with sufficient care the mode of God's presence. He takes up the current definition of creation and explains that all things come from nothing—that is to say, from God, who, since He is above all understanding, may be said to be not-being. This Supreme Being is in all things, because He is the essence and substance of all things. And, adds our philosopher, whoever carefully examines the words of St. Dionysius will see that this is so (Col., 681). The whole truth is summed up in the words "*Deus omnia in omnibus*," a formula which is not clear to the average intellect, because of the heritage of mental darkness which has come down from Adam; but its truth will appear in its native evidence when the clouds of sin are dispersed and the soul, with Paul, is lifted up in contemplation (Col., 685). There is a certain fascination in climbing with Erigena these giddy heights; there is a vagueness which Friedrich Schlegel and others have mistaken for sublimity; but we look in vain for precision of thought or for demonstration other than the argument from authority. A few quotations from the Pseudo-Dionysius and we are turned adrift on the wild waste of pantheism.

Altogether different is St. Thomas' handling of the same

problem. In the "*Summa Theologica*" (I., 8) he inquires, "Does God exist in created things?" The reason from authority is prefixed as usual, but at the very outset of the body of the first article we are asked to make a most important distinction: God is in all things, not as their essence nor as part of their essence, but as an agent is in his work. Then follows a demonstration based on propositions previously established: God is being in its fullness; therefore, wherever being is it is dependent on Him, therefore He is in all things as cause. In the "*Summa Contra Gentiles*" the problem is further elucidated by the distinction between formal and efficient cause. In book I, chapter XXVI, the words of Pseudo-Dionysius, "*Esse omnium est superesse Divinitatis*," are explained to mean that in all things is an image or likeness of the being of God; it cannot be that the being of God is the formal cause of all things.

It has been urged that St. Thomas leaves the problem far from a satisfactory solution. But this, at least, must be conceded by all—he honestly endeavors to apply human reason to the problem of God's existence in things. He is not content with merely appealing to authority and holding out the promise of clearer vision through mystic enlightenment. St. Thomas is the thirteenth century representative of the dialecticians, whose cause was championed by Abelard in the eleventh. He is the continuator of the movement on which St. Bernard and the Victorines looked askance. He is the advocate of the rights of reason; he believes in applying the sharp edge of distinction before undertaking to answer a general question. If, then, as modern pantheists maintain, the solutions of the Schoolmen are unsatisfactory, their method, at least, is deserving of praise. The first metaphysicians of Greece besought their disciples to disregard sense and to follow the guidance of reason. This, we say, is but to bid men use their prerogative and rise above the brute creation to which sense allies them. And yet many philosophers still need the admonition, "use your reasoning powers." It is no longer a contest between reason and opinion as it was in the days of Parmenides. Reason is now the admitted guide in philosophy, but the reason to which appeal is commonly made is simply the power of per-

ceiving truths immediately evident. Now, intuitive perception of truth is not the distinguishing birthright of man; it is a power belonging to higher natures, and man possesses it only in a very restricted sense. To reason from truth to truth, to pass from the known to the unknown, to judge by means of middle terms, in a word, to reason, is the "specific difference" of man. Discursive thought is man's proper instrument of knowledge.

The soul
Reason receives, and reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive. Discourse
Is ofttest yours; the latter most is ours,
Differing but in degree, of kind the same.

The student of Spencer's "First Principles" cannot fail to remark that the author, while aiming at defining the knowable, is guilty of an unwarrantable *ignoratio elenchi* by practically ignoring the ratiocinative faculty. His constant appeal is to our power of intuition, to what may be called the faculty of intellectually visualising truth. He does not invite us to reason and conclude, he challenges us to perceive, and if we confess our inability to represent the whole truth in consciousness we are told that we can know nothing about it. Thus is knowledge limited by ruling out man's greatest faculty of knowledge, and reason's flight is stayed by the maiming of the right wing.

Where mysticism and rationalism fail, where agnosticism confesses its impotence, the method of scholastic dialectics accomplished permanent results. Not only in the problem of God's presence in the universe, but throughout the whole range of speculative thought, reason and revelation were regarded as distinct without being opposed. The syllogism is applied to every problem, distinction is freely employed, and the result is a return to the primitive conviction that these two, faith and knowledge, "make one music, as before, but vaster." It is because St. Thomas accomplished this work in a pre-eminent degree, because he sets before us definitely the principles which justify this method and applies them to the vast fields of knowledge and faith, that he is chosen as representing the Schoolmen of the Golden Age. And, in proportion as St. Thomas' position is judged superior to that assumed by Eri-

gena, will we be justified in regarding thirteenth century scholasticism as a true evolution of the scholasticism of the ninth.

The philosophical significance of this central idea of the scholastic movement is not recognized by all historians, and yet, if we look at it carefully we shall see that the relation of faith to scientific knowledge is of interest, not merely to the Christian apologist, but also to the student of synthetic philosophy. To believe is to know, and knowledge in all its departments must be consistent with itself. The greatest achievements of philosophy have consisted in establishing a continuity between the different departments of knowledge. Philosophy begins by analysis, but aims at final synthesis. The crowning triumph of Greek thought was the doctrine that mind and matter, though distinct, are not opposed; that they are united in the one substantial compound, man, while the "topsy-turveydom of Cartesianism" arises from ignoring the legacy of Greek speculation and postulating an antagonism between mind and matter. Scholasticism never aimed at improving on the central doctrines of Aristotelianism, but it was content to add to Aristotelianism from a source all its own. It took up faith and scientific knowledge and showed that they are distinct yet harmonious parts of a greater organic whole which we may call knowledge. This is the synthetic view which gives philosophical significance to the *Summa Theologicæ* of the thirteenth century. Had the Schoolmen been less successful; had their project failed completely and irretrievably in its application to detail, the very fact of conceiving such a project and of outlining the method by which it should be realized, would entitle them to an honored place among the greatest names in the history of human thought.

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ANGLO-SAXON IN AN ENGLISH CURRICULUM.

Modern scholarship, acting upon the sound principle that the past explains the present, becomes more and more attentive to the study of origins. Races, creeds, arts, institutions, laws, languages, customs, however ancient and obscure, are traced back into the recesses of history, and their embryonic records shed a clear light on all after-growth and development. The flora and fauna of the intellectual and moral world are thus examined in root and in germ, and the result invariably enlarges the domain of science.

Obviously the modern English scholar who would possess more than a superficial knowledge of his subject, will go back to the origins of the English language and become familiar with its earliest growth and development. "A sufficient reason," writes Archbishop Trench, "why we should occupy ourselves with the past of our language is that the present is only intelligible in the light of the past, often of a very remote past, indeed. There are in the English language anomalies out of number, which the pure logic of grammar is quite incapable of explaining; which nothing but an acquaintance with its historic evolutions, and with the disturbing forces which have made themselves felt therein, will ever enable us to understand, not to say that unless we possess some such knowledge of the past we cannot ourselves advance a single step in the unfolding of the latent capabilities of the language without the danger of doing some outrage to its genius, of committing some barbarous violation of its very primary laws."¹ These primary laws are a part and parcel of the primitive language; they are found in the Anglo-Saxon, out of which the English language evolved. And if we would discover where modern English secured its grammatical framework, as well as the most useful part of its vocabulary, we must go back at least five hundred years beyond the Norman Conquest. As Professor Craik observes: "The earliest historically known past with regard to the English language is

¹Trench. *English, Past and Present*, p. 7.

that it was the language generally if not universally spoken by barbaric invaders, who, upon the breaking up of the Empire of the West in the fifth century, came over in successive throngs from the opposite continent, and after a protracted struggle acquired possession of Britain. They are stated to have consisted chiefly of Angles and Saxons. The "Angles," of which term our modern 'English' is only another form, appears to have been always recognized among themselves as the proper national appellation. They both concurred in calling their common country 'Angle-land,' or England, and their common language 'English.' The English language is recorded to have been known by that name and to have been the national speech of the same race, at least since the middle of the fifth century. Call the old English either Angles or Saxons, it makes no difference; it is clear that the names of 'England' and 'English' the country and the language have each retained ever since."¹ Accordingly, the place that Anglo-Saxon should occupy in a curriculum of English study is precisely the place that embryology occupies in the curriculum of the biologist. It is the root and germ of the English flower.

At once the question arises whether this germ-relation that Anglo-Saxon bears to our speech reaches beyond grammatical framework and vocabulary and affects English literature as such. In other words, admitting its philological value, should we attach any importance to Anglo-Saxon literature as a literature? Does it aid the English student in subsequent work upon his special literary subject? Before dealing with its value from a philological standpoint, it may be well to estimate briefly its literary importance. The mass of writing that has been preserved in Anglo-Saxon is considerable, but only a small portion of it can be regarded as coming under the head of literature. Although interesting and valuable, much of what has been printed from old Saxon manuscripts has no claim to the title of literature. In this catalogue may be ranked the six volumes of the *Codex Diplomaticus*, dry and barren as a scholastic treatise; the *Epic of Beowulf*, a considerable poem quantitatively, but with very little poetic value; *Caedmon's Paraphrase*, a slight improvement on *Beowulf*, yet

¹Craik. *History of the English Language*, vol. I, p. 31.

without a true artist's touch or insight; and so on through "Judith," "The Chronicle," the Homilies of Ælfric and the mass of translation extending from Bede to Alfred. The advent of Christianity brought new ideas and a strong literary stimulus, but the barren Saxon mind was never creative, and in appropriating the wealth of Latin and Hebrew literature it made the transfer with anything but artistic grace. So that Anglo-Saxon writings,—an agglomerate mass of some forty volumes,—cannot be regarded as literature in any strict sense of that term. "The soul of literature is artistic expression and beauty of form, and of both, the written remains of the Anglo-Saxons are wholly or all but wholly destitute."¹ On that account, therefore, Anglo-Saxon can have no place in a curriculum of literary studies. Its value and importance lie altogether in another direction.

It will be readily granted that English scholarship has to do, not only with English literature, but with the English language as well. And the study of Anglo-Saxon promises the most abundant harvest of information with respect to the etymology and fundamental laws of our present speech, and an inexhaustible mine of material for the further enrichment of our native tongue. Here is the germ relation which Anglo-Saxon bears, a relation classified in an admirable manner by Professor Marsh:² "I have ample reason for believing that a grammatical knowledge of other tongues is not essential to the comprehension and use of our own. Greek and Latin could be advantageously replaced by the Anglo-Saxon or primitive English. An overwhelming proportion of the words which make up our daily speech is drawn from Anglo-Saxon roots, and our syntax is as distinctly and as generally to be traced to the same source. We are not, then, to regard the ancient Anglican speech as in any sense a foreign tongue, but rather as an older form of our own, wherein we may find direct and clear explanation of the grammatical peculiarities of modern English. With reference to etymology, the importance of the Anglo-Saxon is too obvious to require argument. It is fair to admit, however, that etymology of many of our words must

¹Cralk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 33.

²Marsh. *Lectures on English*, p. 105. In this connection see Klipstein, *Saxo Grammaticus*; Grinam, *Deutsche Grammatik*.

be sought elsewhere, for we have borrowed our scientific, metaphysical and aesthetical phraseology from foreign sources, while the vocabulary of our material life is almost wholly of native growth. Yet the most instructive and impressive etymologies are those which are pursued within the limits of our own tongue. The native word at every change of form and meaning exhibits new domestic relations and suggests a hundred sources of collateral inquiry and illustration, while the foreign root connects itself with our philology only by remote and often doubtful analogies. It comes usually with a fixed form and settled meaning, and thus, as regards further development, will no longer have a history."¹ Accordingly, from the standpoint of etymology alone, Anglo-Saxon must be considered invaluable to the English scholar.

Not less useful is it in accounting for the grammatical structure of the English language. It is true that Anglo-Saxon grammar was modified by contact with the Latin and Romance tongues; inflections were brushed away; new idioms were introduced; freedom of verbal collocation was restricted; employment of the present participle in both absolute and dependent phrases, in accordance with Latin usage, became general. Nevertheless, as Max Müller² observes, "whatever there is left of grammar in English bears unmistakable traces of Teutonic workmanship. What may now be called grammar in English is little more than the termination of the genitive singular and nominative plural of nouns, the degrees of comparison and the persons and tenses of the verb. Yet the single 's' used as the exponent of the third person singular of the indicative present is ample evidence that, in a scientific classification of languages, English, though it did not retain a single word of Saxon origin, would have to be classed as Saxon, and as a branch of the great Teutonic stem of the Aryan family of speech." Keeping in mind that the grammatical framework of modern English is still purely Anglo-Saxon,³ we may briefly summarize those grammatical laws which have come down unchanged: all the relations that subsist between the words and groups of words of which an English sentence

¹Marsh. *Hist. Eng.*, Vol. I, p. 106.

²Max Müller, *Science and Language*, p. 86. Vide Klipstein, *op. cit.*

³Mason, *English Grammar*, p. 5.

is built up, namely, the predicative relation, the attributive relation and the adverbial relation, have been in existence since the earliest Saxon times.¹ Modern English owes to Anglo-Saxon the remnants of inflective terminations in the noun, the verb, and the pronoun; likewise its articles, its numerals, its chief store of particles in words of relation and in conjunctions; also the comparative and superlative forms of the adjective and its adverbial formations.² The Anglo-Saxon has bequeathed the facility of compounding words and a considerable number of forms of derivation; and lastly it has chiefly determined the formation of English periods.³ From a grammatical as well as an etymological standpoint, the study of Anglo-Saxon is all-important to the English student, for as we canvass its bequest of grammatical law and of vocabulary, the vital relation it sustains to our modern English speech becomes more and more evident.

Here it is important to notice the Saxon element in our English vocabulary. The New Oxford Dictionary, now in course of publication, promises 250,000 words, and of this number Dr. Weisse estimates 22,220 as of Saxon origin.⁴ According to his computation, hardly one-tenth of our vocabulary is Saxon. If we examine, however, the classic English words or the vocabulary in actual use at the present time among the English people, the Anglo-Saxon or native element will be found to largely predominate in either case. The following table, carefully prepared by Professor Marsh, gives the percentage of Anglo-Saxon words employed by classical English writers:⁵

| | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| The English Bible | uses 60 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon, 40 of other words. |
| Shakespeare | " 60 " " " " 40 " " |
| Milton (<i>Paradise Lost</i>) | uses 33 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon, 67 of other words. |
| Chaucer | " 88 " " " 12 " " |
| Spenser | " 86 " " " 14 " " |
| Milton (<i>L'Allegro</i>) | " 90 " " " 10 " " |
| Addison | " 82 " " " 14 " " |
| Hume | " 73 " " " 27 " " |
| Gibbon | " 70 " " " 30 " " |

¹Kellner, *English Syntax*, p. 27.

²Maetzner, *Englische Grammatik*, Vol. I, p. 9.

³Koch, *Grammatik der Englischen Sprache*; Vorrede.

⁴On the proportion of Saxon words see Müller, *Science and Lang.*, Vol I, p. 84; Schmitz, *Engische Philologische Studien*, Vol. I, p. 231; Kluge, *Char. Eng. Sprache*, Vorrede.

⁵Marsh, *Lectures on English*, p. 123, 124.

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|----|---|---|---|----|---|
| Webster (Daniel) | uses 75 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon, 25 of other words. | | | | | | |
| Macaulay | " | 75 | " | " | " | 25 | " |
| Browning | " | 84 | " | " | " | 16 | " |
| Ruskin | " | 73 | " | " | " | 27 | " |
| Tennyson | " | 87 | " | " | " | 13 | " |
| Longfellow | " | 87 | " | " | " | 13 | " |
| Bancroft | " | 78 | " | " | " | 22 | " |
| Prescott | " | 77 | " | " | " | 23 | " |
| Irving | " | 77 | " | " | " | 23 | " |
| Channing | " | 75 | " | " | " | 25 | " |
| Pope | " | 80 | " | " | " | 20 | " |
| Swift | " | 72 | " | " | " | 28 | " |

This tabulated percentage establishes the fact that the best English writers habitually employ, in both poetry and prose, a larger proportion of Anglo Saxon words than of foreign words. It also establishes that the best writers of our century use more Anglo-Saxon words than the writers of any preceding century, notwithstanding the extraordinary increase of our vocabulary from foreign sources. The natural sciences, philosophy, theology, will doubtless continue to increase this foreign annex ; but the examination of our literature indicates unmistakably that the literary element in our language is the Saxon element. English authors of the highest rank employ Saxon words in preference to foreign ones, as the increasing percentage of Saxon in modern words of pure literature amply testifies.

During the past quarter of a century the study of Anglo-Saxon in the principal universities of Germany, England, and the United States has brought about a revival of many obsolete Saxon words, and the effect of this increasing study is visible in the style of the best prose and, more especially, poetic compositions of the present day.¹ Our vocabulary is capable of great enrichment from the storehouse of the ancient Anglican speech, as fully one-fifth of the original Saxon is still obsolete.² A revival of taste for Anglo-Saxon will recover these precious native coins and put them once more in circulation. The pedantry of Saxon purists may sin after the fashion of the stilted classicism of Johnson or the Gallic imitations of Gibbon ; yet on that account the sensible scholar will not seek to arrest the movement which makes for the recovery of buried Saxon treasure belonging to our native language.

¹Marsh. *History of English*, p. 99, sqq.

²Sharon Turner. *History of the Saxons*, Vol. IV, p. 520.

For the Catholic student Anglo-Saxon cannot be introduced too early into the curriculum of English, as its presence is needed to counteract the influence of prolonged Latin study. So readily do Latin words and idioms come to the composer of Catholic colleges and seminaries that the composition is too frequently Johnsonian English. Familiarity with the 22,000 Saxon words in our vocabulary would remove this defect. Moreover, for the preacher in the pulpit, one word is not as good as another. The colloquial language of the English-speaking world contains 90 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon. The common people to whom the preacher talks may be said to employ and understand only the Saxon element of our speech. So that the Latinized sermon, however rich in Thomistic quotation, however strong in Aristotelian logic, becomes meaningless to the common mind because of its Latin words and idioms. The reformers who translated the English Bible knew the value of employing a vocabulary "understood by the people."¹ They used the Saxon word whenever it could be pressed into service; hence the beauty and strength and charm of the King James' Version. Catholic preachers who speak about the "*Invention* of the Cross" when they mean "the *finding* of the Cross" and "the *mansions* of the Israelites in the desert" when they mean "the *stoppages* of the Israelites," can ill afford to make a foreign-born vocabulary the medium of their thought. To the common mind the pulpit thundering forth the polysyllabic epithets of Latin rhetoric is "full of sound and fury signifying nothing." The sermon that tells upon the sinning, unlettered multitude is the sermon of a Father Burke or a Cardinal Newman, in which more than 80 per cent. of the words employed are of Saxon origin.

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¹Tillotson, Dissertations, Vol. I.

ANALECTA.

With the present number of THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN the undersigned begins the publication of a series of rare, unedited, historical documents, replete with interest and curious details. They refer to one of the most eventful periods in the world's history, namely, the deliverance of European civilization from the invasion of the Moslems in 1683 by the famous John III, Sobieski, King of Poland,¹ and their utility as elements of history is obvious.

If noble actions are consigned to oblivion for want of records, and the interest religious and cultured men should take in diffusing the light of knowledge and disseminating truth, it becomes the office of the expounder of the Gospel, the prerogative of the impartial historian, the imperative duty of the honest thinker and the inspiration of the Christian writer, in behalf of a higher spiritual and secular education and for the love of God and mankind, to consecrate themselves to the work of that school of moral and intellectual progress which leads the mind to pasture in fields rich in resources and abounding in possibilities. Thus, the tendency will be to uphold Christianity, which carries civilization along with it, and enables man to fill the wide hiatus that would, under other conditions, remain unoccupied between the spiritual and temporal worlds.

The history of Poland² presents a most remarkable record of national character, summed up in the splendid deeds of the heroes of the great Slavic race, constituting a common patrimony of the nation's proud inheritance.

The manful struggles of the Poles for liberty have been the subjects of discussion and universal admiration even amongst

¹1673-1696; born in 1629.

²The history of the reunion in a single nationalized body, composed of Slavic and Lettic elements, is, properly speaking, the history of Poland. To the former belong the Russians, mostly Slavs, as also the Poles, Bulgarians, and Servians; the latter, a subdivision of the Slavic group, are connected with the Indo-European family and inhabit the vast region of Livonia, the Baltic province of Russia in Europe, and Eastern Prussia. The language of the Letts, reduced to writing in the sixteenth century, a type of the Lithuanian tongue, is the least altered of the Aryan group. Its approach to the Sanscrit and that of the many Slavic dialects extant all over European Russia, Austria, and Prussian Poland, is accounted for by modern philologists through the supposition of a common origin of these nations.

those who most abhor revolutionary upheavals. In the great conflicts of opinions among men they are all agreed that the violation of any natural right affecting either the individuality of a person or the nationality of a people, under the false premises of expediency, is a point on which there can exist no possible discrepancy. Therefore, the wrongs of Poland always excite general interest and sympathy among the peoples of the world, and evoke unqualified indignation against the powers who so cruelly dismembered a nation that did so much for liberty, humanity, and civilization. What a fatal mistake was made when Europe consented to the partition of Poland, and opposed subsequent attempts at its return to nationhood! Readers of the BULLETIN will recall that remarkable conversation between Napoleon at St. Helena and his Irish surgeon, Barry O'Meara, in which the great soldier said: "In the course of a few years Russia will have Constantinople, the greatest part of Turkey, and all of Greece. This I hold to be as certain as if it had already taken place. Almost all the cajoling and flattering which Alexander practised towards me was to gain my consent to effect this object. I would not consent, foreseeing that the equilibrium of Europe would be destroyed. . . . A hundred years hence I shall be applauded, and Europe, especially England, will lament that I did not succeed. When they see the finest countries in Europe overcome, and a prey to those northern barbarians, they will say: 'Napoleon was right.'"

In the light of present events in the east, is not this Napoleonic idea the forerunner of a cataclysm near at hand?

For nine centuries the Poles contended with Germany on the west, and the Tartars and Muscovites on the east. The wars subsequently waged against Turks and Swedes were only in fact the last stages of the long and sad drama which resulted in the triumph of Germanism and Muscovite-Russian power and the denationalization of Poland in 1772, 1793, 1795, by the three most powerful nations¹ in Europe.

During the short reign of Prince Michael Wisniowiecki,² elected King of Poland³ (1669), the Turks invaded the country in 1672. Alarmed at the success of the Sultan's army he con-

¹ Austria, Germany, Russia.

² Descended from the House of the Jagellons; its dynasty began in 1386 and ended in 1572.

³ Poland became an elective monarchy in 1576, ending in 1628.

cluded the ignominious treaty of Budczacz,¹ which was rejected by the Polish senate.

The King resigned the command of the army and placed its destinies in the hands of Sobieski, who met the Turks at Chocim (November, 1673) and routed them with great slaughter.

"My comrades," exclaimed the noble warrior, pointing to the brilliant camps before him, "in half an hour we shall lodge under those gilded tents;" whereupon he boldly dashed upon the enemy and made good his famous words. This victory immortalized the name of Sobieski throughout Europe, and "The day at Chocim" resulted in his election as King of Poland May 19, 1674; he was crowned in 1676. A feature of the coronation ceremonies was a form obliging the newly elected King to proceed to the Stanislas-Kirche² and stand at the foot of the altar where Boleslas II³ murdered the saintly Bishop of Cracow⁴ for no other offense than the prelate's remonstrance with the King against his tyranny.

Sobieski, obedient to custom, but fired with indignation at so cruel a reminder of an infamous act, declared that "the crime was atrocious; that he was innocent of it; detested it, and asked pardon for it by imploring the protection of the holy martyr upon himself and his Kingdom." This great soldier was married to a French woman, one of the maids of honor to the wife of Casimir, widow of Zamoyski, Palatine of Sandomir, and daughter of the Marquis d'Arquien, who, according to Bernard Connor,⁵ "was very ingenious and beautiful."

Owing to her influence, Sobieski, who seemed at first unwilling to yield to Leopold's⁶ entreaties for aid against the Turkish and Tartar invasion of 1683, led by Kara Mustapha⁷ and Ibrahim Pacha,⁸ entered into an alliance⁹ with Austria.

The Moslem hordes swept over Austria and besieged its

¹ A town of Galicia (Austrian-Poland).

² A church in the city of Cracow still called by that name in honor of St. Stanislas.

³ Surnamed the Bold; born in 1042; son of Casimir I, whom he succeeded in 1058; excommunicated by Pope Gregory VII and deserted by his subjects, fled from the country and found refuge in a monastery at Carinthia, Hungary, where he died about 1070.

⁴ Stanislas Szczepanowski; canonized by Gregory VII; buried in the cathedral at Cracow, where his beautiful monument still stands.

⁵ Physician and philosopher; born in Kerry, Ireland, 1666; died in 1698. Studied medicine in France, thence went to Poland, and notwithstanding his youth was selected as first physician to the King (Sobieski).

⁶ Leopold I, Emperor of Germany and Hungary; born, 1640; died, 1705.

⁷ Grand Vizier of Mahomet IV (1600); died, 1683; Mahomet IV, son of Ibrahim, ascended the throne in 1649; deposed, 1686; died, 1692.

⁸ Considered by the Turks as one of the ablest generals of his day.

⁹ The unpublished articles of this remarkable alliance will appear in a subsequent number of the BULLETIN.

capital. The city, abandoned by the sovereign, made a gallant and long resistance, but without hope. At the critical moment the heroic Sobieski reached Vienna by forced marches, and on the 12th day of September, 1683, a day "big with the fate of the destiny of Europe," which was to decide whether the crescent of the Turk was to supplant the Cross of Christ and the banners of Mahomet to wave in triumph on the ramparts of the beleaguered city. From eight o'clock in the morning until the going down of the sun the Poles and Turks met in deadly contact. The result of this momentous action is well known. Sobieski's victory saved Christendom, restored the House of Austria and destroyed the hopes of the Osmanlis.

Among the trophies which fell into the hands of the victorious Poles was the sacred standard of Mahomet, claimed by many writers not to be the real one taken. Its presentation, however, to the Pope, as will be seen by the remarkable document following this article, in which reference is made to the "Grand Standard," the real standard that was "inclosed in an ark of gold, with the Koran and the prophet's robe," and displayed in battle, the one that was sent to and suspended in the church of Loretto, where, affirms Connor, "I have seen it," fully authenticates its genuineness.

JOSEPH SMOLINSKI.

I. DISCOURSE OF THE ABBÉ DENHOF, OCTOBER 8, 1683, ON REMITTING TO POPE INNOCENT XI. THE GREAT STANDARD OF MAHOMET, CAPTURED BY SOBIESKI AT THE SIEGE OF VIENNA.

Oratio ad sanctiss, D. N. D. Innocentium Papam XI. Ab illustriss. et reverendiss. D. Ioanne Casimiro Denhof abbate claræ tumbæ serenissimi, et potentissimi Poloniae Regis Ioannis III, extra ordinem ablegato, dicta cûm præcipuum Ottomanici Exercitus Vexillum Regis nomine offerret die 29 Septembris 1683 (Publiè à Milan, in 1684, chez Pandolfo Malatesta).

"Beatissime Pater, Vetustus hic mos est, ab heroicis usque temporibus ad nostram aetatem perductus, ut profligatorum

hostium signis via sternatur Victoribus, qua festas inter gratulantium voces in gloriae Templum provehantur. Verum quoniam Ioannes Tertius Poloniae Rex Dominus meus Clementissimus, qua est animi magnitudine, non sibi, sed Reipublicae Christianae vicit, ejusque in Deum pietas, et in Sanctitatem Vestram, Sedemque Apostolicam observantia singularis, bellicam fortitudinem adaequavit; ideo praecipuum formidabilis Turcarum Dominatoris Vexillum, Regiae dextrae virtute, e mediis eorum castris ereptum, atque in eo potentiae Ottomanicae culmen, ad Sanctitatis Vestrae pedes per me Ablegatum suum reverentissime demittit.

Venit quidem Ioannes Rex, vidit, et vicit; Venit inquam, et Regno relicto, Reginaque cum liberis deserta, ad liberandam Viennam Austriae, imperiumque servandum accurrit; sed Sanctitate Vestra Auctore, cui suum obsequium, exemplo omni memoria inaudito, contestatus est. Vidit etiam imperterritus saeva Turcarum agmina Orbi minantia; sed Sanctitas Vestra-providerat, Clypeum hunc unum tot funera contra objiciens, et Spiritu Sancto afflata intellexerat, eum Christianae Religionis Defensorem a Deo destinatum esse. Vicit denique Ioannes cum turmas hostium, quibus spatium vix praebuit campus, fulminanti dextra delevit. Et—

“Haec omnes veterum revocavit adorea lauros
Ioannes cunctos reddit tibi Roma triumphos.

Sed Victoria tanta auspiciis Sanctitatis Vestrae parta est, vicistis uterque; Sanctitas Vestra votis, et profusis in bellum sacrum sumptibus, Rex gladio, et Regii discrimine sanguinis.

Agnoscat itaque, Beatissime Pater, Sanctitas Vestra, et libenter suscipat Pontificatus sui decus aeternum, quo tum sua, tum Invictissimi Regis virtute parto, multos annos perfruat. ”¹

¹Notwithstanding the fact that this discourse is not generally known, even among historical writers, it appears that the two last paragraphs were found in a Polish translation contained in a work published in 1883 (Warsaw-Ungler, p. 77, Trofea wojenne), on the occasion of the second anniversary of the deliverance of the besieged city of Vienna. Abbé Denhof, the bearer of the letter, was the Prior of the convent of Mogilno, a town situated on the river Dnieper, taken from the Russians in 1662, ceded to Russia in 1772, in the first partition of Poland; and it further appears that he was accompanied by the special secretary of the king, Talenti, when the presentation of the captured standard of the first vizier (Kara-Mustapha) was made, on the 8th day of October, 1683.

ANCIENT ITALIAN TRANSLATION OF THE SAME.¹

BEATISSIMO PADRE.

Costume antico fin dal tempo degli Heroi tramandato alla nostra età con le Bandiere degli abbattuti nemici aprire á vincitori la strada, per la quale tra le voci festive di chi si rallegrano siano condotti al Tempio della Gloria. Ma perche il mio Clementissimo Signore Giovanni III, re di Polonia con quella grandezza d'animo, di cui é dotato, vinse non a prò di se stesso, ma della Christiana Republica, e la sua pietà verso Dio e la singolare osservanza alla santità vostra e alla Sede apostolica uguagliò il suo guérriero valore: perciò riverentissimamente depone per me suo inviato, a piedi della santità vostra il primo Standardo del formidabile Dominatore de' Turchi, tolto a forza dalla possanza della sua Regia destra fin dal mezzo del loro Campo, e in quello l'altezza della potenza ottomana.

Venne in vero Giovanni Re, vidde e vinse. Venne si e abbandonato il Regno, lasciata la Regina, e i Figliuoli, accorre a porre Vienna d' Austria in Libertà e a confermare l'Imperio, ma per motivo della santità vostra, alla quale ha protestato il suo ossequio con un esempio fin' hora non udito gia mai. Vidde ancora intrepido le crude schiere de Turchi, che minacciavano un mondo, ma già ci havea provveduto la Santità Vostra opponendo a tante stragi questo solo scudo, e ispirata dallo Spirito Santo havea conosciuto essere egli destinato da Dio per Difensore della Religione Christiana. Vinse finalmente Giovanni e mentre colla sua destra fulminatrice distrusse squadre dé nemici, à quali a pena havea dato luogo un gran Campo, e:

Questa sola Vittoria
De' prischi Eroi fa rammentare l'imprese,
Roma i trionfi tuoi scorsi cogli anni,
Ecco à nuova memoria,
Ciò che il tempo involò rende Giovanni.

¹The following Italian translation is taken from a very rare old print of the seventeenth century entitled: *Oratione detta alla Santità di N. S. Papa Innocentio XI, dall' Ill'mo, e Rev'mo Sig're D. Gio. Casimiro Denhoff abbate di Chiaratomba Inviato Straordinario del Serenissimo e Potentissimo Giovanni III, Re di Polonia. Nel presentare à nome del Re, la principale Insegna dell' Esercito Ottomano adi 29 Settembre, 1683. Tradotta dal latino da D. Francesco Matteo Appiani in Roma In Milano nella Regia Duca Corte, per Marc Antonio Pandolfo Malatesta Stampatore Reg. Cam. s. d.*

Ma una tanto Vittoria sotto gli auspici della santità vostra si ottenne, vinceste entrambi. Vostra santità con le preghiere e col denaro speso largamente in una Sacra Battaglia, il Re colla spada, e col pericolo del suo Regio Sangue.

Conosca pertanto, Beatissimo Padre, la S. V. e prenda volentieri questa lode eterna del suo Pontificato, della quale goda molti anni, come originata si dalla sua propria virtù, come da quella del mio invittissimo Ré.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Occasional Papers selected from the Guardian, the Times, and the Saturday Review (1846-1890), by the late R. W. Church, M. A., D. C. L. Macmillan. 2 vols., 8°, pp. 492, 416.

Some fifty-four essays and reviews make up these two volumes, the *reliquiae* of Déan Church, one of the most scholarly gentlemen of the Anglican body, and a writer of the most exquisite and idiomatic English. They cover a wide range of mental activity,—book reviews of Carlyle, Merivale, Stanley, Ranke, Thierry, Milman, Lecky, Brewer, Mozley, Renan, and Mrs. Ward; appreciations of Frederick Maurice, Bunsen, Mark Pattison, Bishop Wilberforce; studies on Epictetus, Guicciardini, Bossuet, St. Ignatius, Fénelon, Lamennais, Doellinger,—finally several papers on Cardinal Newman, his Apologia, his answer to Pusey's Eirenicon, his Parochial Sermons, his Course, and his Naturalness. The well-known irenic spirit of Church breathes through these essays, many of which are finished models of their kind,—philosophic, picturesque, epigrammatic. The thoughtful and cultured will read them with interest, and derive pleasure and instruction from them. In a special manner the criticism of "Ecce Homo," "Robert Elsmere," and Renan are consoling and satisfying,—models indeed of firm and correct, but gentlemanly polemic. From many passages that offer themselves for quotation we select this characterization of Renan's historical method in his "Vie de Jésus":

"M. Renan repeatedly declares that his great aim is to save religion by relieving it of the supernatural. He does not argue; but instead of the old familiar view of the Great History he presents an opposite theory of his own, framed to suit that combination of the revolutionary and the sentimental, which just now happens to be in favor in the unbelieving schools. And this is the result: a representation which boldly invests its ideal with the highest perfections of moral goodness, strength, and beauty, and yet does not shrink from associating with it also—and that, too, as the necessary and inevitable condition of success—a deliberate and systematic willingness

to delude and insensibility to untruth. This is the religion and this is the reason which appeals to Christ in order to condemn Christianity." (II. p. 203.)

Ancient English Holy Week Ceremonial, by Henry John Feasey. London, Thos. 1897. 8° pp. 247.

Out of the ancient inventories of churches and guilds, as well as out of church-warden's accounts, and certain old English texts of the pre-Reformation times, Mr. Feasey has reconstructed a manual of the ceremonies of Holy Week as they might have been seen in Ely or Canterbury before the days of Elizabeth. As a picture of the piety, the taste, and the deep religious feeling of English Catholics, it is a deeply interesting book. It is, moreover, a real contribution to the study of ancient ecclesiastical vestments and furniture, and should be in the collection of all who love such recondite but attractive subjects.

Die Chorgesänge im Buche der Psalmen, Ihre Existenz und ihre Form. Von J. K. Zenner, S. J. Erster Theil; Prolegomena, Uebersetzungen, und Erläuterungen. Zweiter Theil; Text.—B. Herder, St. Louis, 1896. \$3 35.

This work by Father Zenner is the latest attempt to determine the form of composition of the poetical parts of the Old Testament. Biblical scholars have labored frequently and earnestly to solve this question, but never with any marked success. Parallelism is the chief characteristic of the poetical art of the ancient Hebrews. Hitherto its application has been restricted to the verses of a Psalm; but in a large number of the Psalms it is impossible to maintain any sequence of thought by merely contrasting verse with verse. In his endeavor to overcome this difficulty Father Zenner hit upon the theory of Strophe and Antistrophe. This was suggested to him by a passage in II Paral. VI, 41:

"Now therefore arise, O Lord God, into Thy resting place,
Thou, and the ark of Thy strength:
Let Thy priests, O Lord God, be clothed with salvation,
And let Thy saints rejoice in good things.
O Lord God, turn not away the face of Thine anointed:
Remember the mercies of David Thy servant."

This is evidently a citation from Psalm 131 (Vulgate). In all likelihood this Psalm was composed by Solomon for the

dedication of the Temple. It gives expression, on the one hand, to the sentiments of David concerning the Ark of God and the Temple, and on the other hand it records the promises of God in regard to His people. The quotation as given here does not follow the order of the verses as we find them in the Book of Psalms. With this as a starting point, Father Zenner set about reconstructing the Psalm and made the following arrangement :

STROPHE.

I.

2. David swore unto the Lord,
And vowed unto the Mighty One of
Jacob :
3. Surely I will not come into the Tab-
ernacle of my house,
Nor go up into the couch of my bed ;
4. I will not give sleep to mine eyes,
Or slumber to mine eyelids ;
5. Until I find out a place for the Lord,
A tabernacle for the Mighty One of
Jacob.

SELAH.

6. Ho, we heard of it Ephrathah :
We found it in the field of Jaar.
7. We will go into His Tabernacle ;
We will worship at His footstool.

III.

8. Arise, O Lord, in Thy resting
place,
Thou and the Ark of Thy strength.
9. Let Thy priest be clothed with
righteousness ;
And let Thy saints shout for joy.
10. For Thy servant David's sake
Turn not away the face of Thine
anointed.
1. Remember, O Lord, Thy kindness
towards David,
And all his gentleness.

ANTISTROPHE.

II.

11. The Lord hath sworn unto David
in truth,
He will not turn from it ;
Of the fruit of thy body will I set
upon thy throne.
12. If thy children will keep My Cov-
enant
And my testimony that I shall
teach them,
Their children also shall sit upon
Thy throne for evermore

SELAH.

13. For the Lord hath chosen Sion ;
He hath desired it for His habita-
tion.
14. This is my resting place forever ;
Here will I dwell : for I have de-
sired it.

IV.

15. I will surely bless Sion ;
I will satisfy her poor with bread.
16. Her priests also I will clothe with
salvation :
And her saints shall shout aloud
for joy.
17. There will I make a horn to spring
forth unto David :
I have prepared a lamp for mine
anointed,
18. His enemies I will clothe with
shame ;
But upon himself shall his crown
flourish.

According to Father Zenner's theory there were two chor-
uses for the chanting of the Psalms. The first chorus chanted

the strophe, and the second chorus answered with a corresponding antistrophe. About the middle of the Psalm occurred the "Selah," at which the melody was altered in order to vary the monotony of the chant.

To account for the confusion which, according to his theory, exists in the arrangement of the Psalms as we now find them, the author claims that in the course of time the traditional manner of chanting the Psalms was forgotten, and that when the scribe was making a copy of them he wrote the whole of the first column and then followed with the second column—that is, he copied the Psalms vertically instead of horizontally.

This is a brief outline of Father Zenner's theory. It surely is ingenious and attractive. In all the Psalms which he has arranged after this system there is clearness in the sequence of the ideas, and the poetic beauty of the composition is much enhanced. The work is indeed a notable contribution to that department of biblical literature which treats of the puzzling question of Hebrew poetry. It is difficult, however, to imagine that such disorder could arise in compositions that were so familiar to all classes of the Hebrew people. The explanation offered by the author is, however, capable of being illustrated by many instances drawn from the Psalms.

The work is in two parts: the first of 92 pages; the second of 72 pages large quarto. The first part contains the "Prolegomena," in which are explained the author's theory of the Psalms and the method of chanting them. It also contains the translation of thirty-six Psalms, arranged according to his system, with full explanations. In the second part we have a number of Psalms in unpointed Hebrew characters, arranged in strophes, with valuable critical notes. Joined to these are a few other poetical pieces from different parts of the Old Testament.

The typographical execution of this work deserves all praise, especially the fine, bold, clear Hebrew characters, which are a delight to the eye.

Life of St. John of the Cross, of the Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel (1542-1591), compiled, translated, and edited by David Lewis, M. A. London, Thomas Banks, 1897. 8° pp. 307.

In this volume we have a gist of the best lives of St. John of the Cross that have been printed, from that of Fra Joseph of Jesus and Mary down to the life of Garnica (Jaën, 1893). The deep human interest in the life of the great mystic loses nothing in the hands of Mr. Lewis. He has understood at once how to bring out the utter unselfishness of the Saint, his high and absolute idealism, and the keen suffering he was made to undergo in order to accomplish the designs of that other saintly reformer, Saint Theresa. This work is a fit companion to the "Works of St. John of the Cross," edited by the same author. Of them Bossuet said (*États d'Oraison*, I. 12) that "they possess the same authority in mystical theology that the writings of St. Thomas and the Fathers possess in dogmatic theology."

St. Augustin de Canterbury et ses Compagnons, par E. R. P. Brou, S. J. Paris, 1897. Victor Lecoffre. 8o, pp. 210.

Le Bienheureux Bernardine de Feltre, par E. Flornoy. Ibid. 8o, pp. 192.

La Psychologie des Saints, par Henri Joly. Ibid. pp. 201.

1. These elegant little volumes are the continuation of the series "Les Saints," issued by the house of Lecoffre, and the first volume of which we have already noticed. Father Brou has completed an accurate and interesting life of St. Augustin from the original sources and the best modern literature. Celts and Saxons, St. Gregory and his Letters, Canterbury, The British Church, St. Paulinus of York—such are the headings under which he groups the facts of this great saint's life. The long extracts from Bede are edifying reading, and the whole life is doubly so, because of the fact that we celebrate this year the thirteenth centenary of the Conversion of England by St. Augustin and his monks.

2. In the story of the Blessed Bernardine of Feltre we have a picture of Italy in the latter half of the fifteenth century, distracted, ravaged, threatened from all quarters, filled with dissension, the prey of France and Spain, quaking before the advancing Turk, crushed by the Jewish usurer. Pitiful reading it makes, and it recalls the line of Filicaja, *Oh, Italia!*

fossi tu men bella od almen più forte. But it serves also as a fitting background for the life of a holy man of God, a minor observant who went down among the *minuto popolo*, made himself one of them, roused Christian ideals in their souls, broke up the usurer's nests and created the Monti di Pieta, by which the poor might obtain at a low rate of interest such modest sums as they needed. Bernardine was no lettered Politian or Mirandola, but a Franciscan friar, in whose soul burned a strong and wholesome love of the plain people of Italy, people who lay perishing for spiritual nourishment while men squandered for cameos and manuscripts the hard-earned wealth of these same poor. The book is "modern" and suggestive, especially in view of the Oriental situation at the present writing.

3. M. Joly contributes to the series a volume of the most practical value on the psychology of sanctity. It will serve to reassure all those who have been troubled by some modern theories concerning the relationship of Catholic mysticism to certain kinds and degrees of nervous exaltation. The notion of sanctity in its historical development, the permanence in the saint of a strong original nature, the workings of the mental faculties, especially under the operation of divine grace, the nature of contemplation, of the thirst for voluntary suffering and heroic virtue, form the main outlines of a very charming book. It deserves to be translated and given the widest circulation. The author is already well known by several works of a psychological character on instinct, the psychology of genius, and of crime, especially in France.

A Smaller History of Greece from the earliest times to the Roman Conquest, by William Smith, LL. D. Revised, enlarged and in part rewritten by Carleton L. Brownson, instructor in Greek, Yale University. New York: Harpers, 1897. 8°, pp. 423.

In this new and improved edition of Dr. Smith's familiar History of Greece the results of modern investigation have been incorporated with skill and moderation. The inaccuracies of the old edition and some noteworthy omissions have been remedied. Some chapters have been largely rewritten, chiefly out of Busolt and Holm, but not without consultation

of the original authors when such was deemed necessary. The constitutions of the Greek states and the literature of Hellas come in for suitable treatment. The maps and plans have been especially engraved for this edition, from Kiepert, Baumeister, Bursian and other reliable sources. The illustrations are nearly all new, and a pronouncing vocabulary and index accompany the volume. It can be recommended to all colleges and academies desirous of a new text-book of Greek history.

Literary Landmarks of Rome, by Laurence Hutton. Illustrated. New York: Harpers, 1897. 8°, pp. 75.

Mr. Hutton gossips pleasantly about a number of Roman sites made famous to English-speaking readers by the pens of illustrious writers, the graves of Keats, Shelly and Constance Fenimore Woolson, the house of Hans Andersen, Hilda's Tower, the Spanish Steps, Tasso's Garden, the Albergo dell' Orso and some other localities. There are certain appreciations that we would not care to subscribe to, but, withal, the book is written in a kindly and reverential spirit, and is an addition to the guide-book literature of the Eternal City.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Die Alexandrinische Uebersetzung des Buches Daniel und ihr Verhaeltniss zum Massorethischen Text, von Prof. Dr. August Bludau (Biblische Studien, II, 2, 3). B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897. 8°, pp. 218.

The Dream of Bonaparte, by William Poland, S. J. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.

A Glimpse of Organic Life, by William Seton, LL. D. New York, P. O'Shea, 1897.

Catholic Education and American Institutions, by Rev. John F. Mullany, LL. D. Syracuse, Azarias Reading Circle, 1897.

A Little Book of Wisdom, being Great Thoughts of many Wise Men and Women, collected by Lelia Hardin Bugg. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

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THE "EVOLUTION" THEORY OF MORALITY.¹

I. THE THEORY.

The publication, a few months ago, by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the third volume of his *Sociology* brings to a close his series of *Synthetic Philosophy*.

Though this volume is the latest to issue, it is not the complement and crown of his philosophic system. Since 1842, he testifies, his ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong a scientific basis. In his *Data of Ethics and Justice* he lays down the basis of that view of morality which, in his own opinion, is the practical fruit produced for humanity from that very extensive system of philosophy which he has built up with so much learning, labor, and ingenuity. If he has succeeded in constructing from the principles of evolution a throne on which morality, having lost or rejected what he would call the fictitious supports derived from religion,

The system is propounded in: Herbert Spencer's *PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY*—The *Data of Ethics*; The *Induction of Ethics*; The *Ethics of Individual Life*; The *Ethics of Social Life*, New York, 1891.

Among other works which support the theory are: "The Science of Ethics," Leslie Stephen, 1882. *Lectures and Essays*, W. K. Clifford, 1886.

The doctrine is criticised in: *Types of Ethical Theory*, James Martineau, 1886. *A Study of Ethical Principles*, James Seth, 1895. *Right and Wrong*, W. S. Lilly, London, 1893. *The Foundation of Belief*, Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, 1895. *L'Idée Moderne du Droit*, Alfred Fouillé, Paris, 1883. *La Science et la Religion*, and *La Moralité de la Doctrine Evolutive*, F. Brunetière, Paris, 1896.

may reign effectively over the conduct of men, his purpose has been achieved.

An examination of the foundations on which he would rear the fabric will show whether success, which has eluded the efforts of other "independent" moralists, has waited upon his.

In the evolutionary hypothesis man is, like all other organized beings, a development from protoplasm, or, as Huxley calls it, the physical basis of life. While some evolutionists admit that, besides the elements that are of material origin, there is a spiritual superadded element, not derived or derivable from matter, Mr. Spencer holds, on the contrary, that all the vital principles in man, intellectual as well as physical faculties, have been evolved out of lower brute life, by the redistribution of matter and motion under the laws which govern evolution.

And as man is but a development from the brute, our moral judgments are the product of animal instinct, which by the force of evolution has been transformed into intelligence. As instinct guides a beast to distinguish what is helpful, what hurtful to its existence, so our intelligence, when acting within the sphere of morality, teaches us what actions are conducive and what are hostile to the development of life in the individual and in the species, a discrimination which constitutes the essential difference between right and wrong. The development of life is the ultimate end of human existence. This general end embraces three—the preservation and development of the individual's own existence, the welfare of offspring, and the good of society at large. Conduct is an adaptation of means to ends. In the lower grades of life we perceive but a meagre adjustment of means to ends; but as life enlarges in the ascending scale of the animal world, the number and complexity of the adjustments of acts to ends increases. These adjustments have for object and result the development of life in the individual and in the species. The struggle for life, which has its outcome in the survival of the fittest, is the compendium of these adjustments. Conduct which is good for the being, inasmuch as the end is attained by it, must often be injurious to other beings. The evolution of conduct is not complete on merely reaching a perfect adjustment of acts to

those ends which subserve individual life and the rearing of offspring. The limits of perfection in conduct can be reached only in peaceful societies where the adjustments are so complete that the individual, pursuing fully the development and enlargement of his own life, not only does not hinder others, but contributes help to them in the pursuit of the same end.

This enlargement and development of life is the supreme end of conduct. Now, anything which we perceive to be adapted to obtain its end, we call good; a good knife is a knife that cuts; a good gun, one that carries far and true. Similarly we call that conduct "good" which of its nature tends to the development of life, which is the end of conduct. Conduct, however, which may be good because it is adjusted to one of the ends, self-preservation, or the good of offspring, or the good of society, may be bad inasmuch as it is ill adapted or positively hostile to either or both of the other ends. Conduct, then, may be good when considered in reference to one end, yet bad because it is not adjusted to some other end. For example (we illustrate Mr. Spencer's exposition), a man appropriates to his own pleasure property which belongs to another, or is required for the sustenance of his own family. His action is called good, viewed with regard to the first end of life, his own development; it is bad inasmuch as it injures either one of the two other ends, the good of offspring or the good of society. But "whatever inconsistency there is in the use of the words arises from inconsistency of the ends. Here, however, the study of conduct in general, and of the evolution of conduct, has prepared us to harmonize these interpretations."¹ We shall see that the evolutionary doctrine fails completely to offer any principle strong enough to harmonize these antagonistic ends.

Having assumed the development of life to be the end of conduct, and ethically good to be that conduct which best promotes such end, Mr. Spencer indicates the criterion to distinguish between right and wrong. "In answering the much discussed question, 'Is life worth living'? both pessimists and optimists assume it to be self-evident that life is good or bad according as it does or does not bring with it a surplus of pleas-

¹The Data of Ethics, § 8.

urable feeling. In calling this life good, if it brings a surplus of pleasurable feeling, bad if it does not, all implicitly admit that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful."¹ With Mr. Spencer then, as with Mill, the criterion of right and wrong is the pleasure or the pain resulting from action; and it is the assumed preponderance of pleasure over pain which renders life the good and supreme end. These views Mr. Spencer lays down in the first three chapters of his *Data of Ethics*; the text is too long for quotation, but this resumé will be found correct. We have now to examine his creed to see whether it makes a more successful attempt than did Mill to establish morality on a sound basis independent of religion. Such was his aim, he himself has told us, in publishing *The Data of Ethics*. In the preface to that work he states that, as moral injunctions are losing the authority given them by their supposed sacred origin, there is a pressing need to establish morality on a scientific basis. The vacuum left by the disappearance of religious belief, Mr. Spencer thinks, can and must be filled by a scientific ethical regulative code; and in pursuance of his belief he has proposed his evolutionary morality.

II. IS LIFE THE END OF LIFE?

Evidently the first step for Mr. Spencer, in order that his ethical system should have weight and not remain within the realm of ingenious theory, would be to prove, directly or indirectly, that the end which his system assumes is the adequate ultimate end, not merely of physical function, but also of conscious human endeavor. But he does nothing of the kind. He assumes the evolutionary hypothesis that the development of life is the end of conduct. He accumulates proof that the end of physical function is the preservation and development of life; then, because this is true, he assumes that the same must be the supreme end of moral conduct. In the true theory of morals it is amply demonstrated that the end of life cannot be life itself. Here it will be instructive to examine how Mr. Spencer manipulates, in his argument, the end which he has come by so unscrupulously. He shows that three kinds of conduct are each

¹Ib. § 10.

considered good, with reference to their own particular ends; but there may be a conflict between the adjustments to some one end, and those to some other. The ends, then, are sometimes opposed. But if these ends are to coalesce in order to form one ultimate end—and if they do not, they are three, or two ultimate ends, in opposition—there must be a subordination of two to the third, so that the good of those must be made secondary to the good of this. But we look in vain through the system for any principle to establish such subordination. When the question of obligation arises, the conflict ruins the pretensions of the theory to be called a moral system at all. Besides, if life is the end of life because it yields more happiness than pain, there must be some good in life which makes it worth living, renders it a thing to be cherished and striven for and developed. The development of life, as mere life, is the work of nature, to which she attends in the lowest zoöphyte as well as in man. The regulation of conscious human conduct—the true sphere of morality—is left to human intelligence. The end of conduct must be something perceived by reason as worthy of intelligent pursuit; something of such attractiveness that it is calculated, when once perceived, to draw men in pursuit. It must be such that its possession means complete success, its loss the worst of evils, otherwise it will have no sufficient influence to regulate conduct. A moral system which fails to establish an end of this character is no more a directive code than is the science of astronomy. What is this good in evolutionary ethics? The development of life to its fullest extent. This means either the development of individual life, or of the social. Both, says Mr. Spencer, since "the conduct conceived as good rises to the conduct conceived as best, when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time." Now, let us pierce through phrases and find the ideas that lie beneath them, if there are any. What is embraced in the good, as far as it means the highest totality of life in our fellow men? The goodness of conduct depends negatively on our not interfering with others in the pursuit of good. But this negative contribution to good increases the totality of enjoyment and life only in the same way that I make you rich by not stealing anything that belongs to

you. This negative good is nothing, unless it implies a positive good that is the cause of life's value. What is the object in the pursuit of which I am not to interfere with others? The development of life means the exercise of our faculties towards the attainment of some object which is to produce happiness. For me and for others there must be some adequate end of the activities called life. Action implies movement—movement implies a goal to be reached. We must not interfere with the activities of one another, to be sure; but if there are activities in play, which are not to be hindered, they must tend towards some object. To anybody inquiring what is the prize in the Brooklyn Handicap or the Liverpool Grand National, you give no satisfactory answer if you say, "The jockeys must not interfere with one another; a foul is a disqualification." He replies, "These are conditions, but what are the stakes?" Tell him that the emulation created by the stakes tends to improve the breed of horses, by developing a faster stride and greater powers of endurance. "But what are the stakes which form the object of all the running?" Similarly after we have enumerated all the prohibitions against various forms of hindrance, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, and all the others, we have not yet learned anything of the good to be gained by life in its grand totality. What, again, is this supreme good which produces happiness, making life worth living? "Rational Utilitarianism," says Mr. Spencer, "does not take welfare for its immediate object of pursuit, but conformity to certain principles which, in the nature of things, causally determine welfare." Still it remains true that welfare is determined by the attainment of some good producing my happiness. What is the good to which, as an intelligent being, I must adjust my conduct? The good of society, is a question-begging answer. Man is the unit, and society is an aggregation; the good of society is the aggregate of the good of all the individuals, mine as well as others. It follows that we must have pointed out in life some adequate end of pursuit for the individual, which is of such beauty, goodness, nobility, that its pursuit both ennobles life and gives a sanction to restrain men from evil. What is the good which is aimed at in life and in the development of life, for

myself, and for others, by me ; for themselves and for me, by others ? If life is, as evolutionists say it is, complete in itself, then this good must be somewhere within the compass of this mortal existence. Does it simply consist in living on, drawing out the vital air as long as we can ? Even the most rabid evolutionist will not say that in this mere protraction of existence consists the highest good, for then virtue and vice would be reduced to a question of physical health, and the true laws of morality would be the precepts of medicine, surgery, and hygiene. Besides living on, there must be some object to live for. Pleasure ? Mr. Spencer would indignantly repel the charge of epicureanism and refuse to have his system confounded with the qualified hedonism of Mill. If the good of life is in either of these ends, then, considering the necessarily limited quantity the most fortunate may obtain, and the very slender share either of health or the pleasures of life many of them are ever likely to reach, life indeed is but a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Certainly we have been told frequently enough that the true happiness and good of the individual lies in making his life help, however slightly, towards the amelioration of the race, to bring about the reign of universal benevolence and happiness. But the happiness that is to be diffused as universally as the atmosphere in the glad centuries to come will be produced by the possession of some good. That good should also be a good for us, the good of our nature *now*. What is it ? Or, is the perfection and happiness of those who will live in the happy time to come also to consist exclusively, not in enjoying any good themselves, but in the consciousness that they in their turn are contributing to the welfare of a still happier posterity ? This chasing after a perpetually receding perfection were not happiness, but the condition of the damned of the third circle :—

"Consult thy knowledge ; that decides
That as each thing to more perfection grows,
It feels more sensibly both good and pain.
Though ne'er to true perfection may arrive
This race accurs'd, yet nearer than than now
They shall approach it." ¹

¹ Dante's *Inferno*, Canto VI. Carey's Translation.

The only apparently satisfactory object that can be named by the evolutionist as the adequate end which is to be the happiness-creating factor of life is some such one as nobility of character, love, virtue, truth. Then the sequence of the argument will be thus: the development of life is the end of conduct: this assumes the postulate that life is worth living, for it has in it a preponderance of happiness over pain, inasmuch as we have for the object of pursuit, love, virtue, goodness, truth, etc. But how does the assumption that any of these objects give life its worth accord with the evolutionary hypothesis that the development of life is the end of conduct? They are in flat contradiction. The hypothesis is, that life is the supreme end from which all conduct takes its moral value. The assumption is, that the exercise and development of life have a value only inasmuch as conduct, which is life in action, aims at some other end possessing a character to perfect and ennoble life; that is, something intrinsically good in itself. And if an analysis is made of this quality we shall see that as soon as an evolutionist proposes any of these objects as the cause of happiness, he must implicitly assume a standard of goodness independent of the test of pleasure and pain. The development of life, then, is the end of our physical activities, but it is no moral end in itself. Its connection with conduct implies another end independently constituted, and it enters the domain of morality only as subordinate to that other end which is the pivot of the moral order.

The evolutionary hypothesis, making a false start in designation as ultimate end of an end only subordinate, is necessarily wrong in its view of the criterion, and when the question of obligation arises it has no answer to give.

III. THE CRITERION.

The evolutionary school, though different from Mill as to the formal concept of the end of conduct, agrees with his views on the standard of right and wrong; in both systems it is pleasure and pain. Mill considered Spencer's theory to be opposed to his own. Spencer, on the contrary, disclaimed any antagonism. He was right; and the two systems approach even nearer to each other than he claimed. For Mill, the end

is happiness. Spencer, approaching nearer the true view, holds that the end is not happiness but the development of life in its totality, from which results happiness. Both unite upon the criterion, pleasure and pain. They again diverge on the nature of the judgment formed by the reason touching the pleasurable or painful consequences of an action. Mill is a pure empiricist; experience itself is the guide in all such judgments. Spencer contends for the existence of judgments, which he calls intuitive and necessary—"these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited; they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience." "Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations—just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of experience, so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility."¹ Elsewhere he argues very conclusively against the absurdity of empirical systems that reject the existence of necessary thought. But, on examining the origin which he ascribes to the necessary character of *a priori* judgments, it becomes clear that his *necessity* is no absolute necessity at all, but a mere relativity dependent on the stage of development reached by the human brain. He bases all moral judgment on experience, just as well as Mill, with this difference, that in their formation he sees experience concur under two different heads—"the assemblage of indistinct representations accumulated by experience as the result of like acts in the life of the individual, superimposed on a still more indistinct, but voluminous, conscious-

¹ The Data of Ethics, § 45.

ness, due to the inherited effects in progenitors, forming a feeling at once massive and vague."¹ Morality, then, does not, in the long run, transcend experience; there is no absolute, immutable character to distinguish good from evil; where, according to a judgment based upon personal, plus ancestral, experience, the pleasurable prevails, there by the very fact, is the morally good; where, in consequences the painful is predominant, there is the bad.

It has been amply demonstrated in the criticism of Mill's system, published in the preceding number of the BULLETIN, that if the division of good from bad is to be referred to a comparison of consequences, pleasurable and painful, it is impossible to classify actions according to the commonly accepted notions of right and wrong as they stand in the old regulative system which Mr. Spencer is so interested in setting on a sound basis. It is not necessary here to show what has been shown already, that an act of immorality, perpetrated under such conditions as prevent any painful results, cannot be condemned by the criterion at all. Whatever, in this respect, tells against empirical utilitarianism tells also against the system of Mr. Spencer. The existing intuitions which men have of right and wrong—right and wrong, without any consideration of advantage or disadvantage—he endeavors to reduce to judgments formed entirely from a consideration of the pleasant or painful results. But his argument falls far short of the mark. If anybody asserts that conduct may be virtuous intrinsically, Mr. Spencer has an infallible form of cross-examination to bring such a man to confess the error of his ways. The argument which is to achieve this conversion is that if the effects of conduct were reversed, it would be impossible to classify the same acts as virtuous and vicious, which we now call such; to conceive virtue as pain giving, and vice as pleasure giving, is to attempt an absurdity. If gashes and bruises gave pleasing sensations, could we imagine the infliction of them bad conduct, or if picking a man's pocket caused him agreeable sensations, could we think of pocket-picking as bad. "Imagine," he says, "that ministering to a sick person always increased the pains of illness. Imagine that an orphan's relations, who

¹ *Ibid.*

took charge of it, thereby brought miseries on it." This is a good example of Spencerian logic. He finds that one phenomenon is, in a certain class of cases, accompanied by another phenomenon ; he concludes that the second phenomenon is the cause, and the sole cause of the first. A formula will state the argument in general terms : A is always found in conjunction with B ; therefore B is the sole intrinsic cause of A. Now it is unnecessary to state that the elementary rules of inductive logic forbid such a conclusion. Given A and B connected, B may be the cause of A, or A may be the cause of B, or one may be a partial cause of the other, or one may be a concomitant of the other which is produced by C. But it suits Mr. Spencer to assume that, in the case under discussion, B causes A—pleasure-giving power constitutes virtue ; and Mr. Spencer usually assumes just those fragments of truth, or views of arguments, which fit into his hypothesis, ignoring all the rest. The only cases which he cites are those in which the happiness is caused to others—he argues as if there were no possibility of virtuous conduct which brings happiness to ourselves, and has no results for others. And in these cases where virtue practised yields happiness, the fact proves that A is the cause of B, not B of A. Virtue is not constituted by the happiness, but the happiness presumes the virtue. On the other hand, let us take the case of a wealthy profligate seducing a young woman. He gains the connivance of her relatives by a liberal donation. He provides amply for herself, and she having a low moral standard is perfectly satisfied, while the entire affair, being judiciously managed, causes no reports, and so breeds no scandals. This is not pain-giving conduct—it is eminently satisfactory for all the parties concerned. Yet it is not virtuous. But it would be if Mr. Spencer's argument held good. Again he says : "If virtue is primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasure giving, in its total effects on self or others or both." A very good and sufficient reason is given ; it is that virtuous conduct is usually the pleasure-giving conduct, owing to the fact that in those actions which refer to others, the mark of utility to others is perceived to be conformable to reason, and for such

conformity necessary. And it is the conformity to reason that constitutes the goodness in these actions. The utility to others is not the intrinsic constituent of the good in such conduct, but it is a necessary condition. A triumphant summary of the argument against the man who maintains the doctrine of moral good being constituted intrinsically, independent of pleasure or pain, is, "Require him to name any moral sense judgment, by which he knows as right some kind of act that will bring a surplus of pain, taking into account the totals in this life and in any supposed other life, and you will find him unable to name one; a fact proving that underneath all these intuitions respecting goodness or badness of acts, there lies the fundamental assumption that acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or increase their misery."¹ Again the same argument: A and B found together, therefore B is the intrinsic cause of A. Let us make a similar one. We wish to prove that the essential characteristic of the McKinley Cabinet consists in each of its members having a middle name. On examining the names of each individual who belonged to that body, let us suppose I find that each one has a middle name. Therefore, what essentially constitutes membership of the Cabinet is the presence of this sonorous distinction; it is a note to be found in each individual. Does anybody deny the justice of my conclusion? then I crush him by requiring him to name any member of the Cabinet who has not two names, and I find him unable to mention one; a fact proving that underneath all the other notions of what is meant by the term member of the Cabinet lies the fundamental truth that the possession of a middle name is the essential element in our notion of a member of the Cabinet. Positivist philosophers, in the field of physical science, respect the laws of inductive reasoning; their thinking usually results in correct conclusions, whilst they confine themselves to the investigations of facts, without the introduction of theories. They follow truth wherever the search may take them. But some of them who have entered the domain of metaphysics and ethics, instead of looking for truth are occupied in an endeavor to dovetail fact and intuition into a preconceived hypothesis with which neither

¹Ibid.

fact nor intuition agrees. This task reduces them to a method of reasoning that would be scouted if employed in physical research. But rigorous thinking is a luxury not to be indulged in by a philosopher engaged in proving that twice two make five, that the moral judgments of men are but a transmuted instinct of the lower animals.

IV. THE CRITERION CONTRADICTS ITSELF.

As long as the physical aspect of conduct is concerned, Mr. Spencer's criterion results satisfactorily enough. Pleasure and pain are the natural guides to direct a sentient being in the discrimination of what is helpful from what is injurious to animal existence, or, to state the fact in Mr. Spencer's own phrase, "Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts." But no sooner does he apply it to moral conduct—and it is only with the conduct which falls within the sphere of morality, that ethics is concerned—than the criterion is found inadequate to the task imposed on it. The element of obligation is what causes the trouble. The difficulty is this: "While recognizing the fact that in our state of transition, characterized by very imperfect adaptations of constitution to conditions, moral obligations of supreme kinds often necessitate conduct which is physically injurious, we must also recognize the fact that, considered apart from other effects, it is immoral so to treat the body, as in any way to diminish the fulness and vigor of vitality."¹ He has already shown from his principles, or supposes himself to have shown, that the development of life is the end of conduct. Now in what he calls the biological view, he recognizes that supreme obligations demand an opposite course of conduct. These supreme obligations must be begotten outside the sphere of the evolutionary hypothesis, for we shall see that within it obligation is a delusion. The original evolutionary test of action classes certain conduct (taking a man's property, for example, or his wife) as moral because it tends to physical development. It is but an illustration of the question of evolution, the struggle for existence, which has evolved us, through mollusk, up to ape, and from ape to our present condition of

¹Ib., § 31.

perfection—why shall the same rule not now hold good as we progress to the higher state? Because, at this juncture looms up that everlasting bugbear of positivist ethics, moral obligation, to make this admirable conduct positively bad. Morality here joins issue with evolution; the conduct good from the point of view of development of individual life is morally bad. Here is Mr. Spencer's solution of the puzzle: "The seeming paradoxicalness of this statement results from the tendency, so difficult of avoidance, to judge a conclusion which presupposes an ideal humanity, by its applicability to humanity as now existing. The foregoing conclusion refers to the highest conduct on which, as we have seen, the evolution of conduct terminates—that conduct in which the making of all adjustments of acts to ends subserving complete individual life, together with those subserving maintenance of offspring and preparation of them for maturity, not only consists with the making of like adjustments by others, but furthers it."¹ The paradox results, then, from our applying to human conduct, as it exists to-day, a standard that will work satisfactorily when human conduct is evolved to perfection in the ideal condition of humanity. The present condition is one in which there are two conflicting tendencies, the "militant" and the "industrial," the former prompting man to act for his own immediate benefit, as in the earlier stages of evolution, the latter tending to make him subordinate his own good to the good of others with whom he lives in society. And "while there coexist two ways of life so radically opposite, human nature cannot become properly adapted to either."² But, Mr. Spencer assures us, the difficulty of adjustment, which is particularly hard where the emotional pains and pleasures enter, must finally be overcome by evolution. Now, Mr. Spencer has proposed to establish a regulative code. The first step necessary to the accomplishment of that purpose is to point the standard by which we are to discriminate between right and wrong. He proposes the pleasure and pain standard. The application of that standard to conduct gives contradictory results, especially when the emotional pains and pleasures are involved. And then he tells us the contradiction arises because the standard is applied to

¹Ib., § 31.²Ib., § 35.

a human nature which has not yet reached the state of ideal perfection. When all conflicting tendencies are completely adjusted, the pleasure and pain standard will work smoothly—whatever is pleasant, whatever is servicable to physical life will be also morally good, the disagreeable will be bad. In other words, when the millennium will have come, and no regulative code shall be any longer required, the standard is to work perfectly. This reply to the difficulty is as if a captain, who complains that the compass furnished him points South or West instead of North, were told that a time is coming, when rocks, sand bars, storms, and all other obstacles are to be suppressed, and his ship of her own accord shall sail straight to her destined port, then the compass, owing to the new adaptations, will be true. Mr. Spencer adduces many facts of biology which show nothing more than that pleasure and pain, as has been said before, are the guides to recognize the useful and the noxious, for animal life. But he feels that after all the light which biology offers common sense will still be unsatisfied. "Doubtless, however, after all that has been said, there will be raised again the same difficulty—then will be instanced the mischievous pleasures and the beneficent pains. The drunkard, the gambler, and the thief, who severally pursue gratifications, will be named in proof that the pursuit of gratifications misleads, whilst the self-sacrificing relative, the worker who perseveres through weariness, the honest man who stints to pay his way will be named in proof that disagreeable modes of consciousness accompany acts that are really beneficent."¹ Undoubtedly they will, to the utter discomfiture of the evolutionary moral standard. Solving ethics by biology will give as satisfactory results as Mr. Spencer would get, if, having given to him the height of the mast and width of beam in the ship above mentioned he were to calculate from these data the age of the captain.

The complicated changes in human condition have, we are told, considerably deranged the guidance by sensation, with the result that pleasure and pain no longer indicate what is to be embraced, what avoided. Mr. Spencer deplors the fact that this condition of affairs should have led men into false ethical

¹Ib., § 35.

theories—"But with the progress of adaptation, bringing faculties and requirements into harmony, such incongruities of experience, and consequent distortions of theory must diminish, until, along with complete adjustment of humanity to the social state, will go recognition of the truths that actions are completely right only when, besides being conducive to future happiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable and that painfulness, not only ultimate but proximate, is the concomitant of actions that are wrong."¹ The pleasure and pain criterion, when applied, lands us in an inextricable tangle and Mr. Spencer, finding himself unable to unravel it, blandly assures us that a time is coming when no such confusion can occur—a time when, if it ever came, men would no more need a regulative code to guide them in conduct than a donkey now needs the science of botany to distinguish between a field of clover and a brick-yard. Even in the hands of its constructor, the criterion of rational utilitarianism is hardly satisfactory.

V. FREE WILL.

Before considering what kind of case the evolutionary theory makes out for moral obligation, it will be interesting to know first Mr. Spencer's views as to the nature of the will which is to be regulated by his code. Turning to his *Principles of Psychology*,² we find that he treats the alleged freedom of the will as an illusion. "That everyone is at liberty to do what he desires to do all admit, though people of confused ideas commonly suppose this to be the thing desired. But that everyone is at liberty to desire, or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free will, is negated, as much by the analysis of consciousness, as by the contents of the preceding chapters." He briefly indicates what seems to him the nature of what he calls the current illusion. He explains how an impression received from without makes nascent certain motor changes, and "this composite psychical state, which excites the action is, at the same time, the *ego*, which is said to will the action. Naturally enough, then the

¹Ib. § 39.

² *Principles of Psychology*, § 219.

subject of such psychical changes says that he wills the action. But to say that the performance of the action is therefore the result of his free will is to say that he determines the cohesions of the psychical state which arouse the action; and as these psychical states constitute himself at the moment, that is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd."

These changes and psychical states are produced by an infinitude of experiences registered on his structure, coöperating with the immediate impression on his senses, these combined effects being qualified by the physical state, general or local, of his organism. Free will is but a subjective illusion, according to Mr. Spencer—the free act is predetermined by a combination of factors over which the man has no control. This subjective illusion is strengthened by an objective illusion: "If we look at a star, which is determined in its course by an infinitude of forces repellant and attractive, from the very multitude of these forces which we are unable to trace in action, its motion appears uninfluenced by any of them and it seems to be free." With this postulate assumed as to the nature of free will, it is absurd to speak of a regulative code of morals at all. A code of morals implies that there are two paths which a man may choose, and the object of a code of morals is to induce him to choose the right one. But if a man's course is determined by forces independent of his will, if he has no control in the determination of his will, he is no longer capable of being moral or immoral. We do not call the sun moral, though by his light and heat he contributes to human well being. Whoever thought of calling an eruption of Vesuvius an act of immorality? A man, from Mr. Spencer's standpoint, acts on a course predetermined for him by forces over which he has no control, just as the sun shines and Vesuvius gives forth lava.

If a man's conduct is thus determined, to what purpose is a moral code laid down? If the forces acting within him—the registered experiences of his ancestors, the influence of objects acting on his senses—determine him to be a rascal, and he cannot alter this determination, to what purpose will you show him that such conduct is forbidden by morality?

"You may as well go stand upon the beach,
And bid the main flood bate his usual height."

The action of the man and of the waves are both the result of natural laws which the agents obey and nowise control.

Accepting this theory of the will, anyone leading a vicious life can triumphantly show not merely that in his conduct he violates no obligation, but also that it is quite impossible for him to act otherwise than he is doing. What determines his action? Not his own free will; free will is an illusion. His appreciation of pleasure and pain is made mainly by the registered experiences of his ancestors, his own past experiences, modified by the physical condition of his organization, acted upon by an external object. When a pleasure-giving object is presented to his consciousness, if the immediate consequences attract more forcibly than the remote results deter, these factors produce an act tending to grasp the immediate pleasure. But the man cannot influence this determination?

Are we to blame him for such conduct? As well blame a phonograph for playing a variety hall effusion instead of the doxology. The machine and the man are both determined to a certain performance, by forces which act for the redistribution of matter and motion. In both effects the character of the rhythmical movements is determined by the antecedent conditions, registered in the constitution of the agents, chiefly for the man in his inherited bent, and for the phonograph in the metal plate. How manifestly unphilosophical then to praise or blame a man for his conduct! Bill Sykes trampling a wretched woman to death is not a subject for reprehension. However unsatisfactory and unaltristic his conduct, Bill is no more to blame than an earthquake. His action is but a harmonious display of the redistribution of matter and force. Bill himself may be laboring under the delusion that he was free to desire or not to desire the performance which he has entered upon for the increase of his own happiness and the development of his faculties. Occasional observations, let us say, of the moon have helped to deepen the hold which this illusion has on his mind. But it is only an illusion. The hardest reflection that we can make about Bill is that "frequent perturbations of the moving equilibrium are caused by those excesses characterizing a career in which the periodicities are much broken, and a common result is that the rhythm of

the internal actions being often deranged, the moving equilibrium rendered by so much imperfect is generally shortened in duration." If, instead of proposing to establish a regulative code of ethics, Mr. Spencer's aim had been to demonstrate that human conduct knows no such thing as morality his doctrine on free will would be a thoroughly logical effort.

VI. OBLIGATION.

Having disposed of free will as a delusion, Mr. Spencer, consistently enough, resolves obligation into a transitory prejudice founded on a confusion of ideas. Instead of accounting for any reality in moral obligation, he confines himself to the task of tracing the origin of the abstract idea. This idea he shows to be abstracted from elements in which it has no existence. In the chapter entitled, "The Psychological View,"¹ he employs several pages to tell in highly scientific language what may be summed up in the statement to which nobody will object, that man is reasonable, and in the conduct of life he is guided by reason, as well as by sensation, in some cases reason, in others sensation, being the more reliable monitor. After telling many undisputed things in a very solemn way he remarks: "And here we are introduced to certain facts of profound significance."

"This conscious relinquishment of immediate and special good to gain distant and general good, while it is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called moral, is also a cardinal trait of self-restraints other than those called moral—the restraints that originate from fear of the visible ruler, of the invisible ruler, and of society at large. Whenever the individual refrains from doing that which passing desire prompts, lest he should afterwards suffer legal punishment or Divine vengeance, or public reprobation, or all of them, he surrenders the near and definite pleasure rather than risk the remote and greater, though less definite pains, which taking it may bring on him, and, conversely, when he undergoes some present pain that he may reap some probable future pleasure, political, religious or social."³ The introduction of the Invisible Ruler strikes one as

¹Data of Ethics, § 28.

²Ib., § 41 et seqq.

³Ib. § 44.

unexpected. But Mr. Spencer spells the words without capitals, and soon reduces the Invisible Ruler of the universe to the level of the children's bogey-man. The four kinds of control mentioned above have the common character that the simpler and less ideal feelings are consciously overruled by the more complex and ideal feelings, but they differentiate, and, Mr. Spencer assures us, from them all eventually emerges moral control with its accompanying conceptions and sentiments on an independent basis. In developing this beautiful theory of the origin of moral obligation, he points out four sources of extrinsic fear, generating a feeling of restraint—the consciousness of evil to follow from the anger of fellow savages, if a satisfaction were obtained at their expense; the control of a strong man, who, having risen to power, inspired others with a dread of his anger; the ghost of the dead man, and his former commands, gradually elevated to the rank of a divine sanction; social opinion, which at first praised and blamed courage and cowardice, and afterwards came to praise or blame conduct according as it exhibited or was wanting in loyalty to the rules and piety towards the god. With the restraints generated from these extrinsic sources there is always joined the thought of external coercion; and from this association finally emerges the notion of obligation, which so becomes habitually associated with the surrender of immediate special benefits for the sake of others distant and general. Restraints properly distinguished as moral, Mr. Spencer tells us, differ from other restraints out of which they evolve, in this that they refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions but to their intrinsic. Mr. Spencer assumes that the one kind of restraints generates the other. But he fails to explain how the restraints which the fear of others imposes on a man will generate a restraint arising exclusively from the fear of the intrinsic results to others of an action; how the fear of being clubbed to death for stealing a horse, however often the feeling may have been experienced in a long, if not illustrious, line of ancestors, will ever transmute itself into a feeling of restraint depending on the fear of inflicting injury on the horses' owner. If the inherited effects of such feelings concerning extrinsic results produce, as Mr. Spencer tells us they do in the individual, a voluminous con-

sciousness, at once massive and vague, it will be a consciousness of the club and the halter, not of the badness of the action because injurious to others. It will be an inherited dread of extrinsic danger, such as is the instinctive fear which a lamb has of a wolf. This explanation of moral obligation is a mere sophism smoothing over a difficulty which is inexplicable to the system. Multiply experiences of extrinsic fear as often as it pleases you, you may have hereditary fear of the same extrinsic consequences as a result, but the notion of moral obligation as the common sense of men conceive it refuses to be explained in this manner. Mr. Spencer's difficulties always commence when he comes face to face with the moral element. All the ingenuity of his approaches, and the freedom which he grants himself in making gratuitous assumptions, fail to establish a continuity of nature between the facts of biology and the notions of morality.

The feeling of duty has now to be manufactured. Two elements are embraced in it—the authoritativeness of the obligation and the element of coerciveness; these two Mr. Spencer accounts for in his happiest manner. Accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that guidance by feelings which refer to remote and general results is usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately gratified.

"The idea of authoritativeness has therefore come to be connected with feelings having these traits, the implication being that the lower and simpler feelings are without authority."¹ So the authoritativeness of moral obligation rests on the fact that we judge, from the results of antecedent experiences, that it is more satisfactory to aim at remote and general, than at immediate results—that it pays far better to be an honest man than a thief, a truthful man than a liar. When, then, a thief would propose to take your property the authoritativeness of the moral obligation barring his way would consist in his consciousness, produced by antecedent experiences, that it would be more conducive to welfare to let your property alone. If he is determined by that tendency which is no more than an instinctive tendency, will anybody see in this determination any recognition of moral obligation? And if, as is often the case,

¹Ib. § 46.

that consciousness concerning the relative values of remote and immediate results is not sufficient to control the acquisitive propensities, what then? The conditions of the "states of psychical cohesions" are such that the "consciousness concerning guidance by the remote feelings" has not yet emerged with sufficient distinctness to be efficient. Evolution has not yet carried the man up to the point where the authoritativeness of duty begins to exist for him. So much for the first element of duty. Manufacturing duty out of such unstable elements as this is akin to spinning ropes out of sand. Perhaps the other element will contribute some principle of cohesion; it is the element of coerciveness. The extrinsic effects of a forbidden act are once more called into requisition. Fear of external penalties (the strong man, the ghost, the constable) has generated a sense of compulsion with reference to extrinsic consequences: this feeling is then transferred indirectly to feelings regarded as moral. "Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act excites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects are thought of, and being thus linked with the intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion."¹ Moral compulsion, then, turns out to be another delusion, arising from a weakness of intellect which finding associated A and B—entirely different characters—makes the mistake of ascribing to A something that belongs only to B. Extrinsic effects produce a dread, and, because with them intrinsic effects are associated in our mind, this dread is transferred to the latter. We have a wholesome fear of Mr. Smith, and as Mr. Jones usually travels with him, we have come to dread the innocuous Mr. Jones. Evidently, if we could but rectify our perceptions, we should have no cause to dread Mr. Jones at all. And this is precisely what becomes of moral obligation in Mr. Spencer's hands: "Emerging as the moral motive does, but slowly, from amid the political, religious, and social motives, it long participates in the consciousness of subordination to some external agency which is joined with them, and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated consciousness; then only does the feeling of obligation fade. This remark implies the tacit conclusion, which will be very startling to most, that the sense of duty or

moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases."¹ The second element, coerciveness, is, therefore, but the result of a misapprehension of causal connections. And this is all that remains of the once respectable notion of moral obligation, in the system of ethics which is to fill up the daily increasing vacuum made by the disappearance of religion. It is evident that the new system need cause no misgiving to the wrongdoer, for he has but to study it to find that it effectually kills the very notion of moral obligation. In the Spencerian Utopia it will not be even thought of. As an earnest of the future he tells us that even now we can trace the dawning of that happy era. Conscientiousness in many has outgrown the sense of compulsion, and the truly honest man pays an equitable claim upon him without any sense of self-compulsion, doing the right thing simply from the satisfaction felt in doing it. To this argument it is not hard to reply.

The feeling of satisfaction is a result, actual or anticipated; there must be some element in the act, then, which makes it desirable in itself. What is that element? The reply must be that it is either the fact that it gives pleasure to the man himself, or that it confers advantage on the creditor paid. It is not the latter—for the conscientious man will have the satisfaction that comes from the payment of his debt, even though he know that the money will be used by the creditor in a foolish or self-injurious way. It is not the former, for the satisfaction arising from the conscientious act to the doer must be the result of the character of the act, and, therefore, cannot constitute the nature of the act. There must, then, be something attractive in the action itself which influences the conscientious man—that is to say, his reason perceives a moral goodness in the action. The conduct of a man who loves virtue for virtue's sake lends but little support to the theory that pleasure and pain are the criterion of right and wrong. One will search in vain *The Data of Ethics* for a foundation of obligation—an indispensable requisite of a moral code. Conscious of the inadequacy of his system in this respect Mr. Spencer refers us to a time when the need for obligation shall

¹I. lb.

have passed away. His success as a logician does not encourage us to put much faith in his prophetic gifts. Most people will share Mr. Balfour's feelings regarding that future era. "Mr. Spencer, who pierces the future with a surer gaze than I can make the least pretence to, looks confidently forward to a time when the relations of man to his surroundings will be so happily contrived that the reign of absolute righteousness will prevail, conscience grown unnecessary will be dispensed with, the path of least resistance will be the path of virtue, and not the 'broad' but the 'narrow' way will lead to destruction. These excellent consequences seem to me to flow very smoothly and satisfactorily from his particular doctrine of evolution combined with his particular doctrine of morals. But I confess that my own personal gratification at the prospect is somewhat dimmed by the reflection that the same kind of causes which make conscience superfluous, will relieve us from the necessity of intellectual effort, and that by the time we are all perfectly good, we also shall be all perfectly idiotic."¹

VII. RIGHTS.

The evolutionary view of the origin of rights is expounded in Mr. Spencer's "Justice." He first traces it in the earlier development among gregarious lower animals. Coöperation among them is beneficial only when they observe the condition that each member of the group, while carrying on sustentation of self and offspring, shall not seriously impede the like pursuit of others. This *à priori* condition to harmonious coöperation comes to be tacitly recognized as "something like a law," and, finally, Mr. Spencer assures us becomes an imperative law for creatures to which gregariousness is a benefit. The human idea of justice contains two elements. On the one hand there is that positive element implied by each man's recognition of his claims to unimpeded activities and the benefits they bring. On the other hand, the negative element implied by the consciousness of limits which the presence of other men having like claims necessitates. A formula has to be found which will unite these two elements—the liberty of each one, limited only by the the like liberties of others. The formula

¹The Foundations of Belief, p. 75.

proposed is: Every man is free to do that which he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. The authority of this formula rests on the fact that it is an *à priori* conception that has arisen, not from the experience of the individual, but from the experience of the race. We perceive by an intuition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. How do we come by that intuition? Not *à posteriori*, or by induction, for no inductive process can ever examine even one pair of straight lines carried out indefinitely. This fixed intuition, according to the evolutionary theory, must have been established by that intercourse with things which, through an enormous past has directly or indirectly determined the organization of the nervous system and certain resulting necessities of thought. And what is true concerning space, time, and numbers, is true also of cognitions which concern ethical relations. The given formula of justice, then, is a necessary truth, perceived intuitively, with an authority derived from that necessity. Assuming the above formula as a general principle to be applied to particular cases, Mr. Spencer reaches the origin of a right. Whoever admits that each man has a certain restricted freedom, admits that it is right he should have this restricted freedom, and the several particular freedoms deducible, may fitly be called, as they are called, rights.

The foundation, then, of right is expressed in the formula that each man is free to use his own activities, provided he does not interfere with a like freedom in others. Now, if a man has a right, one of its essentials is that there is a moral obligation resting upon others not to use their activities in any way that will interfere with him in the restricted use of his activities. Already we have seen that the system fails to establish the existence of any such thing as moral obligation, for want of which all this lengthy tissue of argument to establish the existence of human rights is words, more words, and nothing but words. Why cannot I appropriate the fruits of your labors? Because I am obliged to respect your activities. Why am I obliged to do so? Because the social condition imposes such limitations on the free exercise of my vital forces; because I recognize this principle as a result of evolution, modifying and restricting the primary one on which

evolution works—that is, that life is developed by the struggle which results in the survival of the fittest. But to this attempt to shackle my liberty, I reply that just as the forces that are within my being act on this latter principle, and have acted in all my ancestors, of whose registered antecedent experiences, I am, to a great extent, but the expression; so will they also act according to the principle which modifies the original one. If the second is developed in me, then nature will carry out in me the survival law, with due respect for the modifying law. If it does, well and good; I am a type of the man evolved up to the point of honesty; I am honest by nature, just as a beaver is a dam building animal. But if evolution works otherwise so that I take your property, my conduct is an evidence that the law of restraint is not yet sufficiently developed in me to control the primary influences which make life possible. But you say I ought to observe the law of limitation and restriction, so far as to respect the activities of others. Why ought I? It is for the force which works through evolution towards the development of the species to provide for that result. I am not evolution, but an irresponsible product and tool of evolution. I look for my own happiness where I can find it. The antecedent experiences of the tribe registered in me have not yet become sufficiently intensified to make me conclude that the remote evil results of this particular act of robbery will outweigh the immediate advantages that accrue to me from it. Nature follows her own course. If I were sufficiently developed, then nature, acting through me according to the complete adaptation between the militant and the industrial tendencies, would respect the activities of others. My conduct does not respect them—an undeniable proof that I do not yet fall under the law. To say that I ought to act otherwise implies that I can. Mr. Spencer has made it plain to me that I cannot. I cannot determine the psychical cohesions which make up myself. I recognize well enough that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, for it is impossible to think the contradictory. But when it comes to the assertion that I am to respect, in my conduct, the activities of others, I perceive no such repugnance in thinking the contrary. I not alone can think, but I can do the contradictory, and theory

must bow to fact. The authority of the formula of justice has no more power to establish a moral obligation than has a proposition of Euclid. If the formula is a law, it is a law of evolution, and evolution must carry it out. In a great many instances, as the criminal courts testify, evolution does not carry it out. When Mr. Spencer's promised man arrives, and everybody will be virtuous by nature, then the formula of justice will both impose an obligation, and carry it out, as the law of gravitation acts now. In that glad time the robbery of a hen coop, or a case of criminal conversation, will be as unlikely to occur as a collision between Sirius and Saturn.

If ethical science is to be reduced to the character with which Mr. Spencer would invest it, then the advantage or necessity of respecting the activities of others does but become a motive for a man who has taken progress enough to heart, and consecrates himself to aiding nature in working towards the goal. But after all these tedious explanations, with their elaborate and ingenious accumulation of physical and biological facts, we have not advanced an inch towards an answer to the question—why is a man bound to respect the rights of others when his immediate gratification lies in a conduct which ignores them? Mr. Spencer, attacking Mill's position, makes merry at systems of philosophy which, by denying the existence of necessary thought, have committed suicide. Yet his own theory of the genesis of necessary truth robs it of that very character of necessity. If some intuitions of necessary truth exist, it must be absolute, unchanging and independent of all contingent variable things. Mr. Spencer makes the necessity dependent on the perfection to which the redistribution of matter and motion has reached in the human brain. "Fixed intuitions must have been established by that intercourse with things which throughout an enormous past has, directly or indirectly, determined the organization of the nervous system and certain resulting necessities of thought."¹ If this be necessary truth, what, pray, is relativity? Surely as far back as one can think in that enormous past, when, we are told, the first cells of protoplasm were emerging, it was as true then as it is in the year which is enlightened by the latest

¹ Justice, p. 55. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

product of Mr. Spencer's brain—that two and two of them made four. And in that distant future of which physicists speak, when gradual changes consequent on evolution will have extinguished the race of man and the earth shall be reduced to a mass of revolving gravestones, it will be as necessarily true then as it is to-day—that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Mr. Spencer shows the absurdity of Mill's contention that morality is founded on experience. How much more satisfactory is his own? It is experience with him from first to last. Not the experience of the individual, but the sum of antecedent experiences recorded in him. If the experience of one cannot, however multiplied in himself, produce the moral distinction between right and wrong, neither will it, however, many times it may have been multiplied in a line of ancestors before being recorded in the individual. To experience and relativity he comes at last. His ethical writings may form a valuable contribution to Natural History or Biology. They give no answer to the supreme questions of morality. When one wades laboriously through the long and evolved series of arguments with which Mr. Spencer endeavors to explain morality by evolution, it is hard not to conclude that his arguments, like Gratiano's reasons, are "As two grains of wheat in two bushels of chaff. You shall seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them they are not worth the search."

VIII. LOGICAL EVOLUTIONARY MORALITY.

The dominant idea of Mr. Spencer's ethics, as in all his philosophy, is that all the phenomena of human life, result from the modification of matter and material force. When he approaches the solution of the ethical problem, he finds in possession a moral code, founded on ideas that presume an independent, objective, absolute distinction between right and wrong. To harmonize his system with the code, he resorts to the theory of a conflict between the militant and the industrial tendencies in human nature—a theory which, he practically admits, fails to offer any satisfactory way out of the difficulty. The real conflict exists between the recognized morality—the product of a very different belief—and his primary principle.

He would divorce the regulative code of Christianity from the religion which fosters it, and marry it to his own materialistic creed; but common sense forbids the bans. Had he stuck logically to his principle that evolution is a movement towards progress through the struggle for life which results in the survival of the fittest, he could have worked out a regulative code, which, however startling to our accepted notions of morality, would be consistent with the evolutionary position. The struggle for life, which in the Evolutionary Hypothesis, has produced from original protoplasm, through an ascending gradation, man as we know him, should still continue with the old result of progress towards perfection through the survival of the fittest. The Spartan custom of killing off weakly or deformed infants, the preventive check would have honorable places in the new dispensation. Society, in the selection of males for propagation, would exercise a nice discrimination, such as is now practised by gentlemen who breed race horses, or prize shorthorns. The stronger, in every class, should stamp out the weak. The drivelling sentimentality of Christianity in favor of the feeble, the sickly and the old should be held to constitute high treason against society. The peremptory suppression of such classes would be part of the struggle necessary for the greater development of the type. A recent philosopher, who has a respect for logical thinking, courageously presses the evolutionary theory to its conclusions, and rates Mr. Spencer for inconsistency. Friedrich Nietzsche, who recognizes the absurdity of endeavoring to reconcile Christian morality with evolutionary ethical principles has exposed the fraud and laid down the true morality that flow from the Spencerian principle. Writing of George Eliot, the poetess of evolutionary ethics, Nietzsche's words are: "They have got rid of the Christian God, and now they think themselves obliged to cling firmer than ever to Christian morality; that is English consistency. With us it is different. When we give up the Christian belief we thereby deprive ourselves of the right to maintain a stand on Christian morality. Christianity is a system, a view of things consistently thought out and complete. If we break out of it the fundamental idea of God, we thereby break the whole into pieces. If in fact the English imagine they know

of their own accord 'intuitively' what is good and evil, if they consequently imagine they have no more need of Christianity as a guarantee of morality, that itself is merely the result of the ascendancy of Christian valuation, and an expression of its strength and profundity."¹ "What is good? All that increases the feeling of power—will to power, will in man. What is bad? All that precedes from weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power increases—that a resistance is overcome. Not contentedness, but more power, not peace at any price, but warfare, not virtue but capacity. The weak and ill-constituted shall perish, first principle of our charity; and people shall help them to do so. What is more injurious than any crime? Practical sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak—Christianity."²

Nietzsche did not undertake the hopeless task of squaring the "survival of the fittest" principle with the morality sanctioned by Christianity—and here is the ideal type: "This most valuable type has often enough existed already, but as a happy accident, never as willed; it has rather been the most feared; it has been hitherto almost the terror; and out of that terror the reverse type has been willed, cultivated, attained, the domestic animal, the sickly animal, man—the Christian."³ "Christianity has taken the part of all the weak, the low, the ill-constituted; it has made an ideal out of the antagonism to the preservative instincts of strong life."⁴ Here is the true diagnosis of the conflict between the militant and the industrial tendencies which Spencer vainly tries to harmonize, and which he dismisses with the observation that while there coexist two ways of life, so radically opposed, human life cannot be adapted to either. The radical opposition lies between morality and the creed which holds that life is the end of life; happiness and pain the test of good and evil.

The true position of benevolence and sympathy in the evolutionary assumption is here: "Sympathy stands in antithesis to the tonic passions, which elevate the energy of the feelings of life; it operates depressively."⁵ "Sympathy thwarts on the whole, in general, the law of development, which is the

¹The works of Frederick Nietzsche, vol XI, p. 164, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1896.

²Ib. p. 238.

³Ib. p. 239.

⁴Ib. p. 240.

⁵Ib. p. 241.

law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for extinction ; it resists in favor of life's disinherited and condemned ones ; it gives to life a gloomy and questionable aspect, by the abundance of the ill-constituted, whom it maintains in life."¹ Undoubtedly Nietzsche is a much more logical evolutionist than is Mr. Spencer.

JAMES J. FOX.

¹Ib. p. 242.

PRIMITIVE EPISCOPAL ELECTIONS—I.

The office of the bishop in the Catholic Church is an element so essential and structural, not to say historic, that the manner of its acquisition or inception must always interest the student of ecclesiastical institutions. That manner has been variously modified in the course of church history; yet certain essentials have never been sacrificed, though in the constitution of her chief agents the Church has always sought to take cognizance of the social and political conditions of the world in which they were to exercise their influence. Then, too, she has frequently been forced to undergo the will or the whim of the actual social authority, to tolerate what she disapproved, and to make the best of conditions at once onerous and unjust. At the very dawn of Christianity the office was already the subject of contention. Not to speak of the strife among the Apostles as to who should be greater,¹ we have the peculiar statement of Hegesippus² that as early as the time of St. Simeon of Jerusalem, a certain Thebuthis ambitioned the patriarch's succession, and because he did not obtain the office "corrupted by vain discourses the yet virgin church." A similar tale is told of more than one arch-heretic of the second century.³ About A. D. 96 Saint Clement of Rome⁴ complains that the apostolic ordinance anent the election of bishops is violated by the Corinthians, inasmuch as they had displaced certain persons who fulfilled "unblameably and holily the bishop's office." These persons, it seems, had been elected "in no new fashion," but according to the provisions of "very ancient times," as the successors of the apostles, "by men of repute, with the consent of the whole church." And this manner of election had been provided for by the apostles, not without a certain sadness of heart, for "they knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife over the name of the bishop's office,"⁵ The admirable epistle of St. Clement is entirely taken up with this problem of episcopal elections, which he approaches from every side, in order

¹ Mark x, 42-45.

² Eus. H. E. iv, 23.

³ Test. adv. Valent, 4; de Bapt., 17.

⁴ Ep. ad Corinth, cc. 42-44.

⁵ Ibid. c. 44.

to suppress, if possible, the spirit of contention and jealousy that was already arising in the infant community. That his advice and instruction were not useless appears very plainly from the letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch, some twenty years later (A. D. 106-117), in which, on the eve of martyrdom, the aged "bishop of Syria" is more preoccupied with the episcopal office than with any other element of Christian life. Never was the office of the bishop conceived in a higher sense, or its mystic relationship to Jesus Christ more luminously and forcibly expressed than in these wayside notes or dispatches sent around to the spiritual militants of the coast cities of Asia Minor.¹ To St. Ignatius the bishop is the spirit, the voice, the shadow of Christ. He is Christ Himself, unifying, governing, illuminating, not without the presbyters and deacons, yet not as their representative or the depository of *their* authority, but rather of that of Christ, with whom he stands in an immediate personal, if mystic, relationship of principal and agent. The Syrian Ignatius completes the portrait of the first century bishop, as drawn by the Roman Clement, and though he says nothing of the mode of elections, there is also nothing in the entire correspondence that conflicts with what we otherwise know of early episcopal elections.

I.

After witnessing the ascension from the Mount of Olives of their Divine Master, the apostles and disciples of our Lord Jesus Christ returned to Jerusalem, there to await the coming of the Paraclete. But before the day of Pentecost, which was destined to witness the foundation of the Church of Christ, an event took place of the greatest importance, because of its influence in the future on the discipline of the Church. This was the election of a successor in the apostolate to the traitor Judas.

Peter, we are told, rising in the midst of the assembled brethren, called their attention to the fact that the mystical number of twelve witnesses to the acts of Jesus, from the day of His baptism by John to that of His ascension, was no longer complete. Wherefore, their first duty was to select, from those

¹ Cf. Eph. 5; Magn. 3; Trallians, 3; Romans, 9; Philad., 4, 9; Smyrnæans, 8, and *passim*.

present, one worthy of the apostolate. Two names were then approved, and, after a prayer for guidance, they cast lots, which resulted in the election of Matthias.¹

The rapid growth of the Church which followed the first day's preaching soon made the institution of a new and inferior order of ministers necessary. In the first fervor of conversion the Christians wished to lead a community life; but, notwithstanding the signs and wonders of which they were daily witnesses, human nature soon began to assert itself. Complaints were made to the apostles by the converts of Hellenistic origin that their widows were being neglected by their Hebrew brethren, and to remedy this grievance the order of deacons was instituted.

How the first representatives of the order were chosen we are told in the Acts of the Apostles. Seven men of good reputation, "full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom," were selected by the people and presented to the apostles, who ratified the choice and imposed hands on the candidates.²

In those days of exceptional *charismata* it was not unusual for persons to be divinely appointed for some special work. Saul and Barnabas were set apart by the Holy Ghost for the conversion of the Gentiles;³ and throughout the apostolic age, and probably after it, many persons possessed certain powers, to be used for the good of the brethren. Such ministers were but temporary, and disappeared before the permanent organization of the Church.

As far as can be ascertained from the documents referring to the subject, few, if any, bishops were appointed during the early portion of the apostles' mission. A sufficient reason for thus leaving the little communities without a spiritual head is not far to seek. The office of a bishop was too important to be lightly intrusted to neophytes; time was necessary to ascertain whether the seeds of the Gospel had fallen on fertile soil or on stony ground, and therefore the Church's permanent organization was probably postponed to a more convenient day. Towards the end of the first century discipline became more regular. Timothy and Titus were placed by St. Paul over the churches of Ephesus and Crete, with power to appoint other bishops.⁴ Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, was, by

¹ Acts I, 15 sqq.² Acts VI, 1 sqq.³ Ibid XIII, 2.⁴ 1. Tim., V. 22; Tit. I, 5 sqq.

that apostle, made bishop of Smyrna.¹ St. Peter ordained Clement, and very probably Linus and Anacletus, at Rome;² St. James, one of the twelve, remained in Jerusalem as its first bishop, and after his martyrdom, Simeon, a relation of the Lord, was, by the unanimous choice of the apostles and the kinsmen of Jesus, appointed his successor.³

That the apostles left directions for the appointment of their successors we learn from St. Clement of Rome. In his Epistle to the Corinthians he tells the latter it was the apostles' command that other approved men should take their places. How this was to be done we are told by the same writer: "We are of opinion, therefore, that those appointed by them (the apostles), or afterwards by other eminent men, with the consent of the whole Church," etc. Here two elements are distinguishable: (a) the *eminent men*, as Timothy, Titus, and Polycarp, who had been disciples of the apostles, and (b) the *whole Church*. To the former class pertained the apostles' part, confirmation of the elect and ordination; to the latter the right of selecting a candidate worthy of the office.

We learn from St. Cyprian that this mode of appointing bishops was still in general use in the third century. "God commands a priest,"⁴ he tells us, "to be appointed in presence of all the assembly; that is, He instructs and shows that the ordination of priests ought not to be solemnized except with the knowledge of the people standing by, that in the presence of the people, either the crimes of the wicked may be disclosed, or the merits of the good declared."⁵ This procedure, he goes on to say, was observed also in the ordination of deacons, and as a reason for it he assigns the necessity of excluding unworthy persons from the ministry.

When a bishop is to be elected, all the neighboring bishops of the same province are to assemble in that city for which a prelate is to be chosen. Then, "the bishop should be chosen

¹Euseb., H. E. III, 36.

²Tert. de Praescr, c. 32.

³Euseb., H. E. III, 11.

⁴Bishops were frequently called priests in the early ages of the Church.

⁵Ep. LXVII., No. 4, Ed. Hartel, p. 738. Vienna, 1871.

"Coram omni synagoga jubet deus constitui sacerdotem, id est instruit et ostendit ordinationes sacerdotales non nisi sub populi adistentis conscientia fieri oportere, ut plebe praesente vel detegantur malorum crimina vel bonorum merita praedicentur."

in the presence of the people, who have most fully known the life of each one, and have looked into the doings of each one as respects his habitual conduct.”¹

In another of his letters St. Cyprian tells us how popes were then elected. “Cornelius was made bishop by the judgment of God and of His Christ, by the testimony of *almost* all the clergy, by the suffrage of the people who were then present. The chief part in the election of Roman bishops was borne by the clergy, and later by the clergy and *honorati*; the people, as elsewhere, gave their testimony, and the consecration was performed by the suburbicarian bishops. Apparently unanimity among the clergy was not necessary for a valid election. Cornelius on this occasion had a majority, a small minority voting for his competitor, Novatian.

Besides St. Cyprian, we have, in the Apostolic Constitutions, an early reference to the manner of appointing bishops. When a see became vacant the remaining bishops of the ecclesiastical province met in the city wherein the late bishop resided. The clergy and people were then assembled in the cathedral church and presented their candidate to the bishops for examination. Questions were then put to the assembly by the metropolitan (*πρόκριτος*) as to whether they desired such an one for bishop, and whether he was capable of fulfilling the duties of the episcopal office worthily. The answers were given by acclamation, and, if satisfactory, the bishop-elect was immediately consecrated.²

As to the number of bishops required for consecration, uniformity of discipline during this period did not exist. The first apostolic canon says that a bishop should be ordained by two or three bishops,³ while in the twentieth canon of the synod of Arles it was decreed that the consecrating prelate should be assisted by seven other bishops. In case that were not possible, at least three should perform the consecration.⁴

Besides the foregoing references to our subject in Christian sources, we have a curious and valuable testimony, from a pagan writer, as to the manner and result of elections among

¹Ibid.

²Constit. Apost. VIII, 4 ap. Pitra “Jus eccles. Græcor.” I. p. 49.

³Pitra, *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴Mansi Collectio Amplissima Conciliorum, I, p. 471, sqq.

the early Christians. Lampridius in his life of Alexander Severus (222-35) tells us that, before appointing governors of provinces, that emperor was wont to publish the names of the proposed officials, at the same time exhorting the people if they knew of any crimes committed by the imperial nominee to come forward and prove them. This was done in imitation of the Jewish and Christian practice in the election of bishops.¹

II.

Thus we see that up to the date of the first council of Nice (325) an almost uniform system of episcopal elections existed everywhere in the Church. Nor did any enactment of this council materially affect the ancient mode of procedure. In its fourth canon it was laid down that: "The bishop be appointed by all the bishops of the eparchy (province); and if that is not possible, on account of pressing necessity, or on account of the length of the journeys, three at least shall meet and proceed to the imposition of hands, with, however, the permission in writing of those absent. The confirmation of what has been done belongs of right, in each eparchy, to the metropolitan."²

In this canon we see that, as heretofore, the chief part in the election of a colleague falls to the provincial bishops and the metropolitan. No mention, it is true, is made of the lower clergy or people, but that it was not the intention of the Nicene Fathers to deprive either class of its ancient privileges we learn from their synodical letter to the people of Alexandria.³ The principal effect of the law was that it clearly defined rights which were previously more or less vague. It was also expected to introduce a uniform system of elections for the whole Church. That it failed to produce this effect was due to subsequent circumstances, rather than to any intrinsic want of clearness. The eastern branch of the Church, soon after the conversion of the empire, interpreted it as reserving the election of bishops exclusively to the episcopal body. In the

¹"Cum id Christiani et Judei facerent, in praedicandis sacerdotibus." Lampridius in vita Alex. Sever. The word *sacerdos* usually means bishop in the writers of the first three or four centuries.

²Mansi II, p. 670.

³In this letter the Alexandrians are instructed to admit Meletian bishops to vacant sees, provided that the *people elect them*. Socrates, H. E. I. 9.

west, on the contrary, the popular rights were, during several centuries, not only recognized, but increased by the decrees of popes.

Thus, although in this first period of the Church's history, references to the manner of choosing men to fill the highest rank in her hierarchy are neither numerous nor always well-defined, yet, from the whole, a fairly correct idea of the subject may be acquired. And first, as to the *popular element*. The great respect of the early Christians for all apostolic ordinances is noticeable in the part allowed the people in the election of their bishops. We have seen that the first election in which *all* the young community took an active part was the election of the seven deacons. On this occasion they exercised the right of presentation. St. Paul, also, warns Timothy against appointing any one bishop who had not a "good testimony of them that are without;" that is, not only should a candidate enjoy a good reputation among his Christian brethren but also possess the esteem of his pagan fellow-citizens.¹

These two cases served as precedents after the death of the apostles; and in them is contained the foundation of those privileges long afterwards enjoyed by the laity. The people, as St. Cyprian says, were best acquainted with the merits of their clergy; therefore, in order that "the crimes of the wicked and the merits of the good" might be made known, their testimony was required. The final decision, however, rested with the metropolitan and his suffragans, though in practice, whenever the lower clergy and people unanimously desired a certain candidate for bishop, their wishes were generally final. But later on we shall see bishops appointed not only without consulting, but against the wishes of the people. This, however, was a consequence of heresy or schism. The trial and deposition of bishops also rested with their provincial colleagues as we see by the case of Paul of Samosata, who was deposed by the second synod of Antioch (between 264 and 269) composed solely of bishops.²

As the Church gradually organized, the great cities of the empire, such as Antioch, Alexandria and Corinth, became centers of ecclesiastical life in their respective provinces, while the

¹ I. Tim. III., 7.

² Eus. H. E. VII., 29.

Church of Rome, founded by St. Peter and St. Paul, was the acknowledged Center and Head of the Christian world. The great prestige of these sees, because founded by apostles, or those closely connected with the apostles, attracted the bishops of less dignified or less important dioceses to their colleague of the metropolis, who also presided at their synods. Naturally, too, he was useful in civil or mixed matters, that might require dealings with the government. In this way the bishops of such cities soon came to exercise the jurisdiction afterward termed metropolitical.¹

The term "metropolitan" was not in use before the first council of Nice (325), but the jurisdiction which it implies was exercised long previously.

The part taken by *the lower clergy* in elections is by no means clearly defined. Whenever mentioned they appear to have had only the same share as the people—testimony as to the fitness of a candidate. In the election of Pope Cornelius, however, it is to be noted that the majority of the clergy supported him. At all events, from this time forward, especially in the west, the influence of the diocesan clergy on the choice of their bishop was very great. During the first period of the Church's existence little difficulty, as a rule, was experienced in choosing a spiritual pastor. His post was one of danger and of little or no emolument, two circumstances which effectually excluded the unscrupulous and avaricious. The ever-imminent danger of persecution, too, had usually the result of preserving the closest union among the Christians. Of this union the bishop was the official guardian, and therefore in choosing him it was necessary to find a man willing to maintain it even at the cost of his life.

Yet every rule has its exception, and it would certainly be strange if in three hundred years there were no unworthy pastor. Under certain emperors, too, the Christians enjoyed long intervals of peace, which were accompanied by a corresponding falling off in fervor, and bishops were found to lead even here. Paul of Samosata is a famous example.

Before the era of provincial and œcumenical councils each national branch of the Church was accustomed to follow tra-

¹Even in the apostolic age there already existed, in germ at least, metropolitans. St. Paul tells Timothy not "to impose hands lightly on any man." Evidently Timothy exercised jurisdiction over the bishops of Ephesus. 1 Tim., v. 22.

ditional regulations handed down from apostolic times. The different rules for celebrating Easter sufficiently illustrate this practice. But with the entrance of ambition into the episcopal ranks came also the desire of innovation. Such an attempt is supposed to have given occasion to the enactment of the fourth Nicene canon.¹ Meletius, bishop of Lycopolis, in North Africa (305), consecrated several bishops without either the approbation of his metropolitan, the bishop of Alexandria, or of the provincial bishops. He himself was also the sole consecrator. A schism was the consequence. The Fathers of the first council of Nice merely confirmed the ancient practice by clearly defining the respective rights of the metropolitan and his suffragans relative to the filling of a vacant see.

The sixth Nicene canon also contains an important regulation. "The ancient custom," it says, "which exists in Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis, namely, that the bishop of Alexandria should exercise jurisdiction over these provinces, must remain in force." The bishop of Alexandria was confirmed as chief metropolitan or patriarch, and the bishop of Rome's patriarchal rights over Western Christendom recognized. In this canon, as in the fourth, nothing new is introduced. The ancient privileges, as is expressly said, are but confirmed.² The bishop of Alexandria consecrated not only his subject metropolitans, but their suffragans also. In the latter case the consent of the respective metropolitans was required.³ The bishop of Antioch consecrated only the metropolitans of his patriarchate,⁴ while the bishop of Rome usually conferred episcopal orders on all the bishops of Italy.⁵

III.

IN THE ORIENT—IV—VIII CENTURY.

While the Church acquired great and numerous privileges by the conversion of Constantine the Great, the influence exercised by that emperor and his successors in ecclesiastical affairs was often most injurious to the Church's discipline. In the East, especially, this is noticeable. Two other causes

¹Cf. Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*. I. 385.

²Mansi II. 670.

³Synesius, *ep. LXXVI.*

⁴Innoc. I. *ep. XVIII.*

⁵Cfr. *Lib. Pontificalis, passim*, ed. Duchesne; Paris, 1886.

contributed to the decline of the true Christian spirit in the Byzantine empire, the great wealth and civil jurisdiction attached to the episcopate, and the outbreak of a series of heresies in which the worst passions of human nature are much more in evidence than Christian charity.

Among the evils accompanying these heresies, beginning with the Arian, the violent deposition of orthodox bishops, and the introduction into their sees of heretics, were the most dangerous in their consequences. Popular passions are always easily aroused, but never, perhaps, do they assume so violent a form as in religious disputes. In the Arian heresy the best elements among the people supported the orthodox bishops,¹ but disorder and tumult were frequent concomitants of the intrusion of heretical bishops.

The council of Sardica sternly endeavored to stop this abuse. In its second canon it decreed that: If anyone put forward as a claim to an episcopal see the pretension that he has received letters from the people, some of whom, "not having sincere faith," he could easily bribe to cry out in the church that they desired him for bishop, such an one may not be received, even in lay communion, at the moment of death.²

The Eusebian synod of Antioch (in Encæniiis) also forbade the transfer of a bishop from one see to another, no matter whether he intruded himself, or allowed the people or even the bishops, to force his acceptance.³

Although the councils of Laodicea (between 347 and 381), and Carthage (387 or 390), as well as those of Sardica (343 or 344), and Antioch (341), made several laws relative to the election of bishops, popular rights are, by them, wholly ignored. The only allusions to the influence of the laity are in the canons already referred to of Laodicea and Antioch, and then they are roughly set aside. These enactments indicate the policy of the Eastern Fathers after the first council of Nice. Distrustful alike of princes and people, they interpreted the fourth canon of Nice as reserving the election of bishops to the synod of provincial bishops.⁴ Such a conclusion, however, is arbi-

¹Greg. Naz. Orat. XXI.; Soc. II., 15, 16; Soz. III., 8, 9; Acta SS. Maii VI., 46.

²Mansi III., 23.

³Mansi II., 1318.

⁴Mansi XIII., 419; XVI., 174 Seq.

trary, and not borne out by the document on which it was supposed to rest. The canon in question, indeed, does not mention the popular right of presentation, but it cannot be supposed that the council revoked all rights which it did not expressly confirm. But in the case before us we are not left to conjecture what were the real sentiments of the Fathers. For in their synodical letter to the people of Alexandria, referring to such Meletian bishops as have returned to the Catholic Church, we read: "When it may happen that any of those holding preferments in the Church die, then let those who have been thus recently admitted, be admitted to the dignity of the deceased, provided that they should appear worthy, and that *the people should elect them.*"¹ St. Athanasius also, who was not a bishop till after the council, was elected in sight and with the acclamation of the people.²

Nor does the thirteenth canon of Laodicea, which excludes the *turbæ* or disorderly popular element, lessen the force of the testimony cited. It is not likely that at any time, turbulent, or any but practical Christians, were permitted to give evidence for or against the candidate for a bishopric.

However, from the date of the transfer of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople, popular testimony was of little account. The great nobles, senators, governors, etc., took rank immediately after the clergy, and whether the people assented or not was immaterial. To carry out the policy of popular exclusion the eastern bishops began by discontinuing the custom of holding elections in the cathedral city of the vacant see. Reasons for such an innovation were easily found: long distances, expense, want of accommodation, and, above all, factional interference. When and where this practice originated is not clear. It is probable that occasion was first given it by the Donatist schism; for, in the *Collatio* at Carthage (411) the Donatist bishops complained that the Catholics appointed bishops for places where there were no Catholic people. Such prelates could not have been elected or consecrated in cities where all were Donatists.³

¹Soc. H. E. I, 9.

²Apolog. Contra Arianos, pp. 103.

³Mansi, IV. 7, cf. Bingham, "Antiquities" I, p. 148 seq.; Oxford, 1855.

The eighteenth canon of Antioch (in *Encænii*s) also seems to refer to this new usage. If a bishop, it says, cannot take possession of the church for which he has been consecrated because his people will not receive him, he shall retain his office and dignity.¹ Evidently the bishop, in such circumstances, could not have been elected within the limits of his diocese.

But the resolution of the bishops to exclude all others from participation in the election of their colleagues was not easy of accomplishment. It met at the outset a serious obstacle in the Cæsaro-papistical pretensions of the Byzantine emperors, —pretensions which were recognized and encouraged by successive heretical bodies.

The first imperial aspirant to the dignity of Supreme Ruler in church as well as state was Constantius. A Semi-Arian synod held at Constantinople (338 or 339) deposed, at his instigation, the bishop of that city. His place was filled by the ambitious Eusebius of Nicomedia, after whose death the orthodox bishop was recalled by the people and again exiled by the emperor. The right of confirmation was also assumed by Constantius. He refused to sanction the election of Macedonius, the choice of the Arians for bishop of his capital, because he had presumed to enter on the duties of his office without consulting his imperial master.² St. Athanasius also was expelled from his see by the prefect of Egypt, and Gregory of Cappadocia substituted by order of the emperor.³

Valens, like Constantius, an abettor of the Arians, followed his example. The bishops of Antioch, Samosata, and Laodicea were deposed by him;⁴ and a like fate threatened the great Basil of Cæsarea. His intrepidity, however, compelled the respect of even Valens.⁵

On the accession of Gratian the banished bishops recovered their sees. Theodosius the Great also favored the orthodox party, though he does not seem to have always respected the laws of the Church. Nectarius, a catechumen, through his influence, but with the assent of the clergy and laity, was

¹Mansi II. 1315.

²Soc. H. E. II., 12.; Soz. III., 7.

³Athanas. ep. *encycl. ad episc.*, c. 2.

⁴Theod. IV., 12.

⁵Theod. IV., 16.

appointed bishop of Constantinople. The election of a layman, much less a catechumen, was strictly forbidden by the canons.¹ The successor of Nectarius, St. John Chrysostom, was called from Antioch by the Emperor Arcadius, at whose command he was consecrated.²

It seems at this time to have been generally conceded in the East that the Bishop of Constantinople should be chosen by the emperor. Such a claim was admitted by St. Cyril of Alexandria;³ and even Pope Celestine I. praised the zeal of Theodosius II. because of his care in this respect for the Church's welfare.⁴

Between the second (381) and the fourth (451) œcumenical councils, several particular synods were held, but no new laws relative to elections were enacted. Their chief endeavor in this matter was to enforce the fourth Nicene canon, and to decide between claimants to various sees. Such was the aim of the synod held at Constantinople (394), and of the third and fourth of Carthage.⁵ To the same end Pope Siricius sent a synodical letter to the bishops of Africa, conveying the decision of a council held at Rome in 386. No bishop, it says, should be consecrated without the approval of the apostolic, that is, the primatial, see; and consecrations performed by one bishop are illicit.⁶

The outbreak of the Eutychian, or Monophysite, heresy was a pregnant source of new disorder, not only in the field of dogma, but in that of discipline. Its condemnation by the council of Chalcedon was the signal for a bitter war between the orthodox and heretical parties. In the first session of the council the bishops of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Caesarea, Antioch, Berytus, and Seleucia were deposed by the imperial commissioners. The ejected prelates were not, however, disposed to submission. The successor of Dioscorus, the bishop of Alexandria, was murdered in a popular tumult, and a certain Timothy Ailuros—the Cat—had himself consecrated bishop. The next act of Timothy was to call a synod, which anathematized the council of Chalcedon, the patriarch of Constanti-

¹Theod. V., 8; Socr. V., 8; Soc. VII. 7 seq.

²Theod. V., 27.

³Soc. VII, 34 sqq.; Cyrill, ep. XVIII., XIX.

⁴Coelest. ep. XVI-XIX.

⁵Mansi III., 851 seq.; 926 sqq.; 945 sqq.; Cfr. Hergenroether, Photius I., 37.

⁶Mansi III., 670.

nople and the pope, Leo the Great. He also deposed the orthodox bishops and priests of his patriarchate, supplying their places with his own adherents. Both parties now appealed to the emperor, Leo I, who, after consulting a synod of sixteen hundred bishops, deposed Timothy Ailuros, and appointed his successor, Timothy Salophaciolus.

Antioch also fell into the hands of the Monophysites. Peter Fullo, a favorite of Zeno, the emperor's son-in-law, formed in that city a party composed of Monophysites and Apollinarians; and thus supported created so strong an opposition that the orthodox patriarch, Macarius, was compelled to resign. Fullo succeeded him, and followed the example of Ailuros in appointing only Monophysites as bishops. He was deposed (470) by the emperor, Leo I. The subsequent fortunes of Peter Fullo were in keeping with those of his stormy beginning. He was restored, with Timothy Ailuros, by the usurper Basiliscus, and on the latter's expulsion by Zeno, again exiled; but, afterwards, proving a useful tool to the restored emperor, recovered his see.

The struggle between the orthodox and Monophysite parties continued, with varying fortunes, till the reign of Justin I (527). Possession of the patriarchal sees of Alexandria and Antioch was especially desirable to the two contesting bodies, and they passed from one to the other according as the emperor, for the time, favored the orthodox or the heretical party. Timothy Ailuros, because of his great age, was left in possession of his see.¹ His successor, Peter Mongus, was elected by the bishops of the Alexandrian province. Zeno, however, annulled their act, but, as in the case of Peter Fullo, Mongus was afterwards restored by the same emperor as a recompense for the support of the famous Henoticon.²

A synod of Antioch (478) elected John of Apamae to that see. John was deposed, three months later, by another synod, which elected the orthodox patriarch, Stephen I. Stephen III. was, according to Theophanes, chosen by the emperor, and consecrated at Constantinople by Acacius.³ Calerdion, Stephen's successor, was also consecrated by Acacius.⁴ Mean-

¹Evag. III. 11. ²Evag. III. 12.

³Cfr. Hergenroether, Kirchengeschichte I. 478, Freiburg, 1884.

⁴Id. *ibid.*

while the bishops of the province of Antioch elected John Codonatus, but Calerdion obtained possession of the see, and was afterwards recognized by the synod of 482 and by Pope Simplicius.¹

A synod, composed of court bishops, was held at Constantinople in 496, and deposed, at the emperor's desire, the patriarch Euphemius. Macedonius, whom they selected to succeed him, was himself got rid of by the same means.² Flavian, the new patriarch of Antioch, was also deposed, and replaced by the heretical monk Severus;³ the patriarch of Jerusalem was expelled from his see, while the chair of St. Athanasius fell into the hands of the monophysite, John Niceofa.⁴ The rebellion of the imperial general Vitalian created a diversion in favor of the orthodox party, and the death of the emperor Anastasius (518), contributed still more to their final victory. Another synod held in Constantinople (519) restored the banished bishops to their sees; and the patriarch John dying the same year, his successor was elected by ten metropolitans and several bishops, "by the will of the emperor and empress and the nobles of the empire."⁵

Under Justinian the laws regulating episcopal elections underwent certain modifications. It was now decreed that henceforth the clergy and *honorati* of a diocese should present three names to the metropolitan, with whom rested the final choice.⁶ How far this law was carried out in sees of lesser importance we have no means of ascertaining. Previously the influence of the patriarch seems, within the limits of his jurisdiction, to have been paramount,⁷ and it may be doubted whether it was affected in any important degree by the new enactment. Justinian himself followed the now well-established precedent of his predecessors, and appointed bishops when so inclined; while his empress, Theodora, an ardent monophysite, frequently procured the appointment of her co-religionists.⁸ Justin II. sold ecclesiastical benefices to the highest bidder,⁹ and under succeeding emperors imperial were much more common than canonical elections.

¹Theoph. Chronog. ad ann. 5973 (Migne, PG. CVIII. 315); Mansi VII. 1023, 1054 sqq. 1140.

²Evag. III. 32.

³Evag. I. c.

⁴Evag. III. 23.

⁵Mansi VIII. 491 sqq.

⁶Nov. CXXXVII. c. 2.

⁷V. supra, p. 39.

⁸Liberat, Breviar, c. 23 (Migne PL. LXVIII.) cfr. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte III. p. 786.

⁹Evag. V. 1.

The period between the sixth and seventh œcumenical council (680–787) was, in the Byzantine empire, one of disorder approaching anarchy. The emperors, instead of defending the frontiers of the narrowing empire, employed themselves in the, to them, more congenial and less difficult occupation of theological controversy. It was much more easy to depose bishops than to repel the Saracens, but, unfortunately, the conquests of the latter not only moved back the boundary-line of the realm, but subjected the Christian inhabitants to the greatest hardships. The patriarchate of Antioch fell into the hands of the Mussulmans in 636, Jerusalem the following year, and Alexandria in 641; but imperial dictatorship in ecclesiastical affairs seemed only to increase as the sphere for its exercise narrowed. The see of Constantinople was invariably occupied by some creature of the emperor—generally during good behavior.

This was especially the case while the Iconoclast fury raged. Opposition to the use of images began under Leo the Isaurian (716–741), who was its originator. Germanus, the patriarch of Constantinople, was deposed for resistance to the imperial will, and replaced by the more compliant Anastasius. His jurisdiction was considerably enlarged by the addition of the provinces of Sicily, Calabria, Illyria, and Isauria, which his imperial master withdrew from dependence on the pope, Gregory II., who refused to receive the letters announcing the election of the new patriarch.¹ Leo's son and successor, Constantine Copronymus, was a still more violent persecutor of those who venerated sacred images. To him also belongs the doubtful honor of being the first emperor to assume the right of investiture.²

The further history of elections in the decaying empire of the east is but a repetition of the preceding. Laws were not wanting to safeguard the rights of the Church, but their execution depended on the will of an autocrat, and according as his bias leaned toward one or other party were bishops, orthodox or heretical, installed. In tracing the manner of appointing bishops in the Eastern Church, we are, as a rule, limited to

¹Jaffé-Ewald *Regesta RR.* PP. 2183, Cfr. *Hergenr.* I. 674.

²Mansi XIII. 205 sq; Cfr. Phillips, *Kirchenrecht*, VIII. 80.

the three great patriarchal sees of Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Rarely is any reference made by historians to dioceses of lesser importance. However, it is not improbable that the canons were much better observed in the hundreds of smaller towns, where the people were less likely to be influenced by religious disputes. It is always a grave historical error to assume that, because the heads of States are tyrannical and immoral the great body of the people are lawless and corrupt. Traditions and pious customs handed down for ages cannot in a day be obliterated from the popular mind, so that, often while the more fickle inhabitants of cities follow the fancy of the hour, the villager remains undisturbed, and prefers to retain what was transmitted from his ancestors. It is, then, hardly too much to conclude that in many cases, and making allowance for exceptions, even in the Byzantine empire, the bishop continued to be the true spiritual guide of his flock, and that he was chosen by it in the manner sanctioned by immemorial custom, and the laws of the Church.

MAURICE F. HASSETT.

THE PARTICIPLE IN HESIOD.

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INTRODUCTION.

The difficulties attendant upon the division and definition of the parts of speech are well recognized—cf. Paul, *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*, p. 299; Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax*, *Einleitung*, p. 75, ff.—and it is not my purpose to attempt a new definition of the participle. We must agree, I think, with Paul (p. 308), Brugmann (*Grundriss II.* p. 428, *Griechische Grammatik* p. 196), and Delbrück (*Vgl. Syntax*, 2, 477), in deriving the participle from the adjective, the characteristic difference being that the idea of time, which is only implied in the adjective, is explicitly expressed in the tense of the participle, so that it comes to designate a process that is temporally limited from the point of view of the speaker, and in this way approximates the nature of the verb. This duality of its nature is reflected in its formal peculiarity of possessing the *παρεπόμενα* of both substantive and verb, and is recognized in its name—*μετοχή*. Or, in other words, the participle is an adjective with a richer content of meaning, since it brings from its association with the verb the distinction of voice and tense and the power of verbal regimen. The adjective represents a quality at rest, the participle represents a quality in motion, and the difference between the two is a difference in the degree of mobility—cf. Schroeder's definition (p. 86) of the participle, "als ein Adj. das mit dem Verb die Zeitbedeutung ('Beweglichkeit in der Zeit') und die Rection gemein hat."

Its special value is, as Paul points out, that it allows us to employ the expression of an event in the form of an attribute. In this way it becomes an easy method of subordinating one action to another, of expressing the details, the accompanying circumstances of an action without bestowing upon them a prominence that would distort the perspective, the finite verb

giving the outline of the action while the participle supplies the coloring. (Cf. Gildersleeve *Pindar* cix.; *A. J. P.* ix 137, ff.)

This is the original use of the participle—the participle of attendant circumstances. Of it Jolly says (*Sprach. Abh. der gram. gesell.*, Leipzig, 1874; cf. *A. J. P.* ix 139 n): “Nur im Arischen, Litauischen und weitaus am besten im Griechischen hat sich das Particip seine alte Mittelstellung zwischen Nomen und Verbum noch gewahrt: nur im Griechischen war es daher im Stande, sich allen Functionen des Verb. finit. geschmeidig anzupassen und in unverändertem Fortbestehen neben der in allen verwandten Sprachen so überwuchernden Hypotaxis sich als redender Zeuge der neuerdings mit so grossem Unrecht angefochtenen Vorzüglichkeit des gr. Sprachbaus zu behaupten.”

The purpose of this dissertation is to contrast the Epic and the Attic use of the participle in order to see whether the use of the participle, as an equivalent of the hypotactic clause, is not a purely Greek development within historical times. In doing this, the difference in the departments of literature must be borne in mind, and also the fact that the Attic is not a development from the Epic dialect. Nevertheless, if the Epic use of the participle is found to represent a state intermediate between the original use of the participle and that found in Attic authors, we may, I think, with safety, infer that the Attic dialect must at some time have passed through a somewhat similar stage of development and that the difference in usage is essentially chronological.

Such a development of the Greek participle is in opposition to the views expressed by Classen, *Beobachtungen*, p. 44: “Wir finden den ganzen Reichthum an Formen, welchen die griechische Sprache im Participium entwickelt hat, in der homerischen Poesie entfaltet, und wir sehen ihn mit einer Feinheit und Freiheit jedem Bedürfniss des Gedankens angepasst, die in keiner Beziehung dem gebildetsten Ausdruck der attischen Prosa nachsteht.” For a criticism of Classen’s views, cf. Spieker *A. J. P.* vi 310, ff. The chief cause of Classen’s lack of appreciation of the nature of the participle (*A. J. P.* ix 138 n²)—the nature of the participle is his tendency toward “resolutions” of the participle, a tendency due,

no doubt, to the poverty of the German language in participial constructions that Classen himself laments, and from which Vogrinz seems to have best succeeded in freeing himself, cf. p. 278, Die "Auflösungen" der Partizipien sind *rein logische operationen*," p. 248. "Durch solche Steigerung und daraus hervorspringenden Gegensatz wird *für unser Sprachgefühl* (*italics are mine*) konzessiver Sinn beim *ei*-Satz und beim Partizip erzeugt."

For the Epic period the work has been based upon complete collections of the examples in Hesiod and the Iliad; these have been supplemented by examples from the Odyssey obtained by means of Gehring's Index Homericus, except for the adversative participle and the negative with the participle, for which independent collections of examples have been made. For the Attic period I have depended mainly on the statements made in Kühner's and Krüger's Grammars and Goodwin's, Moods and Tenses, besides which I have made use of the details given for Xenophon's Anabasis by Joost, and for Euripides by Dr. Gonzalez Lodge in an unpublished Hopkins dissertation, "The Participle in Euripides."

The examples have been arranged under the heads of the Circumstantial Participle, the Supplementary Participle, and the Adjectival Uses of the Participle.

THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL PARTICIPLE.

As the participle enables us to express an action in the form of an attribute, it becomes a valuable instrument for subordinating to the main action of the sentence the various circumstances by which it is attended. These circumstances may stand to the main action in different logical relations; but none of these ever receives formal expression in the participle except the relation of time. Originally, even this was no exception, for the tense of the participle designated at first merely the "kind of time" of the subordinate action and not its temporal relation to the main action, since the notion of priority was not originally inherent in the aorist and did not become completely attached to it until after the Homeric period.—cf. Seymour, On the Use of the Aorist Participle in

Greek. Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc., 1881, pp. 88-96; Delbrück Vgl. Syntax, 2, 482.

Nevertheless, under pressure of the needs of translation into languages that are far inferior to the Greek in the development of their participial constructions, these logical relations have been taken by grammarians as the basis for the traditional classification of the participle. Vogrinz makes a notable exception by breaking away from tradition and rejecting all resolutions of the participle as purely logical operations.—cf. p. 278. In this he is undoubtedly right, only he might have gone farther and declared such resolutions to be injurious as tending to deaden the feeling for the difference between the participle and the subordinate finite clause.

Paul (p. 158 of trans.) lays down the principle that we cannot “maintain that the participial construction in itself admits of different meanings—*i. e.*, that it denotes now the reason, now the condition, now an opposition, etc. These relations remain in each case only ‘occasional’ and accidental.” However, the participle is used freely in English, and still more freely in Attic Greek when the speaker *intends* that the hearer shall infer one of these logical relations; and we may then speak of the “usage of the participle for abridging the sentence, that is, for representing temporal, causal and relative clauses” (Gildersleeve, A. J. P. ix 138, n.) of the participle as a conscious “shorthand” substitute for a subordinate clause.¹

As the intentional use of the participle in this way becomes more conscious there would be a growing tendency to make the desired inference more unmistakable by the addition of particles to designate the relation existing between the main and subordinate actions. At this point the participle passes into a second stage of development, behind which there remains the possibility of a third. For the “occasional” use may pass into a part of the “usual” signification of the form, and the participle may then be employed to *express of itself*, the logical relation of main and subordinate action, though it is evi-

¹For the English feeling of the participle, cf. Genung, Practical Rhetoric, p. 116. “The participial construction is generally equivalent to a clause”; p. 158, “is a valuable means of cutting down a clause.”

dent of course that if several of the participial constructions passed into this stage of development there would result a state of confusion that could not long maintain itself in any language.

It is in the development of this use of the participle as a conscious substitute for a subordinate finite clause that the greatest and most essential difference in the Epic and Attic use of the participle consists. Seymour calls attention to the fact that Homer frequently employs the finite verb where Greek prose would use the participle, e. g.,

A 458. *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥ' εὗξαντο καὶ οὐλοχύτας προβάλοντο* which in prose would usually have been *εὗξάμενοι καὶ προβαλόμενοι*. But in spite of this fact Homer is far from being araiometochic. The explanation of this is to be found in the freer use of the circumstantial participle in Epic poetry, which is sufficient to counterbalance the absence of the participle as an equivalent of a subordinate finite clause and constitutes one of the main causes of the vividness and swiftness of Epic narrative. Thus if we compare the use of the participle in Hesiod with that of Euripides, as given by Lodge in his dissertation, "The Participle in Euripides," we find that considerably over half of the participles in Hesiod are circumstantial as against one-fifth in Euripides. Even after making liberal allowances—which are necessary on account of the subjective nature of the work—for differences in drawing the line between circumstantial participles and those that are equivalents of subordinate clauses the fact remains that we have here a difference in the syntax of the two authors, which is important and characteristic.

Fortunately this difference between Epic and Attic syntax can be illustrated from the other side. If we take up each of the participial constructions separately we will find that there are extremely few cases in Epic poetry in which a causal or conditional inference is manifestly intended, and not one in which such an inference is rendered necessary by the addition of a particle, though this is frequently the case in Attic prose. In other words, these constructions are in the first stage of their development in Epic, in the second in Attic. The temporal construction would naturally be expected to develop earlier,

and accordingly we find it in Epic in a state of transition between these first and second stages, as is shown by the greater frequency of its occurrence, and by the occasional addition of temporal particles—in which respect an advance is evident within the Epic period itself.

Of all these constructions, however, the adversative participle was the one that obtained the firmest root in the language. That it must have developed at a very early period is shown by the fact that it has succeeded in becoming the prevailing mode of expression for the adversative relation in Greek. Therefore it is not surprising to find it already firmly established in the Homeric poems in the second stage of its development. It, too, shows an advance during the Epic period, and a still greater advance is perceptible when the Epic usage is compared with that of Attic. It becomes, indeed, a question whether we should not admit that the adversative relation is a part of the "usual" signification of the participle in the Attic period; we must at any rate, in my opinion, admit that it has advanced very far towards such a stage of development.

The facts to which I look for confirmation of these statements will be given under the headings of the Adversative, Temporal, Causal, and Conditional Participles, and then after consideration of the differences between the Epic and Attic use of the Participle of Purpose and the Genitive Absolute, I will pass to the consideration of the use of the Negative with the Participle, in which I hope to find further proof of the undeveloped state of the use of the participle as a substitute for a finite subordinate clause.

THE ADVERSATIVE PARTICIPLE.

The examples of the adversative participle in Hesiod are as follows:

S 101. *καὶ κρατερὸς περ ἑὸν*; Th 465. *καὶ κρατερῶ περ ἑόντι*; Th 616. *καὶ πολυΐδρον ἑόντα*; W 44. *καὶ ἄεργον ἑόντα*; W 704. *καὶ ἰφθιμόν περ ἑόντα*; Th 698. *ἰφθίμων περ ἑόντων*; W 514. *δασυστέρων περ ἑόντων*; Th 719. *ὑπερθύμους περ ἑόντας*; W 154. *καὶ ἐκπάγλους περ ἑόντας*; Th 448. *καὶ μουνογενῆς ἐκ μητρὸς ἐούσα*;

W 292. χαλεπή περ εἶδσα; W 208. καὶ αἰοῖδον εἶδον; W 360. καὶ τε σμικρὸν ἔδον; W [202]. φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς; W 649. σεσοφισμένος; Th 533. καὶ περ χωόμενος.

In the Iliad there are examples of this construction, in which no particles are employed to make the meaning clear. The adversative force is then merely an inference from a contrast in the context and the examples are more or less unsatisfactory.¹

E 433. Αἰνεῖα δ' ἐπόρουσε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης
γιγνώσκων ὃ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπείρεχε ἀσπίδ' Ἀπόλλων.

M 212. Ἐκτορ ἀεὶ μὲν πῶς μοι ἐπιπλήσσεις ἀγορήσῃ
ἐσθλὰ φραζομένῳ.

N 665. ὅς ῥ' ἐν εἰδῶς κῆρ' ὀλοὴν ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινε.

cf. also² ἑὼν B 27. 64. 343. Δ 388. E 903. H 242. Δ 471. 665. N 461. O 611. Π 837. P 143. Σ 105. T 320. T 312. Φ 589. X 176. 360. Ψ 357. 546. 636. Ω 174. 537; παρεὼν O 665; ἐλαύνων Ψ 322; ἰέμενος Π 396; ἀγαγὼν Δ 407; πεπερημένος Φ 58; ἐσύμενος Π 9.

The examples with the various particles are as follows:

Present: ἀχνύμενος A 588. B 270. Θ 125. 317. M 178. N 419. O 133. 651. P 459. Σ 112. T 8. 65. X 424. Ω 523; ἐθέλων Δ 300. T 87. Φ 48; ἑὼν A 131. 275. 352. 546. 587. B 246. Γ 159. 201. Δ 387. 534. E 94. 571. 625. Θ 99. 253. 284. 285. I 343. 373. 552. 627. K 114. 549. Λ 418. 721. M 171. 410. N 236. 361. Ξ 33. O 164. 185. 195. 407. 585. Π 154. 550. 617. 620. 624. 627. 815. P 676. Σ 549. T 80. 82. 118. 155. T 356. 436. Φ 264. 483. X 218. 384. Ψ 306. 610. Ω 35. 53. 423. 570. 593. 609. 617; ἰὼν N 415; ἐπειγόμενος T 142. 189; ἐπικρατέων Ξ 98; ἐργόμενος P 571; ἡβῶν M 382. Ω 565; ἰέμενος O 450. P 276. 292; κηδόμενος A 586. E 382. H 110. Σ 273. X 416. Ω 104; κινύμενος Ξ 173; νοέων A 577. Ψ 305; ὀλλύμενος T 21; πίνων Ξ 1; σκοπιάζων Ξ 58; σκυζόμενος I 198; σπεύδων Θ 293; τειρόμενος Z 85; φιλέων Z 360; φρονέων I 554. Ξ 217 χατέων I 518. O 399; χωόμενος Ξ 260. Φ 384.

¹ Here and elsewhere it has been my effort to cite all passages that could possibly be claimed as examples of the construction in question. The subjective element is so large that there is always room for differences of interpretation, and so I have attempted to gather all the material, although I might personally be inclined to reject part of it.

² For the sake of brevity the participles in the lists given are cited in the nominative singular masculine.

Perfect: ἐκγεγαώς Φ 185; τεθνηώς Π 858. P 229. X 364. Ω 20; μεμαώς E 135. I 655. N 46. 317. Ξ 375. O 276. 298. 604. Π 555. P 181. Ω 298; πεποιθώς Π 624; πεπαρμένος Φ 577; ἐσσύμενος Z 518. Λ 554. N 57. 142. 315. 630. 787. P 663; κεχολωμένος Α 217. P 710.

Aorist: ἀγγείλας K 448; ἀθλήσας O 30; ἀλαλκών I 604; ἀρτύνας N 152; δαμασσάμενος O 476; θανών Λ 453. X 73; οὐτάμενος Ξ 128. 379; καταπεφνών P 539.

The examples in the Odyssey are:

Without particles:

α 37. τὸν δ' ἔκτανε νοστήσαντα
εἰδὼς αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἴπομεν ἡμεῖς.

α 202. αὐτὰρ νῦν τοι ἐγὼ μαντεύσομαι. . . .
οὔτε τι μάντις ἐὼν οὔτ' οἰωνῶν σάφα εἰδώς.

¹β 97. μίμνεν' ἐπειγόμενοι τὸν ἐμὸν γάμον = τ 142. ω 132.

β 102. αἶ κεν ἄτερ σπείρου κῆται πολλὰ κτεατίσσας. = τ 147.
ω 137.

ρ 567. ὅτε μ' οὔτος ἀνὴρ κατὰ δῶμα κιόντα.
οὗ τι κακὸν ῥέξαντα βαλὼν ὀδύνησιν ἔδωκεν.

cf. also: ἀεκαζόμενος σ 135; ἀχεύων π 139; δυνόμενος δ 264; ἐθέλων ε 99; ἐών β 241. γ 193. δ 334. 717. θ 330. 332. ι 515. κ 282. ξ 441. 527. ρ 125. σ 216. τ 230. φ 21. 27. ψ 71; παρεών λ 66; ἐπιελπόμενος φ 126. ἐπιστάμενος δ 730; ἔχων τ 364; παρήμενος ρ 456. τ 209. λιλαίόμενος μ 328; οἰόμενος υ 21; ὀπάζων ω 283; ἀδικῶς μ 281.

With particles:

Present: ἀχεύων λ 88. ο 361; ἀχνύμενος δ 104. 549. 553. η 297. θ 478; κ 174. π 147. φ 250; ἐθέλων β 110. τ 156. ω 146. ἐών β 200. ζ 136. θ 331. 360. ι 57. 379. κ 441. λ 265. ν 294. ξ 147. ρ 381. σ 21. 385. τ 253. 489. υ 131. 271. 274. φ 103. 370. ψ 12. 82. 230. 361. ω 499; παρεών ξ 145; ἰών η 204. λ 425; ἐπειγόμενος α 309. γ 284. ο 49. ρ 570. ἐπιστάμενος ν 313. ψ 185; ἐχθόμενος δ 502; ἀπεχθόμενος σ 165; ἔχων δ 97. ξ 310. ρ 13; ἡβών ψ 187; καθήμενος π 264; ἰέμενος α 6. δ 284. κ 246, ξ 142. π 430. φ 129. χ 409; ἰμειρόμενος ε 209; κηδόμενος γ 240. η 215. σ 178. τ 511; λιλαίόμενος α 315; μενεαίνων

¹ The interpretation is doubtful. See Verbs of Beginning and Ending.

ε 341; ναίων ι 18; δίομενος ξ 298. ω 401; ὀλιγηπελέων τ 356; πάσχων λ 104 111. μ 138; ῥυπόων ζ 87; τειρόμενος ε 324, η 218; τρυχόμενος α 288. β 219; φιλέων θ 316; χατέων β 249. ν 280; χατίζων λ 350.

Perfect: εἰληλουθώς τ 28; τεθνηώς κ 494; μεμαάς χ 172; πεππουθώς ρ 555; ἐσσύμενος δ 733; κεχολωμένος λ 565. τ 324; κεχρημένος ξ 155.

Aorist: ἀνελών σ 16; ἐλθών ψ 7; θανών α 236. γ 258. λ 554. ω 93; μογήσας β 343; ὀμόσσας ξ 392; παθών η 224. θ 184; φυγών ρ 47.

These examples may be summarized as follows:

| | Without Particles. | | | With Particles. | | | Total. | | |
|----------|--------------------|-------|------|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| | pres. | perf. | aor. | pres. | perf. | aor. | pres. | perf. | aor. |
| Iliad: | 29 | 3 | 1=33 | 112 | 28 | 10=150 | 141 | 31 | 11=183 |
| Odyssey: | 33 | 3 | 4=40 | 85 | 8 | 11=104 | 117 | 11 | 15=144 |
| Hesiod: | 0 | 1 | 0=1 | 15 | 0 | 0=15 | 15 | 1 | 0=16 |

The first thing that calls for comment is the relative frequency of the construction. The number of its occurrences in the Iliad and the Odyssey is about in proportion to their bulk (4:3); in Hesiod the construction is not quite so frequent (182:16 > 7:1). This is due entirely to the nature of Hesiod's work, which is unsuited to anything so rhetorical in character as the adversative idea of itself is. The rhetorical nature of the construction can be seen from the fact that it occurs much more frequently in speeches than in the narrative. Thus in the Iliad, 125 out of 183, or about two-thirds of the instances, come from the speeches, while in the Odyssey the proportion is even higher, 125 out of 143, or five-sixths. But the amount of speech is proportionately greater in the Odyssey. To appreciate these figures fully it must be borne in mind that speeches constitute less than one-half of the Iliad—7048 out of 15693 lines—and contain much fewer participles than the narrative—in the Iliad 1719:3286.

The origin of this construction is to be sought in the contrast between a quality inherent in a subject and an action that is not in harmony with it—a contrast which could be heightened by emphasizing the quality and thus bringing out more clearly the adversative relation. Later, when this construction with the participle was more firmly established the

warning particles were omitted, and "failure to understand it was charged to stupidity." Gildersleeve, Pindar cxi. The examples cited above show that the construction has not yet reached such a state of development. It is still felt merely as a contrast between a quality and an action that do not harmonize, and hence in a large proportion of the examples the particles are retained to emphasize the quality, and so bring out the contrast. The following table will show the use of the different particles:

| | Without part. | πέρ | καί | καί—περ | οὐδέ | οὐδέ—περ |
|----------|---------------|-----|-----|---------|------|----------|
| Iliad. | 32 | 86 | 27 | 29 | 2 | 4 |
| Odyssey. | 40 | 63 | 15 | 15 | 6 | 2 |
| Hesiod. | 1 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 |

An unusual doubling is found O 604. *μάλα περ μεμαῶτα καὶ αὐτόν*. To intensify still further the contrast *καὶ ὥς* is employed in addition to the particles Γ 159. λ 104; οὐδ' ὥς α 6. ε 324. λ 88; ἔμπηγς I 518. Ξ 1. 98. 173. O 399. P 229. Ω 523. β 200. λ 350. ο 361. π 147. σ 165. τ 356. (ἔμπηγς goes with the main verb of course. Cf. La Roche at Ξ 1; Ameis-Hentze ο 361 Anhang.) Isolated are:

θ 184. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς κακὰ πολλὰ παθών, *πειρήσῃμ' ἀέθλων*

λ 565. ἔνθα χ' ὅμως προσέφη *κεχολωμένος*.

The difference between the Epic and Attic usage may be shown by contrasting the statistics given for Euripides by Lodge and for Xenophon's Anabasis by Joost. In Euripides occur 450 examples of this construction; of these eighteen are used with *καίπερ*, one with *καί*, and five with *πέρ*. In three of the cases mentioned *καίπερ* and *πέρ* are reinforced by ὅμως, and ὅμως is used without these particles twelve times. Joost says (p. 295): "Diesen 63 Fällen (of the simple adv. part.) stehen nur 14 (13) gegenüber, in denen das konzessive Participle durch *καίπερ* (4!)¹ καὶ allein (5) καὶ μάλα (4) und μάλα allein (1?) ver-

¹It may be well to call attention to the usage of *καίπερ*: it is not used by Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias (2.6; 6.11 belong to Pseudo-Lysias), Hyperides nor Deinarchos. Isaeus (6.54) and Lycurgos (75) have but one example, Aeschines (according to Preuss) but two, 1.45, 167. Isocrates uses it in his letters 2.14; 4.1, 8; 9.16, and in passages of a similar character in his speeches 9.11; 11.9; 12.1; 15.11, 272, 320. Demosthenes has, according to Preuss, 33 instances. Thucydides 18, according to Von Essen. Thus we see that this is one of the syntactical features that connect Thucydides, Isocrates, and Demosthenes, another of which will be found in the use of the participle with *ἄν*.

deutlich wird." The proportion 63:14 is just about the reverse of the Homeric usage, but the complete material to trace the history of the development is not yet collected.

The separation of *καί* and *πέρ* by a word—generally the participle except with *ἑών* where it is the predicate adjective—shows that the original emphasizing force of each word is still felt, and that they have not yet become like the later *καίπερ* (found as *καί περ* only η 224, Th 533) a mere sign for the adversative relation.

A further proof of the undeveloped state of the construction is to be found in the adjectival nature of the participles employed. Notice the large number of the occurrence of *ἑών* with a predicate adjective. and the number of participles that denote states of the mind or feelings: *ἀχνύμενος*, *ἐπειγόμενος*, *ἰέμενοι*, *κηδόμενος*, *νοέοντι*, *σπυζόμενος*, *φρονεόντων*, *χωόμενος*. The perfects too are mostly adjectival, *ἐκγεγαῶτα*, *τεθνηῶτα*, *μεμαῶς*, *πεποιθῶς*, *ἐσσύμενος*, *κεχολωμένος*. There is very little of the contrasting of one action with another, and consequently the use has hardly spread to the aorist. In the Iliad there are but eleven instances of the aorist and four of these *θανόντι* and *οὐτάμενοι* are adjectival and notably close to the perfect, while two out of the remaining seven come from the ninth and tenth books.

The extension of the construction to the future is also of course not made until after the Epic period.

Both as regards the omission of particles and the employment of the aorist the Odyssey shows a gain over the Iliad not only in the number but in the character of the examples. (See tables and examples above.) In Hesiod this is not the case, but the number of occurrences is too small to allow a fair comparison to be instituted.

THE TEMPORAL PARTICIPLE.

The participle frequently denotes a subordinate action that stands to the main action of the sentence in no logical relation except that of time. Still this need not be a case of the participle used as a substitute for a finite temporal clause: for that it is necessary that the participle should be employed where the speaker *wishes that the temporal relation between the two ac-*

tions should be inferred by the hearer. On account of the explicit designation of time in its tense the participle could assume this function with particular ease, and accordingly this construction precedes in its development both the causal and conditional uses of the participle, which are offshoots from it.

In Hesiod there are about fifty examples in which the participle seems to be used to date as it were the time of one action with relation to another. In the Iliad the construction is in about the same state, so that it seems sufficient to cite the examples from Hesiod.

Present: Th 23. 48 (verse corrupt cf. Rzach's note and Wiener Stud. 4. 317 ff.) 91. 202. [219]. 443. 761 (cf. λ 15). [828]. 910. 988. S 232. W 24. 368. 374. 383. 387. 463. 467. 498. 502. 553. 569, 696. 745. 746. 821.

Aorist: Th 184. 188. 292. 293. 606. 859. 861. 951. 954. 994. 997. S 38. 44. 82. 87. [152]. W 218. 384. 386. 506. 547. 652. 664. 697. 701. 735. 755.

Evidently the consciousness of this use of the participle is greater when temporal adverbs are employed to point out the relation more precisely. This is said to be frequent in Attic—cf. G. M. T. 855; Krüger I. 56. 10. A 3; Kühner § 486. 1. An. 4. 5. Thucydides and Xenophon employ adverbs to sum up a subordinate clause and also show similar examples after temporal participles—seven examples occurring in Thucydides, eight in the Anabasis, and thirteen in the Hellenica.—(Cf. Joost, p. 297 ff. and Graeber, Einige Reste nebengeordneter Satzbildung im untergeordneten Satzgefüge bei Thukydides und Xenophon namentlich nach temporalen Vordersätzen Breklum, 1887, to which latter, unfortunately, I have had access only in the summaries, Wochenschrift für Klass. Phil. 1887. 1510; Berl. Phil. Woch. 7. 1338.)

This use, as a survival from a time of parataxis, might be expected to occur even more frequently in Epic poetry. After finite temporal clauses examples are not infrequent in Homer: *ἀντίκα* B 322. 662. E 713. A 582. M 393. Ξ 237. Σ 531. T 20. Φ 419. Ψ 39. 118. 162. 768. Ω 515. β. 379. γ 448. ε 77. 229. θ 361. 447. κ 237. μ 201. 261. ν 272. ξ 153. 340. ο 93. ρ 23. φ 46. 405; *ἔπειτα* A 478. Γ 223. 398. 422. Z 505. H 208. Θ 181. K 522. O 397. Π 247. Σ 545. Τ 338. Φ

383. Ω 719. α 294. β 280. 379. 408. γ 46. δ 338. 415.
 ε 391, θ 378. ι 438. κ 237. λ 121. μ 201. 261. 309. 400.
 ν 318. ο 102. 367. 447. 478. ρ 2. 129. 321. φ 160. χ 217.
 ψ 89. Now, if the participle was felt at this time as an equivalent of a temporal clause we should expect to find, with some degree of frequency, similar examples of its resumption by an adverb. However, the only examples are :

- I 453. πατήρ δ' ἐμὸς αὐτίκ' δισθεις | πολλὰ κατηρᾶτο
 II 308. αὐτίκ' ἄρα στρεφθέντος Ἀρηιλύκου βάλε μηρόν.
 Ω 226. αὐτίκα γάρ με κατακτείνειεν Ἀχιλλεύς
 ἀγκὰς ἐλόντ' ἐμὸν οἶον
 β 367. οἱ δέ τοι αὐτίκ' ἰόντι κακὰ φράσσονται ὀπίσσω
 ρ 327. Ἀργὸν δ' αὖ κατὰ μοῖρα λάβεν μέλανος θανάτοιο
 αὐτίκ' ἰδόντ' Ὀδυσῆα.
 Λ 727. ἔνθα Διὶ ῥέξαντες ὑπερμενεῖ ἱερὰ καλὰ . . .
 δόρπον ἔπειθ' ἐλόμεσθα.
 α 363.=π 450. τ 603. φ 357.
 ἐς δ' ὑπερῷ' ἀναβῆσα σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισι γυναιξὶν
 κλαῖεν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆα.
 ζ 97. αἱ δὲ λοεσσάμεναι καὶ χρισάμεναι λίπ' ἐλαΐφ
 δεῖπνον ἔπειθ' εἴλοντο.
 α 123. παρ' ἄμμι φιλήσεται αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 δεῖπνον πασσάμενος μυνθήσεται. cf. δ 60.

Ameis-Hentze also includes here :

- Ξ 223. ὣς φάτο μείδησέν δὲ βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη
 μείδησασα δ' ἔπειτα ἐφ' ἐγκάθετο κόλπῳ,

but it seems to me doubtful cf. α 336. ρ 33. ψ 207.

Similar to this is the use of ἄρα (cf. Monro, p. 316, Ameis-Hentze to A 68) in ἦ τοι ὃ γ' ὥς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔξετο A 68. 101. B 76. H 354. 365 ; B 310 βώμου ὑπαίξας πρὸς ῥα πλατάνιστον ὄρουσεν ; Λ 743 ἐγὼ δ' ἐς δίφρον ὀρούσας | στῆν ῥα μετὰ προμάχοισιν. For the Odyssey cf. e. g. π 46. 213. ρ 466. 603. σ 110. τ 544.

None of the other adverbial usages of this sort which occur in Attic prose are found in Epic poetry—Kr. Di. 56.10.1—and it is to be noted that these examples of αὐτίκα and ἔπειτα come from the Odyssey and the latest part of the Iliad. Also noticeable is the neglect of the digamma in αὐτίκ' ἰδόντα.

Other words of a temporal character whose combination with the participle calls for mention are :

ἔτι: W 463. νειὸν δὲ σπεῖρειν ἔτι κουφίζουσαν ἄρουραν

Cf. W 502. B 287. Σ 10.

ταπρῶτα: Th 202. τῇ δ' Ἐρος ὠμάρτησε . . . γενομένη ταπρῶτα

Cf. Th 188. W 387. 467. II 811.

νέον: W 569. ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο = τ 519 cf. H 64.

ἤδη: B 663. κατέκτα | ἤδη γηράσκοντα

also to be noted is the expansion of the participle by a temporal clause, T 128 = Ω 210 :

ὅστερον αὖτε τὰ πείσεται ἄσσα οἱ αἶσα

γενομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ.

Cf. also W. 467.

The original function of the tense of the participle was to express the "kind" of time of the subordinate action, and this is still the factor that controls the choice of tenses of the circumstantial participle in Epic poetry. For examples of the aorist participle denoting action contemporary with the tense of the leading verb, cf. Seymour and Delbrück, l. c. But the fact that the aorist expressed the attainment, the "upshot" of an action, led to the inference that the action expressed by the aorist participle was prior to the time of the leading verb, while by contrast the present participle was felt to designate time contemporary with the leading verb. It is only natural that this inference should be stronger the more the temporal element in the participle is emphasized; and, accordingly, we find that in the examples cited above, in which the temporal relations of the two actions are indicated by the participle, the aorist participle is employed to denote time prior, the present participle to denote time contemporary with that of the leading verb.

THE CAUSAL PARTICIPLE.

Apart from its use with Verbs of Emotion—which call for separate treatment—the causal participle is an inference from the temporal, cf. Krüger, 1. 56. 13. Sometimes the two ideas blend, as :

S 82. ὅτ' εὐστέφανον ποτὶ θήβην.

ἦλθε λιπὼν Τίρυνθον εὐκτίμενον πολίεθρον
κτείννας Ἥλεκτρήωνα βοῶν ξυεχ' ἐδρουσετώπων.

N 696 = O 335. *αὐτὰρ ἔναιεν*

ἐν Φυλίσῃ γαίῃς ἀπο πατρίδος ἀνδρα κατακτάς.

That the usage was not far developed in Epic poetry was recognized by Krüger, Di. 56. 12. The examples in Hesiod are :

S 410. *αὐτὸς δ' ἀπαλήσεται ἄλλῃ
χώρου ἄιδρις ἐών.*

Cf. perhaps Th 817. W. 514.

Th. 497.¹ *πρῶτον δ' ἐξήμεσσε λίθον πύματον καταπίνων.*

W 634. *πλωΐ'εσχ' ἐν νηυσὶ βιοῦ κεκρημένους ἐσθλοῦ.*

From the Iliad may be cited : Present, Δ 408. E 331. H 185. I 32. K 4. N 117. 119. P 221. T 295. Φ 220. Ψ 387. 834. Aorist, X 505. Perfect, I 345. Λ 124. 689. T 210. Ω 244.

The use of *ἄτε, οἷα, ὥς οὕτω, διὰ τοῦτο* and *διὰ ταῦτα* to emphasize the causal relation is entirely lacking—cf. Kr. Di. 56. 12. a.—and is proof of the undeveloped state of the construction.

THE CONDITIONAL PARTICIPLE.

Satisfactory instances of the conditional participle are not frequent either in Hesiod or in the Iliad. Those who, like Kühner, see in the potential optative a mutilated conditional sentence may find a suppressed protasis in the participle in an example like W. 12 *τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινέσσειε νοήσας*, or 33 *τοῦ κε κορυσσάμενος νείκεα καὶ δῆρ' ὀφέλλοι*, but to me it seems better not to resolve such sentences as these and Δ 539. M 465. N 96. 127. P 399. Ω 418. 661. In N 96.

*ᾧ μιν ἐγὼ γε
μαρναμένοισι πέποιθα σασέμεναι νέας ἀμάς.
εἰ δ' ὅμεις πολέμοιο μεθήσετε λευγαλέοιο
νῦν δ' ἡ ἐῖδεται ἡμαρ ὑπὸ Τρώεσσι δαμῆναι.*

the following conditional clause is contrasted, not with the participle, but with the whole situation, consequently the example is not comparable with passages in Attic in which a par-

¹Fick Hom. Odyss. in d. urspr. Sprachf., p. 329, reads *καταπίνων*, the *ι* being lengthened under the ictus. Cf. // 825. π 143. σ 3. Rzach rejects the emendation interpreting *καταπίνων* as a participle of the imperfect, cf. W 202. A better example would have been Th 57, but it seems to me that an aorist, and not a durative participle, is wanted.

ticiple is balanced by a finite subordinate clause, although it is the closest approximation to such a use in the Iliad and in Hesiod of which I am aware.

The limiting force of γέ sometimes brings out an apparently conditional meaning, cf. Th 443. 446; K 246. 556. In addition to these may possibly be cited Th 704. 723=725; W 21; I 157=261=299. Λ 509. X 288.

Schoemann proposed to read in W 22.

εἰς ἔτερον γάρ τις τε ἰδὼν ἔργοιο χατίζων
πλούσιον ὧς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἢδὲ φυτεύειν

ὧς=οὕτως. Such a construction is sometimes found in Attic—cf. Kühner 486. 3. An. 7.—but in Epic it is without parallel.

The clearest indication of this use in Attic is the employment of the negative μή. For the range of this usage, cf. Gallaway, On the Use of μή with the Participle in Classical Greek. Baltimore, 1897. No example of it is found in Homer, because the use of the participle as a substitute for a subordinate conditional clause had not yet developed sufficiently to afford any opportunity for the use of such a construction. However, this must be considered in connection with the broader question of the combination of any negative with the participle, and the discussion of Dr. Gallaway's views will be postponed for another chapter.

THE PARTICIPLE OF PURPOSE.

The undeveloped state in Epic poetry of the participle expressing purpose is one of the commonplaces of Greek grammar. The construction with ὥς that afterwards becomes in reality a species of *oratio obliqua* is, as is well known, entirely wanting. The limitations of the use of the future participle are also well known. For the Iliad the following brief statement of the facts will suffice :

Disregarding the adjectival ἐσσόμενος there are 62 instances of the future participle in the Iliad. Four of these are circumstantial participles that might be paraphrased by μέλλων with the infinitive. E 46. τὸν . . . νόξ' ἱππων ἐπιβησόμενον. cf. II 343. Σ 309. Ψ 379. Of the remaining examples 57 are used in connection with verbs of motion where by a natural infer-

ence it denotes the intention or purpose of the subject. The examples are :

Nominative : with βαίνειν B. 49. Λ 101. ἔρχεσθαι B 801. K 343. [387]. N 257. O 179. Ξ 301 ; ἐλθεῖν A 13. 153. 207. 372. T 125. Φ 431. Ω 240 ; ἵεναι A 419. Γ 383. 411. K 32. 451 (bis). Λ 652. M 216. N 168. 209. 248. Ξ 200. 205. 304. O 136. Π 161. P 146. Φ 335. X 310. Ψ 226 ; χίειν Λ 428 ; θορεῖν O 583 ; ἔπεσθαι N 644 ; ἐπιδραμεῖν E 618 ; θέειν Ξ 355 ; ἰκάνειν Ω 502 ; ὀρουσθαι Θ 409. Ω 77. 159 ; δὲ τε θαλάσσης εὐρέα κόλπον Σ 141.

Accusative : a) due to o.o. with ἐλθεῖν Z 109. M 301 ; ἵεναι K 355. b) object after ἐπιπροέγηα Σ 59. 440 ; προιάλλειν Θ 365 ; προπέμπειν Θ 368 ; ὀτρύνειν Θ 398. Λ 185. T 157 ; πόδες φέρον P 701 ; μοῖρ' ἤγ' E 614.

In the remaining passage T 120. αὐτὴ δ' ἀγγελίσουσα Δία Κρονίωνα προσηύδα the future is due to the idea of motion involved in the context—cf. the scholiast.

Desiderative verbs are subject to the same limitations. A 606. οἱ μὲν κακχεῖοντες ἔβαν οἰκόνδε ἕκαστος = Ψ 58. α 424. γ 396. η 229. ν 17 ; Ξ 37 τῷ ρ' οἷ γ' ὀψείοντες αὐτῆς καὶ πολέμοιο | ἔρχει ἐρειδόμενοι χίον ἀθρόοι ; Ξ 340 ἔνθ' ἵομεν κείοντες ; ξ 532. βῆ δ' ἵμεναι κείων. cf. σ 428. τ 48. ψ 292 ; κ 160 κατήϊεν . . . πτόμενος cf. N 493.

This syntactical connection of the desiderative and future tends to strengthen the view advanced by Hopkins, *The Aryan Future*, A. J. P. xiii 1 ff., that the future served originally to express not merely time but also intention. It also furnishes proof for the rejection of Wackernagel's derivation (K Z 28. 141 ff.) endorsed by Brugmann of these forms from ὄψει ἰόντες (κακ) κει ἰόντες as their syntactical behavior shows that they are not to be disconnected from the future. Moreover it may be doubted whether such a use of the dative was possible.—cf. Gildersleeve A. J. P. ii 100 ; Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax* p. 291. "Ein Dativ bei Verben von der Bedeutung 'gehen' den man als Zieldativ ansehen könnte liegt wohl nicht vor."

Hesiod's usage differs from that of the *Iliad* only in quantity—a difference due to the different nature of the subject-matter. The examples are σ 215. ἀπορρίφοντι βουκῶς ; σ 91. ᾤχετο τιμῆσων. At Th 182. πάλιν δ' ἔρριψε φέμεσθαι | ἐξοπίσω, Rzach reports: "ἐξοπίσω] ἐξορίσων exterminaturus Wieselerus." The material

collected furnishes most satisfactory evidence for rejecting the emendation, which was grammatically impossible at Hesiod's time.

Hesiod has one example of the present participle used in this way :

- W 85. εἰς Ἐπιμηθέα πέμπε πατὴρ κλυτὸν Ἀργεῖφόντην
δῶρον ἄγοντα, θεῶν ταχὺν ἄγγελον

The origin of such a construction may be easily explained either from the conative element in the present or from the use of the present for the immediate future. Its use later is not unusual (for Pindar, cf. Gildersleeve cxii) Vogrinz, p. 262, recognizes it for Homer. He cites :

- Δ 445. ἦ σφιν καὶ τότε νεῖκος ὁμοῖον ἔμβαλε μέσσω
ἐρχομένη καθ' ὅμιλον, ὀφέλλουσα στόνον ἀνδρῶν.

However, it is not necessary to subordinate one participle to the other ; the same applies also to

- Π 811. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τότε φῶτας ἐείκοσι βῆσεν ἀφ' ἱππῶν
πρωτ' ἐλθὼν σὺν ὄχρῳ, διδασκόμενος πολέμοιο.

The other passage cited by Vogrinz is :

- Θ 52. αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κορυφῇσι καθέζετο κῆδεϊ γαίῳν
εἰσορόων Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν,

but I do not think that it is necessary to interpret as a participle of purpose either this or

- Z. 239. ἀφ' ἄρα μιν Τρώων ἄλοχοι θῆλον ἦδὲ θόγατρος
εἰρόμεναι παῖδας τε καὶ.

which seems to me the closest approximation to such a use of the present participle in the Iliad. In other passages in which the present participle is joined with a verb of motion its difference from the future participle of purpose is evident : cf. e. g. A 13. 159. 372. B 304. 352. Δ 86. E 168. 553. Z 446. I 10. [K 84]. A 213. N 760. O 175. Π 80. 622. 817.

THE GENITIVE ABSOLUTE.

The first detailed treatment of the origin of this construction and its uses in the Homeric poems was given in Classen's *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch*, Frankfurt, 1867, pp. 160-188. The author's tendency towards "resolutions" of the participle led him to a misconception

of the nature of this construction, as has been shown by Dr. E. H. Spieker: On the so-called Genitive Absolute and its Use, especially in the Attic Orators, A. J. P. vi 310-343—for the criticism of Classen's views cf. especially pp. 312-318. We must, I think, agree with Dr. Spieker in holding that the most likely explanation of the origin of this construction is to be sought in the genitive of time. Cf. Dr. Gildersleeve's note to page 312: "In my essay on the Syntax of Pindar (p. cxii), I have said: 'The detachment must have been gradual, beginning probably with the genitive of the time within which, with the present and extending to the aorist, beginning with the pure genitive and extending to the ablative genitive, until it became phraseological and lost to consciousness. The last step is taken when the subject is omitted.' For many years I have taught that we are to start from the genitive of time within which, but as it is impossible to escape the time after which, it seems better to bring in the ablative element as a consequence of that differentiation of present participle and aorist participle which resulted in giving the latter the notion of priority which does not inhere in it. The notion of priority given, the ablative element of the genitive would assert itself."

All that is necessary after this is to record the examples found in Hesiod and see what light they throw upon the subject. The examples are:

Present: Th 59 (?). S 65. (??.) 232. W 383. 387. 502. 553 569. 745. 821.

Aorist: Th 184. 493. S 87. 152. 363. W 384.¹ 386. 415. 506. 547. 664.

These examples may be tabulated as follows:

| | Th. | S. | W. |
|-----------|-----|----|--------|
| Present : | 1 | 2 | 7 = 10 |
| Aorist : | 2 | 3 | 6 = 11 |
| | 3 | 5 | 13 21 |

Classen's examples, as corrected by Dr. Spieker (p. 317), would yield:

| | Il. | Od. |
|-----------|-----|----------|
| Present : | 25. | 19. = 44 |
| Aorist : | 15. | 4. = 19 |
| | 40 | 23 63 |

¹ The form *δοσομενάων* is an aorist, cf. Classen, 179 note, Mouro, § 41, Vogrinz, p. 123.

The first thing to be noticed is the great increase in quantity in Hesiod. This contains an interesting confirmation of the theory of the temporal origin of the participle. Dr. Spieker observes (p. 342) that "A number of the examples in Homer involve expressions of time, as *ἔτεος* and *ἐνταυτοῦ*." The nature of Hesiod's subject-matter is such as to call for a large number of these and similar expressions—*ῥοῦς γενομένης*, *ἔαρος νέον* *ἱσταμένοι*, *μηρῶν φθινόντων*, *ἐς τέλος ἐλθόντος θέρους*, *ἐπιπλομένων ἐνταυτῶν*, etc,—and it is to this fact that the increased frequency of the construction is due. When the participle is not temporal it is purely circumstantial, resisting all attempts at analysis, so that we see that the construction is in this respect not beyond the stage found in Homer. The use of the aorist, however, shows a real gain, as great as its gain in Pindar,—cf. Dr. Gildersleeve's note, p. 318—but it is in the line along which the development was to be expected.

One instance of the junction of two genitive absolutes occurs. W. 386-7.

*αὖτις δὲ περιπλομένου ἐνταυτοῦ
φαίνονται ταπρῶτα χαρασσομένου σιδήρου*

which may be compared with—

υ 312. μήλων σφαζομένων αἰνοῖό τε πιόμενοι.

The example from Hesiod shows, however, not mere coördination, but the subordination of two separate actions to the same main action.

In W. 745. *μηδὲ ποτ' οἶνοχόην τίθήμεν χρητῆρος ὕπερθεν πινόντων*, cf. also S 232. W 384, we have examples of "the last step," the omission of the subject, which, though extremely easy, are more satisfactory than any found in Homer cf. Dr. Spieker, p. 317.

NEGATIVE WITH THE PARTICIPLE.

The negative particles *οὐ* and *μή* were used at first only with finite verbs—participles and infinitives being negated by composition with a negative prefix. Survivals from this period are still to be seen in *ἀέκων*, *ἀεκαζόμενος*, *ἀφρονέοντες* and in the use of *οὐ φημι* where the negative belongs grammatically to the main verb, although logically it qualifies the dependent

infinitive. Monro, § 360, considers the first exception to this rule to have been in Greek the use of *οὐ* with the participle which he declares to be well established in Homer.

Such a use of the particles *οὐ* and *μή* could arise in two ways; first, by displacement of the syntactical distribution—cf. Paul, Chap. XVI—and second, from a feeling that the participle was the equivalent of a subordinate finite verb. A study of the occurrences of the negative with the participle in Epic poetry will show that the process by which the negatives *οὐ* and *μή* detach themselves from the main verb and attach themselves to the participle can still be traced; that there are extremely few instances in which this origin is not plainly visible; that instances of this sort increase in frequency as we approach the close of the Epic period; that they are to be explained—with the exception of a few instances of the adversative participle—as analogical extensions of the preceding case, and that, except for the adversative participle, the participle has not begun to take the negatives *οὐ* and *μή* in virtue of its being a substitute for a finite verb.

A sentence like “he did not slay him playing the coward but <he slew him> standing before the Trojans, tends, owing to the contrast to be felt, as “he slew him, not playing the coward, but standing in front of the Trojans.” The examples of this type are:

- Δ 224. ἐνθ' οὐκ ἂν βρίζοντα ἴδοις Ἀγαμέμνονα οἶον
οὐδὲ καταπτώσσοντ' οὐδ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι
ἀλλὰ μάλα σπεύδοντα.
- Ρ 221. οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ πληθὺν διζήμενος οὐδὲ χατίζων
ἐνθάδ' ἀφ' ὁμετέρων πολίων ἤγειρα ξεκαστον.
- Ψ 70. οὐ μὲν μευ ζώντος ἀκήδεις ἀλλὰ θανόντος
- Ω 172. οὐ μὲν γάρ τοι ἐγὼ κακὸν ὀσομένην τόδ' ἱκάνω
ἀλλ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέουσα.
214. ἐπεὶ οὐ ἐ καχιζόμενόν γε κατέκτα
ἀλλὰ πρὸ Τρώων . . . ἑσταότα.
- λ 529. κεῖνον δ' οὐ ποτε ἅμπαν ἐγὼν ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
οὔτ' ὠχρήσαντα χροῖα κάλλιμον οὔτε παρειῶν
δάκρυ ὁμορξάμενον.
- ρ 115. αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς ταλασίφρονος οὐ ποτ' ἔφασκεν
ζωοῦ οὐδὲ θανόντος ἐπιχθονίων τευ ἀκοῦσαι.
- Χ 351. ὥς ἐγὼ οὐ τι ἐκὼν ἐς σὸν δόμον οὐδὲ χατίζων | πωλεύμην.

The question now arises whether in these passages the negative is felt to belong to the participle or to the finite verb. With the possible exception of P 221, I should incline to the latter view pointing to the passages in which we have the same order of words and yet cannot possibly connect the negative with the participle. Compare, for instance: N 419. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀχνύμενός περ ἐοῦ ἀμέλησεν ἑταίρου and other instances of the ad-versative participle with οὐδὲ . . . περ, and οὐδέ. Cf. also E 157. Θ 164. Ψ 585. λ 339. 613. Here I would include E 150 τοῖς οὐκ ἐρχομένοις ὁ γέρων ἐκρίνατ' οὐεῖρους, interpreting with the scholiast: ἐρχομένοις εἰς τὴν μάχην οὐκ ἐμαντεύσατο.

Of similar origin also are :

T 77.¹⁰ τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων
αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης οὐδ' ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάς.

β 231=ε. 9. μή τις ἔτι πρόφρων ἀγανὸς καὶ ἥπιος ἔστω
σκηπτούχος βασιλεὺς μηδὲ φρεσὶν αἴσιμα εἰδώς

γ 96 μηδὲ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο μηδ' ἐλεαίρων.

Th 761 οὐδὲ ποτ' αὐτοὺς
'Ἡέλιος φαέθων ἐπιδέρεται ἀκτίνεσσιν
οὐρανὸν εἰσανὼν οὐδ' οὐρανόθεν καταβαίνων.

In the following passages the negative is perhaps more detached from the verb, but still not so closely attached to the participle as to warrant their separation from the last examples, as Gallaway has done for the last two, pp. 15, 24, 31.

σ 173. ἀλλ' ἴθι καὶ σῶ παιδί ἔπος φάο μηδ' ἐπικευνθε
χρῶτ' ἀπονιψαμένη καὶ ἐπιχρίσασα παρειάς
μηδ' οὕτω δάκρυσι πεφυρμένη ἀμφὶ πρόσωπα.

α 289=β 220. εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούσης μηδ' ἔτ' ἐόντος.

δ 684. μὴ μνηστεύσαντες μηδ' ἄλλοθ' ὀμιλήσαντες
ῥύστατα καὶ πύματα νῦν ἐνθάδε δειπνήσειαν.

Monro, § 361, says: "Here μὴ belongs to ὀμιλήσαντες, and expresses a *wish*: 'may they (after their wooing) have no other meeting, but sup now for the last time.' " I should prefer to say that we have two wishes fused by passion into one, the full expression would have been μὴ ἄλλοθ' ὀμιλήσαντες δειπνήσειαν

¹⁰This is the only instance of the aorist in the Iliad, except the adhaerent οὐ ταρβήσας, and the line has been recognized as spurious ever since the time of Zenodotus.

ἀλλὰ ὕστατα κτλ. in which the construction of the negative would have perfectly resembled the other examples already cited.

Again, in sentences like "neither was he honored by gods, nor <was he honored> by men;" "he was not like to a man, but <he was like> to a giant;" "remember this, and not <i. e. do not remember> that." The tendency is for the negative to be felt as attaching to the single words "he was honored neither by gods nor men," etc. After this feeling has arisen, there is no reason why the use of such negatived single words should not be extended to constructions with the participle. Examples of this, however, are not found in the earliest parts of the Iliad. The examples are:

I 627. καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν περ ἔοντα "although it is bad."

N 48. Αἶαντε σφὼ μὲν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀλκῆς μνησάμενω μηδὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο.

X 459. τὸ δὲν μένος οὐδενὶ εἴκων.

Ψ 515. κέρδεσιν οὐ τι τάχει γε παραφθάμενος Μενέλαον.

Ω 129. μεμνημένος οὔτε τι σίτου | οὔτ' εὐνῆς

216. οὔτε φόβου μεμνημένον οὔτ' ἄλεωρῆς.

533. φοιτᾶ δ' οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν.

δ 818. νῆπιος οὔτε πόνων ἐν εἰδῶς οὔτ' ἀγοράων.

ε 182. ἧ δὲ ἀλιτρός γ' ἔσσι καὶ οὐκ ἀποφώλια εἰδῶς.

θ 179. εἰπὼν οὐ κατὰ κόσμον.

ι 215. οὔτε δίκας ἐν εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας.

κ 120. οὐκ ἄνδρεσσιν εὐκότες ἀλλὰ Γίγασιν.

λ 515. ἐὼν μένος οὐδενὶ εἴκων.

ξ 82. οὐκ ὄπιδα φρονέοντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶν οὐδ' ἐλεητύν.

χ 39. οὔτε θεοὺς δέισαντες . . . οὔτε τιν' ἀνθρώπων νέμεσιν.

425. οὔτ' ἐμὲ τίουσai οὔτ' αὐτὴν Πηνελόπειαν.

Th 295. οὐδὲ εὐκότος

θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

W 481 (?). οὐ μάλα χαίρων.

637. οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων οὐδὲ πλούτον τε καὶ ὄλβον
ἀλλὰ κακὴν πενίην.

649. οὔτε τι ναυτιλῆς σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν.

In these examples from Hesiod it may be doubted whether the negative does not really belong to the participle; if so,

however, they merely show an extension of the preceding construction.

These examples that show how the negative could come to attach itself to single words lead to the consideration of the adhaerent negative, where the negative and verb unite to form a quasi compound similar to οὐκ ἀγαθόν "bad," οὐκ ἀποφώλια "seemly" quoted above. If the participle of a verb like ἀλέγω that is generally used with a negative οὐκ ἀλέγω "*contemno*" is to be employed, it will, of course, appear with the negative also, cf. Π 388 θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες=W 251. and this opens the way for the negative in other expressions.

Thus we have οὐκ ἀέκων E 366. 768. Θ 45. K 530. Λ 281. 519. 716. X 400. ο 192. τ 374; οὐκ ἐθέλων (notice that οὐκ ἐθέλω is retained where μή would generally be required, cf. *Monro*, §§ 355. 359.) Δ 224. 300. Z 165. N 572. Σ 434. T 377. T 87. Φ 36. 48. Ψ 88. Ω 289. β 50. 110. ε 99. 155. κ 573. ο 73. τ 156. χ 31. ω 307; οὐ ταρβήσας E 286. Λ 384. T 430; οὐκ εἰδώς (?) I 440. Λ 710. O 632. P 5. δ 534. Th [187]. W 521; οὐκ αἰόντι Ψ 430; οὐ δεδαηκότες β 61.

After gaining a foothold in these ways, the use of the negative with the participle was sure to spread, and we find the following passages in which none of the explanations offered above are applicable:¹

- H 185. οἱ δ' οὐ γινώσκοντες ἀπηνήναντο ἕκαστος.
 O 325. ἐλθόντ' ἐξαπίνης σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος.
 665. τῶν ὕπερ ἐνθάδ' ἐγὼ γουνάζομαι οὐ παρεόντων.
 T 255. πολλά τ' ἐόντα καὶ οὐκί.
 X 384. ἦε μένειν μεμάσσι καὶ Ἑκτορος οὐκέτ' ἐόντος.
 α 202. αὐτὰρ νῦν τοι ἐγὼ μαντεύσομαι . . .
 οὔτε τι μάντις ἐὼν οὔτ' οἰωνῶν σάφα εἰδώς.
 δ 264. παῖδά τ' ἐμὴν νοσφισσαμένην θάλαμόν τε πόσιν τε
 οὐ τευ δευόμενον οὔτ' ἄρ φρένας οὔτε τι εἶδος.
 690. οἶος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσκε μεθ' ὑμετέροισι τοκεῦσιν,
 οὔτε τινα ῥέξας ἐξαΐσιον οὔτε τι εἰπὼν
 ἐν δήμῳ.
 κ 553. Ἑλπήνωρ δέ τις ἔσκε νεώτατος, οὔτε τι λήην
 ἄλκιμος ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτε φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀρηρώς.

¹Unless οὐ παρεών be considered adhaerent.

- λ 66. νῦν δέ σε τῶν ὀπιθεν γονιάζομαι οὐ παρεόντων.
 535-6. μοῖραν καὶ γέρας ἐσθλὸν ἔχων ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινε
 ἀσκηθῆς, οὐτ' ἄρ βεβλημένος ὀξεί χαλκῷ
 οὐτ' αὐτοσχεδὴν οὐτασμένος.
 ξ 145. τὸν μὲν ἐγών, ὧ ξεῖνε, καὶ οὐ παρεόντ' ὀνομάζειν
 αἰδέομαι.
 ρ 567. καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε μ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ κατὰ δῶμα κιόντα
 οὐ τι κακὸν ῥέξαντα βαλὼν ὀδύνησιν ἔδωκεν.
 χ 50. οὗτος γὰρ ἐπῆλεν τάδε ἔργα,
 οὐ τι γάμου τόσσον κεχρημένος οὐδὲ χατίζων
 ἀλλ' ἄλλα φρονέων.
 318. θυοσκόος οὐδὲν ἐοργῶς.
 ω. 401. ὦ φίλ', ἐπεὶ νόστησας ἐλδομένοισι μάλ' ἡμῖν
 οὐδ' ἔτ' οἰομένοισι.
 512. ὄψεαι αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα, πάτερ φίλε, τῶδ' ἐπὶ θυμῷ
 οὐ τι κατασχύνοντα τεὸν γένος.
 Th 213. οὐ τιμὴ κοιμηθεῖσα θεὰ τέκε Νύξ ἐρεβεννή.
 927. "Ἡρῇ δ' "Ηφαιστον κλυτὸν οὐ φιλότῃ μιγεῖσα
 γείνατο.
 S 50. διδυμάονε γείνατο παῖδε | οὐκέθ' ὅμα φρονέοντε.
 217. ἐν δ' ἦν ἠυκόμου Δανάης τέκος ἱππότα Περσεύς,
 οὐτ' ἄρ' ἐπιψαύων σάκεος ποσὶν οὐθ' ἐκὰς αὐτοῦ.
 W 444. ὃς ἔργου μελετῶν ἰθείαν κ' αὖλακ' ἐλαύνει
 μηκέτι παπταίνων μεθ' ὀμήλικας, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἔργῳ
 θυμὸν ἔχων.
 489. μηδ' ἀπολήγοι
 μήτ' ἄρ' ὑπερβάλλων βοὸς ὀπλήν μήτ' ἀπολείπων.
 591. εἴη . . .
 καὶ βοὸς ὕλοφάγοιο κρέας μῆπω τετοκυῖης.
 696-7. Ὀραιοὶ δὲ γυναῖκα τεὸν ποτὶ οἶκον ἄγεσθαι
 μήτε τριηκόντων ἐτέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπων
 μήτ' ἐπιθείς μάλα πολλά.
 823. αἶ δ' ἄλλαι μετὰδουποι, ἀκήριοι, οὐ τι φέρουσαι.

S 98. and W 730. have been omitted on account of the uncertainty of the text.

The question now arises as to whether any of these examples are due to the participle being felt as a substitute for the finite verb. This is the case with the adversative participles O 665 (?). X. 384. α 202. δ 264. λ 66 (?). ξ 145. ρ 567.

ω 401 ; and with the temporal participle O 325. An example with the causal participle is found H 185 and χ 50 might also be cited, but it is better to explain it as an extension of the use found P 221. Gallaway, p. 52, admits as an example of μῆ with the conditional participle :

N 48. Αἶαντε σφῶ μὲν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀλκῆς μνησαμένω μῆδὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο

the true explanation is given by Leaf σαώσετε is an imperative as is shown by the following μῆδέ. For the formation cf. Monro, § 41 Vogrinz, p. 123. With Gallaway's views as to the reason for the avoidance of μῆ with the conditional participle in Epic poetry, I cannot agree. Μῆ with the conditional participle is absent for exactly the same reason that οὐ with the causal participle, and οὐ with the temporal participle are extremely rare—because there is no opportunity to use them since the participle is not yet felt as a possible substitute for a subordinate finite verb.¹

The study of these examples has shown that the negative first came in contact with the participle, owing to displacement of the syntactical distribution (cf. Delbrück's remarks on Sanskrit *na*ciram and *mā*ciram, Vgl. Syntax, 2. 534). In this case it was of course the negative that would have been used with the main verb, and so it seems to me impossible to deny the influence of the leading verb on the choice of the negative of the participle—an explanation which is sufficient to account for all cases of μῆ with the participle in Epic poetry, cf. Dr. Gildersleeve A. J. P. xviii. 244. It is only when the participle has come to be felt as the substitute for a finite verb, that it can combine freely with the negatives οὐ and μῆ.² The negative chosen then is the negative which would be used with the verb that the participle represents, and so we see that there is no reason for divorcing the uses of μῆ with the participle from the other uses of that particle.

The examples cited above are the only instances of the negative and the participle found in about nine thousand in-

¹ Notice in this connection the way in which Homer avoids the use of οὐ with the infinitive by combining it with the leading verb—cf. Dr. Gildersleeve, A. J. P. XII. 520.

² Thus in Sanskrit the participle is usually negated by composition with the privative syllable, but when it is used as a substitute for a finite verb only *na* is employed—cf. Speyer, Grundr. d. indo-ar. Phil., p. 72.

stances of the participle, and the rarity of the construction is significant. Delbrück Vgl. Syntax 2. 531, says: "Im allgemeinen aber lässt sich für das Gotische ebenso wie für das Griechische und Lateinische festhalten dass die Zusammensetzung mit der privativen Silbe um so mehr zurücktritt, je mehr das Partizipium von dem Wesen des Verbum finitum annimmt was am meisten im Griechischen geschehen ist, wo das Partizipium so oft wie ein Verbum des Nebensatzes erscheint." The argument may be carried further, however, and we may see in the difference of use of the participle with the negative that exists between the Epic and the Attic dialects the clearest proof that the participle was not yet used in Epic as a substitute for a subordinate finite clause. The same argument is also applicable to the use of *ἄν* (*κέ*) with the participle which does not occur in Epic poetry.

SUPPLEMENTARY PARTICIPLE.

With certain classes of verbs the statement of the sentence is not complete without the addition of the subordinate idea that is expressed by the participle. In this case we speak of the supplementary participle—'das Partizip als Ergänzung eines Verbalbegriffs.' The supplementary participle is merely a particular case of the circumstantial participle and would not call for separate treatment if it were not for the fact that the logical union of the main and subordinate action has led to the fusion of verb and participle into a single complex, which is then liable to analogical extension. It is in this direction that the advance of the Attic over the Epic usage lies. Comparison will show, under every heading, that the list of verbs that take a supplementary participle is greater in Attic than in Epic. This may be due, no doubt, in part, to the wider range of vocabulary and literature, but, in part, it also represents a real syntactical advance on the part of the language.

There is one instance, however, of the working of analogy on a scale so much broader that it calls for more special mention. Verbs of actual perception take a participle in agreement with their object that does not differ essentially from a circumstantial participle. Afterwards this construction is transferred by analogy to verbs of intellectual perception.

Cf. Dr. Gildersleeve, A. J. P. xiv 374. "Intellectual perception may have the same construction as actual perception, but it is only in a figure, and it usually takes the separate object sentence ὅ, ὅτι, and the like." This opens the way for a similar use of the participle with verbs of knowing. Only the beginning of this extension is to be found in Epic poetry and it can be seen to gain ground during that period. The figurative use of the participle starts, as was to have been expected, with the sense in which the connection between the perception and the object perceived is least immediate, viz., the sense of hearing—cf. its different case regimen—and, although we see this construction increasing in frequency, it does not, during the Epic period extend to the sense of sight. The use of verbs of knowing with the participle, also becomes more frequent as we approach the end of the Epic period, but the number of verbs employed is smaller than it is in Attic and it remains entirely for the later language to develop the construction with verbs of showing, representing, and announcing—except for the isolated construction ἐρέουσα φίλον πόσιν ἔνδον ἔοντα. The absence of the nominative of the participle deserves to be emphasized as it tends to show that a construction like ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες is not to be explained as originating in a circumstantial participle agreeing with the subject of the sentence, but by some such proportion as λέγομεν αὐτοὺς ἀδυνάτους εἶναι: λέγομεν ἀδύνατοι εἶναι=ὁρῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀδυνάτους ὄντας: ὁρῶμεν ἀδύνατοι ὄντες.

The treatment of the Epic use of the supplementary participle, as given below, is based primarily on the Homeric usage, the examples from Hesiod being afterwards cited under each head. This method of arrangement was rendered necessary by the rarity of the construction in Hesiod's works, a fact which is probably due entirely to the nature of his subject matter.

VERBS OF PERCEPTION.

The best method of classification is, to subdivide according to the sense involved. Beginning with the sense of sight, we find after ὁράω and its compounds in Homer the following examples of the participle:

Present: A 56. 588. 600. Γ 154. 307. Δ 149. 151. 223-5.

232. 240. 276. 374. 467. E 166. 511. 515-6. 572. 599. Z 330. 459. H 308. Θ 279. 472. I 360. K 516. 521. Λ 83. 188. 203. M 209. 268. N 229. Ξ 14. 146. 158. O 7. 9. 44. 279. Π 279. 377. 661. 819. P 199. 330. 441. 681. 724. 756. Σ 227. 236. T 133. 152. 340. Τ 46. Φ 390. X 26. 168. Ψ 386. Ω 245. 367. 492. 702. γ 221. δ 556. θ 526. ι 147. κ 99. 427. λ 569. 577. 582. 593-4. ν 155. 400. ξ 383. π 108-110. 353. 357. 472. ρ 142. 329. σ 143-144. υ 233. 318-9. χ 148-9. ω 512.

Aorist: Δ 99. 354. E 28. Z 284. Λ 745. M 389. N 495. O 484. 489. Π 420. P 101. Σ 135. 190. Ψ 462. α 163. δ 421. λ 529-30. σ 269. 379. χ 22.

An interesting shift between these two tenses is found X 62 ff.

Perfect: E 244. P 329. T 283. X 26. δ 141. λ 583. χ 384. ψ [48]. 84.

Here belong also the examples of the participle after νοέω, which, when used of actual perceptions, generally refers to such as are received through the sense of sight. To emphasize this, it is coupled with the phrase ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, Ω 294. 312. It is, however, not simply = ὁράω, but is the broader word, as may be seen from its use for taking in a situation and from the fact that it is used after ἰδεῖν in sweeping negations. Frequently it connotes a certain amount of attention and interest as do our verbs "perceive," "observe," "notice." Finally, it passes over entirely to the intellectual side and is construed with an accusative of the inner or outer object which may then be expanded by an epexegetic infinitive or by an object clause with ὥς.

The examples with the participle are:

Present: B 391. Γ 22. E 96. 712. Z 470. H 18. Θ 10. Λ 521. 576. 582. Π 789. P 117. 683. Τ 420. Φ 563. X 464. α 58. 258. δ 653. ζ 163. η 40. 291. θ 271. κ 375-6. λ 573. π 6. ρ 301. τ 553. υ 368. ω 233.

Aorist: Γ 31. O 423. P 487. ν 319.

Perfect: Δ 201. M 143. 336. O 395. Ω 701.

To these must be added the examples after ἀθρέω present Ξ 334. aorist M 391; δοκέω present Θ 340; θηέομαι present β 13, = ρ 64; λεύσσω present ζ 157. κ 30.

The first difference to be noted between the Epic and the later usage is that the transfer from actual to intellectual perception with verbs of seeing has not yet been made. There are no such constructions among the examples cited above, as ὁρῶ δέ μ' ἔργον δεινὸν ἐξεργασμένην Soph. Tr 706, nor καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες κτέ. Thuc. 1. 32. The closest approach to intellectual perception is found:

Θ 10. δν δ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε θεῶν ἐθέλοντα νοήσω
ἐλθόντ' ἢ Τρώεσσιν ἀρηγέμεν ἢ Δαναοῖσι.

(cf. B 391. Δ 151. 223. 240. E 244. P 329. 441. ρ 142. ω 233.)

where the participle denotes a mental state, but one that manifests itself in external actions, which are the objects of physical vision. In υ. 368 ἐπεὶ νοέω χαλὸν ὄμμι | ἐρχόμενον we have not intellectual perception but prophetic vision cf. Classen, p. 148. Schmitt, p. 8.

Another matter for comment is the use of the tenses—the absence of intellectual perception excludes of course any possibility of the use of the future participle—but the occurrence of the aorist is at variance with the usage of Attic prose. Contrast Homer's 154 pres. 31 aor. 16 perfs. with the use of the Anabasis 67 pres. 1 aor. 12 perfs. (Joost, p. 307). Goodwin explains the difference between present and aorist in this construction by saying, § 884, "Here the participle approaches very nearly the ordinary objective infinitive in its use, and the tenses of the participle differ only as the same tenses of the infinitive differ in such constructions, the aorist not denoting past time."

This statement is true inasmuch as the difference between aorist and imperfect—however it may be formulated—is the same in all moods. The parallelism of the object infinitive will not, however, explain the most striking feature of this construction, the great preponderance of the present over the aorist—to appreciate this, contrast e. g., the verbs of actual hearing where the two tenses balance—and the almost complete disappearance of the aorist in Attic prose. The preponderance of the present is not to be explained by the necessary temporal coincidence of main and subordinate action and the connotation of prior action the part of the aorist. For in that case

we should expect a decrease in the use of the aorist, which is not found, as may be seen from the following table :

| | | | |
|---------|----------|---------|----------|
| Iliad | 95 pres. | 21 aor. | 10 perf. |
| Odyssey | 59 pres. | 10 aor. | 6 perf. |
| | — | — | — |
| | 154 | 31 | 16 |

The direct observation of an action forces it to be considered as progressive, and thus makes for the exclusion of the aorist, just as we shall see under the head of Verbs of Beginning and Ending that the same effect is produced by the interruption of an action. With other senses than the sense of sight the connection between subject and object is not so direct, and the action need not necessarily be considered as durative.

For the explanation of the aorist participles that are found it is significant that some of them will recur in adjectival uses. That is, they denote qualities of the object with which they agree, and if this is the case there is no more reason why they should not occur after verbs of seeing than there is for the non-occurrence of an adjective or perfect participle.

A study of the examples cited above will lead, I believe, to the conclusion that these aorist participles are much nearer to the perfect than to the present—that they are used to denote the resulting condition of the action—*i. e.*, as shorthand perfects. Thus O 484:

Ἐκτωρ δ' ὥς εἶδεν Τεύκρου βλαφθέντα βέλεμνα

is "when he saw Teucer's weapons broken," rather than "break." So *κτάμενον* in E 28 denotes the result *κτεινομένους* in *ν* 233 the process. Contrast also *δ* 653 and *ν* 319 *ἐπιβᾶσαν* is much nearer a perfect, such as *ἐμβεβαυῖαν* Th 12, than it is to a present, and the passages might be translated: "I saw Mentor going on board" and "I did not see you on board."

This view will be corroborated by the following facts. The aorist regularly assumes the function of the perfect when the latter is not formed. Now these 31 instances of the aorist come from 20 verbs: of these, two, *βλήμενον* and *κτάμενον*, though aoristic in form are notably near the perfect in meaning—cf. Classen, 103 ff. Five more, *ἀλευάμενον*, *γυμνωθέντα*, *ἐπισπόμενον*, *νοστήσαντα*, *ὠχρήσαντα*, form no perfects. The perfects of four others are post-Homeric, *κεχώρηκα* (Her.), *γεγενείακα* (Com. fr.),

εὐνημαι (Anth.), ὠμορρμένος (Arist.). Four more are excluded by the metre ἐπιβεβαυῖαν δεδημημένους εἰλκυσμένας amounting in all to fifteen out of the twenty verbs.

The later disappearance of the construction in prose was due on the one hand to the increasing number of the perfects and to emancipation from metrical laws, and on the other hand to the fact that such aorists would tend to be felt as cases of intellectual perception after that construction had been developed.¹

The verb εὐρίσκειν, to find, and ones of similar meaning are really verbs of actual perception, and as such most closely allied to verbs of sight. The examples of the participle after these verbs in Homer are as follows :

After εὐρίσχω : pres. A 330. 498. B 198. E 356. 753. 795. Z 321. I 186. K 34. 181. M 303. N 767. O 153. 240. Σ 4. 372. T 4. Ω 123. β 109. 300. δ 3. ε 151. η 137. κ 409. 452. λ 108. ξ 5. ο 5. ω 145. 227. 364; perf. B 170. Δ 90. 328. 366. Λ 198. M 121. N 460. ο 6. χ 402. ψ 46. After κίχημι, κίχάνω : pres. A 27. B 19. 258. Δ 386. Σ 268. γ 169. ζ 51. κ 61. ο 258. 260. perf. T 289. τ 400. After τέτμε pres. Δ 294. ε 58. After λαμβάνω pres. Δ 230. E 160. Λ 106. α 193. ι 418. After δῆω pres. η 50. ν 407. perf. N 261. After μάρπτω pres. Z 364. Ω 680.

These examples may be summarized in the following table :

| | | | |
|---------|----------|--------|---------|
| Iliad | 29 pres. | 0 aor. | 9 perf. |
| Odyssey | 23 “ | 0 “ | 3 “ |
| | — | — | — |
| | 52 | 0 | 13 |

The complete absence of the aorist is the most striking difference between these verbs and the verbs of sight. But as I can see no cause for such a difference of treatment, and as the perfect gains in this category what the aorist loses (52 : 13 being nearly the same as 154 : 47 (31 + 16)), I think we must look upon this as no argument against considering the aorist participles after verbs of sight as shorthand perfects.

¹ κίόντα has been disregarded so far on account of the ambiguity of the form. In x 574 it behaves as a present, and it seems most natural to consider it such in Δ 284. E 440. φ 286.

Passing now to the sense of hearing¹ we find three points of difference between it and the sense of sight. The case governed is the genitive, not the accusative; the figurative transfer to intellectual perception has begun; in actual perception there is no preponderance of the present over the aorist, *i. e.*, the tense of the participle is not bound by the complex of verb and participle, but varies like the tense of any circumstantial participle according to the "kind of time" of the subordinate action. Each of these three differences I would ascribe to the same cause, which may be stated in the words which Classen uses (p. 150) when speaking of the first: "Offenbar liegt diesem Unterscheide der Construction die Auffassung zu Grunde dass die sichtbare Erscheinung viel weniger von ihrem Gegenstande abzulösen ist als der von ihm ausgehende Ton oder das von ihm verbreitete Gerede."

In Homer, verbs of actual hearing are construed only with the genitive. The examples are:

After ἀκούω: pres. A 397. O 199. 506. Φ 476. β 423. θ 95. 534. κ 221. τ 419; aor. A 381. Z 281. K 276. Π 531. θ 564. ι 497. φ 211.

After ἰδω: pres. I 509; aor. A. 453. K 47. II 236. γ 337. δ 505.

After αἶω: pres. K 189. Λ 463.

After ξυνίημι: pres. δ 76.

These may be summed up as follows:

| | | |
|---------|-----------|---------------------|
| Iliad | pres. 7 | aor. 7 = 14 |
| Odyssey | 6 | 5 = 11 |
| | <u>13</u> | <u>12</u> <u>25</u> |

Since perception is not so immediate with the sense of hearing as it is with the sense of sight, the observation of the action—and hence its durative nature—is not brought out so plainly, and the action may be considered in itself. According as it is regarded as durative or complexive, the tense varies between present and aorist exactly as it does in the Circumstantial Participle. Compare with the examples cited above, *e. g.*,

υ 92. τῆς δ' ἄρα κλαιούσης ὅπα σύνθετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς
B 182. ὁ δὲ ξυνέηκε θεῶς ὅπα φωνησάσης.

¹Cf. Classen, pp. 163-164. Schmitt, p. 9. Merriam Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc., 1877, 4-5.

It is to be noted that the naturally durative actions—*ἐπρόνουντος ἀειδοῦσης στενάχοντος ἰάχοντος ἀγορεύοντος*—occur only in the present. The later predominance of the present is to be explained as due partly to the influence of verbs of sight, partly to the fact that the aorist would tend to pass over to intellectual perception.

These verbs of hearing may, however, become verbs of knowing or learning by hearsay, and still as verbs of intellectual perception retain the construction of actual perception—the participle instead of the object clause. In Homer we find the following examples of the participle: With *ἀκούω*: pres. H 129. Ω 490. α 289. β 220. λ 458. π 301. Aor. β 375. δ 728. 748. ρ 115. 493. Perf. α 289. β 220. With *πεύθομαι* pres. A 257. δ 732. Aor. N 522. P 379. 428. T 322. 337.

The construction spreads to verbs of knowing, and we find: With *οἶδα* pres. η 211. ψ 29. Aor. ω 405. Perf. A 124? P 402. ψ 110? *Γιγνώσκω* varies between actual and intellectual perception. As a verb of actual perception it is followed by the present participle, E 824. Ξ 155. P 86. σ 31.; as a verb of intellectual perception by the present participle, Δ 357. Z 191. δ 250. ε 444. λ 144. ο 532. ρ 549. 556. ω 159.

With regard to the case construction, it is to be noted that the later distinction (Goodwin, § 886) *ἀκούω* takes the genitive of actual, but the accusative of intellectual perception is not observed, the accusative occurring only once, H 129. In one example, Δ 357, *γινώσκω* takes the genitive probably under the influence of verbs of hearing cf. Schmitt, p. 8.

The distinction of tenses is determined by the temporal relations of the main and subordinate actions, the aorist connoting priority and the present by contrast action contemporary with the time of the leading verb. The growth of such a distinction may have been helped by the similar use of the tenses of the infinitive in *oratio obliqua*.

The construction, although still in a state of development that stops far short of the usage of Attic prose—cf. Krüger 56. 7. 1–4—shows in the *Odyssey* a marked advance over the *Iliad*, as may be seen from the following table:

| | <i>ἀκούω.</i> | <i>πεύθομαι.</i> | <i>οἶδα.</i> | <i>γινώσκω.</i> |
|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| <i>Iliad</i> | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 = 12 |
| <i>Odyssey</i> | 9 | 1 | 4 | 7 = 21 |

πεύθομαι is exceptional in its behavior, but it may be noted that two of the examples occur in T, one of the latest books of the Iliad.

The use of the participle with verbs of showing and representing, has not yet developed, and but a single isolated example is found after verbs of expression.

ψ 2. ἀνεβήσεται . . . δεσποίνῃ ἐρέουσα φίλον πόσιν ἔνδον ἐόντα.

Hesiod's use of the participle after verbs of perception seems to coincide with that of Homer, so nothing is required but to record the examples.

Under verbs of actual sight we find: *ὁράω* used with the present participle Th 82 and with the aorist participle S. 334. This aorist participle *γυμνωθέντα* is one of those employed by Homer. Interesting are S. 334 and 425. The former reads:

αὐτὸς δὲ βροτολοιγὸν Ἄρην ἐπιόντα δοκέουσας
ἔνθα κε γυμνωθέντα σάκευς ὕπο δαιδαλέοιο
ὀφθαλμοῖσι ἴδῃς ἔνθ' οὐτάμεν ὀξέει χαλκῷ.

where *ἐπιόντα* clearly depends on *δοκέουσας*, the passage, however, is evidently modelled on N 545. cf. II 313.

Ἀντίλοχος δὲ θώονα μεταστρεφθέντα δοκέουσας
οὔτασ' ἐπαΐζας,

where *μεταστρεφθέντα* is probably governed by *οὔτασε* and is so explained by La Roche.

The participle is also found after *εὐρίσκω* S 60-61; after *μάρπτω* S 253; after *λαμβάνω* Th 773. Verbs of hearing and verbs of intellectual perception are not found with the participle.

W 449. εἴτ' ἂν γεράνου φωνὴν ἐπακούσῃς
ὕψοθεν ἐκ νεφέων ἐνιαύσια κεκληγυῖης.

may, however, be compared with *υ* 92, etc., cited above.

ΛΑΝΘΑΝΩ ΤΥΓΧΑΝΩ ΦΘΑΝΩ.

The construction of *λανθάνω*, *τυγχάνω*, and *φθάνω* has been discussed by Dr. Gildersleeve A. J. P. xii. 76-77. "The typical construction," he says, "is identity of tense so far as continuance, attainment and completion is concerned." In Homer all the examples of *φθάνω*, *λανθάνω*, and *λήθω* conform exactly to this rule—apparent exceptions being explained on the principles laid down on p. 76.

The examples with $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ are I 507. K 368. Λ 51. 451. N 816 (as the aorist precedes there is no violation of the rule). Π 314. Ψ 444 (future clearly aoristic). λ 58. π 383. χ 92. ω 437.

With $\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ and $\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omega$ K 280. N 273. 560. 721. P 2. 89. T 113. X 191. Ψ 388. Ω 13. 332. 477. δ 527. θ 93=532. μ 221. ν 270. π 156 (here as after verbs of seeing $\kappa\iota\omega\nu$ behaves as at present participle) τ 88. 92. χ 198 (future durative). In P 676. μ 183. $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\theta\epsilon$ = $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$ $\eta\nu$ and consequently is accompanied by the present participle.

In μ 17. $\omicron\upsilon\delta'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ Κίρκην | $\acute{\epsilon}\xi'$ Ἀίδεω $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$

the participle is circumstantial, not supplementary, "nor did we remain unnoticed by K. after our return from H."

With these verbs the construction may be reversed. Thus $\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ H 144; $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ E 119. N 387. Φ 576. Ψ 779; $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ Ψ 515; $\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$. \omicron 171. τ 449; $\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ I 477. Λ 251. M 390. O 541. Ω 681. ρ 305; $\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omega\nu$ Ξ 296.

With $\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ the case is different. There is no reason theoretically why the tenses should coincide here as there is in the other verbs. Τυχών is not found in Homer except in the sense of "hitting." E 98. 582. 858. N 371. 397. Π 623. Ψ 726. \omicron 158. τ 452. So too $\tau\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ Δ 106. E 579. M 189. 394. ϕ 13. Once we have the reverse of this construction, O 581. $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\sigma\epsilon$ $\beta\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ and once $\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ in the sense "to succeed" is combined with the participle Ψ 466. $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\sigma\epsilon\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\iota}\xi\alpha\varsigma$. But the ordinary prose construction is found only ξ 334= τ 291. $\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\sigma\epsilon$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ $\nu\eta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ and there is no coincidence. All this tends to justify Dr. Gildersleeve's conclusion that "we have in the construction of $\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ a mere analogy to the typical constructions of $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$, to which verb $\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ has some affinity of sense."

Hesiod's usage does not differ from that of Homer. With $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ the construction does not occur. It is found with $\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ Th 471, with $\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omega$ W [492], both examples showing coincidence of tense. The reverse construction is seen W 52. $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\psi'$. . . $\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\Delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\iota\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\nu\nu\omicron\nu$ and W 554. $\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ $\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu\delta\epsilon$ $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ where $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ coincides with $\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$. W 570 $\tau\acute{\eta}\nu$ $\phi\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\omicron\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\alpha\mu\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu$ is exceptional, but allowances must be made as $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ is open to metrical objections.

The only instance of the participle with *τυγχάνω* is in a fragment of the *Κατάλογος*, No. 34 (Rzach).

δωδέκατος δὲ Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ
ξείνος ἔων ἐτύχησε παρ' ἱπποδάμοισι Γερήνοισι,

where there is no coincidence.

VERBS OF BEGINNING AND ENDING.

The supplementary participle is also used with verbs denoting the beginning or end of an action. The examples in Homer are: *ἄρχω* B 378. Γ 447; *λήγω* (*ἀπολήγω*) I 191. P 566. Φ 224. θ 87. τ 166; *παύω* Λ 506; *παύομαι* X 502. μ 400=426; *μεθίημι* O 717; *διανύω* ρ 517; *διαπρήσσω* ξ 197; *τελέω* M 222. Whether La Roche at A 168 is right in including here *μῖμνετ' ἐπειγόμενοι τὸν ἐμὸν γάμον* β 97. τ 142. ω 132 is doubtful. Ameis regards it as concessive. *Σπεύδω*, however, certainly does not belong here, *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ σπεύσε πονησάμενος τὰ ἄῃ ἔργα* ι 250. 310. 343. Its meaning is not the same as other verbs of this class, and the tense of the participle shows the difference—for the aorist cf G. M. T. § 150. La Roche also cites several examples in which the participle is not supplementary, but circumstantial, e. g., Δ 56. I 326. ο 294. At Ω 48 *ἀλλ' ἦ τοι κλαύσας καὶ ὀδυράμενος μεθέηκεν* he renders *μεθέηκεν* by “*hört auf*” comparing O 717. Here such an interpretation is inadmissible on account of the tense of the participle. An action that is interrupted must necessarily be regarded as progressive, and consequently with this class of verbs only the present participle is employed.¹ Of course, any of these verbs may be combined with a circumstantial participle and this participle may be in the aorist, e. g., θ 499. *ὁ δ' ὀρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, φαῖνε δ' αἰοδῆν*. This is the case in Ω 48 which means not “he ceases to weep and mourn for him,” but “he weeps and mourns for him and gives him up.” The same is true of W. 710. *εἰ δέ σέ ὃ γ' ἄρχει | ἦ τι ἔπος εἰπὼν ἀποθύμιον ἦε καὶ ἔρξας*, “but if he is the first [to do evil] to you either by saying, etc.,” and these are the only apparent exceptions.

In Hesiod the only example is W 178.

οὐδέ ποτ' ἤμαρ
παύσονται χαμάτων καὶ οἰζύους οὐδέ τι νύκτωρ
φθιέμενοι.

¹ This holds good also for Xenophon (Joost 305-306) and for Euripides, who has twenty-five instances of *παύειν* eight of *λήγειν*, all with present participles.

This construction is found also with verbs of the same general meaning as Ψ 603. Ἀντίλοχε νῦν μὲν τοι ἐγὼν ὑποείξομαι αὐτὸς | χωόμενος. N 687 σπουδῇ ἐπαΐσσοντα νεῶν ἔχον; Λ 801=Π 43.=Σ 202 ἀναπνεύσωσι δ' ἀρήιοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν | τειρόμενοι cf. Λ 327; K 201 ὅθεν αἰτίς ἀπετράπετ' ὄβριμος Ἐκτωρ | ὅλλυς Ἀργείους. This accounts for the tense of the participle in the last two examples. The principle extends also to cases like ἦλθες ἀλώμενος, ἔγρετο εὔδων; cf. Ameis-Hentze at ν 187, Anhang "so zeigt, sich, dass das Partic. actionis infectae (wie man das Partic. Praes. richtiger bezeichnen würde) trotz der Antecedenz der Handlung mit dem Aorist verbunden wurde, sobald mit diesem der Abschluss der vorhergehenden dauernden Handlung gegeben wurde.

Akin to these, and at the same time serving as a bridge to the Verbs of Emotion are κορέννυμαι and κάμνω. The examples of these verbs with the participle in Homer are: κορέννυμαι Λ 88. Σ 287. X 427. δ 541. κ 499. υ 59; κάμνω A 168. B 101. Δ 244. Z 262. H 6. 220. Θ 195. 449. Π 107. P 658. T 368. Φ 26. Ψ 64. Ω 613. φ 150. 426. In two cases, Δ 28, μ 233, the participle agrees with the logical subject in the dative. In all the examples cited the participle, it will be noted, is in the present, except the present perfect ἐελμένοι Σ 287. Hesiod offers no instance of this construction. Here may also be cited ἀνέχεσθαι E 895. δ 596. π 277. τλῆναι ν 311. τολμᾶν ω 163, all construed with the present participle. The aorist participle is rare anywhere, e. g. Xen. Cyr. 6. 2. 18. (neg.) cf. A. J. P. i. 242.

VERBS OF EMOTION.

In dealing with Verbs of Emotion the first case we have to consider is where the participle itself expresses a state of feeling that is subordinate to the main action of the sentence. This category would hardly call for separate treatment were it not for the fact that, as the participle expresses in the large majority of instances the feelings of the subject of the sentence, an extra linguistic inference of causality becomes particularly easy. Something over fifty examples are found in Hesiod and about the same number proportionally in the Iliad. I give a list of the examples from Hesiod, arranged alphabeti-

cally, under the different tenses of the participle. A study of the examples will show that there are but few in which we feel strongly tempted to infer the causal relation.

Present: nom. ἀγαλλόμενος Th 68. S 86; ἀγώμενος Th 619; ἀχεύων W 399; ἀχέων S 93; ἀγνόμενος Th 623. S 435; ἐλπόμενος S 66; ἰέμενος S 23. 196. 231, 304; ἰμείρων Th 177. S 31; κοτέων Th 315. S 176. [403]. 454; κυδιών S 27; λιλαιόμενος S 113; μενεαίνων S 361; τερπόμενος S 47; χαίρων Th 438. W 481; χολούμενος W 138; χωόμενος Th 533. 561; oblique cases ἀγαλλομένην Th 587; κοτεόντων θ' ἰέμενων τε S 169.

Aorist: ἀαχών Th 868; γηθήσας S 116; ὑποδδείςας S 98 (text doubtful); θαρσήςας Th 168; θυμήνας S 262; ὀχθήσας Th 558; χολωσάμενος W 47. 53; χωσάμενος S 12.

Perfect: ἀαχημένος Th 99; δειδώς S 248; μεμαώς S 240. 414. 453; τετιημένος Th 163.

The second case is where the verb of emotion—using this term to include actions such as “to weep” and “to laugh,” that are expressions of the feelings—is itself the main verb of the sentence. In this case the participle tends to pass from a designation of accompanying circumstances, through the causal relation, into a still closer union with the main verb. The examples from Hesiod are: Th 159. 680. S 65. 115. W 24. 58. 205. 312. Notice especially:

W 55. χαίρεις πῦρ κλέψας καὶ ἐμὰς φρένας ἠπεροπέυσας
476. καὶ σε ἔολπα
γηθήσειν, βιότου αἰρεύμενον ἔνδον ἐόντος.

From the Iliad it seems necessary to cite only examples like those just quoted of the closer union of main verb and participle, to which I will add examples taken from Classen and Schmitt of the verbs that with this construction occur first in the Odyssey.

The nominative of the participle is found with γηθέω A 330. Δ 255. 283. 311. H 127. 214. Θ 278. K 190. N 344. Ω 320.; χαίρω Γ 23. 28. 76. 112. [Λ 73]. Σ 259. Ω 490; τέρπομαι A 474. B 774. Δ 9. E 761. I 336. Λ 643. T 18. 19. Υ 23. Ψ 298. Ω 633. 636. ἀσχαλάω Ω 403. ὄθομαι E 403. The Odyssey adds also instances of ἤδομαι ι 353; ἰαίνομαι τ 537.

Instances of the dative are found after χαίρω E 682. Ω 705;

γάνυμαι Ξ 504 ; νεμεσάω Δ 414. ἀνιάομαι also occurs in the Odyssey ο 335. The genitive occurs more frequently : Τ 75, οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν . . . μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλείωνος may be explained as genitive absolute, but we have the genitive after χολοῦμαι Δ 494. Ν 207. 660. Σ 337. Φ 146. Ψ 23. ἀλεγίζω Α 181. Θ 478 ; ἀλέγω Θ 483 ; κήδομαι Θ 353 ἀκηδέω Ψ 70. cf. μεθήμι Α 841 ; ἀμελέω Θ 330. Ρ 10 ; ἀχαρίζω Π 16 ; ὀλοφύρομαι Θ 202. ἀσχαλάω with genitive of the part occurs first. τ 159.

In addition to these the genitive is found with a number of phrases of similar meaning. μέγα πένθος (ἔστιν) Δ 417 ; πένθος ὀφθαλμοῦς ἐκάλυψε Α 250 ; πένθος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ . . . εἶη Σ 89 ; ἄχος γένετο Μ 392. Ν 417. Ξ 458. 486. Π 581 ; ἐντρέπεται φίλον ἦτορ Ο 554.

The accusative is found after γηθήω Θ 378 δεῖδια Ν 482 ; ἐλέεω Ε 561. 610. Ρ 346. 352 ; ἐλαίρω Η 27. Ι 302. Ν 16 ; ἄχθομαι Ν 353 ; ὀλοφύρομαι Θ 245. Ρ 648. Cf. Krüger, 56. 6. 4.

ADJECTIVAL USES OF THE PARTICIPLE.

After finishing the investigation of the uses of the participle in which the verbal side of its nature is more prominent, there remain for consideration the cases in which it stands in closer relation to the noun. A thing may be characterized not only by qualities that are fixed and inherent in it, but also by the actions that it performs or by the effects of actions that have been performed upon it. The form of expression for attributing such qualities to the noun is the participle. In this way the participle comes to be used as an adjective in Direct Attribution, but with this difference, that the participle always retains more or less of the action—of the mobility of the verb. According to the degree of this mobility the participle varies all the way from a stereotyped epitheton ornans that has almost hardened into an adjective pure and simple to the expression of an action by which the noun has been, will be, was, or is affected—a relation that our language is often forced to express inadequately by a relative clause. The advantages of the participle in this use over an adjective are its capacity for expressing the relations of tense and voice and for forming by its power of verbal regimen complexes that could be expressed by adjective-attribution only in compounds

—cf. χρυσέοισι πεδίλοις ἐμβεβαΐαν with χρυσοπέδιλος—such as would frequently become more cumbersome than the Greek language would tolerate. (Cf. Gildersleeve A. J. P. ix. 139. n. 3.) When used as an adjective the participle was liable to be treated as one—to be substantivized either with or without the article, and even to be degraded so low that the need was felt for a copula to connect it with its substantive.

The limited use of the article in Epic poetry renders it sometimes doubtful whether a participle should be classed as Attributive or Circumstantial. However, the following list of participles in Direct Attribution in Hesiod aims at completeness :

Nominative: ἀνάσσω Th [850]. S 328; ἀποπνέουσα Th [324] ἀπουράμενοι S 173; ἀραβεῦσαι S 249; ἀρηρώς Th 812. S 271; δεδορκώς S 145; βριθόμενος S 300 (rejecting 299); εἰρημένος W [370]; ἐόντες Th 851. S 73 ἐχγεγαυῖα Th. 76. W. 256; ἐρχόμενοι Th 272; ἔχων Th 75. 98. 456. 670 [908]. S 188. 227; εἰδώς Th 264. 545. 550. 561. W [187]. 731. θαλφθεῖς Th 864; θύων Th 109; ἰδών W 267. ἰεῖσαι Th 830; κεκαλυμμένη [Th 757]; καταπεπτηυῖα S 265; λαμπετόντα Th 101; λελιχότες Th 826; μαρμαίρουσα Th 699; μεδέουσα Th 54; ναίων W 18; νοήσας W 267; παθοῦσα Th 276; πνείοντες S 24; βέοντες Th 367; σειόμενος S 298; τετελεσμένον W 799; φέροντα Th 216; χατίζων W 21.

Oblique cases: ἀεναόντων¹ W 550; ἀέντων Th 869. W 625; ἀεζομένοιο W 773; αἰθομένοιο Th 324. 867. S 60. 275. W 755; ἀαχμένον S 135; ἀλιτήμενον S 91; ἀρηρυῖαν Th 608. S 137; βριθομένων S [290]. 295; γηράσκοντας W 185; γηράντεσσι W [188]; δερκομένων S 169; ἐμβεβαυῖαν Th 12; ἐοικός Th 295. 584. W 235; ἐόντων Th 21. 33. 105. 801. W. 718; ἐσσομένοισι W 56; ἐυκτίμενον¹ S 81; ἔχοντος Th 61. 114. 139. [186] 239. 833. 896. 898. W [438]; θάλλοντα Th 902. τεθαλυῖαν W 173. θεόντων S 146; θῶον Th 131. εἰδώς Th 559. W 54. ἰδυῖαν Th 313. 887. ἰεμένων S 169; ἰούσης W 720; ἰσταμένοιο W 780; καταφθιμένοισι Th 850; κεκασμένον Th 929. κερκισμένην S 55. κλείουσαι W [1]; κτεόντων S 169; κταμένοιο S [402]. W 541; κυανόντων S 7; κυμαίνοντος W 390; λαμπετόντι Th 382. S [390]; λαμπομένους Th 186. S 145; μεμηλότα W 231; οὐλομένης¹ Th 225. 593. W 717; πεπυχασμένῳ Th 484; πνέουσαν

¹ Although these words cannot strictly be called participles they have been included as producing a participial effect.

Th 319; προπεφραδμένα W 655; προρεόντων W 757; σβεννυμενάων W 590; τεθνηῶτα S 158; τετελεσμένον Th 795. W 561; τετοκυίης W 591; φλεγέθοντος Th 846; φρονέοντα Th 987. S 50. ἰκεχρημένον W 317. 500.

Very thoroughly adjectivized is the participle ἄρμενος and its compound ἐπάρμενος. It presents the peculiarity of being used proleptically. Examples are: S. 84. W. 407. 542. 601. 627. 632.

In Attic prose—cf. W. J. Alexander, Participial Phrases in Attic Poetry, A. J. P. iv. 291 ff.—most of the examples of the present participle in direct predication are limited to participles that are thoroughly adjectivized or to such as readily lend themselves to being conceived as qualities. In Hesiod also the adjectival function is clear and the construction is frequently eased by a preceding adjective. Many of the examples are complexes that could be expressed in adjectival form only by clumsy compounds. The examples of the present are: Th. 823. S. 134. [143]. 183. 304. W. 823. Of the aorist no examples are found except of ἄρμενος, which has completely become an adjective—cf. W. 424. [617]. 786. 808. The perfect, especially the middle passive, as expressing the result of an action, is particularly well qualified to enter into such periphrastic uses. The examples are: Th. 415. W. 478. 616. 641. 683. 793. 799.

The following examples of the participle and article are found in Hesiod:

Nominative: W 732. ὁ γὰρ πρὸς τοῖχον πελάσας; W 364. τό γ' ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενον.

Oblique Cases: Th 32. τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα; Th. 38. τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα; W 266. τῷ βουλευσάντι; Th 973. τῷ δὲ τυχόντι; W 353. τὸν φιλέοντα . . . τῷ προσίοντι; 342. τὸν φιλέοντα.

But as the articular use of the stem *το-* was not fully developed in Hesiod's time we have instances of the participle standing alone where we speak of the ellipsis of the article or of some noun with which the participle agrees, although often no such definite ellipsis is felt. There are two examples (Th 32. 38. *πρό τ' ἐόντα* quoted above) which can hardly count as participles with the article precede. Ellipses with the femi-

nine are W 462. θέρεος δὲ νεωμένη οὐ σ' ἀπατήσει; W 720. πλείστη δὲ χάρις [γλώσσης] κατὰ μέτρον ἰούσης; S 206. μελπομένησιν εἰκνύαι. With this last are to be compared the instances in which ἀνὴρ, the poetical article, (cf. Dr. Gildersleeve as quoted by Gallaway, p. 63), is to be thought of: Th 92. μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισι; S 215. ἀπορρίβοντι εἰκώς; W 5. βριάοντα χαλέπτει; Th 770. ἐς μὲν ἰόντας | σαίνει; W 295. δς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται; S 251. περὶ πιπτόντων; S 228. σπεύδοντι καὶ ἐρρίγοντι εἰκώς; W 309. καὶ ἐργαζόμενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισι, if 310. be rejected on account of the external evidence against it; W 412. οὐ γὰρ ἐτωσιοεργὸς ἀνὴρ πῖμπλησι καλιῆν | οὐδ' ἀναβαλλόμενος. The neighborhood of ἀνὴρ in the last example lets it serve as a transition to those in which the omitted idea is to be gathered from the context. S 209. λιμήν . . . κλυζομένφ ἕκελος; S 211. δελφῖνες νηχομένοις ἕκελοι; S 314. Ὀκεανὸς πλήθοντι εἰκώς. The phrase Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες occurs five times without θεοί Th 783. 963. W 81. 110. 128. and the list of masculine ellipses is completed by that of μνῆος. W 798. φθίνοντός θ' ἰσταμένου τε and Ἡέλιον. W 728. ἐς τ' ἀνιόντα. Examples of the neuter are W 366-7 παρεόντος ἐλέσθαι . . . χρητίζεν ἀπεόντος; S 116. ἄρμενα εἶπεν; W 363. ἐπ' ἔοντι; Th 834. εἰκότα (φθέγγετο); W 731. πεπνυμένα εἰδώς. In one case the idea to be thought of is indicated by a partitive genitive:

Th 584. τῶν ὃ γε πόλλ' ἐνέθηκε (χάρις δ' ἀπελάμπετο πολλή)
 θανμάσια, ζώουσιν εἰκότα φωνήσσειν.

Examples of the participle in direct attribution and direct predication are so frequent in the Iliad that it seems unnecessary to cite them, and I will confine myself to the treatment of the participle with and without the article.

Of the participle with the article the following examples are found in the Iliad. Nominative: I 320. ὃ τ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ ὃ τε πολλὰ ἐοργῶς; Ω 687. παῖδες τοῖ μετόπισθε λελειμμένοι; Ψ 663. ὁ νικηθεῖς. Oblique cases: Φ 262. τὸν ἄγοντα; A 70 τὰ τ' ἔοντα τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα; Ψ 325 τὸν προύχοντα; Γ 138. 255. Ψ 702. τῷ νικήσαντι; Ψ 656. τῇ νικηθέντι—cf. Ψ 704. ἀνδρὶ νικηθέντι.

Of the participle used alone as a substantive—so-called ellipses—we have the following examples: B 10. Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες=B 13. 67. E 383. O 115. Ψ 430. ὥς οὐκ αἰοῦντι εἰκώς; Ξ 63. οὐ γὰρ πως βεβλημένον ἔστι μάχεσθαι; B 119.

καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι cf. Γ 287. 460. Z 358. X 305; M 374. ἐπειγομένοισι δ' ἴκοντο; Π 457. τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων=675. Ψ 9. cf. X 389; Ψ 72. ψυχὰς εἶδωλα καμώντων; Σ 309. κτανέοντα κατέκτα; Ν 262. τὰ κταμένων ἀποαίνυμαι; Τ 494. κτεινομένους ἐφέπων; Ε 903. περιτρέφεται κυκώοντι; Ι 318. ἴση μοῖρα μένουσι; Τ 79. ἐστεῶτος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούμεν; Χ 199. φεύγοντα διώκειν; Ε 532. φεγγόντων δ' οὔτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται=Ο 564; Ζ 389. μαινομένην εἰκυῖα; Ο 90. ἀτυζομένην δὲ ἔοικας; Σ 548. ἀρηρομένην δὲ ἐρέκειν; Π 182. μετὰ μελπομένησιν; Α 70. πρό τ' ἐόντα; Ρ 32. ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω=Τ 198; Ι 58. πεπνυμένα βάξεις; Ω 661. κεχαρισμένα θεῖης.

Add to these the instances of the vocative Α 225. κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων; Ο 128. μαινόμενε; Ξ 184. οὐλόμενε; Α 149. ὦ μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε.

The participle then had given up by the time of Homer enough of its verbal nature to allow it to be separated from the declaration of the sentence and spend its force on a single noun. This can be seen most clearly when the participle is used in the vocative that is outside of the construction of the sentence, as: *κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί* Β. 323; *καὶ σὺ κακοῖσι δόλοισι κεκασμένη* Δ 339; *Ἀντίλοχε πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε* Ψ 570, etc. So as there was no room for further development on this line the comparison of the use of Hesiod with that of Homer becomes a stylistic question of the individual freedom with which they employed this construction.

Beginning with the consideration of bulk, we find in the Iliad about 420 participles in direct attribution. Classen, p. 52, places the number at about 360, and on the following page calls attention to the impossibility of drawing a hard and fast line, between attributive and predicative participles which is the cause of the difference in our estimates. These examples are divided among the tenses as follows: present, 202; perfect, 169; aorist, 51. Similarly in Hesiod we find about 63 presents, 33 perfects, 14 aorists, and 1 future, making a total of about 110 examples. This instance of the future in Hesiod is without special significance, as the participle *ἐσσόμενος* is completely adjectivized—cf. Dr. Gildersleeve, Pindar cxi note—and is used by Homer as a substantive both with and without the article, while the noun with which it agrees in Hesiod, *ἀνήρ*, is hardly more than a poetical equivalent of the article.

The present and the perfect predominate in both authors and in about the same proportion. The reason for the predominance of these tenses is that lasting actions are the ones that lend themselves most readily to attribution, and these are to be found either in the continued action of the present or in the perfect as denoting attitude and resulting condition. The aorist is employed only when there is an action that stamps on the noun certain lasting qualities, so that when we know the action we may infer the condition that results from it. Thus, ἀνὴρ θανάων is one that has crossed the boundary between life and death; Τρῶες ἀγρόμενοι are Trojans that have entered the assembly.—cf. Classen, p. 57, ff.

But while the relations of the tenses to one another remain practically within the same proportion, there is a considerable difference between the relative frequency of the construction in the two authors.

The bulk of the Iliad is, roughly speaking, about seven times as large as that of Hesiod, but the attributive participles are less than four times as numerous. This shows that the construction is nearly twice as frequent in Hesiod as in the Iliad. Besides this the examples in Hesiod exhibit much greater variety, since one verb furnishes on an average two examples in Hesiod as against four in the Iliad. There is danger, however, of being misled by this calculation, as allowance must be made for the large amount of repetition in Homer.—cf. A. J. P. vi. p. 399.

In this construction, moreover, Hesiod is not a close imitator of Homer's phraseology, as at least half of the verbs employed by him as attributive participles are not similarly employed by Homer.

Tracing more closely the resemblances and differences of the authors we find that a large number of the examples in each consist of what are apparently mere stock epithets, e. g., *πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο*, *θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔόντες χαμαὶ ἐρχόμενοι τ' ἄνθρωποι*, *θεοὶ Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες*, *θεοὶ βεῖα ζῶντες*, etc. Of these Homer shows a list of nearly fifty phrases, with about two hundred and eighty examples. Twelve of these are taken up by Hesiod, furnishing twenty-two examples, as follows: *πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο* Z 182. Th 324. 867. S 60; *θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔόντες* A 290, etc. Th 21. 33.

105. 801. W 718; *Κρόνον ἀμφὶς ἔόντες* O 225. Th 851; *χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ' ἀνθρώπων* E 442. Th 272; *Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι* β 484, etc. Th 75. 114; *πόντον κυμαίνοντα* Ξ 229. W 390; *πυρὶ λαμπετόντι* A 104. cf. Th 110. 382. S [390]; *κορύθων ἀπὸ λαμπομένων* N 341, etc. Th 186; *αἰθέρι ναίων* B 412, etc. W 18; with *μένεα πνεύοντες Ἀχαιοί* cf. S 24 *ὕπὲρ σακῶν πνεύοντες*; with *πυρὶ φλεγέθοντι* Φ 358 cf. *κεραυνοῦ τε φλεγέθοντος* Th. 846; *ἔγχος ἀαχμένυν*. S 135. Similar epithets, occurring in Hesiod but not in the Iliad, are: *χορωνιόωντα πέτῃλα* S 289; *Εἰρήνην τεθαλυῖαν* Th 902; *τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐναυτόν* Th 795. W 561. Of these *χορωνιόωντα* is post-Homeric; *τετελεσμένον* is used by Homer only in direct predication; *τεθαλυῖα* occurs in the Iliad I 208, but more frequently in the Odyssey, and we may best compare: λ 192 *αὐτὰρ ἐπὶν ἔλθῃσι θέρως τεθαλυῖά τ' ὀπώρη*. As was to have been expected the connection with Homer is closest in the Theogony and least in the Works and Days; but two examples coming from the last work, four from the Shield, and the remaining sixteen from the Theogony.

Other instances of parallelism between the phraseology of Hesiod and Homer are: Th 850 *Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσων*, O 188 *Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισι ἀνάσσων*; Th 324. *δεινὸν ἀποπνεύουσα πυρὸς μνῆος αἰθομένοιο* = Z 182; Th 812 *ρίζῃσιν διηνεκέσσιν ἀρηρώς*, M 134. *ρίζῃσιν μεγάλῃσιν διηνεκέσιν ἀραρυῖται*; W 256. Th 76. *Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖαι* cf. Γ 189. 418. δ 184. 219. ζ 229. ψ 218; Th 545. 550. 561. *Ζεὺς ἀφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς* = Ω 88. Th 109 *καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος οἶδματι θύων* cf. Th 131. and the circumstantial participles Φ 234. Ψ 250; Th 264. *ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖται*, cf. I 128. 270. T 245. Ψ 263. ω 278. More frequent in the Odyssey is *ἀγλαὰ ἔργα* or *κεδνὰ ἰδυῖται*; Th 869. W 625. *ἀνέμων μένος ὕγρον ἀέντων*, τ 440; S 145. *ἔμπαλιν ὄσσοισιν πυρὶ λαμπομένοισι δεδορκώς* cf. τ 446. *πῦρ ὀφθαλμοῖσι δεδορκώς*; Th 830. *φωναὶ . . . παντοίην ὄπ' εἴσαι ἀθέσφατον*. cf. μ 192. *ὥς φάσαν εἴσαι ὄπα κάλλιμον*; Th 757. *Νῦξ δλόη νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένη ἡεροιδεῖ*, θ 562. λ 15; S 275. *αἰθομένων δαΐδων* cf. α 428. 434. η 101; W 752. *ἱεροῖσιν ἐπ' αἰθομένοισι* cf. Λ 775. μ 362; S 137. *κυνέην . . . ἐπὶ χροτάφοις ἀραρυῖαν* σ 378. χ 102. The phrase occurs without *ἐπὶ* N 188. Σ 611; Th 239. 833. cf. 61. *θυμὸν ἔχων*, cf. E 670. P 720; W 780. *Μηνὸς δ' ἱσταμένοιο τρισκαιδεκάτην ἀλῆασθαι* cf. ξ 162. *τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνὸς τοῦ δ' ἱσταμένοιο*, but the verse is bracketed by Ameis-Hentze; Th 850. *ἐνέροισι καταφθιμένοισιν*. λ

401. *νεκρέςσιν καταφθιμένοισι*; W 757. *ποταμῶν ἄλαθε προρεόντων* = E 598. W 317. 500. *Αἰδῶς* (**Ελπις*) δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ *ξεχρημένον* ἄνδρα *χομίζει*, ζ 347. *αἰδῶς* δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ *ξεχρημένον* ἄνδρϊ *παρεῖναι*.

But even after deducting these sufficient examples remain to show Hesiod's independence. His freedom seems to lead him in the direction of complex phrases equivalent to compound adjectives, as is shown by the fact that active transitive verbs are proportionally much more frequent in Hesiod than in the Iliad. Some of these phrases strike us as homely or quaint, and thus fall into line with Jebb's remarks on Hesiod's style, cf. *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry*, p. 91.

The participle in this construction is an adjective with greater wealth of meaning, so that a large use of it would be an evidence of richness of vocabulary and of the imagination necessary to produce poetic compounds. But when carried to excess it overburdens the author's style, and this seems to be the case in both the Theogony and the Shield, where the proportion is about twice as great as in the Works and Days.

Of the participle used as a substantive without the article forty-one examples are cited above from the Iliad. The ellipses are extremely simple, being always *ἀνήρ*—which largely predominates—*γυνή*, or *χρήμα*, except for one instance of *γῆ* Σ 548, the phrase *῾Θλόμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες* and the vocatives. All the tenses are represented—the future not only by *ἐσσόμενος* but also Σ 309. *καί τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα*. No instance of the nominative occurs except *῾Θλόμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες*. Hesiod's 29 examples show a great advance in frequency of use. The future is represented by S 215. *ἀπορριψοντι ξοικῶς*, which may be compared with Σ 309. The masculine still predominates and the chief ellipses are still those of *ἀνήρ*, *γυνή* or *χρήμα*, but we find, besides *γῆ* W 462. and *θεός* as in Homer, still more striking examples of S 209. 211. 314. W 720. 798. and one case in which the omitted idea is suggested by a partitive genitive Th 854. The nominative is used W 309. 412. 462. It will be noticed that the examples that show an advance over the Iliad come chiefly from the Shield and the Works and Days.

When it comes to the question of the combination of this

substantivized participle with the article Hesiod shows a still greater advance not only in quantity—Iliad 9, Hesiod 10—but also in usage, cf. *Monro* §264. Notice in Hesiod especially:

W 364. οὐδὲ τό γ' ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενον ἀνέρα χήδει.

W 353. τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν καὶ τῷ προσιόντι προσίμεν.

From the *Theogony* might be cited 973, but the text is doubtful.

In the use of the participle as a predicate after copulative verbs Hesiod again shows an increase in quantity (*Iliad* 31, *Hesiod* 16), and what is more significant an increase in the number of tenses employed. In the *Iliad* only perfect participles, generally passive, are found; in Hesiod there are six instances of the present, only one of them from the *Theogony*, and three of the aorist ἄρμενος, all from the *Works and Days*. Other verbs than εἰμί employed as a copula are πέλομαι W. 808. Ψ 67 and γίγνομαι X 219.

CONCLUSION.

The main purpose of this thesis was the consideration of the syntactical differences between the Epic and the Attic use of the participle. The most important of these is the development after the Epic period of the participle as a "shorthand" equivalent for a finite subordinate clause, a result of which is that the use of the negatives οὐ and μή with the participle also remains undeveloped in Epic poetry. Conspicuous besides this are the extensions in Attic of the use of the future participle, of the genitive absolute, of the supplementary participle, and of such uses of the adjectival participle as were rendered possible by the development of the article.

Syntax and style, however, are so closely united that some mention must be made of the stylistic effect of the participle in Hesiod. The general principles for the treatment of this question are to be found in *Dr. Gildersleeve's* article, *On the Stylistic Effect of the Greek Participle*, *A. J. P.* ix. 137 ff. In spite of the fact that the number of occurrences of the participle per 100 lines is even a rougher way of estimating its effect than the proportionate number of occurrences of finite verb and participle, I will give such a table for the *Iliad* and for Hesiod:

| | No. of lines. | | | No. of part. | | | Part. per 100 lines. | | |
|-------|---------------|---------|--------|--------------|---------|--------|----------------------|---------|-------|
| | narr. | speech. | total. | narr. | speech. | total. | narr. | speech. | total |
| A | 238 | 373 | 611 | 96 | 90 | 186 | 40.3 | 24.1 | 30.4 |
| B | 599 | 278 | 877 | 129 | 69 | 198 | 21.5 | 24.8 | 22.5 |
| Γ | 218 | 243 | 461 | 78 | 52 | 130 | 35.7 | 21.3 | 28.1 |
| Δ | 302 | 242 | 544 | 133 | 54 | 187 | 44. + | 22.3 | 34.3 |
| E | 575 | 334 | 909 | 214 | 84 | 298 | 37.2 | 25.1 | 32.7 |
| Z | 207 | 322 | 529 | 83 | 75 | 158 | 40. + | 23.8 | 29.8 |
| H | 239 | 243 | 482 | 92 | 41 | 133 | 38.4 | 16.8 | 27.6 |
| Θ | 297 | 263 | 565 | 105 | 64 | 169 | 35.3 | 23.8 | 29.9 |
| I | 126 | 587 | 713 | 45 | 139 | 184 | 35.7 | 23.6 | 25.8 |
| K | 287 | 292 | 579 | 105 | 64 | 169 | 36.5 | 21.9 | 29.1 |
| Λ | 547 | 301 | 848 | 214 | 95 | 309 | 39.1 | 31.5 | 36.4 |
| M | 349 | 122 | 471 | 137 | 25 | 162 | 39.2 | 20.4 | 34.3 |
| N | 583 | 254 | 837 | 242 | 58 | 300 | 41.5 | 22.8 | 35.8 |
| Ξ | 274 | 248 | 522 | 103 | 58 | 161 | 37.2 | 23.3 | 30.8 |
| O | 454 | 292 | 746 | 182 | 80 | 262 | 40.0 | 27.3 | 35.1 |
| Π | 615 | 252 | 867 | 229 | 64 | 293 | 37.2 | 25.4 | 33.7 |
| P | 493 | 268 | 761 | 213 | 56 | 269 | 43.2 | 20.8 | 35.3 |
| Σ | 351 | 266 | 617 | 126 | 84 | 210 | 35.9 | 31.5 | 34. + |
| T | 152 | 272 | 424 | 65 | 71 | 136 | 42.7 | 26.1 | 32.3 |
| Τ | 274 | 229 | 503 | 105 | 48 | 153 | 38.3 | 20.8 | 30.4 |
| Φ | 342 | 269 | 611 | 153 | 63 | 216 | 44.7 | 23.4 | 35.3 |
| X | 229 | 286 | 515 | 106 | 88 | 194 | 46.2 | 30.7 | 37.6 |
| Ψ | 544 | 353 | 897 | 197 | 90 | 287 | 36.2 | 25.4 | 31.9 |
| Ω | 350 | 454 | 804 | 134 | 107 | 241 | 38.2 | 23.5 | 29.9 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | | | |
| | 8645 | 7048 | 15693 | 3286 | 1719 | 5005 | 37.3 | 24.3 | 31.8 |
| Th | 988 | 34 | 1022 | | | 275 | | | 26.9 |
| S | 407 | 73 | 480 | 171 | 25 | 196 | 42. + | 34.2 | 40.8 |
| W | 818 | 10 | 828 | | | 279 | | | 33.6 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2213 | 117 | 2330 | | | 750 | | | 32.1 |

The figures show to what an extent the narrative is the home of the participle and serve to point out some other facts of interest, notably, the wide divergence of the different works assigned to Hesiod; the araiometochic nature of the Theogony, which is shared by the second book of the Iliad,

owing to the common nature of their subject-matter, a cause which also makes itself felt in Π ; the lower level of the participle in the narrative of Θ-K, and the manner in which its proportion rises in the narrative of the battles, reaching its maximum in the *Ἐκτορος ἀναίρεσις* and dropping again in the two concluding books. But bulk alone will not give an adequate idea of the situation, for the stylistic effect of the participle is not the same in all constructions. The consideration of the details of this would lead too far, but the great difference between the stylistic effect of the participle in Homer and in Hesiod is to be found in Hesiod's rare employment of the supplementary participle and the excessive use that he makes of the adjectival participle. The latter is especially the case in the *Theogony* and constitutes one of the most characteristic features of its style.

GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Le Socialisme aux Etats Unis, par Rev. W. J. Kerby, Licencié en Théologie, Docteur en Sciences politiques et sociales, Professeur agrégé de Sociologie à l'Université Catholique de Washington. 1 vol. in 8°, pp. 244. Bruxelles Goemaere, Imprimeur du Roi. 1897.

This work, which was written by the author in the School of Political and Social Sciences of the Louvain University, is not dogmatic nor polemical. It is an impartial exposition of facts and doctrines based directly on original sources. It is divided into five parts. The first, which treats of socialist organizations, embraces three chapters: one on International Socialism (Socialist Labor Party, Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance, Social Democratic Federation); a second on National or American Socialism (Nationalism, Brotherhood of the Coöperative Commonwealth, Socialist Colonies); a third on Socialism of English origin (Christian Socialism, Fabianism). The doctrines, organization, tactics, impact and force of each are described logically and clearly. The second part treats of socialism as found in organizations not professedly socialistic, there being two chapters, one on Trades Unions and one on the Populist Party. The third part is devoted to Henry George and Single Tax, containing two chapters, one on the doctrine and one on the history of the movement. The fourth part discusses social conditions briefly in two chapters, one general and one on the presidential elections of 1896. The last part contains a short discussion of socialism and social reform.

At the beginning of each chapter and of each section in particular, a foot-note contains indications of sources, acts of congresses, official reviews and journals, etc. Every important statement in the text is corroborated by a reference. Readers of the work will admire the abundance of documents brought to light by Dr. Kerby, and his judicious use of them within the limits of an academic dissertation, omitting nothing essential, including nothing not of value. The fact that the book is in French prevents it from being accessible to a large number of American readers, but it is to be hoped that the author

will soon enlarge and publish the work in an English dress. However, as it stands, the work is necessary for anyone who wishes to have an exact knowledge of the actual condition of socialism in this country, rather than vague inexact ideas on it. Though the sources are fully indicated throughout the book, it might have been an advantage had they all been arranged in one classified list.

On this occasion we cannot refrain from paying a tribute to the School of Political and Social Sciences of the Louvain University and to its eminent founder, Professor Von den Heuval. Since 1894, eight dissertations of solid value have, together with the severe examinations undergone, merited for their authors the Doctorate in Political and Social Sciences. Aside from Dr. Kerby's work, the others are: Legrand, *L'Impôt sur le Capital et le Revenu en Prusse*. Nerinx: *Du Regime legal de l'Enseignement primaire en Angleterre*. Moyersoen: *Du Regime legal de l'Enseignement primaire en Hollande*. Genart: *Les Syndicats industriels*. Melot: *Des Impôts sur les valeurs mobilières en France*. Physseuzides: *L'Arbitrage international et l'établissement d'un Empire grec*. De Kerchove d'Exaerde: *De l'Enseignement obligatoire en Allemagne*.
T. BOUQUILLON.

Dictionnaire pratique de Droit Comparé. Première partie: *Legislations Européennes*, par Hector Lambrechts, Docteur en droit, attaché au ministère de l'Industrie et du Travail de Belgique. Paris: Chevalier, 1896. 8°.

Though laws are largely determined by the peculiar historical development and the political and economical conditions of a people, there is nowadays a marked tendency towards uniformity of legislation among nations. Indeed, more than one attempt has been made to supplant national by international laws. This is visible in the new labor legislation. A common understanding of the basic principles of justice, the development of international relations and similarity of social conditions, have created this condition. It has made the study of comparative law a scientific and practical necessity. It is to meet this necessity that Dr. Lambrechts has undertaken the publication of this dictionary, which may be regarded as the complement of the great French collection of

foreign codes. In this work the laws of each European nation are exposed concisely and clearly. All is reduced to nineteen chapters, which reappear in the same order for each legislation considered. They are: birth (nationality, civil status); denizens; civil capacity (minors, absentees, interdicted, married women, civil death); corporations (juristic persons); marriage; divorce; testament; intestate estates; administration; action; organization and jurisdiction of courts; costs; appeals and manner of attacking judgments; attachments; execution of judgments; rules of evidence; fraud and defects of consent; mortgages and preferences; sources of law.

To guarantee exactness and an objective presentation of the various legislations to be treated, Dr. Lambrechts has associated with himself in the work a number of scholars and professors, each of whom will expound his own country's laws exclusively. The work is well under way, seven fascicles having appeared already.

In the first Dr. Lambrechts exhibits Belgian laws, and M. Auguste Liger, a lawyer of Luxemburg, those of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The second contains French legislation by M. Arsène Laurent, professor of the Catholic Faculty of Paris, and the laws of the Principality of Monaco by M. de Rolland, judge of the Supreme Court of Monaco; the third is taken up with English law by Mr. J. McMahon, a London attorney; the four, fifth, sixth, and seventh are given exclusively to Roumanian legislation, their author being M. Dimitri Alexandresco, professor in the faculty of law of Jassy, Roumania. It might be objected at first glance that there is lack of proportion here; 83 pages for France and 550 for Roumania. But it seems to us to be perfectly justified. Works on Roumanian legislation are less accessible than the others, hence the authors have done well in giving considerable space to it. Dr. Lambrechts is already known for his solid contributions to legal and sociological science. He is one of a group of brilliant young men attached to the various departments of the Belgian government (Morisseux, Van Overberg-Verhees, and others) who took such a prominent part in the congresses held in Brussels this year on the occasion of the international

exposition. The publication of this Dictionary shows that its author has a thorough knowledge of his time and its needs. The work is reliable, complete in plan, and exhaustive in treatment. In addition, it is well printed. We wish it every success.

Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.—Herbert B. Adams, Editor. Fifteenth series. 1897.

III-V. The Street Railway System of Philadelphia, by Frederic W. Speirs, Ph. D.

VI-VIII. The Economic History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, by Milton Reizenstein, Ph. D.

IX. South American Trade of Baltimore, by Frank R. Rutter, Ph. D.

Prof. Speirs, in his monograph, discusses a very timely topic. There is a growing interest manifested in the problem of what is the best form of municipal control of transportation systems in our great cities, "but while there has been extended general discussion, there have been few comprehensive studies of particular systems in this country, and the discussion has thus suffered from the lack of exact knowledge regarding local conditions in American cities." Mr. Speirs' study "is an attempt to make to the general discussion a contribution of fact regarding local transportation in one of the largest of our cities." The history of the local transportation system of Philadelphia begins in 1831, when Dr. James Boxall provided himself with a "superior new coach, harness, and good horses," and ran an hourly stage coach for the accommodation of the good people of Chestnut street. A ten-cent fare was charged, and the line made profits at this rate, and soon omnibus lines had covered the city fairly well. In 1857 three hundred and twenty-two omnibuses were in service on the various lines in the city. Then came the street railway system, and after two years of competition only fifty-six of the omnibuses were left in service. The first railways were built in the face of a very fierce opposition on the part of the press and the citizens, and it is interesting to note that one of the principal objections to their being chartered was that "the proposed railways were a mischievous speculation, aiming at monopoly of transportation along great lines of travel." It was generally charged that corrupt methods were resorted to

for the purpose of bringing the General Assembly to regard the proposed roads as great public benefactors, and when that body granted the first charter, the fact was announced to the citizens of Philadelphia by one of her papers under the heading "Sold and Delivered." Again, when in 1858 a protest was made against a grant by the City Council of valuable franchises on Chestnut and Walnut streets without any adequate returns to the city on the part of the railway corporations, the protest was unavailing, owing, it was charged, to the fact that "the railway company had opposed to the reasoning of the remonstrants the less admirable, but more effective, argument of stock distribution among the councilmen." Such was the inauguration of the system.

It was hoped that the danger of monopoly might be avoided, or at least minimized, by freely granting charters to numerous competing companies. But experience only showed the fallacy of this notion, which sound judgment might easily have pronounced visionary at the outset. "From 1857 to 1874, thirty-nine separate passenger railway companies were given charter right to operate street railways in the city of Philadelphia." The legislative grants of charters frequently prefaced the grant with the soothing preamble: "Whereas, the interests of the public demand that no corporation should have the monopoly of carrying passengers over the streets of a city between points which require the advantages of competition," etc. The separate companies very promptly took effective means to regulate the matter of competition. A "Board of Presidents" was organized in 1859 with ten companies represented in it, and as fast as new companies were chartered their presidents added themselves to the board. No pretense was made of independent action. The fare was raised from five to six, and later from six to seven cents, and this action was announced as the action of the Board of Presidents. Indignant protest arose from the citizens against this illegal attempt to stifle "that healthful competition which the General Assembly had intended to establish." Multiplying companies failed to secure competition. "The real result was the evil of a monopoly price without the advantage of the economy of operation which direct monopoly management would have made possible." In

1864 the process of consolidation began. In 1876 the various systems were in the hands of only seventeen companies. By 1880 the current had "set strong toward monopoly." By 1893 the whole passenger transportation system of Philadelphia was in the hands of four companies, and in 1895 the three more important of these were united under one management. Economy of management and operation is the justification assigned for this consolidation. If that aim has been attained it seems not to have inured to the benefit of the public. The abolishing of free transfers, which marked the commencement of the last consolidation, has been a virtual raising of fares from five to eight cents. The actual cost of the roads and equipment of the consolidated company is, approximately, \$34,000,000 ; capitalization, \$108,000,000. The difference between these two sums, \$74,000,000, represents the value of the franchise which the city has given to the roads. The interest and the importance attaching to the subject of Prof. Speirs' monograph has led us into this brief outline of its story. The monograph itself is the result of a very careful study, forms an interesting and most instructive contribution to an important subject, and invites the careful study of the intelligent citizen as well as of the student of economics. It is one of the best of the recent studies in the Johns Hopkins series.

Mr. Reizenstein's interesting study of the early history of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad gives a good idea of the methods and the enterprise that went to develop the resources of Maryland and the contiguous western and southwestern country in the second quarter of the present century. The history of the B. & O. has a particular interest in that it was the pioneer railroad of the country, and as it was projected upon a scale which was rather ambitious for its time, it had to meet and solve many problems of construction, of management, and of financiering, without the light of experience to guide it. Its beginnings were sufficiently modest, compared to what it has become after nearly three-quarters of a century of existence. But the difficulties that confronted those projectors of this railroad with horses for motive power were none

the less real and grave. From the historical point of view the subject is consequently of considerable interest. To the economist the most interesting chapter is the one which deals with the influence of the road upon the development of the industries of Maryland. Having cleared the way by this introductory study, it is to be hoped that Mr. Reizenstein will find time and facilities available for the further history of B. & O. since 1853. This is the period when its history has the greatest interest for students of economics, and for all who are interested in a study of the methods and tendencies of those huge industrial systems that have become so potent a factor in the progress of modern society.

Mr. Rutter presents, in his monograph on the South American trade of Baltimore, the results of a very careful study into the development and the fluctuations of Baltimore's trade with the other America, and the reasons underlying them. The period embraced in the study is from the close of the last century to the present time. Baltimore's South American trade was but an extension of its early West Indian trade, which in time had been an outgrowth of the coasting trade. The Napoleonic wars favored the trade of the United States with South America, and Baltimore possessed herself of a large share of that trade, owing to the spirit of enterprise of her citizens, to her famous "clippers"—particularly valuable as carriers at a time when ability to outsail a privateer was a most important factor of success in the carrying trade—to her proximity to the wheat fields of Virginia, and to her milling facilities. Mr. Rutter traces the development of Baltimore's trade, her growing ascendancy over Richmond, an early rival, and then the gradual ascendancy of New York as a competitor for the Brazilian coffee trade, and the final absorption by that port of nearly all other lines of imports from Brazil. The study of the various and shifting causes that have brought about the rise and the changes in the trade of Baltimore with South America form an interesting study of some of the influences that have been most potent in the economic history of our century.

Geschichte des deutschen Volkes während des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts. Erstes Buch. von Emil Michael. Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 1897, 8°, pp 334; \$2.00.

Fr. Michael is a disciple of Janssen, and in this first volume of his "History of the German People in the Thirteenth Century," we have a remarkable specimen of the manner and method of Janssen in dealing with great epochs of the popular life of Germany. An accurate computation of the original sources, a full collection of all the modern or ancient writings relative to the point, a conscientious personal reading and study of it all, and a narrative formed by the chaining together of what seems the best evidence, the wisest judgment—such are some of the more striking peculiarities of that method of writing history. It has been severely criticised as opening the door to an individual conception of the past, to bias and personalism under the cloak of learning and partiality. But it is certainly better than the subjective narration based upon second or third hand accounts, for it honestly reveals the names and whereabouts of its guarantors. It reveals, too, the comments, favorable and unfavorable, made in the course of time upon the original authorities, and it brings before the eye of the reader a certain quantity of the ancient texts that he would otherwise be unable to contemplate. All history, by the necessity of its nature, must take on something of the sentiments, the convictions, and the personality of the writer. We can only ask of him in the fine formula of Leo XIII. not to forget "*primam esse historiae legem ne quid falsi dicere audeat; deinde ne quid veri non audeat; ne qua suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo, ne qua simultatis.*" (Aug. 18, 1883.)

Right and wrong are not equal in the past any more than in the present. And the ultimate criterion of judgment must always be the suitably enlightened conscience of the individual, if he is to be more than a parrot or an automaton.

The main problem before the German people in the thirteenth century was the cultivation of the soil. As the result of three centuries of conflict with the Slav and the Hun, great stretches of land across the Elbe and the Oder had been added to the State,—Brandenburg, a part of Saxony, the Lausitz, Silesia, Pomerania, and the vast territory of the Teutonic Order between the Weichsel and the Memel; in a word, the whole

Eastern March of the Empire lay open as an overflow land for the too populous districts of Germany proper.

The Premonstratensians in the twelfth, and the Cistercians in the thirteenth century, divided the task of colonization with the brethren of the Teutonic Order. But, whereas, the former proceeded more peaceably, the latter, under men like Hermann von Salza, Hermann Balk and Heinrich von Meissen, frequently converted the heathen Prussians after the manner of the great Karl himself at Verden. Many interesting questions are treated by Fr. Michael in the first part of his interesting book,—questions concerning the administration and cultivation of the German soil, the social and legal position of the thirteenth century “Bauer,” his dress, amusements, dialect, and other characteristics.

In time there arose cities where once were only the village communities, feudal settlements, or ecclesiastical centres like the abbeys, monasteries and cathedrals. With the cities came a new source of wealth—money-capital. The thirteenth century writers of Germany do not spare their denunciations of the new power. Perhaps these lines from the famous “*Carmina Burana*” give as good an idea as any other writing of the popular feeling against the kings of the money market, then for the first time appearing as a continental power.

“Regnat avaritia,
Regnant et avari,
Mente quivis anxia
Nititur ditari,
Cum sit summa gloria
Censu gloriari.

Multum habet oneris
Do, das, dedi, dare:
Verbum hoc prae ceteris
Norunt ignorare
Divites quos poteris
Mali comparare.

“Omnes Iura laedunt
Et in rerum numeris
Numeros excedunt.”

By means of the corporations and guilds the German workmen of the Middle Ages counteracted the power of the money-market, and some of the most valuable pages of this book are those devoted to the study of the political, military, social, and religious conditions of the countless corporations of artisans and guilds of merchants that filled the Germany of the thirteenth century. The highest expression of this industrial and mercantile life is the Hanseatic League, a great commercial union or “bund” of some ninety cities, with its adminis-

trative seat at Wisby, in the little island of Gotland, off the coast of Sweden, whence trade relations were at an early date established with all the lands bathed by the waters of the Baltic. An old German song says :

“ Lubeck ein Kaufhaus,
 Koeln ein Weinhaus,
 Braunschweig ein Zeughaus,
 Danzig ein Kornhaus,
 Hamburg ein Brauhaus,
 Magdeburg ein Backhaus,
 Rostock ein Malzhaus,
 Lueneburg ein Salzhaus,
 Stettin ein Fischhaus,
 Halberstadt ein Frauenhaus,
 Riga ein Hanf-und Butterhaus,
 Reval ein Wachs und Flachshaus,
 Krakau ein Kupferhaus,
 Wisby ein Pech und Theerhaus.”

The Hansa was a creation of commercial genius, and by it the German people spread their trade to England, France, the Northern nations, even to Russia, and entered into the larger world that was opening up before the peoples of the European mainland.

In other chapters Fr. Michael develops the peculiar German institution of the “Ritterthum,” the German cavalier or noble, the natural expression of German feudalism, and as such well worthy of study. The corresponding pattern in France has been admirably painted by Léon Gauthier in “La Chevalerie.”

Not all the “Ritters” were pure and upright knights, “moral, truthful, and pleasing to God.” In spite of law and tradition, a multitude of them degenerated into the “robber barons” of the Middle Ages, against whom the Church established the “Peace of God,” the cities formed their alliances, and the emperor declared the “General Peace.” But it was of little avail. They pillaged cloisters and churches, robbed the traveller and the merchant, exercised the “Faustrecht” or right of individual warfare, and maintained themselves for a long time against all comers.

The thirteenth century saw the greatest development of the imperial system in Germany—the successful union in Frederick

the Second of the "German Kingdom" with the Crown of Sicily, under the imperial diadem. But close on that unfortunate forcing of the empire's natural development followed retribution, in the overthrow and ruin of the house of Hohenstaufen by the popes of the thirteenth century, and the profound humiliation of the imperial dignity that never more regained its ancient prestige.

Mediæval Germany was an hereditary kingdom within certain limits. And the king was within a certain time chosen (electus) as emperor, and bound to proceed to Rome to be anointed and crowned as Imperator Romanorum. Originally all the German princes had a share in the election of the emperor. But by some mysterious process, in the thirteenth century, it becomes the exclusive privilege of seven among them, three ecclesiastical and four temporal lords, to elect the German king. At the same time it appears that the powers of these great vassals are much enlarged, and that for the future the emperor will be practically all-powerful only in his hereditary domains. It is the beginning of a new epoch, the first dawn of the "Landeshoheit," the local or partial sovereignties of Central Europe, each in itself a more or less perfect state or autocracy, with only the loosest relationship in practice to the empire, henceforth half submerged in the kingdom of Bohemia or the Austrian March.

The concluding chapter of this history treats of the ancient German law, as it was applied and operative in the thirteenth century, especially as it is found in the "Sachsenspiegel" and other Germanic law books of the time. The observations of Fr. Michael on the influence of the Roman law in Germany are characterized by moderation. The work is prefaced by a very lengthy bibliography, in which the extensive pertinent literature of the subject is laid before the reader, and a good index rerum is added, without which such books cause vexation of spirit to the student or teacher.

La Prédication, Grand Maitres et Grandes Lois, par le R. P. G. Longhaye, S. J., 2e édition. Paris: Victor Retaux, 1897; 8°, pp. 553.

The prophets, Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Apostles, in particular St. Paul, then St. John Chrysostom, St. August-

tine, Bossuet, and Bourdaloue are counted by Father Longhaye as the great masters of the art of preaching. Under the rubric of the "Great Laws of Preaching," he treats of the object of the preacher's discourse,—its limitations and the sources of its treatment, notably the Scriptures; also of the essential parts of the discourse, the doctrine, morality, the apologetic purpose; finally of the object *par excellence* of the discourse, viz., Our Lord Jesus Christ. He is the end and scope of all preaching, and His life,—mortal, glorious, eucharistic,—is the proper theme of every preacher. He is the synthesis of religion, and by preaching Him the minister of God is sure of never-ending novelty of view and expression. The knowledge of his auditory is necessary to the preacher, hence our author treats the sermon as a dialogue with the auditor, in which the preacher must foresee the natural questions and objections that come back from the listener, whether he be the typical Christian of all ages or the Christian of this time and place; hence, too, a knowledge of the actualities of life is needed by the preacher, and the question arises about the description of popular life and manners,—to what extent it is permissible in the preacher. The latter must work both on the mind and on the heart, on the imagination and will of the listener. Therefore he must be popular in the best sense, which means a certain amplitude, simplicity, brevity, and good order. Some originality is not out of place, and if the preacher be gifted with the poetic instinct, its exercise is not reprehensible. But, above all, he stands in need of penetrating unction, a certain melting sweetness that floods the soul of the listener and predisposes him to accept the teaching of his spiritual guide.

Father Longhaye speaks with sympathy and sense of the men of his own time, and of the duty incumbent on the preacher to know them, their peculiar temptations, and mental conditions, and to adapt himself thereto with prudence and zeal. The motives of conversion by which the preacher may attain his end are faith, the fear of God, hope, charity, penance, and zeal. In an epilogue the writer treats of the formation of the preacher, the man of God, of the care to be bestowed upon his mind, heart, and character; of the imme-

diate preparation, and of the style and delivery which befit the Word of God. These conferences on preaching contain an excellent and sure doctrine, and they are written in a very pleasing manner, with considerable *verve*. They cannot but do good to the youthful teacher in the household of the faithful, for they are based on long experience and offer in a small space the results of much reading and observation.

Historiographia Ecclesiastica quam historiae seriam solidamque operam navantibus accommodavit Guilielmus Stang, S. Theologiae doctor ejusque in Coll. Americano Lovanii professor. Lovanii, Polleunis et Ceuterick, 1897. 8°, pp. 267.

This little manual treats in its opening pages of the sources of Church history, of some principles of criticism as applied to that science, and of the chief helps for the study of ecclesiastical historiography. The bulk of the book is devoted to an account of some five hundred writers on Church history. These brief biographical notices are so drawn up as to give the seminary student some essentials of that historico-literary culture needed in order to approach properly the study of Church history. Possible improvements strike the reader at the first glance. But there is so little fresh material of this kind accessible to seminaries that we have only words of praise for the undertaking. In the vast domain of patrology and Church history guides are everywhere needed, and we welcome this modest and unassuming, but useful addition to their number. Without vouching for individual paragraphs or judgments, it may be said that the doctrine of the book is reliable, the fruit of solid and varied reading, and disposed with much judiciousness. We recommend the work to the studious youth of our seminaries.

add to
James Clarence Mangan, with a Study by Louise Imogene Guiney. London, 1897; 8°. John Lane.

Miss Guiney is particularly fitted for the very delicate task of choosing from the verses of James Clarence Mangan the best of his poems; she is a poet,—so much of a poet that one grows impatient of her prose,—and only a poet can feel the highest charm of Mangan. Those who remember Miss Guiney's appreciation of Crashaw and other of the minor poets

know that they are in sure hands when Miss Guiney undertakes to study a bard. Mangan, like Spenser and Shelley and Keats, is a poet of the poets. Compare him by the standard of critical judgment used for Dryden or Pope, and he is scarcely a poet. But, if we judge him by the measure of Poe, of Heine, of Keats,—the standard by which we measure the lyrics of Goethe and Tennyson,—he is a poet of the supremest kind. The lyrics of Moore are less Celtic than the poems of Mangan. Moore's lyrics are, above all, obvious; he wrote with his eye on an English audience; having caught the trick and the auditors, he could go on tinkling forever. But the sweetness, the pathetic gloom, the aspiration,—like the fragrance of violets crushed in the dark,—is not of his immortal melodies. The genius of Moore and Mangan is composed of opposite qualities; they both produced hundreds of metred lines; but, while Moore's are as equal and polished as those of Gray, Mangan's are painfully unequal, and hence he needs the help of a collector of insight and culture.

"Apollo," says Miss Guiney in her Study, "has a class of might-have-beens whom he loves; poets bred in melancholy places, under disabilities, with thwarted growth and thinned voices; poets compounded of everything magical and fair, like an elixir which is the outcome of knowledge and patience, and which wants in the end, as common water would, the essence of immortality. The making of a name is too often like the making of a fortune; the more scrupulous contestants are

"Delicate spirits, pushed away
In the hot press of the noon-day."

Mangan is no subject for biography; he gave out his best; he was always gentle and humble; he harmed no other than himself,—and Miss Guiney's study is an example of tenderness and sympathy. It is regrettable that Poe was not earlier studied by a poet and gentlewoman. Miss Guiney—page 101 of "A Study,"—says of the cadences of Mangan and Poe: "Let us have a care lest we are letting Poe reign in Mangan's kingdom. The unmistakable mark of Poe's maturer poetry, the employment of sonorous successive lines which cunningly fall short of exact duplication, belong also to Mangan in the same

degree." "It happens," she adds, "that the man over in Dublin has the advantage of priority." "The Raven" was published in 1845. Mangan, from 1839 to 1840 bestowed on almost everything he wrote the curious involved diction in question. Miss Guiney marks specially "The Winnegar Winehouse" and "The Kiosk of Morttandzar-Billah." Miss Guiney has, in this volume, earned the gratitude of every lover of the poetic essence clothed in musical and enduring form.

Samuel Sewall and the World He Lived In. By Rev. N. H. Chamberlain. Boston DeWolfe, Fiske & Co., 1897. 8°, pp. 319.

Samuel Sewall, business man, counsellor, judge, and Puritan, began his diary December 3, 1693, and ended it October 13, 1729, thus covering in it more than fifty-five years of old New England life, when that life was putting itself into form; and although there is a gap from July, 1677, to March, 1684-5, it has been partially filled by the editors of the diary from the diary of Sewall's father-in-law, John Hull, so that the diary as it now stands is substantially continuous. Its value as an historical source is immense when we consider the great opportunities at the command of its author for observing the life of his age. As a man of social position, as a traveller officially connected with government here and abroad, as a judge brought into contact with questions of land tenure, witchcraft, etc., few men of his age could have been as well equipped with information concerning it, and his opinions on the characteristics of his age are of corresponding value. The subjects treated are intensely inviting, such as, for instance, town and country life up to 1700, the Indians and negroes, Salem witchcraft, Puritan home life, Puritan literature, Sewall and the Church of England, Puritan marriages, etc. Such a book as this ought to be read by all, when, in the words of the author, we consider that the residuum of Puritanism "is in this nation's life infallibly, exactly"; and no one can hope to fully understand this country without mastering at the same time the early history of the Puritans, whether he admire them or otherwise. The only defect we notice in the book before us is the scarcity of extracts from the diary. This, to some extent, lessens its objective value, as the expression of the thought

of Sewall himself. The modern editor is a little too prominent. We should prefer to have the diary itself before us.

Brother Azarias. The life-story of an American Monk, by Rev. John Talbot Smith, LL. D. New York: William H. Young & Co., 1897. 8vo., pp. 280.

The life of a scholar is always a valuable addition to the history of any age or nation. The scholars resume in themselves certain tendencies and movements that escape the notice of the ordinary observer, but are none the less characteristic of popular life and thought at any given period. The casual traveller from Europe would be likely to say, after some acquaintance with our American clergy, that it was zealous and energetic beyond belief; that it was capable of extraordinary labor in the upbuilding of the material edifice of the Church; that it had turned architect, engineer, mason and carpenter, in order to dot the land with ten thousand edifices that recall in their own way the great church-building fever of the thirteenth century; that it was frank, manly, and virtuous to a degree. But he would scarcely praise it for deep learning, or even for a very ardent desire for learning. And, if he were kindly disposed and philosophical, he would say that the clergy is like the nation—young, ardent, and full of possibilities, but still *à la remorque* of the great universities and academies of the Old World, still pupil to the marvelous teachers of old Dame Europa's school.

This observer would be more gravely in error than he would like to admit. Within twenty years the clergy of the United States have made a great step forward in the path of intellectual culture, and towards that varied and elegant erudition that graces so many of its brethren in the older lands of ecclesiastical history. Brother Azarias is a type and a model of this new race; and the very admiration that attended him in life, the sympathy that this gentle scholar everywhere called forth, the hopes that were built upon him by so many, and the sorrow that his early death evoked, are so many proofs that the material of which he was made is abundant. He was an American-born ecclesiastic, intensely national and patriotic; but his was also an intensely Catholic nature, and he reached before his death an enviable position in the world of letters.

His intellectual curiosity and his gifts of mind were not, however, used for pure dilettanteism. His studies were always of an apologetic nature, destined to serve the immediate interests of the Catholic Church in his own country. Whether he labored at the first sources of English literature, or on the development of the higher academical teaching, or at other erudite and difficult problems, there was always visible in him the earnest manner of the teacher and the defender of the purest Catholic traditions in life and thought. Dr. Smith rightly calls him a monk. *Cucullus non facit monachum.* And Brother Azarias had the true spirit of unselfishness, of labor, of other-worldliness that commended the monks of old to a hard, rough, and warlike time. Under the plain gown of a son of De la Salle he bore the heart of a Mabillon, a heart deeply interested in all the historical past of the Church, but still more interested in transfusing into the modern mind the quintessence of that spiritual culture that the Middle Ages possessed in so high a degree.

This volume is written in a pleasing style, and with the evident purpose of encouraging our American youth to imitate the spirit and the career of Brother Azarias. May it have a wide circulation and raise in many hearts the resolution to cling resolutely to the highest ideals, and to follow where they lead, despite the manifold temptations to supineness and mediocrity that beset the path of the young!

Elementa Philosophiae Scholasticae—Pars Prior, pp. 192, N. Y. C. Protectory, 1897.

This little manual, from a "Professor in Manhattan College," is a concise exposition of the principles of Scholastic Philosophy. In a series of propositions it lays down the main points in logic and metaphysics. As its author expressly disavows polemics, the relations between Scholasticism and modern thought are not touched upon. The style is clear and will be appreciated by college students who have learned to think in Latin.

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
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
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- A Little Book of Wisdom, being Great Thoughts of Many Wise Men and Women, collected by Lelia Hardin Bugg. St. Louis: Herder, 1897; 16°, pp. 239.
- The Worst Boy in the School, by Michael J. A. McCaffery, LL. D. New York: G. W. Dillingham & Co., 1897; 8°, pp. 59.
- Am I of the Chosen? the same being a series of conferences spoken by the Rev. Henry Aloysius Barry to the nuns and the public in the Carmelite chapel, in the city of Boston. Angel Guardian Press, 1897.
- Echoes from Bethlehem, a Christmas Miracle, by Rev. Francis J. Finn, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1897; 8°, pp. 24.
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- History of the Catholic Religion in the Sandwich Islands (1840), etc. Reprint. San Francisco, 1897; 8°, pp. 72.
- Catholic Education and American Institutions, by Rev. John F. Mullany, LL. D. Syracuse, 1897; 16°, pp. 39.
- Canon Schmid's New Tales of Good Fortune, adapted by Rev. Thomas Jefferson Jenkins. Illustrated. Chicago: D. H. McBride & Co., 1897; 16°, pp. 189.
- Life of John Nepomucene Neumann, Bishop of Philadelphia, by Very Rev. F. Maguire, C. SS. R. St. Louis: Herder, 1897; 8°, pp. 99.
- Institutiones Juris Ecclesiastici, tum publici tum privati, ad usum eminariorum et in gratiam sclericorum qui Romam se conferunt ad gradus academicos consequendos exaratae, auctore P. Ch. Makée. Paris: Roger et Chernoviz, 1896; 2 vols., 8°, pp. 500, 505.
- Commentarium in Facultates Apostolicas, Episcopis necnon Vicariis et Praefectis Apostolicis per modum Formularum concedi solitas, ad usum venerabilis cleri, imprimis Americani, concinnatum ab Antonio Konings, C. SS. R. Editio quarta, recognita, in pluribus emendata et aucta, curante Joseph Putzer, C. SS. R. Benziger Bros.: New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago, 1897; 8°, pp. 466.

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S. J. professoris Theologiae Moralis et Juris Canonici,
Tournai, Desclée, Lefebore et Cie., 8°, pp. 60.

Papa sit Rex Romae! Haec est summa solutio quaestionis
socialis praesentis. Scripsit F. X. Godts. C. SS. R.
Tournai, Desclée. De Brouwer et Cie; 8°, pp. 424.

Geschichte der Christlichen Kunst, von Franz Xaver Kraus.
Zweiter Band. Die Kunst des Mittelalters, der Renais-
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